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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the accountability o f public international 
financial institutions to their constituencies at global and local geographic scales. It 
investigates the compliance o f the World Bank and the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) with their own environmental and social policies as they relate to 
biodiversity protection.
While the World Bank and the GEF pursue a global environmental agenda, 
their environmental and social policies commit the institutions to building bridges 
between the global and the local levels by requiring the participation o f locally 
affected communities in decision-making. The study investigates the compliance 
with the policies in a specific geographic, political and economic space. Cameroon 
was chosen because both institutions consider the country’s biodiversity to be o f 
global significance and are financing operations which have indirect and direct 
impacts on its biodiversity. The operations investigated include World Bank 
macro-economic policy advice and traditional investments in infrastructure 
projects as well as a GEF project specifically designed to protect biodiversity.
The central finding of this research is that the institutions comply only 
partially and in an uneven manner with their own mandatory policy guidelines.
In order to mitigate the risk o f studying the institutions’ operations in only 
one country and to ascertain possible systemic patterns o f institutional behaviour, 
the results o f the case studies are contrasted with the institutions internal evaluation 
reports covering their overall portfolios.
A political ecology approach to international financial institutions is used to 
examine the political factors behind the emergence o f the institutions’ biodiversity 
agenda and the implementation o f their operational policies. Analytical tools from 
both political science and the areas o f  sociology and economics concerned with 
theory o f organization are employed to further the understanding o f the functioning 
o f the global institutions.
Finally, the thesis seeks to contribute to defining the characteristics o f 
global institutions which can mediate between the global and local levels by 
creating spaces o f negotiation in which a plurality o f views are taken into account.
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CHAPTER 1
THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK: ISSUES, INSTITUTIONS AND THEORIES
1.1 Introduction
This thesis investigates how multilateral financial institutions address the 
conservation o f biodiversity. It will examine the policies of the World Bank, the 
world’s pre-eminent development institution, and the role o f Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), a financial mechanism managed jointly by the World Bank, the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Enviromnent 
Program (UNEP). The GEF was created specifically to address biodiversity loss and 
other environmental problems considered to be o f global significance. Since policies 
may tell us how institutions think, but not necessarily how they act, the core research 
o f this thesis examines the compliance o f the international institutions with their own 
social and environmental policies as they relate to biodiversity conservation. These 
policies create frames of reference and offer accountability mechanisms for global 
institutions whose operations have local level impacts.
While there are numerous publications about the World Bank’s and GEF’s 
policies and stated intentions to address environmental and social issues in their 
funding operations, the institutions themselves admit that they are doing a poor job in 
monitoring the actual adherence to their policies in concrete development projects 
(World Bank 1996a, GEF 1994a). In addition, there are few independent studies 
which investigate the institutions’ compliance with their own environmental and 
social policies in the design and implementation o f their operations (Fox & Brown 
1998). This study examines specific activities o f the institutions in light o f their 
existing policies. It chooses Cameroon as a specific geographic, political and 
economic space to examine the degree to which the institutions comply with their 
own policy mandates. Both the World Bank and the GEF consider Cameroon's 
biodiversity to be o f global importance and are financing programmes in the country 
which have direct and indirect impacts on biodiversity. This thesis examines three 
distinct types o f programme supported by the institutions ranging from the promotion 
o f policy refonns at the macro level to individual projects. The findings from the
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programme-level research will then be contrasted with internal World Bank and GEF 
evaluation reports about the aggregate effectiveness o f their operations in order to 
establish if  the case study findings form part of more systemic patterns o f internal 
institutional dynamics.
Global plans to protect biodiversity and local realities in biodiversity rich 
regions, in particular in developing countries, may often be at odds with each other. It 
is in the context of global-local intersections, that geographer David Harvey states 
that political power structures must be created which are able to "arbitrate and 
translate" between geographic scales ranging from the global to the local (Harvey 
1996: 204). The question o f what kind o f characteristics such political power 
structures should have is ever more pertinent in a world where globalization is leading 
to an unprecedented degree o f multiple linkages between global and local scales.
The goal o f this thesis is to contribute to an answer to this question by 
examining existing international institutions. The study chose to examine their 
discourse and compliance with social and environmental policies related to 
biodiversity because the question o f biodiversity represents a privileged area for the 
observation o f the interplay between global and local objectives.
Ultimately, the study's focus on the degree o f compliance o f the institutions 
with their own policies is directed at the question o f institutional accountability. 
Accountability is a difficult concept to operationalize but by focusing on a broadly 
accepted indicator, such as policy compliance, which has been accepted by the 
institutions themselves, this thesis hopes to provide insights into the conditions that 
are necessary if  the institutions are to be rendered more accountable to their 
constituencies at different geographic scales ranging from international donors to 
intended local beneficiaries.
It may be noted that national governments in the countries where World Bank 
and GEF programmes are being implemented share much o f the responsibility for 
successful implementation o f World Bank/GEF policies. Indeed, the institutions 
themselves often blame national governments for their problem projects. However, 
this thesis takes the view that since decision-making power on channeling large 
amounts o f funds rests with the institutions, they also bear the ultimate responsibility 
for ensuring that these funds are used for the intended purposes and according to
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established policies. Therefore the focus o f this study is the World Bank and the GEF, 
representing global power structures whose activities are funded through international 
public financing. The role o f national governments and the political dynamics at the 
regional and local level as they affect biodiversity are subjects that require in-depth 
study in a broader framework.
1,2 Cutting a Slice out of a Vast Multidisciplinary Pie
Biodiversity protection, which was elevated to the top o f the World Bank's 
enviromnental agenda in the early 1990s and which lies at the core o f the GEF, is an 
area where global and local processes meet. Often local realities o f biodiversity, as 
experienced by hundreds o f millions o f  rural and indigenous peoples in mostly 
Southern countries, may not mesh easily with plans originating in Northern countries 
to protect biodiversity in the South.
Biodiversity has evolved into a complex area of study, encompassing a variety 
o f seemingly distant disciplines. The natural science community and in particular 
conservation biology continue to struggle with scientific uncertainties about the 
degree o f the loss o f biodiversity, the impacts o f potential climate change on 
biodiversity and other questions. These can range from the role o f genetic diversity, 
which is often highlighted in the context of agriculture and food security, to the 
preservation o f soils and water as well as the maintenance o f the gaseous composition 
o f atmosphere. Since the ecological functions o f biodiversity cover the entire 
spectrum o f life-support systems, the area to be covered by the natural sciences is vast 
indeed.
Why has the World Bank declared biodiversity protection to be central to its 
mission o f promoting sustainable development and why is biodiversity a key priority 
for GEF activities? A similar question would be to ask how biodiversity conservation 
became a top item on the agenda o f governments, which led to the signing o f the 
United Nations Convention on Biodiversity at the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, also known as the Rio Earth Summit. While groups 
o f international experts supported by the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) played a 
leading role in drafting the Convention on Biological Diversity, governments gave it
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its final shape. They rejected the notion that biodiversity be considered the "common 
heritage" o f humankind since most components o f biological diversity are under 
national jurisdiction. Instead they placed emphasis on "sovereign rights" over 
biological resources while recognizing that the conservation o f biodiversity is a 
"common concern" o f humankind (Glowka et al. 1994). Political science is being 
called upon to illuminate the uneasy balance o f  multiple layers o f interests in 
biodiversity and to explain how the preoccupation with biodiversity loss by relatively 
small circles o f people in Northern countries became a widely popular subject able to 
capture the attention o f national governments and subsequently, o f  global institutions.
Furthermore, a variety o f disciplines including sociology, anthropology and 
economics, can help shed light on the complex social, economic, political and cultural 
realities o f biodiversity-rich areas. Competing interests at the local level may draw 
different benefits from biodiversity. In many cases the distinction between dominant 
groups in a society and local communities is that the latter often have a weak political 
power base and little influence in decision-making processes affecting the land, 
forests and water resources on which their livelihoods depend in a direct fashion. A 
kaleidoscopic range o f natural and social science disciplines can contribute to 
understanding the linkages between biodiversity and human activities at different 
geographic scales ranging from its local uses by agricultural, pastoral and fishing 
communities to international trade, consumption and concerns about conservation in 
far away places.
The objective o f this thesis is to examine a very small and circumscribed, yet 
influential, piece o f this puzzle. Using a variety o f analytical tools, it focuses on 
political power structures as represented by the international financial institutions and 
their compliance with their own policy mandates as they relate to biodiversity 
conservation. Political ecology thinking with its emphasis on the importance of power 
relations provides the overall theoretical framework o f the research being undertaken.
1.3 Political Ecology Thinking
Political ecology is based on the recognition that environmental problems have 
ecological as well as political-economic dimensions. According to Blaikie, political 
ecology thinking represents a shift from a structural to an inter-actionist way o f
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understanding the environment and society (Blaikie 1995b). Political ecology 
emphasizes that the scientific understanding o f the environment is no longer accepted 
uncritically and advocates an understanding o f the environment as a social construct. 
This view does not represent a post-modernist denial o f the objective existence of the 
environment and the real physical changes that are taking place in it. It does however, 
as Blaikie suggests, represent a way o f opening our vistas to a broader view o f 
environment and society (Blaikie 1995b).
The core research of this thesis addresses the question o f  the compliance o f the 
World Bank and the Global Environment Facility with their own biodiversity-related 
policy mandates. The question fits well into an as yet underexplored area o f political 
ecology, which occupies itself with the interface o f international financial institutions 
and the enviromnent.
The theme o f a dialectical relationship between the environment and society is 
also central to geographer David Harvey. Harvey refers to the historical geography o f 
socio-ecological change that sheds light on the ways in which socio-political and 
ecological projects intertwine and at some point become indistinguishable from each 
other (Harvey 1996 :182-183). Harvey adds:
“The circulation o f money not only makes the 
environment go round, but it simultaneously makes 
social relations in such a way as to bring back the 
golden rule that environmental transformations are 
always transformations o f social relations” (Harvey 
1998:335).
In David Harvey's interpretation o f historical geography, all ecological 
projects are simultaneously political-economic projects and vice versa (Harvey 1996:
182). This assumption underlies the broad question about the characteristics o f 
political power structures which are able to 'arbitrate and translate' between different 
geographic scales ranging from the global to the local.
The focus o f this study is the political power structures represented by the 
multilateral financial institutions. The motivation behind choosing these global actors 
and not others is reflected in a statement by Gasper: "If one believes, however, that the 
ideas, norms, blueprints and personnel determining 'development' come in large part 
from  the North, notably from  a fe w  donor organizations, ...then one must indeed study
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those organizations as closely as possible" (Gasper 1996a: 165). The importance o f 
examining international financial institutions is also emphasized by Blaikie who 
views development agents as being part o f the solution and possibly also a part o f the 
problem (Blaikie 1995b:205). The World Bank's objective o f taking on the task of 
managing the global environment (World Bank 1997d) lends added weight to 
examining its programme practice.
In the area o f biodiversity, the international financial institutions are engaged 
in "arbitrating and translating" between global and local geographic scales. While the 
policy frameworks are set and the funding is raised at the global level, the impacts of 
the programmes and funding flows are at the local level in developing countries and 
in countries in transition, the former Eastern Bloc. While the World Bank and GEF 
pursue a global environmental agenda, their environmental and social policies, which 
have a bearing on biodiversity, build bridges to the local level by requiring the 
participation of local communities in decision-making regarding the design and 
implementation o f projects. The Cameroon case studies examine the institutions’ 
compliance with their biodiversity-related policies in specific local development 
programmes.
1.4 The Institutions’ Policy Mandates
1.4.1 The World Bank
Claims to the importance o f biodiversity conservation rest upon a broad 
spectrum o f ethical, moral, economic and multi-level arguments (Blaikie 1995). Many 
aspects o f this broad spectrum are reflected both in World Bank and GEF policy 
discourse, as well as in specific World Bank operational directives which provide 
mandatory guidance for World Bank staff in the preparation and implementation of 
projects.
In recent years, the World Bank has refined its mission from one o f promoting 
economic growth to promoting sustainable development, in which it considers 
biodiversity to be o f key-importance (World Bank 1992). In the institution's 
discourse, its twin goals o f poverty alleviation and human development depend on 
environmental sustainability and biodiversity conservation (World Bank 1995a). The 
key-role accorded to biodiversity leads the World Bank to acknowledge that specific
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targeted investments in biodiversity conservation per se {e.g. financing o f  a nature 
reserve) only have very limited impacts as long as biodiversity concerns do not figure 
prominently in overall decision-making. As a result, its discourse and policies commit 
the institution to incorporating biodiversity concerns in all o f its activities, ranging 
from its policy dialogue with governments and the promotion o f policy reforms at the 
macro-economic level to the design and implementation o f individual development 
projects. Many o f the latter are in biodiversity-sensitive sectors such as agriculture 
and forestry, infrastructure, mining and energy.
In addition, World Bank statements on sustainable development are permeated 
by a discourse emphasizing the need for highly participatory approaches and the 
participation o f local people in decision-making that directly affects their lives (World 
Bank 1989c). In the area o f biodiversity conservation in particular, World Bank 
discourse establishes the link between improved local livelihoods and the chances for 
biodiversity conservation and emphasizes the need for active participation o f local 
communities and non-govemmental-organizations at the project level (World Bank 
1995a). This discourse appears to be at odds with the World Bank's and the GEF's 
state-centered activities. Both institutions work through national governments many 
o f which have little interest in the participation o f marginalized and disempowered 
people who often live in remote biodiversity-rich areas.
Reflecting much o f the discourse, the World Bank has developed over the past 
decade a series o f specific environmental and social policies and operational 
directives to provide guidance to its staff and ensure quality and consistency 
throughout its investment portfolio.
Amongst the World Bank's mandatory operational policies and directives 
which have a direct bearing on biodiversity conservation, are the Bank's policies on 
environmental assessments (OD 4.01), on natural habitats (OD 4.04), on forestry (OP 
4.36) and on indigenous peoples (OD 4.20). Many o f these policies require the 
infonned participation o f project-affected people and therefore fit into what Blaikie 
has called the "neo-populist" approach to biodiversity conservation as distinct from 
the "classic approach" with its roots in colonial administration and the use o f state 
power as its main tool (Blaikie 1995a).
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1.4.2 The Global Environment Facility
The GEF was established in 1991 as the world’s primary financial entity to 
provide funding for projects to protect the global environment in four focal areas: 
climate change; biodiversity conservation; the protection o f the ozone layer; and the 
protection o f international waters. The GEF was established at the initiative o f 
Northern governments and its choice o f  focal areas reflects the perceptions o f 
Northern constituencies o f what the most urgent global environmental problems are. 
The GEF was further strengthened in 1992 when it was adopted as the interim 
financial mechanism by the United Nations Conventions on Biodiversity (CBD) and 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) to help developing countries 
meet their obligations under the Conventions. The CBD became a legally binding 
international agreement in December 1993 when, as stipulated by article 36 o f the 
CBD, thirty o f the states which are signatories to the Convention had passed national 
legislation to ratify it. The preamble o f the CBD recognizes that the conservation o f 
biodiversity is a common concern to humankind and sets three goals that place the 
CBD squarely in the field o f environment and development:
(1) The conservation o f biodiversity;
(2) The sustainable use o f its components;
(3) The fair and equitable sharing o f the benefits arising out o f genetic
resources (CBD, Art. 1).
The CBD also establishes that the GEF "function under the authority and  
guidance of, and be accountable to, the Conference o f  the Parties o f  the Convention" 
(CBD, Art. 21). This stipulation puts the GEF on an unclear legal footing as to which 
guidelines ultimately apply to its projects because the GEF is not an independent 
entity but a tri-partite arrangement co-managed by the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Environment Programme in 
which the World Bank exercises a dominant role as administrator o f  the GEF trust 
fund and as implementing agency for all GEF investment projects. Functioning under 
the authority o f  a United Nations-type body is not reconcilable with the World Bank's 
charter which establishes that voting shares are proportional to the shareholders' 
financial contribution (IBRD, Articles o f Agreement 1989). The unsolved dilemma 
consists o f a United Nations agreement, based on the principle o f one country/ one 
vote, attempting to have under its authority, a financial mechanism largely identified
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with a Bretton Woods institution, in which the world's wealthiest ten countries have a 
majority o f the vote. So far, the potential conflict has not come to the fore as the 
Conference o f the Parties o f the CBD has limited itself to providing guidance to the 
GEF in only the most general terms. As a result, the fact that decision-making 
procedures and internal policies o f World Bank apply to all GEF investment projects 
has not been subject to in-depth questioning.
The World Bank itself emphasizes that it administers GEF-funds with the 
same care used for its own funds. Therefore, in addition to the more general guidance 
from the Convention on Biodiversity, World Bank policies and directives apply to all 
GEF investment projects (Shihata 1994).
1.5 The Cameroon Case Studies
The detailed nature o f the World Bank's environmental and social policies, the 
number o f World Bank staff working in the environmental area and the institution's 
unmatched institutional and financial resources represent a formidable potential for 
biodiversity conservation. It is generally accepted that the World Bank's policy 
framework is very advanced in comparison with other multilateral and bilateral 
development agencies, many o f whom have weaker or no guidelines on social and 
environmental safeguards in their operations (Haas & Haas 1995). For example, the 
World Bank was the first public development institution to develop guidelines on 
involuntary resettlement and on indigenous peoples.
The World Bank and GEF policies which require a more participatory 
approach and greater attention to local geographies are a reflection o f  what Crush has 
described as a "pronounced undertow" o f alternative discursive strategies within 
development discourse (Crush 1995:20). Some of the environmental reform policies 
include significant provisions for transparency and participation in World Bank and 
GEF projects, which, if  implemented, may in many cases undermine what Bryant has 
described as elite interests, i.e. the perpetuation o f the economic and social status quo 
(Bryant: 1997b).
Crush suggests that development discourse is not hermetically sealed and 
impervious to reformulation when challenged (Crush 1995). The changes in 
environmental discourse appear to indicate that the institutions are modifying their
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view about how the world works. Are we witnessing a paradigm shift away from the 
mechanistic assumptions o f the neo-classical economics to a new thinking which 
embraces the complexities o f biological interdependencies and social justice? Or, as 
Piers Blaikie puts it, could it be that what appears to be a major paradigm shift at an 
important international organization “ ...m ay hardly create a shudder to a lumberjack 
with chain saw in hand somewhere in the African tropical forest” (Blaikie 1995a:4)? 
Have the changes in the institutions1 discourse and policies affected concrete projects 
and funding flows?
Answers to these questions require the examination o f concrete development 
practices in a specific geographic area. A central reason for the choice o f Cameroon is 
that the institutions themselves consider the protection of natural forest and savanna 
ecosystems in Cameroon to be o f high international importance (World Bank-GEF 
1995d). Both the World Bank and the GEF have accorded biodiversity protection in 
Cameroon a high priority. Large remaining tracts o f relatively undisturbed lowland 
humid tropical forest, the broad range o f ecological habitats and biogeographical 
affinities with both western and central Africa explain Cameroon's wealth in 
biological diversity (Alpert 1993). In addition to its large tropical rainforest estate, the 
country's savannas and especially its ecotones, the transitional areas between savanna 
and rainforest, are attracting the attention not only o f scientists but also o f a whole 
range o f international donors (Sunderland et al. 1997, Smith et al. 1997).
Apart from recognizing the importance of Cameroon's biodiversity as being 
globally significant, the World Bank is investing in policy reforms and infrastructure 
development in Cameroon which have both direct and indirect impacts on the 
country’s biodiversity. The GEF, on the other hand, is financing a project designed to 
directly promote the conservation o f  biodiversity in several specific regions o f the 
country.
The study examines how three different types o f on-going or planned 
programmes follow the institutions' biodiversity-related policies. The World Bank 
programmes date mostly from the second half o f the 1990s, a time when the 
environmental agenda at the institution was already solidly established. The GEF 
project for Cameroon was one o f the first GEF projects to be approved by the GEF 
Council soon after the founding o f the GEF in 1991. However, the project has 
undergone further development in subsequent years.
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The first programme concerns the promotion of macro-level policy reforms 
and includes both the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy, a blueprint for 
development assistance, and the institution’s efforts to reform Cameroon's forestry 
law. The second type o f programme represents more traditional development 
projects, i.e. investments in infrastructure development. It includes a transport sector 
loan as well as the preparation o f the building o f an oil pipeline. The third programme 
is a GEF-funded project directly targeted at biodiversity conservation. Although the 
study examines compliance with biodiversity-related policies in three distinct types of 
investment, the limit o f the study to only one country carries methodological risks. 
While this risk cannot be completely eliminated, it is being addressed by contrasting 
the findings o f the Cameroon case examples with internal World Bank and GEF 
evaluation and quality performance reports which cover the institutions' overall 
activities. Placing the place-specific findings into this broader context may indicate 
that they form part o f more systemic patterns of internal institutional dynamics.
1.6 The Choice of Analytical Tools
Interdisciplinary approaches integrating knowledge and methods from a 
variety o f social and biological sciences are contributing to the design o f  policies 
intended to halt the loss o f biodiversity. This thesis takes as its point o f departure 
broadly accepted environmental and social policies designed to address the question 
o f biodiversity protection. Existing World Bank and GEF policies are considered to 
be broadly accepted because they were approved by the World Bank's Board o f 
Executive Directors, representing all o f  the institution’s shareholder governments. In 
addition, they were implicitly endorsed by the United Nations when it adopted the 
GEF as the financial mechanism for the U.N. Convention on Biodiversity.
The central question o f this study concerns the compliance o f  international 
financial institutions with these policies. The relation between the intentionality o f  the 
policies and the application o f the policy requirements in practice is complex. The 
complexity requires the use o f distinct sets o f analytical tools which are borrowed 
from political science and from the areas o f  sociology and economics which are 
concerned with theory o f organization.
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The usefulness o f employing tools from political science and theory o f 
organization can be deduced from Ascher’s findings about the paradox o f 
international financial institutions. According to Ascher, this paradox consists o f 
international financial institutions being creatures o f states as well as full-blown 
bureaucracies in their own right (Ascher 1983). The neo-realist perspective o f the 
political science approach holds that international institutions are an instrument o f the 
interests of their most powerful shareholder nations. This perspective offers insights 
into how the environment in general and biodiversity in particular were propelled to 
the top o f the agenda o f international financial institutions. The adoption o f an agenda 
which declares biodiversity conservation to be central to the World Bank's mission o f 
alleviating poverty, represents a sharp departure for an institution which is closely 
associated with the traditional interpretation o f development understood as resource 
exploitation through activities such as agricultural expansion, logging and mining. 
This approach largely considers the environment to be an infinite resource and a free 
good. Northern governments, which hold most o f the voting shares and which 
exercise considerable informal influence within the institutions, were instrumental in 
establishing the environmental agenda at the World Bank and in creating the GEF. 
Since they provide most o f the direct and indirect contributions to the World Bank 
and the GEF, they should have an immediate interest in seeing the funding flows 
address the problems that they have identified. But what resources and mechanisms 
do they use to ensure that the environmental mandate of the institutions is actually 
being implemented in practice?
The analysis o f  the influence o f powerful external actors, which in the case o f 
the World Bank and the GEF are the countries which provide most o f  the financial 
backing and therefore hold most o f the proportional voting shares, reaches only to a 
certain point. It has limited explanatory power when it comes to the internal processes 
of institutions. Ultimately, however, the internal dynamics o f institutions determine to 
a large degree how institutions will pursue new sets o f goals and how these will 
become incorporated into institutional practice. The bureaucracy itself has to be 
examined because it is an actor with objectives and approaches that are not simply the 
vector o f interests of its member states (Wade 1997a).
After reviewing the degree o f compliance with the institutions' own policy 
mandates in three specific programme areas in Cameroon and placing the results in
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the broader context o f internal World Bank/GEF evaluation and quality perfonnance 
reports, this thesis seeks to explain possible systemic patterns o f policy adherence by 
using a variety o f tools borrowed from theories o f organization. These address the 
general analytical issue o f how and why relatively autonomous organizations change 
and provide a rich source o f understanding o f their internal dynamics.
The work o f Max Weber, whose early 20th century theories form the basis o f 
the sociology o f organizations, continues to be helpful in understanding the nature o f 
institutions. Weber viewed bureaucracy as being at the center o f the modernization 
process. Both the World Bank and the GEF fall squarely into Weber's definition of 
bureaucracies as modem systems o f large-scale administration in which the 
administrative staff is clearly distinguished from the governing body that employs it 
(Beetham 1996). The tenn bureaucracy applies only to the administrative staff which 
are responsible to the governing body for execution o f policy and administration o f 
funds. By definition bureaucracies are both subject to higher authority and involved in 
exercising authority themselves. Political economy thinking expands on this definition 
by adding that bureaucracies are financed by grants rather than by the sale of a 
product on the market, which is what distinguishes a bureaucracy from a firm 
(Beetham 1996). The definition o f bureaucracy as a grant-financed entity applies 
seamlessly to the GEF and in a slightly more complicated fashion, to the World Bank, 
whose main sources o f funding are either direct government grants or its ability to 
raise funds on international bond markets using possible calls on capital from its main 
shareholders as collateral. Furthermore, its status as preferred creditor, (i.e. the first 
entity to receive loan repayments from borrowing countries in times o f crisis as well 
as the lack o f a connection between loan repayment and actual performance o f  the 
projects financed by the loan) establish the World Bank as an entity operating outside 
the rigors o f free market competition. While W eber’s theories have limited usefulness 
in a world which has undergone profound changes since he first developed them, his 
definitions remain useful frames o f reference.
Using Wildavski's classic analysis o f the "Self-Evaluating Organization", the 
study examines the evaluative activities o f the World Bank and the GEF and their role 
in promoting internal learning (Wildavski 1972). Theories o f organization distinguish 
between organizational adaptation and learning. While the latter mode o f  learning 
leads to the adoption o f  qualitatively new objectives and priorities, the former
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involves changes brought about by new pressures or incentives but without 
adjustments in the organization's underlying goals and priorities.
According to its established rules, known as the Articles o f Agreement, the 
World Bank may base its lending decisions only on economic grounds and is 
explicitly barred from considering political aspects in its client countries (The World 
Bank 1989a, p. 13). Is the apparent depoliticized nature o f World Bank/GEF activities 
undermining learning potential because it chooses to pay little, if  any, attention to 
concrete political power relations in its client countries? An institution's ability to 
learn may be directly related to its effectiveness. One definition o f  effectiveness is to 
inquire if  the measures taken have changed the behaviour o f  actors (Keohane 1996). 
For example, have the biodiversity-related enviromnental and social policies led to a 
change in the way in which World Bank/GEF staff prepares projects?
Increasingly, the World Bank and other development agencies are recognizing 
that “institutions matter” and that the role o f institutions in development is likely to be 
more important than the role o f public investment (Picciotto 1995). This approach, 
known as new institutional economics, emphasizes the importance o f the design o f 
responsible and accountable institutions in developing countries. It extends the scope 
of economics to include an exploration of'opportunism ', rationally self-interested 
behaviour and uncertainty in the way institutions operate (Toye 1995). Turning the 
table around, this thesis inquires whether the approach provides valuable insights into 
the internal dynamics o f the international financial institutions themselves.
A parallel analysis is represented in the public choice approach, which holds 
that international organizations cannot be assumed to be unitary rational entities 
always acting in the public interest (Vaubel 1991). The approach views international 
organizations as self-interested entities which try to maximize their power in terms of 
budget size, staff and freedom o f discretion. According to this approach, the 
fundamental goals o f an international organization, its survival, control over resources 
and decision-making authority, may be divorced from the objectives, or value 
allocation, for which the institution was created (Le Pestre 1986).
The analytical tools borrowed from political science as well as from the areas 
o f sociology and economics concerned with theory o f organization, are used to 
explain how biodiversity conservation became a priority on the agenda o f the 
international financial institutions and how they incorporate this new goal into
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institutional practice. The findings o f the Cameroon case examples are contrasted with 
the results o f several internal World Bank and GEF evaluation reports in order to 
assess whether they form part o f more systemic patterns o f institutional dynamics. 
Such patterns may lend themselves to more systematic hypothesis testing in future 
research.
The goal of the research is to provide insights into the conditions that are 
necessary if  the institutions are to be rendered more accountable to their 
constituencies at different geographic scales. Since accountability is a difficult 
concept to operationalize, the sole indicator chosen for the purpose o f this study is the 
degree to which the institutions comply with their own reform policies. The final 
results hope to contribute to an answer to the question about the nature o f political 
power structures which can "arbitrate and translate" between global and local 
geographic scales (Harvey 1996:204). Such political power structures would have to 
be able to create political spaces of negotiation for a plurality o f  interests and views 
regarding the environment and biodiversity (Blaikie 1995).
1.7 Thesis Overview
The thesis can be broadly divided into two parts. The first four chapters 
provide the theoretical and practical background to the research and the following 
chapters present and analyse the collected material.
The introductory chapter provides background and frames the basic research 
question which examines the compliance o f the World Bank and the GEF with their 
own environmental and social policies as they relate to biodiversity protection. It 
provides a brief overview o f political ecology thinking which represents the overall 
conceptual framework o f this study. The chapter then describes the biodiversity- 
related policy-mandates o f the World Bank and the GEF and explains the choice of 
Cameroon as the geographic context for examining the compliance o f the institutions 
with their own environmental and social policies. The chapter concludes by referring 
to the analytical tools borrowed from political science and from the area o f  sociology 
concerned with theory o f organization which help explain both the rise o f biodiversity 
conservation as a priority o f the institutions and the discrepancies between their policy 
statements and the development o f specific programmes. The objective is to 
contribute to an answer to the question about the nature o f political power structures
28
which are able to arbitrate and translate between global and local levels and thereby 
render these structures more accountable to their constituencies at different 
geographic scales.
Chapter 2, the literature review, is divided into two major sections. The first 
section provides an overview o f the literature in the area o f political ecology and the 
related field of critical development theory. It then reviews the literature relating to 
the political rise of biodiversity on the global agenda and the history o f environmental 
reform at the World Bank. The second section reviews the literature related to the 
different angles o f the biodiversity debate. It begins by laying out the biophysical 
dimensions o f biodiversity and the respective arguments provided by the natural 
science community. This is followed by reviewing the literature related to the human 
dimensions o f biodiversity which establish linkages between biodiversity and 
sustainable livelihoods and highlights the complexities o f local situations.
Chapter 3 presents the methodologies being applied. It describes the variety o f 
both public and internal sources o f information both at World Bank and GEF 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. and in Cameroon. In addition to written materials, 
the research made use o f informal social science research methods, such as semi­
structured interviews, to gather additional information and verify findings. The 
chapter refers to the methodological risk incurred by limiting the study to only one 
country and describes how this risk is being addressed by contrasting the specific 
findings from the Cameroon case studies with the results o f internal evaluation and 
project quality reports carried out by the institutions themselves. The chapter 
concludes with a review o f the tools borrowed from political science and theory o f 
organization which are being used to analyse the case study results.
Chapter 4 contains three sections which describe the overall research 
landscape. The first two sections provide a more in-depth review o f the World Bank 
and the GEF as institutions which are key brokers between global and local 
geographic scales. It examines the World Bank's history o f environmental reform, its 
goals o f "mainstreaming" global environmental concerns into its overall project 
portfolio, as well as its internal evaluation mechanisms. With regards to the GEF, it 
explains its genesis, the motivations behind its complicated institutional set-up and the 
controversial trajectory since its establishment in 1991. The third section presents the
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geographical context o f the research by providing an overview o f the political, socio­
economic and environmental situation o f Cameroon in the 1990s.
The following three chapters represent the primary and core research o f the 
thesis. Each covers one o f the three programmes financed by the World Bank or the 
GEF in Cameroon.
Chapter 5 examines the World Bank's policy dialogue with Cameroon, which 
provides the overarching framework for World Bank support o f macro-economic and 
sector policies as well as the implementation o f individual development projects. The 
first section analyses the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy, a key strategic 
document which serves as a blueprint development plan and lays out World Bank 
priority investments. The second section examines World Bank efforts to assist 
Cameroon in reforming its forest policy. These efforts to write a new forestry code for 
Cameroon have been part o f successive structural adjustment programmes.
Chapter 6 analyses how the World Bank's biodiversity-related environmental 
and social policies are reflected in specific infrastructure development programmes. 
The first project being examined is a Transport Sector loan which involves financing 
of a range o f activities, including the rehabilitation or construction of a priority 
network of roads, some o f which are located in Cameroon's south-eastern forest 
region. The second section examines the preparation o f the building o f an oil pipeline 
through Cameroon which traverses forests, savannas and transition areas which are 
considered to be rich in biodiversity. The Atlantic forest area, where the pipeline 
enters the ocean, is also the home o f Bakola people, indigenous forest-dwellers who 
under existing Bank policy deserve special attention.
Chapter 7 examines the biodiversity protection project for Cameroon, which is 
funded by a grant from the GEF and implemented by the World Bank. The project's 
goal is to be accomplished by assisting the government in improving the management 
o f its protected areas. The first section o f the chapter analyses the conservation 
paradigms present in the World Bank/GEF approach, This is followed by research 
into the origins o f the project and an analysis o f the role o f different project actors, 
which in addition to the World Bank/ GEF and the government include several 
international non-governmental organizations.
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Chapter 8 reviews the findings o f the three previous chapters and contrasts 
them with World Bank and GEF internal and public evaluation reports. In the case o f 
the World Bank, these include the landmark 1992 Wapenhans report, which 
highlighted the underlying institutional culture o f "loan approval", as well as several 
confidential reports from both the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department 
and its Quality Assurance Group. The GEF, on the other hand, has undergone two 
major public evaluation reports since its establishment in 1991 which provide 
background and context for the GEF biodiversity protection project in Cameroon.
Chapter 9 pulls the multiple strands together by placing the findings in their 
theoretical context. While political ecology serves as the overall theoretical umbrella, 
the analytical tools being used are borrowed from political science and the area of 
sociology which is concerned with theory of organization. The conclusion seeks to 
contribute to an answer to the question about the characteristics o f political power 
structures which are able to "arbitrate and translate" between global and local 
geographic scales. Having focused on existing international financial institutions, the 
thesis represents an attempt to spell out the political and institutional conditions under 
which institutional change can lead to greater accountability to the institutions' 
constituencies at different geographic scales in particular to the intended project 
beneficiaries in developing countries, who often are part o f the politically weakest 
groups.
1.8 Summary
The introductory chapter presents the broad lay-out o f  the research. It places 
the research in a theoretical framework based on political ecology thinking which 
emphasizes the central role o f political and socio-economic structures in shaping 
resource use (Fig. 1.1). The core research addresses the degree to which two o f the 
world’s most influential multilateral institutions comply with their own environmental 
and social policy mandates as they relate to biodiversity conservation. The study 
examines the discourse and key policies o f the World Bank and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) and evaluates how they are reflected in specific 
programmes in a concrete country context. Since both the World Bank and the GEF 
have declared Cameroon to be a country o f globally important biodiversity, the thesis
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examines three distinct development programmes financed by the institutions in 
Cameroon. The programme-level findings are contrasted with the World Bank's and 
GEF's own evaluation reports in order to determine if  they form part o f more systemic 
patterns o f internal institutional dynamics.
Analytical tools borrowed from political science are used to explain the rise of 
biodiversity conservation as a stated priority for both the World Bank and the GEF 
and the development o f institutional policies reflecting this new goal. The areas o f 
sociology and economics concerned with theory of organization provide the tools to 
help understand the discrepancy between the established policies and institutional 
practice which is documented in the case studies and reflected in the institutions’ own 
internal evaluation reports. The combination o f the findings facilitated by both sets o f 
analytical tools contributes to answering the question o f the nature o f political power 
structures which can arbitrate and translate between global and local levels, and 
thereby be rendered more accountable to their constituencies at different geographic 
scales.
32
Political Ecology
Biodiversity-Related Policies
Systemic Patterns
International Financial 
Institutions
Programmes in Cameroon
The Institutions’ Internal 
Evaluation Reports
Case Studies 
Compliance Results
Analytical Tools 
Political Science/ Sociology
Insights Into the Nature o f Political Power 
Structures Able to Arbitrate and Translate 
Between Local and Global Geographic Scales
Fig. 1.1 Conceptual Framework
33
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW:
POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND DIMENSIONS OF BIODIVERSITY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews a broad range o f literature on political ecology and the 
critical theory o f development as well as on the multiple approaches to viewing 
biodiversity from the natural and social science perspectives. The multiple angles 
being examined provide a broad context for the question o f how international 
financial institutions comply with their own policy mandates as they relate to 
biodiversity.
One way o f looking at political ecology is to understand it as an important 
field in which the regulation o f societal relationships with nature takes place (Keil 
et al. 1998:12). A critical area of this regulation is reflected in the environmental 
and social policies adopted by the World Bank and the Global Enviromnent 
Facility, because they intend to regulate how activities backed by large-scale 
international funding insert themselves into the natural environment.
While the natural and social science arguments relating to biodiversity are 
not the focus o f this study, the part o f the literature review which covers the current 
debates in these areas, provides background and lends perspective to the focus on 
global institutions o f this study. Indeed, the contents o f the institutions’ 
environmental and social policies related to biodiversity reflect some o f the 
findings o f the scientific communities. The identification o f the problem of 
biodiversity loss by the natural sciences enabled the building o f political support 
for the establishment o f environmental policies at the World Bank and the creation 
o f the GEF. The fact that some o f these policies include provisions for the active 
participation o f local people in the design and implementation o f projects reflects 
the approaches upheld by social science thinking in which human activities are 
considered to be essential to protecting, if  not to generating, biodiversity.
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This chapter is divided into four major sections. The first section reviews 
the growing literature in the field o f political ecology and the critical theory of 
development. Political ecology is based on the recognition that environmental 
problems have ecological as well as political-economic dimensions. It is therefore 
well-placed to address a central problem underlying biodiversity loss which was 
identified by the 1987 report o f the World Commission on Environment and 
Development:
"Those responsible fo r  managing natural resources and protecting the 
environment are institutionally separated from those managing the 
economy. The real world o f  interlocked economic and ecological systems 
will not change; the policies and institutions concerned m ust" (WCED 
1987:9).
The World Bank and to a lesser extent the GEF are amongst the most 
influential institutions concerned because o f their significant impacts on the 
economy and environment in many Southern countries. Following the publication 
of the WCED report, the enviromnental and social policies o f the World Bank 
were strengthened and the institution’s discourse became more environment­
conscious The question posed here concerns the institutions’ compliance with their 
social and enviromnental policy mandates as they relate to biodiversity. Both 
political ecology and the critical theory o f development inform the approach to this 
question.
The second section reviews the emergence o f a global biodiversity agenda 
and how, subsequently, biodiversity protection has become central to the activities 
o f the World Bank and the GEF. These institutions are now the world's foremost 
multilateral agencies with the power and the financing to influence natural resource 
management decisions and biodiversity in Southern countries (and increasingly in 
the formerly communist countries). As the world's largest development agency, the 
World Bank has refined its mission in recent years from one o f  promoting 
economic growth to promoting sustainable development in which the conservation 
o f biodiversity is considered to be essential (World Bank 1992). In addition, the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established with the purpose o f serving as 
a multilateral funding mechanism for global enviromnental problems with much o f 
its attention focused on biodiversity conservation. The discourse o f  the 
international financial institutions has been shaped by the findings o f the natural
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sciences. Other elements, however, have been added, such as an emphasis on local 
participation in projects and the role o f economics in valuing the environment, 
which Blaikie and others have described as the "neo-populist" and the "neo-liberal" 
approaches to biodiversity conservation ( Blaikie 1995, Blaikie & Jeanreneaud 
1997, Biot et al. 1995).
The third section o f this chapter reviews how the natural sciences define 
biodiversity and reflects some o f the scientific uncertainties with which the natural 
science community continues to struggle. The debate within this community is 
largely shaped by the discourse o f conservation biology with its construct o f  the 
natural world in which the realities o f local people and their livelihood practices 
are often excluded (Pimbert & Pretty 1997, Zem er 1996). Since natural science 
arguments are not the focus o f this thesis, this section provides mere reference 
points suggesting the scope o f the problem.
The final section covers social science approaches to biodiversity. These 
reflect the complex reality in biodiversity-rich areas where competing interests 
may draw different benefits from biodiversity. Local societies not only differ from 
place to place, they are also continuously changing. Despite local differences and 
change processes, the vast majority o f rural people in tropical forest regions suffer 
severe hardships when deforestation and the loss o f biodiversity disrupt their 
delicately maintained livelihood systems (Barraclough & Ghimire 1995).
Ironically, projects to protect forest ecosystems and biodiversity through the 
establishment o f parks and protected areas can also have severe impacts on 
traditional livelihood sources and culture when they restrict local people's access to 
common property resources that are essential for meeting a variety o f their needs 
(Ghimire & Pimbert 1997). The intricate relationship between local livelihoods and 
biodiversity has helped place the concept o f  sustainable livelihoods at the center o f 
the biodiversity conservation debate.
2.2 Elements of Political Ecology
Since political ecology is based on the recognition that environmental 
problems have both ecological and political-economic dimensions, this emerging 
field o f study embraces both natural and social sciences. Blaikie advocates a 
leading role for geography in political ecology because he considers geography to 
be well placed for bridging the disciplinary divide between natural and social
36
sciences. He remains, however, concerned about the predominance o f human and 
physical geography which, in his view, has not yet understood how the “other h a lf ’ 
o f geography works (Blaikie 1995b: 213).
Blaikie him self has been a pioneer in establishing the often interlocked 
nature o f environmental and political problems. The pathbreaking research on land 
degradation and society undertaken by Blaikie and Brookfield defines soil erosion 
as being a socio- political-economic issue, as well as an environmental one 
(Blaikie 1985, Blaikie & Brookfield 1987). The problems o f ‘soil erosion’ and o f 
Toss o f biodiversity’ represent a very similar problematic with a variety o f social, 
economic and political forces at work in the degradation o f land or the erosion o f 
biodiversity. Blaikie and Brookfield refer to ‘regional political ecology’. In 
addition to combining concerns o f ecology with considerations o f  a broadly 
defined political economy, including the role o f the state and the relationships 
between classes and groups, they emphasize the need to take the environmental 
variability and spatial variations o f regional situations into account (Blaikie & 
Brookfield 1987).
Atkinson turns away from a regional-specific approach and suggests in 
“Principles o f Political Ecology”, that the environmental crisis ought to be 
accepted as a given since many situations may have become irreversible by the 
time we have final proof o f the degradation o f the earth’s life support systems 
(Atkinson 1991a: 4). He adds that while the enviromnental problematic is 
increasingly seen as a genuine problem for humanity and modem culture, the 
theoretical literature on which to construct an adequate political ecology remains 
sketchy (Atkinson 1991a: 39).
Harvey states that environmental transformations are always 
transformations o f social relations (Harvey 1998:335). In his view environmental 
problems need to be analysed in the light o f underlying processes such as 
associated power structures, institutional configurations and discourses (Harvey 
1996).
One recent contribution to the field o f political ecology is the ‘Third World 
political ecology’ developed by Bryant. Third World political ecology represents a 
response to the perceived apolitical nature o f the traditional approaches or 
business-as-usual attitude o f decision-makers to pressing environmental problems 
in developing countries (Bryant 1997a, Bryant & Bailey 1997b). This approach
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establishes linkages between conflicts over access to natural resources and systems 
o f political and economic control and emphasizes the increasing marginality o f 
vulnerable populations as a result o f such conflicts. Third World political ecology 
is characterized as being a geography-based research field which explores the 
political dimensions o f human-environmental interactions (Bryant & Bailey 
1997b: 17). The authors argue that while political ecology still has to elaborate the 
contours o f an alternative political economy, an emphasis on local level decision­
making based on ‘sustainable local livelihoods’ may provide a logical outcome of 
political ecology research (Bryant 1997a: 9). A political ecology focused on the 
Third World and the emphasis on local livelihoods is complementary to Blaikie’s 
thinking when he establishes vital links between democratic control o f all local 
land-users o f their enviromnent and the success o f conservation efforts (Blaikie 
1985). These approaches have much in common with the current debate in the area 
o f critical development theory which turns its back on technical, supposedly 
apolitical, approaches to development and instead focuses on the political and 
economic forces at work in the development process and on issues o f 
accountability (Crush 1996).
2.2.1 Political Ecology and Development Theory
Although the relationship between the two disciplines is often not referred 
to explicitly, political ecology thinking and critical development theory share a 
fundamental approach. Both recognize that relations o f power within societies as 
well as amongst countries are o f critical importance. Both also see the 
‘conventional development juggernaut’ as part o f the problem o f environmental 
degradation but conclude that a decisive challenge to the existing development 
paradigm has not yet been put forward (Atkinson 1991b:410). Critical 
development theory analyses the discourses and processes o f development. What 
follows is a b rief overview o f its contribution to the debate on development and on 
what its proponents view as the impasse o f  development practice and the possible 
way forward.
Radical critiques o f the development process are increasingly entering the 
arena o f debate within academic development theory (Adams 1995, Porter 1995). 
The fundamental critique is that Western capitalist thinking, as well as dependency 
theory and other Marxist critiques o f development, all share a concept o f
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development that originated in 19th century positivist thinking which is 
characterized by beliefs in linear progress and faith in the supremacy o f 
technology. The notion o f a mechanistic march towards progress, which has 
rationalized both the capitalist system o f individual ownership and the centralized 
planning by bureaucratic authority, has facilitated technologies to exploit stock 
resources (Norgaard 1994). A mechanistic approach is also inherent in neo­
classical economics and assumes a system that can always adapt to a new 
equilibrium independent o f ecological factors. This is what leads Norgaard to 
believe that "economics as it evolved in existing institutions is at the heart o f the 
problem why development has been unsustainable" (Norgaard 1994: 18). The fact 
that enviromnental systems begin to break down and species are disappearing has 
led to what Watts describes as an impasse in development theory and a crisis in 
development practice (Watts 1995). But development can reinvent itself 
"Development discourse has a remarkable capacity for forgiving its own mistakes 
and reinventing itself as the remedy for the ills it causes" (Crush 1995: 16). The 
idea o f sustainable development may have provided a new lease o f life for 
discredited earlier notions o f  development as . .an alluring route for policy 
development, promising escape from the environmentally destructive record o f 
dominant development paradigms” (Adams 1995 :99). But what exactly is 
sustainable development? The World Commission on Environment and 
Development defines it as:
"Sustainable development is 
development that meets the needs o f  
the present without compromising the 
ability o f  future generations to meet 
their own needs” (WCED 1987: 43).
Norgaard points out that the definition makes no attempt to indicate how it 
is achieved and that numerous attempts to give it an operational definition have not 
succeeded (Norgaard 1994).
A critique o f the concept o f sustainable development is that it pays little 
attention to the political and economic forces behind unsustainable practices even 
though they play a critical role in the shift away from traditional, more sustainable 
agricultural practices to specialization and economic dependency (Redclift 1987). 
The present debate about sustainable development does not include considerations 
involving restructuring the international economy which might relieve many o f the
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resource pressures in the South. According to Redclift, a focus on global solutions 
appears to be an attempt to evade the issue o f the role o f the international economy 
in structural underdevelopment (Redclift 1987). Or, as Anderson and Grove put it, 
it may ignore the undeniable reality o f environmental degradation engendered 
directly and indirectly by the penetration o f Western economic forces (Anderson & 
Grove 1987).
Western knowledge and technologies are spreading to many parts o f the 
world and 'development' with many different meanings is what much o f humanity 
is aspiring to. Crush argues that development discourse is not hermetically sealed 
and that it is open to challenge and reformulation (Crush 1995). As a result, new 
ways o f understanding what development is and what it does may gradually 
emerge. Which direction may possible changes in development philosophy and 
social organization take? Echoing the voices o f many authors, Watts proposes a 
confluence around civil society as a way out o f development gridlock "...w here 
markets are socially embedded, economic dynamism demands social capital and 
economies are built around trust, obligation and accountability" (Watts 1995: 58, 
Shiva 1992). Greater accountability to those who are the stated beneficiaries of 
development is a central theme pointing to the road ahead (Lonsdale 1987, 
Barraclough & Ghimire 1995).
The emphasis which the critical theory o f development places on the need 
to pay attention to political and economic forces as well as to issues o f 
accountability demonstrates its closeness to political ecology thinking, in particular 
Blaikie’s and Brookfield’s regional political ecology and Bryant’s Third World 
political ecology,
2.3 Global Biodiversity Agenda
Biodiversity conservation has become a priority on the agenda o f global 
institutions as a result o f perceptions o f  the environment and the building o f 
political constituencies in Northern countries (Anderson & Grove 1987, Fairman 
1996). In addition to traditional concerns about the disappearance o f exotic 
wildlife, arguments about biodiversity's significance for future developments in the 
areas o f global agriculture and modern medicine have helped build northern 
political and financial support for biodiversity conservation. Since most o f  the
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earth's biodiversity is geographically located in the South, there is the tendency o f 
a North/South divide between local realities o f biodiversity as experienced by 
hundreds o f millions o f rural and indigenous peoples in Southern countries and 
Northern plans to protect natural resources in the South (Colchester 1994).
While considerable doubts remain about the rates o f loss o f species and o f 
habitat destruction, the broad literature reflecting both natural science research and 
the growing problems o f Third World peoples as a result o f degraded 
environments, provides evidence that the on-going disappearance o f landscapes 
and habitats causes the loss o f plant and animal life, which in many cases may be 
irreversible.
Based on the findings o f the natural science community, environmentalism 
in the North has been successful in building domestic constituencies for 
biodiversity protection and getting the attention o f governments (Fairman 1996). 
Norgaard adds that environmentalists and natural scientists have themselves 
become part o f the political and administrative fabric o f Western nations (Norgaard 
1994). Once these political constituencies were mobilized, it became a question o f 
donor government self-interest to establish environment-friendly policies to guide 
their development aid and to create environmental aid budgets (Connolly 1996). 
Consequently, the institutions have accepted the crisis o f biodiversity loss as a 
given and have adopted a range o f biodiversity-related environmental and social 
policies as their way o f addressing the problem. 1
The fact that most o f the loss o f biodiversity was occurring in Southern 
environments helped direct the burden o f adjustment at developing countries to the 
point where more rigorous standards for development and conservation activities 
may be applied to the south than domestically in northern countries (Bell 1987).
A considerable portion o f national aid budgets is channeled through the 
World Bank which makes the institution vulnerable to the possibility o f having its 
budgets cut by its main shareholders, i.e. the Group o f Seven Industrialized (G 7) 
countries. While the World Bank is "owned" by all its members, o f  which there 
were 180 as o f 1996, its financial strength depends on direct contributions from its 
wealthiest member countries or on the collateral provided by the same countries 
which enables the World Bank to borrow on international capital markets at
‘Please see the Appendix for analytical descriptions o f  the policies.
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advantageous interest rates. As a result, the survival o f this large multilateral 
agency depends on the institution's ability to sense the mood in the donor countries 
and adapt to it (Hancock 1989), The World Bank has been adapting to the 
environmental priorities o f its principal shareholders ever since the mid-1980s 
when two highly publicized cases revealed its vulnerability to environmental 
criticism by establishing the link between World Bank-funded forest colonization 
schemes and massive deforestation in northwest Brazil and on Indonesia's Outer 
Islands (Lutzenberger 1985, Secrett 1986).
It is within the context o f how environmental problems are being perceived 
in the major donor countries that the rise o f the environment as a priority o f  the 
World Bank has to be understood. While some of the environmental criticism had 
aimed at reducing the World Bank's power to intervene in developing countries, 
the World Bank's role was strengthened by adopting the enviromnental agenda as 
its own (Sachs 1992). The World Bank's participation in 1989 in the publication o f 
a major biodiversity strategy document, launched by the world's largest 
conservation organizations, signaled the elevation o f biodiversity concerns to the 
top o f the institution's environmental agenda (World Bank 1990). This helped lay 
the groundwork for the World Bank to establish itself as the world's main financier 
o f projects specifically aimed at biodiversity conservation through its role in 
creating the GEF, housing it at World Bank headquarters and staffing its 
Secretariat. By the time governments met for the 1992 U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, the GEF was solidly 
established with the backing o f the world's wealthiest countries and thereby pre­
empted the establishment o f alternative financial funding arrangements for the 
U.N. Convention on Biodiversity which was signed at UNCED (Fairman 1996).
As a result, a largely Northern environmental agenda with large-scale 
financial backing both through World Bank loans and GEF grants is striving for 
implementation in the south (Connolly 1997). In addition, conservation of 
biodiversity was declared as fundamental to the development process itself 
(McNeely et al. 1990). However, having a stated environmental agenda is one 
thing and carrying it out is another. As Brown, Pearce and others point out, in 
biodiversity, as in other areas, economic and political factors often dictate the 
policies that are enacted (Brown et al. 1993).
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2.3.1 A Focus on International Financial Institutions
The core research o f this thesis addresses the question o f the compliance o f 
the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility with their own biodiversity- 
related policy mandates. The question fits well into an as yet underexplored area o f 
political ecology, which occupies itself with the interface o f international financial 
institutions and the environment.
In recent years, these institutions have, at least in theory, moved away from 
attempting to simply impose their solutions on the South by emphasizing the need 
to ensure local participation in development projects and to integrate local social 
and economic development activities with protected area management (Wells et al.
1992). The obstacles are great since 'local ownership' may be at odds with the 
interests o f local or national elites. As Colchester puts it, the politics o f 
conservation projects tend to mitigate against adequate involvement o f  local people 
since foreign funding agencies and conservation organizations usually seek 
legitimacy and authority by making alliances with the government in the country 
where they wish to operate (Colchester 1994), This cannot but contribute to what 
Little and Brokensha describe as a shifting o f the locus o f resource-related 
decision-making away from local communities to state-related institutions and 
organizations (Little & Brokensha 1987). As a result, indigenous management 
systems, where they still survive, are likely to become increasingly marginalized.
In a similar vein, Sachs states that national resource management planning, as 
promoted by international financial institutions, reduces ecology to a set o f 
managerial strategies aimed at resource efficiency, which clashes with the ecology 
o f the commons and is the continuation o f what he calls "the war against 
subsistence" (Sachs 1992:35).
Some o f the relevant World Bank policies, which also apply to GEF 
investment projects, reflect an attempt to build bridges to local people and local 
realities.2 The policy on indigenous peoples in particular presents a commitment to 
allowing indigenous peoples a direct voice in shaping investments affecting their 
traditional homelands.
2 The World Bank is currently in the midst o f  “reformatting” its social and environmental policies. 
The purpose is to streamline them. There is some evidence that some o f  the policies might emerge 
weakened from this process and less stringent in their requirements.
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World Bank/ GEF Biodiversity-Related Environmental and Social Policies
Environmental Assessment Policy Operational Directive 4.01, 1991
Infonnation Disclosure Policy Best Practice 17.50, 1993
Indigenous Peoples Policy Operational Directive 4.20, 1991
Policy on Involuntary Resettlement Operational Directive 4.30, 1990
Forest Policy Operational Policy 4.36, 1993
Natural Habitats Policy Operational Policy 4.04, 1995
Economic Evaluation o f Investment Operational Policy 10.04, 1994
Operations Policy
Fig. 2.1 World Bank/GEF Policies
These biodiversity-related policies and the more general environmental 
discourse o f the institutions serve as the point o f departure for the approach to the 
Cameroon case studies. The relation between the intentionality o f  the policies and 
the practical application o f the policy requirements in practice is complex. This 
complexity has to do, at least in part, with what Ascher describes as the paradox of 
international financial institutions which are simultaneously creatures o f states and 
full-blown bureaucracies in their own right (Ascher 1983).
The analysis o f compliance with these policies is facilitated by a variety o f 
analytical tools from the political science perspective and from the areas o f 
sociology and economics concerned with theory o f organization. These analytical 
tools will be examined in the next chapter.
2.3.2 Institutional Adaptation to the Biodiversity Agenda
The environment first became a heading in the World Bank's annual report 
in 1987, which identified poverty o f countries and of people as a major cause of 
environmental degradation, a situation the Bank seeks to remedy by promoting 
economic growth with emphasis on improving the incomes o f  the poor (World 
Bank 1987: 33). In the same year, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) published its report "Our Common Future", which 
popularized the concept of'sustainable development', linking conservation and 
development. The report also calls for a change in development patterns in order to 
make them compatible with biodiversity conservation by highlighting that the
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disappearance o f tropical forests demonstrated the need to attack the problem at its 
source (WCED 1987).
Following the publication o f the WCED report, the Bank added specificity 
about its environmental efforts in its annual reports. Perhaps the most significant 
aspect was the World Bank's implicit acknowledgment o f its own role in causing 
environmental problems. It did so by committing itself to anticipating the 
environmental consequences o f  its large-scale development projects and to carry 
out appropriate mitigation measures.
In order to meet the new challenges, the World Bank's small office for 
environmental affairs became a fully-fledged environmental department in 1988. 
The environment was further elevated within the Bank's structure in 1993 when the 
Vice-Presidency for Environmentally Sustainable Development was established. 
The goal o f this Vice-Presidency is to break barriers between disciplines and 
sectors in order to ensure that all Bank-promoted development activities were 
environment-friendly and sustainable (World Bank 1995c). From a single staff 
member in the mid-1970s, the World Bank's environmental staff grew to 300 
environmental experts by 1997 (World Bank 1997). The environmental work is 
guided by about 18 operational policies ranging from directives on how to carry 
out enviromnental assessment to how to deal with cultural property in Bank- 
financed operations (Shihata 1994).
2.3.3 The Proposed Range of Action
The World Bank's annual report in 1988 announced a two-fold approach in 
its operations:
(1) address the environmental consequences o f individual projects 
and identify projects aimed directly at enviromnental problems;
(2) develop policy interventions to influence environmental 
behavior on a large-scale (World Bank 1988: 43).
Perhaps the most important tool in addressing the environmental impacts o f 
individual projects is the Bank's policy on Environmental Impact Assessment 
(Operational Directive 4.00 o f October 1989), which requires that every project is 
screened for possible environmental impacts. A full EIA study is mandatory for all 
investment projects where significant environmental impacts can be expected.
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In addition, the World Bank has invested considerable effort in identifying 
environmental components o f projects and free-standing environmental projects. 
The World Bank states that its active lending for the environment increased from 
zero in 1986 to US $ 12 billion in 1996 (World Bank 1996c). The environmental 
programs are carried out in 68 countries and cover pollution control, ecosystem 
protection and capacity building (World Bank 1997). Depending on the region, 
between about one third and about two thirds o f the environmental funding is for 
natural resource management and biodiversity-related projects. World Bank 
financed GEF projects in the biodiversity area are included in this subcategory 
(World Bank 1996c).
World Bank publications acknowledge that it is insufficient to address 
biodiversity concerns only in the design o f  individual projects. As a result, the 
World Bank has stated its commitment to assisting developing countries with 
integrating biodiversity in national planning and macro-economic policy-making. 
The vehicles by which this is to be accomplished are National Environmental 
Action Plans (NEAPs) whose results are then incorporated into Country Assistance 
Strategies (CAS) (World Bank 1995a). A Country Assistance Strategy is an 
important document because it represents the basic plan for World Bank 
investments in a given country. Chapter 5 o f this study examines the World Bank’s 
CAS for Cameroon. With regards to the CAS, the World Bank's strategy on 
biodiversity conservation states that:
"Specifically, when 'sources o f growth' and 'comparative 
advantage' are evaluated, natural resources, including 
biological sources, need to be valued at their full opportunity 
cost."
(The World Bank 1995g:4).
The institution's important environmental policies and its unmatched 
institutional and financial resources represent a formidable potential for 
biodiversity protection. The policies and resources, however, say little about the 
extent to which the environmental statements filter down to operational reality at 
the concrete project level. The Cameroon case studies presented in chapters 5, 6 
and 7 o f this study shed light on the practical relevance o f the policies in a specific 
geographic context.
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The following two sections provide background material and lend 
perspective to biodiversity-related policies by reviewing literature reflecting the 
natural and social science perspectives on biodiversity.
2.4 Biological Definitions and Ecological Functions of Biodiversity
The problem of biodiversity was first identified by natural scientists who
defined its scope as reaching from the tiniest o f micro-organisms to the functioning 
o f entire ecosystems and to the composition o f the earth’s atmosphere (Watson & 
Hey wood 1995). The term biodiversity as used in the Convention on Biological 
Diversity is defined as “The variability among living organisms from all sources, 
inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes o f which they are part; this diversity includes diversity within species, 
between species and o f ecosystems” (United Nations 1992: Art. 2). When 
describing biodiversity, biologists usually refer to three hierarchical levels, ranging 
from whole systems at the landscape or ecosystem levels to single species and 
genes:
•  Genetic diversity is the sum o f genetic information contained in the genes o f 
plants, animals and micro-organisms;
•  Species diversity refers to the variety o f living organisms;
•  Ecosystem diversity relates to the diversity o f habitats and the variety o f 
ecological processes (McNeely et al. 1990).
Soule adds two layers in this “biospatial” hierarchy by including 
“assemblages”, which are biotic communities within a defined ecosystem, and 
“populations”, which are dynamic assemblages o f individuals which maintain 
genetic information that may ramify and merge (Soule 1991).
In summary, the ecological functions o f biodiversity cover the entire spectrum 
o f life-support systems. They range from genetic diversity, which is often 
highlighted with reference to global agriculture and food security (Brown et al.,
1993) to the preservation o f  soils and water quality and the maintenance o f the 
gaseous composition o f  atmosphere (Watson & Heywood 1995).
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2.4.1 Biodiversity and Moist Tropical Forest
Much o f the environmental discussion about biodiversity relates to 
deforestation. Tropical moist forests are widely held to be the terrestrial habitats 
that are the richest in species (Wilson 1988, Groombridge 1994). There appears to 
be scientific consensus that overall species richness increases with decreasing 
latitude (Brown et al. 1993). With the exception o f certain groups such as conifers 
and salamanders, the strongest trend worldwide is the latitudinal diversity gradient 
which means that group after group reaches its maximum richness in the tropics, 
most particularly in the tropical rain forests and coral reefs (Ehrlich & Wilson
1991). As a result as much as 50% of the earth’s biodiversity is estimated to live 
in tropical rainforest regions (Myers 1988). Others estimate that anywhere between 
50% and 90% o f all species on earth are in these regions (WRI, IUCN, UNEP,
1992).
In addition to forests, some intensely managed habitats such as agroforestry 
systems, can be very rich in species. Therefore, some land-use systems and 
agricultural practices enhance biodiversity within managed landscapes (Srivastava 
et al. 1996).
With much attention focused on the tropical moist forest, the biodiversity 
o f other terrestrial ecosystems such as temperate coniferous forests, grasslands and 
Mediterranean shrublands, appears to be underexplored. In particular, the 
biological diversity o f dry tropical forests may often have been underestimated 
(Groombridge 1994). Oceans, coastal waters, estuaries and wetlands are 
increasingly at risk from human activities (WRI, IUCN, UNEP, 1992), yet 
knowledge about marine and freshwater biodiversity is very limited (Norse 1993).
2.4.2 Definition of Forests and Deforestation
While there appears to be agreement that tropical moist forests contain 
most terrestrial biodiversity, there is some disagreement in the literature as to what 
constitutes a forest area. Similarly there is no single definition o f what constitutes 
deforestation. The FAO, which has earned out comprehensive analyses o f tropical 
forest cover defines forests as ecological systems with a minimum o f 10% crown 
cover o f trees and/or bamboo which are not subject to agricultural practices (FAO
1993). This definition is considered too broad because it includes many open
48
vegetation formations which would not be regarded as forests (Groombridge
1994). A more widely accepted definition o f what constitutes a forest is that o f 
“closed canopy forest” described as mostly woody fonnations with a minimum 
crown cover o f 40% (Groombridge 1994).
Deforestation has been occurring in temperate and tropical regions 
throughout history (Williams 1990). However, definitions o f deforestation vary 
from a complete clearing o f tree formations and their replacement by non-forest 
land-uses to a degradation o f forests, which can involve changes in tree species 
composition, wildlife species and gene pools. This latter definition is advanced 
commonly by conservation organizations, such as IUCN and WWF and reflects the 
inclusion o f biodiversity considerations (Barraclough & Ghimire 1995).
How much tropical moist forest is being lost annually? Again, there is no 
single answer. According to the FAO, some 154,000 square kilometres o f tropical 
forest were lost annually between 1981 and 1990, which corresponds to a 0.8% 
compound annual rate o f deforestation (FAO 1993). A higher estimate is provided 
by the World Resources Institute, which puts annual loss o f tropical forest at
204,000 square kilometers (WRI 1990). According to Fairhead and Leach, many o f 
the estimates overstate the extent of deforestation (Fairhead & Leach 1998).
The problem appears to be that measuring and assessing changes to forests 
depends on a consistent application of categories and definitions by all research 
efforts, but widely acceptable measures have not been developed (Groomsbridge
1994). The overall trend, however, is not being disputed, and the impacts on 
biodiversity from forest loss may be more far-reaching than deforestation statistics 
indicate.
2.4.3 The Edge Effect
Data on deforestation o f Brazil’s Amazon region have been the subject of 
some dispute. Initial measurements by the Brazilian National Institute for Spatial 
Research, which were widely reported (World Resources Institute 1990), indicated 
a rate substantially higher than the one revealed by subsequent Landsat satellite 
images (Skole & Tucker 1993). The divergent assessments provided arguments for 
those who felt that the seriousness o f  forest loss was vastly overstated. Skole and 
Tucker explained the difference as stemming from a different evaluation in the
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forest-cerrado boundaries used by the different researchers. They concluded that 
while their research indicated considerably less area deforested, their findings 
document that the patterns o f forest clearing matter as much or possibly more than 
numbers o f forest acres lost because o f what is known as the edge effect. Networks 
o f roads, powerlines and farms increase access into the forest from the edge 
between tropical forest and deforested areas and lead to increasing “habitat 
fragmentation.” The indirect effects o f deforestation are estimated to be two to 
three times greater than the area o f deforestation. As a result Skole and Tucker 
conclude that although their estimates o f deforestation are lower than previous 
estimates, the effect on biological diversity is greater (Skole & Tucker 1993).
2.4.4 Taxonom ic D ata
Speciation (the process by which isolated populations diverge by being 
subjected to different environments) and extinction are natural processes which 
occur continuously. However, the rate at which humans are altering the 
environment and the extent o f those alterations and their consequences for 
ecological systems are considered unprecedented in human history (Watson & 
Heywood 1995). An estimate put forward by both UNEP and by Harvard 
University biologist E.O. Wilson is that the human-induced rate o f extinction is 
1000 to 10,000 times the natural background rate before human intervention 
(Watson & Heywood 1995, Wilson 1988).
Both world bodies specifically charged with environmental protection and 
conservation, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN) have reached similar estimates o f species loss in 
recent studies. IUCN, in the most comprehensive inventory to date, estimates that 
about 25% o f all mammals and 11% o f all known bird species are threatened with 
extinction (Baillie & Groombridge 1996). UNEP, in its Global Biodiversity 
Assessment, concludes that due to projected loss o f forest cover over the next 25 
years, a range o f 2% to 25% o f mostly the better known groups, plant and bird 
species will be lost (Watson & Heywood 1995).
Estimates o f species in tropical forests range from 3 million to 30 million or 
more o f which only about 1.4 million species have been named so far (Raven 
1988). Present estimates o f how many forms o f life exist on earth have to be
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approached with caution because, as E.O. Wilson puts it, the number o f species o f 
organisms is not known even to the nearest order o f magnitude (Wilson 1988)
This lack o f taxonomic precision leads critics to charge that the loss o f 
species is being overstated. According to Julian Simon, estimates o f future 
extinction rates lack any kind o f empirical basis and are therefore unnecessarily 
alarmist (Simon & Wildavsky 1993). Charles Mann, in an article in Science 
magazine, emphasizes that the inadequacy o f existing taxonomic data raises 
questions about the possibility o f predicting species loss since if  species have 
actually not been discovered, one cannot be sure if  they became extinct or never 
existed in the first place (Mann 1991).
2.4.5 The Theory of Island Geography
Estimating species loss is often based on the basis of the principles o f 
island biogeography, which stipulate that the number o f species in island systems 
increases approximately as the fourth root o f  the land area. This has been found to 
hold true not only on real islands, but also in isolated terrestrial ecosystems 
(MacArthur & Wilson 1967). Extinction curves are calculated by treating habitats 
as 'islands' and asking what happens to species when islands grow smaller. Critics 
charge that the theory’s applicability is limited because it was originally developed 
by studying wild populations on islands and therefore may not apply to larger 
mainland areas. In addition, they point out that the island biogeography theory fails 
to distinguish between deforestation and extinction (Lugo 1988). The theory 
assumes that loss o f  forest cover is identical to cutting out a piece o f  an island. 
However, islands are surrounded by water, a hostile environment to terrestrial 
species, while the land surrounding forests offers displaced species potential new 
habitats. Critics emphasize that the nature o f the relationship between deforestation 
rate and species loss is not known (Lugo 1988).
A further critique is that the 'species-area curve' derived from island 
biogeographic calculations implies that infinite growth in area corresponds to 
infinite growth in species and thereby fails to consider that habitat loss can occur 
without substantial species loss (Mann 1991).
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University o f Oxford professors Smith and May and W orld Conservation 
Monitoring Centre (WCMC) scientists Pellew, Johnson and Walter, recognize the 
roughness o f extinction estimates as derived from the species-area relations and 
projected rates o f destruction o f natural habitats. They refine estimates of 
extinction rates by studying documentation on the loss o f plant and animal species 
since 1600, which are presented in W CM C’s Red Lists o f animals threatened with 
extinction and W CM C’s database on seed-bearing plant species threatened with 
extinction. The authors recognize the limitations o f their approach given the lack o f 
data, the fact that existing data have been compiled opportunistically and not 
systematically and the focus o f existing data on a few comparatively well-studied 
groups, i.e. birds and mammals. They conclude, however, that for the better 
known taxa, the estimates o f extinction rates are o f the same order o f magnitude as 
those derived from species-area relations (Smith, May, Pellew, John & Walter
1993).
2.4.6 Biodiversity and Climate Linkages
Enviromnents and species community patterns have changed constantly in 
the past and they will continue to change naturally in the future, particularly under 
the influence o f global warming (Graham 1992). While there are scientific 
uncertainties about anthropogenic climate change, there are indications that global 
warming could be developing at an extremely rapid rate when compared with most 
paleoclimatic trends (Schneider, Meams & Gleich 1992). Man-made climate 
change is subject to considerable debate but the critical role o f forests in stabilizing 
climate at both the local and the global levels is widely acknowledged (Woodwell 
1990, Watson & Heywood 1995). The linkages between forests/ biodiversity and 
climate can be found at different levels:
Deforestation and Local Climate Change: Rainforests depend on rain for 
their growth and also produce rain as much o f the moisture on the forest canopy 
evaporates quickly, forms clouds and produces rainfall further downwind. As a 
result, deforestation leads frequently to the desiccation o f previously humid soils 
(Barraclough & Ghimire 1995). Farmers in coastal regions o f  West Africa have 
long understood the linkage between the loss o f forest cover, changing rainfall
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patterns and declines in the yields o f  their crops (Horta 1991). Scientists are now 
corroborating the farmers’ findings. The destruction o f the rainforest in West 
Africa over the past two decades has led to droughts and studies carried out by the 
Massachusetts Institute o f Technology indicate that further deforestation might 
lead to the collapse o f  the West African monsoon (Pearce 1997), but the scientific 
basis o f such predictions is still questionable.
Forests and Global Climate Change: Conversion o f forests into cropland 
and pasture results in a net flux o f carbon to the atmosphere because the 
concentration o f  carbon in forests is higher than in the agricultural areas that 
replace them. Over the last several hundred years, agricultural conversion of 
forests appears to have contributed to an increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide, 
possibly affecting climate. Initially most deforestation occurred in Northern 
countries but in recent decades loss o f tropical forest has been the main 
contributor. Tropical moist forests are estimated to contain about 200 tons o f 
carbon per hectare, which is substantially more than boreal forests (110 t/ha) or 
temperate broadleaf forests (ca. 100 t/ha) (Graham et al. 1990). It is estimated that 
tropical forest loss contributed approximately 1.6 gigatonnes o f carbon per year to 
the atmosphere, while fossil fuel combustion released an additional 5.5 gigatonnes 
(Watson & Heywood 1995). The numbers indicate that forests constitute a 
significant factor in the carbon exchange with the atmosphere and provide an 
additional rational for a precautionary approach to forests.
Global W arming’s Possible Impacts on Forests: While it is difficult to 
forecast what precisely the effects o f  global warming will be on the earth’s biota, 
natural warming events in the past are serving as a reference. According to Russell 
Graham, one such event occurred at the Pleistocene/Holocene boundary, 10 000 
years ago, when more than 32 genera o f large terrestrial animals became extinct in 
North America alone. The most encompassing impact o f climate change appears to 
have been habitat destruction. The paleobiological record indicates that species 
will respond to environmental changes individually and not as communities o f 
species. This may hold lessons for the design o f biological reserves which should 
facilitate the migration o f species instead o f focusing on preserving static 
community patterns (Graham 1992).
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Biological adaptation, however, may be more difficult than the 
paleobiological record might indicate, since the rate o f human transformation o f 
the earth and a growing world population leave considerably less margin for 
adjustments (Soule 1992).
What could be global warming’s likely impacts on tropical forest areas? 
According to Hartshorn, it is unlikely that higher temperatures p er  se will have 
direct negative impacts on tropical forest communities. For one reason, tropical 
forest regions are less hot than surrounding regions as high temperatures are 
modulated by cloud cover. If  global warming causes increased cloud cover over 
tropical forest regions, then average daily temperature increases may not be 
significant. Seasonal patterns and the distribution o f rainfall are more important 
than temperature in cuing many biological activities (Hartshorn 1992). There may, 
however, be a myriad indirect impacts, ranging from climate change induced 
tropical cyclones that can devastate tropical forests to changes in human settlement 
patterns as people search for new sources o f agricultural land and water as a result 
o f global warming (Harte, Tom & Jensen 1992).
Since natural science approaches to biodiversity are not the focus o f this 
thesis, this section presents a mere overview o f the scope o f the biodiversity 
problem as identified by the natural sciences. Despite the degree o f uncertainty 
involved in scientific issues relating to the earth's biodiversity, there is ample 
agreement in the literature that deforestation and the loss o f biodiversity caused by 
human activities are advancing at an unprecedented scale. The inter-connectedness 
between climate and forests appears to provide further arguments for forest and 
habitat protection.
2.5 The Human Dimensions of Biodiversity
The previous section has focused on the literature covering biophysical 
aspects o f biodiversity as presented by the natural sciences. The findings o f the 
natural sciences, particularly o f conservation biology, have generated the political 
and financial support in major donor nations which has led to the biodiversity- 
related policies at the World Bank and the establishment o f the GEF. In addition 
to the role played by the natural sciences, these policies also reflect findings from 
the social sciences, especially in their emphasis on involving local people in
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project design and implementation. From a social science perspective, biodiversity 
protection is a social process that depends on actions at the local level (Davis ed.
1993). In its discourse and policies the World Bank acknowledges the importance 
o f local social forces in ensuring enviromnental sustainability. For example, the 
institution’s long-term strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa plans to ".. .release the 
energies to allow ordinary people... to take charge o f their lives" (World Bank 
1989c: 4). Broadly speaking, at present biodiversity conservation programmes 
almost universally emphasize the need for 'people-orientedness' (Jeanrenaud 1997).
However, integrating local people in development and conservation means 
dealing with complex social, economic and ecological realities. This requires a 
breadth o f knowledge and skills that most development and conservation projects 
find difficult to muster (Bailey 1996).
Claims to the importance of biodiversity conservation rest upon a broad 
spectrum of ethical, moral, economic and multi-level arguments (Blaikie, P. 1995). 
The mostly urban elites in both the North and the South that are concerned about 
the need to preserve nature, offer generally two rationales for biodiversity 
conservation. Either they emphasize the aesthetic and amenity values o f wilderness 
as something that needs to be preserved or they focus on possible commercial uses 
of biodiversity ranging from tourism ventures to industrial-pharmaceutical uses o f 
chemical compounds found in biodiversity-rich areas (Barraclough & Ghimire 
1986 ). These objectives often do not represent local priorities and as a result 
global strategies to conserve biodiversity may not easily mesh with local societal 
dynamics.
Local situations can be complex with different classes o f  producers 
pursuing different strategies and uses for the environment (Little and Brokensha 
1987). The interests o f local elites may diverge from the majority o f the rural 
peasant population. The distinguishing characteristic between the dominant groups 
and local communities is that although the latter are numerically the majority, their 
political power base is weak and they usually have little or no share in the 
decision-making processes affecting the land, forests and water resources on which 
their livelihoods depend in a direct fashion, even if  their income is frequently 
supplemented by small-scale trading and income from wage labor (Ghimire & 
Pimbert 1997).
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2.5.1 Sustainable Livelihoods
Biodiversity conservation and sustainable development can only become a 
reality when the livelihoods of the poor are given priority (Redclift 1987). They are 
the forest-dwellers, smallholder farmers, fisherfolk and pastoralists, whose 
livelhoods are inextricably linked with biodiversity through a mosaic o f activities 
which meet their needs for example for food, medicines and construction material 
and embody many of their cultural, aesthetic and spiritual values. The forest and 
the land are most often an inseparable part o f the identity o f communities, 
especially of indigenous peoples whose survival as a people depends on living in 
their forest (Bailey 1996).
Chambers' concept of'sustainable livelihood thinking' establishes causal 
relationships between development and livelihoods and the environment and 
livelihoods (Chambers 1986 ). The concept o f ‘sustainable livelihoods’ has 
recently been placed at the center o f the ‘basic capabilities perspective’ in 
development thinking, which replaces the former ‘basic needs’ approach. The 
‘basic capabilities perspective’ includes an assessment o f local people’s ability to 
have a role in society and influence decision-making (Carney 1998). The concept 
o f sustainable livelihoods lies at the heart o f biodiversity debate and provides a 
framework for the analysis of development and conservation projects and their 
potential for sustainability.
Sustainable livelihood thinking creates an indicator to help counter the 
effects o f international development which systematically increases the marginality 
o f the most vulnerable groups (Redclift 1987). Shiva argues that when forests, 
land and water are being “developed” or “scientifically managed” in order to 
supply industrial inputs, they are appropriated from communities whose lives and 
livelihoods they have supported for centuries (Shiva 1992:213). Unless local 
communities enjoy strong protection from the state, they are often dispossessed o f 
their resources when these become commercially attractive to others (Barraclough 
& Ghimire 1995). With respect to conservation efforts, rural populations and 
indigenous peoples can suffer adverse effects on their livelihoods and food security 
as a result o f the establishment o f protected areas that reduce their access to what 
had previously been common property resources (Ghimire & Pimbert 1997, Horta
1994).
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Indigenous peoples and rural people often may know that their long-term 
survival depends on using resources in a way that will not lead to their depletion or 
irreversible destruction. They often possess what Lonsdale calls "inherited 
ecological caution" (Lonsdale 1987: 274). Indigenous knowledge is a dynamic 
process or as Vandana Shiva puts it, nature itself is the experiment and ordinary 
people are the scientists as sylviculturalists, agriculturalists and water experts 
(Shiva 1992). An example is the description offered by Jacobs about management 
systems amongst the Maasai with their detailed knowledge about a myriad issues 
ranging from elaborate grazing sequences to ensure dry-season reserves o f  hay and 
water, to the nutritional value o f livestock, many grasses, herbs and seeds at the 
appropriate stage o f their growth (Little & Brokensha 1987). Paul Richards in his 
study o f traditional knowledge systems in West African farming systems found the 
environmental management o f small farmers to be dynamic and innovative and 
argues for the support o f indigenous science instead o f undercutting it with foreign 
expert advice (Richards 1985).
Vansina states that tradition is a process: it lives only while it changes 
(Vansina 1990: 251). Recognizing the stewardship o f local and indigenous peoples 
over their resources does not mean that their practices cannot change. The notion 
that local people only be allowed in or near biodiversity conservation areas if  they 
do not change their practices is what Goodland has described as "forced 
primitivism" (Goodland 1982:21, Colchester 1994).
2.5.2 Indigenous Peoples
Indigenous peoples have a unique status and must receive special attention 
because o f their historical claims to the lands of their ancestors and their 
vulnerability to disease and general disruption o f their lives when they enter into 
contact with the modem world (Sponsel et al. 1996).
The World Commission on Environment and Development warns o f 
"cultural extinction" (WCED 1987: 114) when it describes the situation o f 
indigenous and tribal peoples whom it recognizes as being the holders o f 
extraordinary skills which enable them to manage very complex ecological 
systems. “Indigenous peoples” here refers to peoples in a particular territory with 
their own social and cultural characteristics distinct from the dominant culture o f
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the nation state where they live. The term is becoming increasingly synonymous 
with concepts such as tribal peoples and cultural minorities (Gray 1991). In order 
to counter the increasing vulnerability o f indigenous peoples to the loss o f their 
traditional lands, WCED recommends that "The starting point for a humane policy 
for such groups is the recognition and protection o f their traditional rights to land 
and the other resources that sustain their lives" (WCED 1987:115).
There are an estimated 200 million indigenous or tribal peoples in the 
world today, or about 4% o f world population (Burger cited in Gray 1991, World 
Bank 1982). The World Bank's paper on Tribal Peoples and Economic 
Development recognizes that indigenous peoples in tropical forest regions are the 
only known groups with the knowledge to use the resources o f tropical moist 
forests without degrading or destroying them. Based on this recognition, the World 
Bank commits itself not to support projects on tribal lands or projects that will 
affect tribal lands, unless the tribal society is in agreement with the objectives o f 
the project and the borrowing state has the capacity to ensure no harmful side 
effects from the project (Goodland 1982).
Indigenous peoples' organizations recognize the increasing 
acknowledgment in the international community o f their traditional biodiversity 
knowledge. But they are concerned about the emphasis in international agreements 
on the sovereignty o f the state in exploiting the natural resources within its 
jurisdiction because this does little to strengthen ancestral rights to territories if  the 
state chooses to ignore these rights (United Nations 1992: Article 3).
The Charter o f the Indigenous Tribal Peoples o f the Tropical Forests, an 
international coalition o f  tribal groups which gives a voice to peoples who are 
often in remote (and the biologically most diverse) regions, states in its Article 42:
"The best guarantee o f  the conservation o f biodiversity is 
that those who promote it should uphold our rights to the 
use, administration, management and control o f our 
territories. We assert that guardianship should be 
entrusted to us, indigenous peoples, given that, we have 
inhabited them for thousands o f years and our very 
survival depends on them" (International Alliance o f the 
Indigenous-Tribal Peoples o f the Tropical Forests 1992).
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2.5.3 Human Ecology Perspective
The cultural groups that appear to be the least destructive to natural systems 
are those that have been occupying the same place for centuries or more (Chandler
1991). Beyond this point, there is growing recognition that biodiversity and 
cultural diversity are linked in a two-way fashion and that both people and their 
habitats are part o f a reciprocal system (Vansina 1990). Human cultures are shaped 
in part by the living environment that they in turn influence (WRI, IUCN, UNEP,
1992). Bailey states that biodiversity exists in central Africa today, not despite 
human habitation, but because o f it (Bailey 1996; 325).
Nelson and Serafin argue that biodiversity cannot be understood in its 
complexity if  the activities and influences o f humans over long periods o f time are 
ignored (Nelson & Serafin 1992). The definition o f biodiversity must go beyond 
primarily biological definitions and include the multitude o f human activities, land- 
uses and institutional arrangements which help shape biodiversity. In this view 
biodiversity is not just simply the underpinning o f human activity but is also the 
result o f human activities that occurred over millennia. A corollary is that the 
exclusion o f indigenous peoples and local communities from protected areas and 
the neglect o f their knowledge can lead to a gradual impoverishment o f 
biodiversity (Ghimire & Pimbert 1997, Bailey 1996).
A related aspect concerns the intellectual property rights o f local 
communities whose activities have helped create what are regarded as "wild 
species" and who have enhanced biodiversity in general. The Convention on 
Biodiversity calls for the equitable sharing o f the benefits arising from "...the 
knowledge, innovations and practices o f  indigenous and local communities" 
(United Nations 1992: Art. 8(j)). UNEP's Global Biodiversity Assessment declares 
that the equitable sharing o f benefits o f biodiversity is a pre-requisite for creating 
the incentives needed to maintain the Earth’s biological wealth (Watson & 
Heywood 1995).
2.5.4 Ignoring Historical Geography
Ignoring or misinterpreting a region’s historical land-use patterns can lead 
to seriously misguided decisions, as anthropologists Fairhead and Leach 
demonstrate in the case o f  Guinea. They studied the historical vegetation cover o f
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the Ziama Reserve in the prefecture o f Kissidougou and then compared it to 
present-day forest cover (Fairhead & Leach 1993). They found that forest cover 
had actually increased substantially over the past 40 years. When officials from a 
conservation and a development organization visited the area, they concluded that 
the area had been subject to massive environmental degradation. Their findings 
resulted in a World Bank loan to halt the alleged destruction (IUCN 1991, World 
Bank 1991c).3 Fairhead & Leach do not downplay problems stemming from large- 
scale logging operations, the establishment o f plantations or other industrial 
interventions in the forest area. However, they succeed in establishing that the 
long-term historical and the socio-political context, which links local people to 
their forest environment, is essential to understanding the dynamics o f  a changing 
environment. Little and Brokensha emphasize a similar idea when they state that 
local resource management has to be examined in the context o f social change and 
that simplistic causal statements about the breakdown in local resource 
management and associated ecological problems are inappropriate (Little & 
Brokensha 1987).
2.5.5 Underlying Causes of Biodiversity Loss
Keohane argues that effectiveness requires that a problem is more or less 
correctly perceived (Keohane 1996) Understanding the causes o f a problem is part 
o f that perception. The causes o f deforestation and biodiversity loss are multiple 
and complex and vary according to local circumstances (Sponsel et al. 1996). 
Humankind has cleared forests throughout centuries but deforestation appears to 
have accelerated whenever technological innovations increased integration o f the 
world economy. In his broad historical sweep, Williams argues that the cause and 
progress o f deforestation can be found in world economic development beginning 
with European expansion in the late fifteenth century which led to a redistribution 
o f people, plants and technologies (Williams 1990). The improvement o f 
technologies in logging tools and transportation has accelerated deforestation over 
time and has led to a situation where at present most o f it is occurring in tropical 
countries (Wilson 1998, Myers 1989, Williams 1990).
3 The World Bank’s “Projet de Gestion des Ressources Forestieres” o f  1989 was followed by 
preparation for a Rural Resources Management Project, both o f  which focused on theZiama Forest
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Clearance o f  forests for agriculture is generally accepted as the proximate 
cause o f deforestation but there is considerable debate about the underlying forces 
driving agricultural expansion. Swidden agriculture, often pejoratively called slash 
and bum  farming, is usually seen as the culprit by governments and international 
aid agencies. However, it is not just poor farmers who are causing the forest to 
disappear. Forest conversion for industrial monocrop production is an important 
cause o f forest loss and erosion o f genetic diversity. With regard to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the World Bank has established a theory closely linking population growth, 
unsound agricultural practices and environmental degradation (Cleaver &
Schreiber 1992). Studies sponsored by the World Bank usually list demographic 
growth and underdevelopment as the forces driving forest and biodiversity loss 
(Srivastava, P.J.et al. 1996). The Bank's Forest Policy also lists population pressure 
as the first cause o f deforestation but adds three further causes, including 
deterioration o f income opportunities in some countries, greater access to frontier 
areas as a result o f infra-structure development and subsidies for alternative land- 
uses and logging (World Bank 1991). A non-differentiated claim that puts 
population pressure at the heart o f environmental degradation may often be too 
simplistic and miss the root o f the problem. Westoby, the former head o f F AO's 
Forestry Department, argues that deforestation has less to do with the numbers o f 
humans than with the way that human society is organized and that deforestation 
progresses most rapidly when exploitation o f subordinate groups and resources has 
intensified (Westoby 1988). In many cases, resource degradation associated with 
overpopulation may be the result o f the loss and/or privatization o f lands around 
communal areas (Little and Brokensha 1987).
In addition to agriculture, forestry practices, fisheries, transportation and 
urban development can all be proximate causes o f biodiversity loss (Watson & 
Heywood 1995). Often these activities are promoted through misconceived 
development projects and funded through international development aid (Rich 
1994, Caufield 1996). Further causes o f biodiversity loss are those mentioned in 
the plan o f action emerging out o f UNCED, known as Agenda 21, which include 
inappropriate land tenure systems and increasing demand for forest products 
(Posey 1996).
Reserve in Guinea.
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Consumption patterns in Northern countries which generate demand for 
tropical crops, timber and increasingly for genetic raw materials from the "wild" to 
supply growing biotechnology industries, are a significant driving force of 
biodiversity loss. Soule argues that overharvesting o f  wild species and forests 
occurs when countries are undergoing integration into the global economy and land 
is opened up to human groups with no experience o f the geographic setting in 
which they are operating (Soule 1991). The role o f the international economy in 
biodiversity loss includes other variables such as deteriorating terms o f trade and 
foreign debt burdens which encourage countries to overexploit their resources for 
foreign exchange earnings (McNeely et al. 1990, Barraclough & Ghimire 1995). 
Deep-seated economic and social forces must be considered at the root o f  forest 
and biodiversity loss. Colchester and Lohmann succeed in providing a succinct 
description o f the causes o f deforestation when they state that it is both wealth and 
poverty which underlie deforestation and that it is in the inequitable structures that 
link the two that the roots o f forest loss can be located (Colchester & Lohmann 
1991).
2*5.6 The Interplay of Local and Global Sustainability
While the ‘sustainable livelihoods’ concept establishes a close link to local 
biodiversity conservation, there may also be a broader link to global food supply. 
The significance o f genetic diversity is often highlighted with reference to global 
agriculture and food security since the few food staple species on which a majority 
o f the world’s population depends have been improved by tapping genes from 
their wild relatives to increase their resistance to pests and disease (Brown et al.
1993). Continued progress in raising and sustaining agricultural yields hinges on 
better protecting and harnessing the earth’s biological wealth (Srivastava et al. 
1996).
Genetic erosion occurs in the context o f the world-wide spread o f new 
varieties o f crops and livestock which have replaced traditional varieties. Africa, 
for example, is estimated to have more native cereals than any other continent. 
Conservation o f this exceptional cluster o f  cereal biodiversity holds the promise to 
thrive where introduced crops are problematic and thereby help provide nutritious 
food on relatively infertile soils (National Research Council 1996). A similar
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connection exists between biodiversity and human health. Traditional medicine 
directly derived from local biodiversity is the main form o f health care for a 
majority o f people in developing countries. In addition, biodiversity in tropical 
forests has yielded numerous pharmaceutical compounds which have been 
synthesized into popular western drugs. More recently, pharmaceutical companies 
have shown increasing interest in incorporating ethnobotanical studies in their 
research and development programmes (Balick et al.1996).
A purely technical approach o f collecting and storing genetic material is not 
feasible. Ex-situ collections o f seeds and field gene banks suffer from a myriad o f 
financial and managerial problems but even more importantly, they suffer from a 
loss o f cultural infonnation on how to use the varieties in their collections (Watson 
& Heywood 1995). The importance o f wild populations can hardly be overstated 
due to the fact that ex-situ collections o f plant germplasm are no longer capable o f 
evolving in response to environmental changes, only wild populations can do so.
Food security and human health are linked to biodiversity conservation. 
Giving priority to sustainable livelihoods in biodiversity-rich regions appears to be 
the most promising way to serve the needs of both local and international 
communities.
2.5.7 Rapid Social and Economic Change
In view o f rapid social and economic change, such as the spread o f either 
externally or internally generated demand for money, it is less clear if  rural 
populations and indigenous peoples will continue to be able to protect and generate 
biodiversity as they have done until today. Indigenous societies are well-equipped 
to conserve biodiversity given their extensive traditional knowledge o f their 
environment and a desire to remain on their land in the future. However, whether 
indigenous peoples are the bearers o f  a conservationist ethic is a contentious 
question (Colchester 1994). Colchester believes that ecological balance may have 
more to do with traditional political systems and settlement patterns than with a 
conservationist attitude to the enviromnent (Colchester 1994). W hen indigenous 
peoples have lost part o f their ancestral land to outsiders, too many people may 
have to share too little land, resulting in over-use and degradation o f the
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environment (Little & Brokensha 1987). The introduction o f new technologies, 
such as chainsaws, guns for hunting and agricultural equipment, may not only 
change land-use patterns but also traditional value systems and decision-making 
processes as a result o f changing internal social dynamics (Colchester 1994).
Little and Brokensha do not argue for a return to indigenous systems o f 
resource management but suggest that these be examined and that current 
paradigms of natural resource use be subject to more rigorous empirical analysis 
(Little & Brokensha 1987).
2.6 Summary
This chapter provides an overview o f several strands o f literature, all of 
which provide context to the question o f the compliance o f international financial 
institutions with their own biodiversity-related policy mandates. The chapter 
begins by laying out the basic ideas o f political ecology thinking and its 
relationship to the critical theory o f development. Both share the recognition that 
environmental problems cannot be understood in isolation from economic and 
political forces. The core research o f this study fits well into an as yet 
underexplored area o f political ecology, which occupies itself with the interface o f 
international financial institutions and the environment.
The theoretical background is followed by reviewing publications on the 
emergence o f a global biodiversity agenda and the adoption o f this agenda by 
international financial institutions. Armed with natural science arguments, 
environmentalism in Northern countries has been able to attract government 
attention and funding for biodiversity conservation to be undertaken in Southern 
countries. The World Bank, in which Northern governments exercise predominant 
influence, has adopted biodiversity as a central theme in its stated objective o f 
promoting sustainable development. In addition, the GEF has firmly established 
biodiversity as one o f the most important global environmental problems to be 
solved by the international community.
The final sections o f the chapter review the literature covering the natural 
and social science perspectives on biodiversity. Both perspectives have helped 
shape the institutions’ biodiversity related policies. The identification o f the 
biodiversity problem by the natural sciences generated the political support for the
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adoption o f biodiversity-related policies by the World Bank and for the 
establishment o f the GEF. The emphasis of the policies on the participation o f 
local people in the design and implementation o f projects indicates a shift away 
from pure conservation biology to include findings obtained by social science 
studies which view biodiversity conservation as a social process.
The natural science perspective embraces biodiversity as an all- 
encompassing concept whose reach extends from the tiniest micro-organism to the 
earth’s atmosphere. Although scientific uncertainties remain with regard to 
estimating species loss, natural scientists have identified the problem of 
biodiversity loss by mostly focusing on tropical moist forests which are widely 
held to be the most biologically diverse terrestrial habitats (Groombridge 1994). 
Correspondingly, the loss o f these habitats through deforestation or forest 
degradation is considered to be one of the most important conservation problems 
today.
The causes o f biodiversity loss are linked to both global economic forces 
and to local social forces and have to be addressed at different levels. Purely 
technical solutions to biodiversity conservation which focus on ex-situ collections 
o f genetic materials are not feasible for a variety of reasons but especially because 
only species in the wild can continue to evolve in response to environmental 
changes. Global agriculture, food security and medicine are likely beneficiaries of 
in-situ biodiversity conservation.
From a social science perspective, biodiversity is inextricably linked to the 
livelihoods o f local communities and these must be given priority if  biodiversity 
protection is to be successful (Redclift 1987). The concept o f  sustainable 
livelihoods is increasingly being placed at the center o f the biodiversity 
conservation debate and adopted by mainstream development thinking. Human 
ecology thinking takes this a further step by recognizing not only the role o f human 
activities in protecting biodiversity but in helping to create biodiversity in the first 
place.
Biodiversity is a privileged arena for the observation o f the interplay 
between global and local processes. To the complexities o f international financial 
institutions which are not homogeneous entities but the locus o f often contradictory 
currents, are added the complexities o f socio-political, economic and cultural 
factors in the biodiversity-rich regions o f the South. In view o f the many possible
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approaches to the institutional, political and socio-economic variables that lie at the 
heart o f biodiversity erosion and conservation (Machlis 1992, Blaikie &
Jeanrenaud 1997), this study focuses on one small but influential piece o f the 
overall picture: the compliance o f the international financial institutions with their 
own biodiversity-related policies.
The next chapter presents the methodology employed in studying the 
institutions’ compliance with their own policies and describes the analytical tools 
which help explain the reasons for the convergence or divergence o f existing 
policies from operational practice. This is followed by chapter 4 which provides a 
more in-depth view o f the World Bank and the GEF as well as an introduction to 
the geographic, political and economic space o f Cameroon. The following three 
chapters cover three distinct operations financed by the institutions in Cameroon. 
The choice o f country fell on Cameroon because both the World Bank and the 
GEF consider Cameroon to be home to globally important biodiversity.
Ultimately, the analysis o f the results o f the case studies and the 
institutions’ own internal evaluation reports help generate insights into the 
necessary conditions under which international financial institutions are likely to 
adhere to their own policy mandates. Future studies on the effectiveness of 
development assistance and environmental aid may find these results to be a useful 
point o f departure.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL TOOLS 
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the 
methodologies used throughout the research phase o f this study, describing the 
sources o f infonnation and the informal research methods employed in the 
gathering o f information. The section is completed by notes on field research in 
Cameroon. This research examined the degree o f World Bank compliance with its 
environmental policies during the environmental assessment phase o f a proposed 
oil pipeline. The final section o f this chapter describes the analytical tools being 
employed to explain the conclusions o f the case study material and the findings o f 
the World Bank’s and G EF’s own internal evaluation reports. Tools from political 
science as well as from the areas o f sociology and economics concerned with 
theory o f  organization are helpful in explaining the convergence or divergence o f 
policies and operational practice.
3.2 Methodology
A 1995 study on organizational learning analysed the response o f thirteen 
international organizations to environmental challenges and concluded that only 
the World Bank and the United Nations Environment Program had fully learned to 
integrate environmental considerations with their traditional responsibilities (Haas 
& Haas 1995). In the case of the World Bank, the study cites the institution’s 
policy requirement to carry out environmental assessments for all the major 
projects it funds and its role in the administration o f the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) as evidence for successful institutional learning. The conclusion o f 
this study is open to challenge because, as Gasper suggests, policies cannot be 
judged primarily by their good intentions or supposed inherent worthiness 
regardless o f actual performance (Gasper 1996a: 160). The number o f 
environmental staff, the availability o f funding and policy commitments to
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biodiversity conservation have reached unprecedented levels in the international 
financial institutions. But, as Wade points out, these indicators do not necessarily 
shed light on actual operations o f the institutions (Wade 1997b).
The World Bank’s and GEF’s environmental literature and its numerous 
enviromnental policies convey the idea that environmental considerations are now 
solidly integrated into the institutions’ main work programmes. While the 
publications and policies may reflect the thinking o f sectors within the institutions, 
they do not necessarily affect the design and implementation o f  specific 
programmes financed by the institutions. The World Bank’s and the GEF’s own 
internal evaluation reports admit that the institutions are doing a poor job o f 
monitoring the implementation o f their own projects and therefore may not record 
how policies are applied in practice (Global Environment Facility 1994a, World 
Bank 1995j, Fox & Brown 1998).1
A further problem is that few independent researchers are monitoring the 
preparation and implementation o f programmes and projects funded by the 
international financial institutions. It is this lacuna that the present research helps to 
fill. Following Blaikie’s suggestion that there must be ‘place-based’ analysis 
(Blaikie 1985), this study chooses Cameroon as a specific geographic context in 
which to examine the World Bank’s and the GEF’s compliance with their 
biodiversity-related policies.
The research is facilitated by the author’s professional experience in non­
governmental organization activities focused on monitoring the environmental 
debate at the World Bank. This work, which stretches over a decade, also has 
permitted her to closely follow the evolution o f the Global Environment Facility 
from its pilot phase in the early 1990s through its consolidation following the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and to the present. 
The long-term contacts at the institutions have created a situation where the author 
had access to numerous World Bank and GEF officials who were willing to share 
their experiences within the institutions -  albeit in a confidential manner. For the 
same reason, the author was able to review internal World Bank documentation 
which is rarely made publicly available or found in libraries.
1 Chapter 8 reviews the World Bank and the GEF’s own evaluation efforts in more detail.
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A further facilitating factor was the author’s previous knowledge o f 
Cameroon and the existence o f long-term relationships with non-governmental 
organizations and researchers in the country (Horta 1991). This combination o f 
factors facilitated the research in Washington, D.C. and in Cameroon and enabled 
the researcher to gain a more in-depth understanding o f the internal dynamics at 
play in the international financial institutions.
One methodological risk o f the present study is that it is limited to only one 
country. A trade-off had to be made between choosing to study World Bank and 
GEF policy compliance in several countries or several different types o f 
programmes financed by the institutions in only one country. The latter option was 
chosen because o f the need to cover different types o f programmes ranging from 
World Bank macro-economic policy prescriptions to a GEF-funded project for the 
management o f protected areas. Coverage o f this broad spectrum o f activities is 
required in order to gain an understanding o f how biodiversity concerns are 
integrated at different levels. While the risk o f limiting the study to one country 
cannot be completely eliminated, the risk is being mitigated by contrasting the 
findings o f the Cameroon case examples with World Bank and GEF evaluation and 
quality perfonnance reports which cover the institutions’ overall activities. In 
addition, placing the place-specific results in the broader context o f the 
institutions’ own evaluation results may help identify more systemic patterns o f 
internal institutional dynamics.
Another critical argument that can be made is that the success or failure of 
compliance with World Bank and GEF policies can be attributed to the 
governments in the project countries. The importance o f governmental 
commitment has been shown to be the major explanatory factor for the success or 
failure o f environmental programmes (Connolly 1996). However, the position 
taken here is that the responsibility for the implementation o f the policies lies with 
the international financial institutions which are being entrusted with the 
management o f international public financial resources and have the fiduciary 
responsibility to ensure that the funding is used according to established policies 
and for the intended purposes.
While there are differences in the organizational structures o f the World 
Bank and the GEF and despite the fact that the former disburses loans and the latter 
grants, these distinctions matter less than the fact that World Bank loans and GEF
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biodiversity investment projects are prepared by the same staff, under the same 
policy direction and within the same institutional framework. Therefore, as 
Keohane suggests, the same obstacles to effectiveness that have hamstrung 
development assistance can be expected with respect to international funding for 
the environment (Keohane 1996). The case studies as well as the institutions’ own 
evaluation reports may help confirm this expectation.
3.2.1 Sources of Information
Research for this thesis utilized two principal sources o f  information: 
written documents and interviews. The main research site is Washington, D.C., 
where both World Bank headquarters and the Secretariat o f  the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) are located. The other research site is Cameroon 
including the capital o f Yaounde and villages in the southern and south-eastern 
forest region. The research was conducted using informal research methods, 
especially semi-structured interviews.
3.2.2 Documents
The documents being used are from a variety o f sources. World Bank 
documents include both publicly available infonnation (annual reports, policy 
papers, environmental reports, etc.) as well as internal documents (office 
memoranda, Memoranda o f the President to the Board o f Executive Directors, 
Operations Evaluation Department Reports, Implementation Completion Reports, 
etc.). Other sources for documents are the Global Environment Facility (project 
documents, evaluation reports) and the Republic o f Cameroon (project documents, 
environmental assessments). Academic research and conference papers provide 
complementary information and insights.
3.2.3 Interviews
Those interviewed represent a broad cross-section o f  officials involved in 
policy-making and project management in the World Bank's Washington, D.C. 
headquarters and in the GEF Secretariat. One interview was held with the official 
in charge o f  forests and environment in the World Bank's Yaounde office. In 
addition to interviews with the institutions' staff and management, interviews were 
held with officials working at the political level either in the offices o f World Bank
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Executive Directors or as government representatives to the bi-annual GEF 
Council meetings.
Interviews in Cameroon were held with government officials, 
representatives o f non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) in the capital and in the 
south-eastern forest region, as well as residents o f local villages and members o f 
the Bakola and Baka indigenous communities.
The central purpose o f the field research was to gauge the participation o f 
NGOs, local villagers and members o f the indigenous communities in the 
preparation o f the environmental assessment o f the oil pipeline. In order to achieve 
a broadly representative picture o f NGO views in Cameroon, the interviews in 
Yaounde, covered a wide range o f  different organizations, ranging from large 
expatriate environmental and humanitarian organizations to the affiliates o f 
African NGO networks and smaller Cameroonian NGOs. More details on the field 
research component are provided in section 3.3. while maps and research questions 
are provided in chapter 6.
Academic scholars in the United States, Europe and in Cameroon helped 
provide additional insights. A complete list o f interviews is not produced here due 
to the confidential nature o f  many o f the interviews held with World Bank and 
GEF staff in Washington, D.C. . Interestingly, the confidentiality requirement was 
more pronounced with World Bank and GEF staff in Washington, D.C. than in 
Cameroon despite the country's restrictions on freedom o f expression.
3.2.4 Informal Research Methods
The qualitative nature o f the research called for informal social research 
methods such as non-random sampling and semi-structured interviews. Informal 
methods are considered to be essential in exploring community attitudes when 
dealing with a potentially sensitive topic (Nichols 1991). Interviews with World 
Bank staff often were o f  a confidential nature and the informality o f the approach 
was essential to obtaining information.
The interviews have been conducted using the following informal research 
methods: the use o f key-informants, individual in-depth interviews and group 
discussions. Formal survey questionnaires, large samples and statistical analysis 
would have been time-consuming and costly. Given the nature o f  the inquiry, 
quantitative analysis was not necessary to obtain results in this particular area o f
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research. Instead, questions were individualized for the issue, the organizational 
affiliation or the interest o f the person involved. A semi-structured interview 
approach was used, which introduced the questions as topics o f conversation and 
left sufficient flexibility for the respondents to express their own attitudes and 
priorities. In terms o f financial cost, speed o f delivery o f results and depth o f 
perception, social science research has shown that the qualitative research 
approach using a selection procedure based on the critical judgm ent o f the 
researcher is superior to an officially conducted random sample survey o f a 
conventional kind (Ward 1993, Nichols 1991).
The methodology used in Cameroon fits into the Participatory Rural (or 
Urban) Appraisal (PRA) approach, which, by definition, allows for a great variety 
o f methods and techniques in both urban and rural settings to learn directly from 
local people. An advantage o f the approach is that it gets an assessment o f the 
proposed project from the grassroots level. A drawback o f the approach is that it 
represents an intrusion into rural society without any immediate and visible benefit 
to the community. For this reason, special care was taken to avoid raising false 
expectations amongst the members o f the communities visited. The questions 
raised with local people were straightforward and simple since the purpose o f the 
PRA was limited to assess the compliance with the World Bank’s mandatory 
policy which requires the participation o f locally affected people in the design and 
execution o f an environmental assessment.
PRA and its predecessor, the Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) approach, have 
been described as being like good investigative journalism, involving an 
imaginative and intelligent use o f common sense put to a specified goal (Pratt & 
Loizos 1992). The PRA and RRA approaches deliberately use different methods o f 
gathering information as a way o f cross-checking and o f  generating a picture o f a 
specific situation and does so in a quick and inexpensive way (Nichols 1991).
Unless done badly, as Robert Chambers puts it, PRA is practical and better 
for many purposes than alternatives (Chambers 1993). On the other hand, a central 
problem o f the PRA method is that while it provides useful insights on the status 
quo, it reveals little about the future. This shortcoming is not relevant for the 
purpose o f this research since its emphasis is placed on insights relating to a 
specific point in time and not on future trends. PRA methods are often used for the 
analysis o f complex situations, such as local income-generation structures and
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wealth ranking o f local people to identify the poorest among them, whose results 
are then used to develop frameworks for participatory planning and the design o f 
development projects based on local priorities. By comparison, the purpose o f the 
present research addresses a problem that is o f a relatively simple and 
straightforward nature and therefore can avoid sensitive social or gender related 
matters in complex local situations. The questions asked concerned local people’s 
knowledge o f and participation in the environmental impact assessment study for 
the proposed oil pipeline project.
The method chosen is one o f non-random sampling where the selection is 
based on the researcher's judgment. This method, which is also known as 
purposive sampling, carries the risk o f producing a significant bias. The research 
has tried to address this risk by including interviews with national and local 
government representatives and by systematically surveying the opinions o f non­
governmental organizations in Cameroon which are active in the areas o f 
development and environment. These range from small advocacy groups to large 
NGO organizations, which are often members o f extensive African NGO 
networks, to the field offices o f expatriate NGOs. The phase o f  research in a rural 
setting was facilitated by the guidance and experience o f Cameroonian NGOs. 
Through contact with the researcher, these NGOs developed an interest in the 
research subject for use in their own activities related to promoting environmental 
and social safeguards in the context o f the proposed project.
The semi-structured interview approach provided the flexibility o f adapting 
to the different cultural settings o f  the respondents, which included government 
officials, members o f  the NGO-community, villagers and semi-nomadic forest 
people. An unstructured interview approach might not have led to clear responses 
on the basic questions that needed to be addressed. A fully structured interview, on 
the other hand, might have been seen as too official and in the rural areas would 
have raised suspicions about being government-related.
3,3 Notes on Field Research Concerning the Proposed Oil Pipeline
Field research on World Bank compliance with its own mandatory 
environmental policies was carried out in the context o f the proposed oil pipeline 
project. Details on the field research, including maps and a check list o f questions, 
are provided in chapter 6. The listing o f the groups o f respondents (Fig. 3.1)
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provides an overview o f the different interview settings while the following 
sections on the individual groups identify some o f the possible drawbacks o f the 
interview situations. However, since the questions were simple (e.g. Have you 
heard about a planned pipeline project?) and did not represent an interference with 
sensitive issues o f local people's lives, the interviews did not pose problems despite 
the cultural differences amongst the respondents and the need for multiple 
translation. The interview situation was open and people could raise issues they 
cared about if  they so chose (e.g. will the revenues from the pipeline be distributed 
fairly?).
Representatives of NGQ Community
• National Environmental and Development NGOs
• Enviromnental and Development NGOs led by Expatriate Staff
w  Groups of Local Villagers
• Bwambe Village (on the coast near Kribi)
• Eboundja Village (on the coast near Kribi)
• Lomie (small town in the south-eastern forest region)
Forest-Dwellers (Baka and Bakola People)
• Bakola Camp (two hours upstream from the Lobe River)
• Bakola Settlements along the Lolodorf-Kribi Road
• Baka living near IUCN-Ecodevelopment Project (Lomie)
Fig. 3.1 Groups o f  Respondents
3.3.1 Representatives of the NGO-Community
The individual and in-depth interviews with leaders o f the NGO 
community in Cameroon were a critical component o f the research. The research 
efforts covered the broadest possible spectrum o f NGOs in Cameroon in order to 
ensure the representativity o f the interviews being conducted. The NGOs ranged 
from large international environmental and social NGO networks (such as WWF 
and Care) and African development NGO networks (such as Saild and Inades) to 
smaller national NGOs (such as the Center for Environment and Development and 
African Forest Action Network). While the representativity o f NGOs is always a
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question open to debate, the comprehensiveness o f the effort to cover a broad 
range o f NGOs, including most o f the major NGO networks and NGOs present in 
Cameroon, helped ensure that the interview results were representative o f  NGO 
experience concerning the oil pipeline project.
NGOs are often used to facilitate the contact between donor agencies 
and rural people. Given the World Bank’s policy mandate to consult with locally 
affected people during the environmental assessment process, it would have been 
likely that the World Bank, or its proxies, i.e. the Government o f Cameroon and 
the private sector (EXXON, Shell, ELF in the case o f  the pipeline project), would 
have made use o f the broad and wide-spread presence o f the NGO community in 
rural areas to inform and consult with local people and solicit their input. 
Interviewing representatives o f the very diverse Cameroonian NGO community 
was facilitated by the fact that the researcher was known to many o f them for a 
period o f several years and a basis o f trust existed already. There were no language 
problems both in a literal and conceptual sense. Communication was mainly in 
French, except for interviews with Anglophone NGOs, and the concepts being 
dealt with (e.g. what is an environmental impact assessment?) were equally 
familiar to the interviewer and the respondents. Some o f the NGOs developed a 
keen interest in the research topic as a way o f  obtaining more information on the 
potential environmental and social impacts o f the oil pipeline. Their assistance was 
a vital aspect o f field visits since they speak local languages and are known to at 
least some people in the local villages. Despite the fact that the initial 
environmental assessment had been completed, NGO-interviews revealed that the 
NGOs did not know the routing o f  the pipeline with any degree o f precision except 
for the fact that it would enter the ocean at or near Kribi. This is why we chose 
villages near Kribi, where the oil pipeline and its marine facilities were likely to 
have direct impacts, as the sites for study.
3.3.2 Groups of Villagers
Given the possibility, even if  remote, that the NGOs had been by-passed, it 
was important to include interviews with people in an area known to be affected by 
a major infrastructure project (the oil pipeline in this case). Since interviewing 
members o f local communities represents an intrusion into rural society without 
any immediate and visible benefit to them (Bulmer, M. 1993), much care was put
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into introducing the purpose o f  the visit and to ensure that the presence o f outsiders 
would not raise false expectations (Hershfield et al. 1993).
Two villages (Eboudja and Bwambe) near the town o f Kribi were chosen 
for interviews with local people because o f their proximity to the marine terminal 
o f the oil pipeline. During the first phase o f the field research before the 
approximate routing o f  the pipeline was known, the small town o f Lomie was 
included in the local interview as well. The people interviewed were not chosen 
according to particular criteria, but were the people who were present in the 
villages at the time o f the research visits. They included a group o f elders, as well 
as youth and individual women and men.
The cooperation o f Cameroonian NGOs was critical. An initial important 
point o f clarification was to explain that the research group did not work for the 
government which, in the regions visited, is looked at with reserve and suspicion. 
After a warm-up period, the respondents seemed to be glad about the visit and to 
see the interview as an opportunity to express their opinions and make their voices 
heard. Only part o f the conversation/interview was in French, another part o f it was 
in the local Bantu language and was translated for the researcher by the 
Cameroonian NGO representatives.
3.3.3 Bakola People and Baka People
The Bakola people, who live in Cameroon’s coastal forest area where the 
pipeline is to enter the ocean, and the Baka people o f the country’s south-eastern 
forests, are often referred to as Pygmies. However, they feel that this term is 
derogatory and prefer to be called by their proper ethnic names. Both are semi- 
nomadic peoples who spend part o f the year in the forest in traditional hunting and 
gathering activities. During the dry season they often settle along the dirt roads that 
pass through forest areas near Bantu villages.
Interviewing the Bakola and Baka people presents a special challenge for a 
variety o f reasons. However, the relative simplicity o f the basic research questions 
allowed for simple responses. A more complicated fonn o f inquiry could not have 
been carried out with the research tools being used as it would have required 
considerable knowledge o f local culture and language.
During the first phase o f  the field research, prior to the release o f  the 
environmental assessment, the situation o f the Baka in relation to the pipeline was
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uncertain since the exact routing o f the pipeline was not known. However, since 
some NGOs were concerned that the pipeline might pass near the Dja Wildelife 
Reserve, the first phase o f the field research included interviews with Baka people 
in the Lomie region. Some o f the younger members o f the community spoke basic 
French as a result o f some irregular attendance at local missionary schools. The 
first group o f Bakola interviewed was chosen on the basis o f  their geographic 
proximity to the potential routing o f the oil pipeline. The group was temporarily 
living in a forest camp in the wider Kribi area. The camp was located about two 
hours by canoe upstream o f the mouth o f the Lobe River on the Kribi coast. Local 
Bantu youth from a village near Kribi facilitated both the transportation and the 
translation from the Bakola language into a Bantu language from which it was 
translated into French.
The second phase o f the field research was carried out after the release of 
the environmental impact assessment which described the routing o f the pipeline. 
The environmental assessment also confirmed Kribi as the site o f the marine 
terminal of the pipeline from where the oil is to be pumped to an off-shore loading 
vessel. As a result o f that information, interviews were carried out with Bakola 
people living in small settlements along the Lolodorf-Bipindi-Kribi dirt road which 
runs parallel to the proposed oil pipeline.
The researcher was aware o f the ambivalent relationship between the Bantu 
villagers and the Baka and Bakola people. In general, Bantu villagers consider the 
forest-dwellers as very backward and in need o f being ‘civilized’ before they can 
become members o f  rural Bantu society. On the other hand, they admire the 
courage o f the Baka and Bakola because they live in the forest, which the Bantu 
consider to be dangerous. In addition, the Bantu rely on the Baka and Bakola 
knowledge o f medicinal plants for their healthcare needs.
Since the cultural and social divides between the Baka and Bakola and their 
Bantu neighbors needed to be taken into account and problems o f conceptual 
equivalence were to be expected, the author was aware o f  the potential dangers o f 
'cultural mis-hearing' or interpretation o f  responses in the translator's (or 
interviewer's) own socio-cognitive framework. As a result, the researcher observed 
and listened to the exchanges in a way that has been described as "lateral hearing", 
which includes a close observation o f the interaction (gestures, tone o f voice and 
attitude) between the Bantu facilitators/ translators and the Bakola people. Mitchel
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and Slim describe “lateral hearing” as a situation where the content o f what is 
being said is not necessarily reflected in the literal meaning o f the words (Mitchell 
& Slim 1990).
3.4 Analytical Tools
The section above presents the methodology being used in gathering 
information for the overall research and the case studies presented in this thesis. 
Once the case studies are completed and their results contrasted with the 
institutions’ own internal evaluation reports, analytical tools provided by two areas 
o f study may be useful to explain the findings. The two areas o f study derive from 
Ascher’s characterization o f the paradox o f international financial institutions as 
being creatures o f states as well as full-blown bureaucracies in their own right 
(Ascher 1983). They are political science, in particular its neo-realist perspective, 
and the areas o f sociology and economics concerned with theory o f organization.
3.4.1 Political Science Perspectives
Political science offers two competing theories o f international 
organizations:
(1) the institutional perspective states that international organizations help to 
reduce the role o f the nation-state and foster inter-dependence and exchange;
(2) the realist perspective states that international organizations are only effective if  
nation-states view them as advancing their own interests.
The institutional perspective holds little explanatory power for international 
financial institutions because o f  the considerable influence exercised by the 
principal donor governments and because the institution’s governing structures are 
a reflection o f the distribution o f power o f its member states. The most powerful 
member states not only provide the financial resources for the institutions, they are 
also largely responsible for determining the institutions’ policy framework.
The realist perspective o f political science has the most explanatory power 
for an understanding o f  the international financial institutions. The distribution o f 
power in the voting structure o f the Executive Board o f the World Bank and, in a 
modified fashion, in the GEF Council is based on voting shares which are 
proportional to a country’s financial contribution to the institutions.
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As a result o f  pressure from political constituencies in donor countries, the 
governments o f these countries worked for and succeeded in placing the 
enviromnent and biodiversity at the top o f  the agenda o f the international financial 
institutions. Yet while the most powerful government members o f the institutions 
are responsible for the adoption o f enviromnental and social policies and the flows 
of funding that come with it, what about the practical implementation o f these 
policies?2 Are the most powerful shareholding governments minding the store? If 
not, how is the bureaucracy handling the environmental policy mandates in 
practice?
According to Ascher, limiting the analysis of international financial 
institutions to the interests o f their main shareholding governments is inadequate 
since the institutions have developed into full-blown bureaucracies with their own 
institutional goals and autonomous space to pursue these goals (Ascher 1983). The 
bureaucracy itself has to be examined because it is an actor with objectives and 
approaches that are not simply the vector o f interests o f its member states (Wade 
1997a).
3.4.2 Theory of Organization Perspectives
The area o f sociology concerned with theory o f organization provides 
useful tools for analysing the workings o f bureaucracies. Max Weber, 
bureaucracy’s best known theoretician, defines bureaucracies as being at the center 
o f the modernization process in which nature and society become objects o f 
administration and management (Beetham 1996). The World Bank’s development 
mission and the GEF’s goal o f spreading protection o f the global environment to 
developing countries are motors o f a ‘modernization process’, where nature is 
considered to consist o f natural resources and society becomes human capital.
While W eber’s theories have limited usefulness in a world which has 
undergone profound changes since he first developed them, his definitions remain 
usefiil frames o f reference. For example, he defines bureaucrats as being subject to 
higher authority while involved in exercising authority themselves (Beetham 
1996). The definition fits the profile o f officials at the international financial 
institutions. On the one hand they are subject to the authority o f the institutions’
2 Chapter 4 examines in detail the political pressure which has led to the prioritisation o f  the 
environmental/ biodiversity agenda in the mandate o f the international financial institutions.
79
shareholding governments, on the other they enjoy broad discretionary power in 
deciding about funding priorities and large-scale international financial flows. 
Weber also defines bureaucracies as non-market organizations which are financed 
by grants and in which decision-makers are largely insulated from the 
consequences o f their actions (Beetham 1996). Again, this definition is applicable 
to the World Bank and the GEF which are financed both by outright grants and, in 
the case o f  the World Bank’s non-concessional lending, by grant-like collateral 
provided by donor countries against which the institution can borrow on private 
capital markets. Officials o f the institutions are not subject to sanctions in case o f 
ill-conceived projects and programs. In addition, given the World B ank’s preferred 
creditor status with its client governments, its loans are repaid irrespective o f the 
success or failure o f  the projects financed by these loans. Since GEF funding 
consists mostly o f grants, the repayment question does not pose itself.
This brief description o f international financial institutions as bureaucracies 
in the Weberian sense is to emphasize the importance o f paying attention to the 
internal dynamics o f the institutions themselves. Blaikie makes a similar point 
when he emphasizes that development agents are subject to analysis too, because 
they are part o f the solution as well as o f the problem (Blaikie 1995b).
In recent years, the World Bank, and subsequently the GEF, have 
recognized that ‘institutions do matter’ (Gray et al. 1990). In its analytical work, the 
World Bank emphasizes the critical role o f institutions and establishes positive co­
relations between institutional development and the success and sustainability o f 
development projects (World Bank 1994e). According to the head o f  the World 
Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED), Robert Picciotto, “ . . .policy is 
useless without an institutional machinery capable o f implementing it” (Picciotto 
1995: 18).
The revived interest in institutions has led to the creation o f a discipline 
named New Institutional Economics (NIE), which extends the scope o f economics 
to include an exploration o f ‘opportunism’, rationally self-interested behaviour and 
uncertainty in development theory. NIE challenges the prevalent economic 
orthodoxy o f the past decade which focuses on market forces and economic growth 
as the central forces while neglecting the role o f  institutions, and has stepped in to 
develop a theory o f appropriate institutional change (Harris et al. 1995, Toye
1995).
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The acknowledgement o f the critical importance o f responsible and 
accountable public institutions is focused on institutional development in 
developing countries (Toye 1995). It seems, however, appropriate to apply some o f 
the theoretical thinking being used to understand institutions in developing 
countries to the international financial institutions themselves.
The public choice approach o f theory o f organization, which is important to 
NIE, holds that international organizations cannot be assumed to be rational 
entities always acting in the public interest (Vaubel 1991). This approach views 
international organizations as self-interested entities which try to maximize their 
power in terms o f budget size, staff and freedom of discretion. A similar view is 
taken by the Open System Perspective o f Organization Theory which emphasizes 
that the fundamental goals o f an international organization, such as its survival, 
control over resources and decision-making authority, may be divorced from the 
objectives, or the value allocation, for which the organization was created (Le 
Pestre 1986).
In addition, theories o f organization also distinguish between (1) 
organizational adaptation and (2) organizational learning (Fiol & Lyles 1985). 
Organizational adaptation occurs when new pressures or incentives lead to 
adjustments without changing the institutions’ underlying goals and priorities. 
Organizational learning, on the other hand, leads to changes brought about by the 
adoption o f qualitatively new objectives and priorities. How can we evaluate if  
institutions are learning or merely adapting? One possible way is to look at how 
effective the institutions are in complying with their own policies.
NIE - Public Choice Approach; Institutions seen as self-interested entities 
Open System Perspective o f Organization Theory:
Organizational Goals vs. Value Allocation 
Institutional Adaptation vs. Institutional Learning
Fig 3.2 Overview o f  Theory o f  Organization Perspectives
3.5 Summary
The core question o f this thesis analyses the compliance o f the international 
financial institutions with their own biodiversity-related policies. The first part o f
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this chapter describes the methodologies used in the research presented in this 
thesis. It provides details on the sources o f information, which cover a wide range 
o f both publicly available and internal documents, as well as semi-structured 
interviews. The qualitative nature o f  the research called for the use o f  informal 
research methods. The author’s previous professional experience with regards to 
environmental policy at the World Bank and the GEF as well as her previous 
knowledge o f the country of Cameroon facilitated the research being undertaken in 
both Washington, D.C. and in Cameroon.
The second section describes the analytical tools borrowed from the 
political science and the theory o f organization perspectives which are employed to 
explain the conclusions o f the case studies and the findings obtained from 
contrasting them with the results o f the institutions’ own internal evaluation 
reports. Since international financial institutions are simultaneously governed by 
their member states and ruled by their own internal dynamics, analytical thinking 
from the realist perspective o f political science and the areas o f sociology and 
economics concerned with theory o f organization are helpful in explaining the 
convergence or divergence o f established policies and the institutions’operational 
practice.
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CHAPTER 4
THE BROAD RESEARCH LANDSCAPE: 
THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE COUNTRY
4.1 Introduction
The literature review (chapter 2) provides an outline o f  the field o f political 
ecology thinking and critical development theory before delving into the literature 
which covers the multiple views on biodiversity from the natural and social science 
perspectives. Chapter 3 addressed questions o f methodology and analytical tools.
The objective o f this chapter is to provide concise background infonnation 
and analysis on the two spaces in which the research for this thesis takes place. The 
principal space o f research consists o f two multilateral financial institutions, the 
World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), both o f  which are located 
in the same sprawl o f office buildings in downtown Washington, D.C. only a five- 
minute ride away from the White House, the executive seat o f power o f the 
institutions’ principal shareholder. The second space o f research is the concrete 
political, socio-economic and environmental country context o f Cameroon in 
which the compliance o f the two international financial institutions with their own 
policies as they relate to biodiversity is being examined.
In order to understand how the policies and operational guidelines o f these 
institutions are applied in a concrete geographic context, two choices had to be 
made. The first choice relates to selecting a specific policy area. The choice fell on 
biodiversity conservation because o f  its high profile in both the World Bank and 
the GEF and because it encompasses a variety o f environmental, social, economic- 
and political policy issues (chapter 2). The selection o f biodiversity protection as 
the policy theme helped narrow down the second choice concerning the selection 
o f a specific geographic and political space. Cameroon was chosen as this space 
because the World Bank and the GEF consider the country to be the site o f 
globally important biodiversity and both institutions are promoting programmes in 
the country which have direct as well as indirect impacts on biodiversity.
The first two sections o f this chapter provide an overview o f the institutions 
both o f which occupy strategic positions in the international system. W hile the 
World Bank has positioned itself as the central multilateral institution in the
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development field, the GEF has carved out its niche as the world's most significant 
source o f funding for projects intended to address global environmental problems.
The third section describes the political environment, as well as socio­
economic developments in Cameroon as they are reflected in World Bank reports. 
The final section provides information on the country's biodiversity from the point 
o f view o f the scientific and donor communities.
The monographic nature o f this chapter serves as background for the case 
studies presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The interface o f the two distinct spaces of 
research that are being portrayed here, i.e. the area where policy meets praxis, 
generates insights about the functioning o f the multilateral financial institutions. 
The goal is to help define the characteristics required o f global power structures 
that can mediate between global and local levels and thereby render such structures 
more accountable to their constituencies at different geographic scales (Harvey
1996).
4.2 The World Bank
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), more 
commonly known as the World Bank, was established in 1944 as one of the pillars 
of the post-World War II international financial architecture. It was created 
together with its sister organization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
both organizations are frequently referred to as the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
named after the small New Hampshire (U.S.) town where their founding 
conference took place.1 The World Bank was to be the primary lender for post-war 
European reconstruction, while the IMF was to improve international monetary 
arrangements and assist countries facing balance-of-payments problems with 
policy advice and finance (Helleiner et al.1983). Neither institution achieved 
primacy in the role for which it was initially created. The Marshall Plan was the 
leading financier in the rebuilding o f Europe, while international economic 
coordination has largely been the task o f the leading industrial powers which meet
1 A third pillar o f  the post World War II financial architecture consisted o f  plans to create an 
international trade organization. At the Bretton Woods conference governments established the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a set o f  rules for the trade o f  goods. GATT only 
found an institutional home in 1995 with the founding o f  the World Trade Organization
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as the Group o f Seven (G7) or in recent years, with the inclusion o f Russia, as the 
Group o f Eight (G8).
Both the World Bank and the IMF grew into roles not easily conceivable in 
1944 when European powers were still trying to keep a tight grip over their 
colonial empires in Asia and Africa. It was only when Latin American countries 
and an increasing number o f newly independent states became clients o f the 
Bretton Institutions that their role gained its present shape. While the focus here is 
on the World Bank, it is important to keep in mind that the institutions do not work 
in isolation from one another. When the IMF rescue packages for the troubled 
Asian and Russian economies came under harsh media criticism in the autumn o f 
1998, World Bank statements tried to distance the institution from the IMF by 
emphasizing its role in promoting long-term sustainable development as opposed 
to the IMF's short-term focus on providing balance-of-payments support.2 In 
practice, however, the division of labour between the two institutions has become 
blurred over time with a large percentage o f World Bank lending dedicated to fast 
disbursing loans which are intended to promote economic policy reforms. In 
addition, membership in the World Bank is only open to countries which are 
members o f the IMF and World Bank lending is usually conditional on a country 
having signed an agreement with the IMF (World Bank 1989a).
4.2.1 Institutional Bipolarity
As the first "Multilateral Development Bank" in a world governed by 
nation-states, the World Bank is a public sector institution which is owned by 
national governments. It is, however, subject to bi-polar tension between its 
government shareholders and its bureaucratic structure. This bipolarity has been 
described as the institution’s fundamental paradox (Ascher 1983). As an 
international financial institution, the World Bank is both the creature o f  its 
government shareholders and a full-blown bureaucracy in its own right. As a 
bureaucracy it is not a simple mirror-reflection o f its main shareholders because a 
variety o f organizational and professional norms have become ingrained in the 
bureaucratic structure which may render it distinct from the interests o f the 
participating nation-states (Ascher 1983).
2 See, for example, the Financial Times o f 12 October 1998 "Wolfensohn faces test o f  strategy."
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Unlike the United Nations General Assembly, the constitution for which 
was drawn up in 1945 and holds that all states are equal, independent o f power and 
size, the World Bank's founding in the previous year is rooted in political realism. 
Although, the World Bank is registered as a specialized United Nations agency, its 
relationship with the United Nations system is tenuous. World Bank management 
does not answer to the United Nations and the institution's budget is not included 
in the United Nations' budget (Hancock 1989). A further significant distinction 
between the World Bank and United Nations agencies is their different status o f 
power because World Bank advice, unlike that o f most U.N. agencies, is 
accompanied by significant financial flows (Kapur et al. 1997).
At the onset, the establishment o f the World Bank is an illustrative example 
o f the neo-realist perspective o f political science which holds that international 
organizations are an instrument o f the interests o f their most powerful state 
members. Ownership shares in the World Bank are based on a country's financial 
commitments to the institution. Together, the largest industrial countries (Group o f 
Seven) own about 45% of the shares. As a matter o f rule, the physical location o f 
the World Bank is in its largest shareholding country, the United States, which also 
has the right to appoint the institution's president. In addition, with about 17% of 
the shares, the United States has the power to veto any changes in the Bank's 
capital base and its Articles of Agreements since 85% o f the shares are needed to 
effect such changes (World Bank 1994d).
Under the Bank's Articles o f Agreement, the powers o f the Bank are vested 
in a board o f  governors (World Bank 1989a). While each member country has the 
right to appoint one governor to the Board (usually the member's finance minister), 
day-to-day management o f the World Bank is vested in its Board o f  Executive 
Directors, which is permanently in session at the Bank's headquarters. As provided 
in the Articles o f  Agreement, five o f the World Bank's twenty-four executive 
directors are appointed by the governments with the largest number o f ownership 
shares (the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France). The 
remaining Board members are elected by the other member governments which 
form constituencies (The World Bank 1996f).
The governance structure, dominated by the United States and other OECD 
countries, is important in determining which new issues the World Bank takes on 
board and as such is critical to understanding how biodiversity concerns have
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become integral to the World Bank’s development discourse. The World Bank's 
Board o f Executive Directors approved the institution's biodiversity-related 
policies and is responsible for overseeing their implementation in Bank-financed 
operations.
However, as a World Bank-commissioned history o f the institution's first 
fifty years indicates, tensions over the balance-of-power between the shareholders 
and the top layer o f the institution's bureaucracy are a hallmark o f the institution 
(Kapur et al. 1997).
The World Bank's institutional structure fits neatly into the distinction that 
Max Weber has drawn between a bureaucracy, which consists o f administrative 
staff, and the coiporate group, i.e. the government members in this case, which 
employs the administrative staff to carry out its policies (Beetham 1996). A 
central characteristic o f the bureaucratic staff is that it is both subject to higher 
authority and involved in exercising authority itself. The bureaucracy may have its 
own power derived from control o f information, infonnal networks or expertise 
which can be used to modify, delay or even obstruct policy mandates from its 
governing body (Kramer 1983, Beetham 1996).
Early on, World Bank presidents sought independence from interference by 
Bank shareholders in its day-to-day business. In what is being described as a pro­
management tilt, World Bank management was able, in 1947, to impose an 
agreement on its Executive Board that blocked the Board from taking operational 
initiatives (Kapur et al. 1997). This meant that all loan proposals had to come from 
World Bank management and not from Board members.
Management autonomy grew until the establishment in 1960 o f the 
International Development Association (IDA),3 the World Bank's "soft loan 
affiliate" for low income countries. While both IBRD and IDA loans are managed 
by the same staff, approved by the same Board and subject to the same policies, the
3 Since the establishment o f  IDA in 1960, the designation "the World Bank" covers both IBRD, the 
institution's largest and regular lending window, and IDA, the concessional lending window for 
low-income countries which usually lack creditworthiness for IBRD borrowing. Both IBRD and 
IDA lending are managed by the same staff, and are subject to the same rules and policies. In 
addition to IBRD and IDA, the World Bank Group comprises the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the institution's branch which lends or provides equity capital directly to the private sector, 
and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which provides non-commercial 
investment risk insurance to promote private investment. In addition, the World Bank Group 
includes a less well known conciliation and arbitration service, the International Centre for 
Settlement o f  Investment Disputes (ICSID) to help settle disputes between foreign investors and 
client governments.
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sources o f their financing are very different (Hancock 1989). The financial 
resources for IBRD's lending on near-commercial terms are largely raised through 
the sale o f bonds on international capital markets, which is made possible because 
o f the guarantees provided by the World Bank's largest donor country members. 
The concessional IDA funding, which is interest-free and whose repayment o f 
principal can be stretched out over up to fifty years, comes directly out o f the aid 
budgets o f national governments (World Bank 1994d). IBRD accounts for about 
three-fourths o f World Bank lending (World Bank 1998a),4 but the establishment 
of the much smaller IDA lending window increased the number o f clients by 
including countries that are considered to be too poor to qualify for IBRD 
financing on near-market terms. Lending to such countries on IBRD-terms could 
have endangered IBRD's creditworthiness on international capital markets (Kapur 
et al. 1997).
However, while IDA offered the advantage o f augmenting the World 
Bank's membership base, it also limited the autonomy o f World Bank 
management. Since IDA funds come directly out o f national budgets, which have 
to be approved by national parliaments, the possibilities for interference o f donor 
governments in Bank management increased vastly. The United States Congress in 
particular has imposed environmental and other conditions on the U.S. 
contributions to IDA (Rich 1994, Caufield 1996, Wade 1997b). World Bank 
managers are especially preoccupied with seeking autonomy from the United 
States executive branch (U.S. Treasury Department) and micro-management by the 
U.S. Congress (Kapur et al. 1997).5
In its search for autonomy, the World Bank emphasizes its role as a 
provider o f technical expertise, much o f which was provided early on by field 
seasoned specialists who had previously worked for the colonial regimes in Africa 
and Asia and who had become available as more countries became independent 
(Kapur et al. 1997: 8). The institution's emphasis on investing in physical assets 
such as dams and roads required this type o f technical expertise, which was 
supplemented by a growing number o f economists and financial experts in
4 In fiscal year 1998, IBRD financial commitments were about US $ 21.5 billion, whilelDA's loan 
commitments were about US $ 7.5 billion (World Bank 1998a).
5 Unlike the model o f parliamentary democracies in Europe, the U.S. Congress enjoys greater 
power in determining the use o f  public funds and thereby is able to play a large role in defining 
U.S. policies with regards to the World Bank and the other multilateral lending institutions.
connection with the 1980s debt crisis when structural adjustment programmes 
started forming a growing share o f World Bank activities (World Bank 1994a).
Choosing a technical approach, World Bank management sought to carve 
out greater autonomy from member countries (Kapur et al. 1997). Unlike United 
Nations agencies, the World Bank is less pressured to hire staff according to 
country quotas, thereby enabling it to recruit on the basis o f a certain set o f 
professional qualifications. This enabled the institution to create a more 
homogenizing environment (Kapur et al. 1997), Although the staff is multinational, 
its professional training in economics, finance and other technical issues is very 
homogeneous with a preponderance o f United States or United Kingdom-trained 
experts in economics and finance (Miller-Adams 1996).
A further characteristic o f the World Bank is that its mandate is to follow 
an apolitical agenda. Its Articles o f Agreement prohibit the institution from 
considering political aspects of its member countries and emphasize that the 
institution has to exclusively rely on economic considerations for decision-making 
(World Bank 1989a: 13). Consistent with this rule, World Bank publications insist 
that the institution's efforts in the area o f "governance" exclude political 
dimensions and are limited to the economic and social aspects o f governance 
(World Bank 1994e). The semantic effort which has been made to limit the 
definition o f governance and to construe World Bank activities in narrow and 
apolitical terms is at odds with the thesis that all ecological (or development 
projects) are simultaneously political-economic projects and vice-versa (Harvey 
1996:182). The case studies o f World Bank/ GBF programmes in Cameroon shed 
light on the pitfalls and dangers for environmental policy implementation when 
little attention is being paid to the political dimensions o f governance.
4.2.2 Growth of the Environmental Agenda
In a seminal speech in 1987, then World Bank president Barber B. Conable 
declared that with regards to the environment "If the World Bank has been a 
problem in the past, it can and will be a strong force in finding solutions for the 
future."6 On the same occasion, he announced the creation o f a top-level 
Environment Department as well as four regional technical departments to
6 Address by Barber B. Conable, President o f  the World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation, to the World Resources Institute, 5 May 1987, Washington, D.C.
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integrate environmental considerations into all the World Bank's lending and 
policy activities. In Conable's words, the World Bank had recognized that "sound 
ecology is good economics" and that poverty alleviation and environmental 
protection are mutually reinforcing. This line o f thought was subsequently 
endorsed by the Joint Ministerial Committee o f the World Bank and the IMF, 
known as the Development Committee, which emphasized that governments and 
international institutions should not address environmental issues in isolation but 
consider them as being central to the formulation o f development policy (Joint 
Ministerial Committee 1987:5).
However, prior to the establishment o f the Enviromnent Department in 
1987, the World Bank had already shown some preoccupation with the damage 
that economic development can do to the environment. In 1970, under then-World 
Bank President Robert McNamara, the World Bank was the first international 
institution to create the post o f enviromnental adviser, which was subsequently 
organized into an Office o f Enviromnental Affairs (Wade 1997b).8 The external 
political context o f this initiative was characterized by growing enviromnental 
awareness in some o f the Bank's principal shareholding countries as exemplified 
by the passage o f the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the United 
States in 1969, which required U.S. government agencies to carry out 
environmental impact assessments for all public investment projects with possible 
environmental risks. Furthermore, preparations for the first United Nations 
conference on the Human Environment, which took place in Stockholm in 1972, 
were fully underway. In his address to the Stockholm conference, W orld Bank 
President McNamara referred to environmental problems as being an important 
consideration for developing countries. In addition, several o f the World Bank's 
Executive Directors, namely those from the United States, Scandinavia and 
Canada, supported McNamara's plans to screen World Bank-funded projects for 
their environmental impacts (Wade 1997b).
However, in those early days these concerns played no role in the selection 
and design o f  projects or in the Bank's decision-making processes (Le Pestre
7 ibid.
8 For the most complete history o f  the World Bank's engagement with the environment, see Robert 
Wade's chapter "Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Environment" in the World Bank- 
commissioned two-volume study o f  its first fifty years o f  history, The World Bank - Its First H alf 
Century, edited by Kapur et al, and published in 1997.
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1989). The Office o f  Environmental Affairs9 grew to a staff o f five by the mid- 
1980s but given the growing amount o f Bank lending, the staffing level was 
inadequate to serve its function o f  screening World Bank investments.
Furthermore, the small enviromnental staff had no capacity to address 
environmental management questions in a more comprehensive fashion (Tumham 
1991). World Bank annual lending exceeded U.S. $ 15 billion by 1986 and since 
Bank-financing usually only covers about 50% o f total project cost while average 
implementation time is four years, the Bank's total investment portfolio had 
reached an estimated $ 100 billion o f projects under implementation at that time 
(Turnham 1991). The varied and often complex enviromnental impacts o f its 
projects that included large dams, forestry, water development, mining and 
agriculture, could not but exceed the capacities o f the small expert staff.
Overall, the Office o f  Enviromnental Affairs remained marginal within the 
institution, understaffed, underfunded and subject to hostility from operational 
departments which did not want to see their projects delayed or costs increased as a 
result o f environmental screening (Wade 1997b). In addition, World Bank 
Management sent no signals to operational staff to encourage them to include the 
enviromnent on the agenda in discussions with the borrower governments 
(Tumham 1991).
The Office o f Environmental Affairs had only the most tenuous influence 
on World Bank-financed projects, especially in the area o f natural resource 
management. Projects in this area, such as agriculture and forestry projects, lend 
themselves less easily to readily prescribed solutions than projects involving 
industrial pollution control. Despite the weak influence o f the Office o f 
Environmental Affairs, the institution's environmental agenda expanded to include 
issues o f involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples. Policy statements for 
both areas were then being formulated.10
9 With the integration o f  the World Bank's science and technology adviser into the Office o f  
Environmental Affairs, the office was renamed in 1983 to become the Office o f  Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs (LePestre 1989).
10 The World Bank's 1982 paper "Tribal Peoples and Economic Development - Human Ecologic 
Considerations" recognizes that World Bank-assisted projects are increasingly directed to remote 
rural areas which often are the home o f  tribal peoples. The paper represents a broad policy 
statement committing the World Bank to only finance projects in these areas after it is satisfied that 
best efforts have been made to obtain the voluntary, full and conscionable agreement o f  the 
concerned tribal people and that project design and implementation are appropriate to their special 
needs and wishes (World Bank 1982).
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From its modest beginnings with five environmental experts on World 
Bank staff in the mid-1980s, the institution's enviromnental capacity grew to about 
three hundred high-level staff and long-term consultants a decade later (World 
Bank 1994f). Along with the increase o f staff, the number o f environmental 
policies expanded greatly since the establishment in 1987 o f the Environment 
Department and the technical enviromnental divisions in the Bank's operational 
regions.
Since the earliest days o f enviromnental activities at the World Bank, these 
efforts played an important public relations function with the goal to counter 
outside criticism (Tumham 1991, Wade 1997). Throughout the World Bank's 
history on enviromnental matters, outside pressure was critical in getting the World 
Bank to take on the environmental agenda and establish environmental policy 
guidelines for its operations (Wade 1997, Tumham 1991, Le Prestre 1989, Rich 
1994, Caufield 1996).11
Starting in the late 1980s, the United States Congress played an 
increasingly important role in directing the World Bank's environmental policy 
mandate by publishing legislation providing policy guidance, establishing voting 
restrictions for the U.S. Executive Director to the World Bank or threatening to 
withhold U.S. funding.12 Coalitions o f U.S. environmental and indigenous rights 
organizations persuaded key Congressional committees to hold a series o f hearings 
beginning in the mid-1980s. These hearings provided the U.S. Congress with the 
momentum and necessary information to forward precise instructions to the U.S. 
Treasury Department on how to make U.S. influence felt in the World Bank (Rich 
1994, Wade 1997b). One o f the better known examples o f Congressional 
intervention is the International Development and Finance Act o f 1989, which 
contains a provision known as the Pelosi Amendment.13 This amendment instructs 
the U.S. Executive Directors to the Multilateral Development Banks not to vote for 
any action to be undertaken by the institutions which would have significant effect 
on the human environment unless a complete environmental impact assessment o f
11 Interviews with World Bank environmental staff confirm that outside monitoring and advocacy 
efforts continue to be crucial until today to create the necessary breathing space for internal 
environmental efforts.
12 Ian A. Bowles and Cyril F. Kormos provide a detailed account o f  the activism on part o f  the U.S. 
Congress in "Environmental Reform at the World Bank: The Role o f  The U.S. Congress", Virginia 
Journal o f  International Law, Vol 35, No. 4, Summer 1995.
13 This Act was published in Report 101-271 o f  the 101st Congress, 1st Session on 6 October 1989.
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the proposed action and o f alternatives to the proposed action has been made 
available to the Executive Director at least 120 days in advance o f the date o f the 
vote. Furthermore it stipulates that such an assessment and a comprehensive 
summary have to be made available to other interested federal agencies and to the 
public.14 In numerous other pieces o f legislation, the U.S. Congress made it clear 
that a release o f U.S. funding for the replenishment o f IDA or for General Capital 
Increases was not automatic. In 1991, it instructed the U.S. Executive Director to 
demand World Bank procedures which would give NGOs and affected parties 
access to information on World Bank projects. In the same year, the U.S. Congress 
withheld twenty-five percent o f  the U.S. contribution to the World Bank's General 
Capital Increase pending submission o f a report from the Secretary o f the U.S. 
Treasury Department detailing the changes the World Bank had implemented with 
regards to its energy and forestry lending (Bowles & Kormos 1995).
U.S. laws, such as the Pelosi Amendment, became milestones o f World 
Bank environmental policy-making and public access to information on 
environmentally risky World Bank projects. Two months before the Pelosi 
Amendment took effect in October 1991, the World Bank revised its 
environmental assessment policy to reflect the requirements o f the U.S. Congress. 
Failing to do so would have led the U.S. Executive Director to abstain from voting 
in the cases o f many loans and might ultimately have endangered the institution's 
access to public funding.
Since the U.S. legislation is not directed at the World Bank itself, but at the 
U.S. Executive Director and the U.S. Treasury Department, it is not considered to 
be outright interference in the multilateral character o f the institution. As a 
multilateral body, the World Bank is at liberty to ignore unilateral political action 
by one o f its members (Bowles & Kormos 1995). However, the institution's sense 
o f political realism leads it to avoid a collision course with its principal 
shareholder, who - especially in the area o f environmental protection - can count 
on the support, even if  less outspoken, o f some o f the other major donor countries, 
principally Germany and the United Kingdom.15
14 Ibid. The law allows for an exception to this rule when disclosure would jeopardize the 
confidential relationship between the borrower country and the respective bank.
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4.2.3 Expanding into the Global Environment
In addition to the establishment o f policies to guide overall Bank 
operations. World Bank lending for environmental projects took off sharply in 
1990, turning the institution into the world's single largest financier o f 
environmental projects (fig.4.1). However, beyond investments in environmental 
projects and environmental screening o f regular development projects, World Bank 
statements emphasize that environmental considerations must be integrated into 
economic decision-making at all levels and should be reflected in the establishment 
o f policies, regulations and incentives in borrowing countries (World Bank 
1989b,World Bank 1995a). In addition to World Bank environmental issue papers 
and national environmental action plans, all country economic and sector activities 
were required to take environmental concerns into account (Joint Ministerial 
Committee 1989).
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15 Interviews with former U.S. Executive Director Patrick E.Coady and current U.S. Executive 
Director Jan Piercy.
World Bank Lending for Environmental Projects
Fig. 4.1 World Bank Lending for Environmental Project 
Source: World Bank 1998a
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The integration o f environmental considerations ''up-stream" from specific 
projects and into overall economic decision-making became known as 
"mainstreaming". In 1995, in addition to dedicating its annual environment report 
to "Mainstreaming the Environment", the World Bank published its strategy paper 
on mainstreaming biodiversity in development. This strategy paper is based on the 
acknowledgment that the conservation o f biodiversity depends to a large degree on 
how well policies and programmes in the economic sectors address biodiversity 
(World Bank 1995a). The mainstreaming goal is reiterated in numerous World 
Bank publications, including in its 1998 annual report which states that "Helping 
countries improve environmental management capacity and mainstream 
sustainability principles into their development programs is at the core o f the 
Bank’s business" (World Bank 1998a:77).
The World Bank's three-pronged approach to the environment (Fig. 4.2) is 
being complemented by plans for a new dimension which would encompass the 
environment on a global scale outside the somewhat narrow confines o f the GEF. 
In addition to playing the leading role in the Global Enviromnent Facility (GEF), 
the World Bank is positioning itself to be a major actor in the management o f the 
global enviromnent in the future. A 1997 internal strategy document states "... the 
global enviromnent must be regarded as a core business for the Bank Group and 
managed accordingly" (World Bank 1997d:iii). The document emphasizes that 
global environmental problems, such as climate change and biodiversity loss, are 
threatening the goal o f meeting basic human needs in vulnerable developing 
countries. Since the Bank's primary objective is poverty alleviation, the document 
states that it must address these global problems, especially since the populations 
most vulnerable to a deterioration o f the global environment reside in the Bank's 
client countries, i.e. the developing countries (World Bank 1997d). How exactly 
the World Bank intends to play this role has not been established. Initial signs are 
that the institution is undertaking preparations to offer itself as the manager for the 
Clean Development Mechanism, a process launched by the Kyoto Climate 
Protocol, to serve as a brokerage for the international trading o f  greenhouse gas 
emissions.16
16 Interviews with staff in the Environment Department andVice-Presidency for Environmentally 
and Socially Sustainable Development, November 1998.
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Fig. 4.2 World Bank Approaches to the Environment
The World Bank's ambitions in the global environment area show how the 
institution adapts to a changing external environment not by replacing existing 
institutional goals with new ones but by adding new goals to the existing ones. 
Ascher referred to an increasingly cluttered World Bank agenda and more recently, 
Wade described this situation as being one o f mission overload (Ascher 1983, 
Wade 1997a).
The establishment o f the Vice-Presidency for Environmentally and Socially 
Sustainable Development in 1993 elevated the environment within the institutional 
hierarchy. Since then World Bank publications and studies on the environment 
have multiplied. Yet, as Tumham points out, most o f these studies are o f a 
diagnostic sort with emphasis on the description and analysis o f  environmental 
problems and little information on the precise actions the institution is undertaking 
to address them. "Yet it is action, not diagnosis, that ultimately makes a difference; 
all sensitive institutional policy questions have to be broached and resolved in 
moving from study to implementation" (Tumham 1991:369). This transition from 
idea to action is especially pertinent in the case o f the World Bank because more 
than any other single multilateral or bilateral agency, it has the ability to turn ideas 
and intentions into expenditure programmes through its vast financial resources for 
projects and other types o f lending operations.
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4.3 The Global Environment Facility
In response to scientific evidence and growing public concern, regional and 
global environmental problems became important issues on the diplomatic agendas 
o f developed countries in the 1980s. Mounting international concern over global 
environmental problems led to the establishment o f the W orld Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED), whose landmark report Our Common 
Future called for an increase in financial resources for new multilateral efforts and 
actions for environmental protection and sustainable development (WCED 
1987:340).
The international negotiations to reverse the depletion o f the ozone layer, 
which led to the 1987 Montreal Protocol, are an example o f  growing political 
initiatives to address problems related to the management o f  the global commons. 
In the Montreal Protocol, developed countries pledged to reduce their production 
o f one o f the ozone-depleting substances, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), while 
developing countries were pennitted to increase their use o f  CFCs over the next 
decade (Porter & Brown 1996).
By the late 1980s, many developed countries were eager to demonstrate 
their commitment to address global environmental problems and provide assistance 
to developing countries for their participation in global enviromnental management 
(Fairman 1996). It is in this context o f the late 1980s that preparations for the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Earth 
Summit o f 1992) began as a follow-up conference to the 1972 Stockholm 
conference on the Human Environment. Donor governments were concerned that 
planned negotiations on climate change, biodiversity protection and deforestation 
might lead to proposals for an inefficiently large number o f financial transfer 
mechanisms. They also feared that the equal voting shares o f  developed and 
developing countries in the Montreal Protocol’s Interim Fund might turn into a de 
facto  precedent for future environmental conventions and thereby reduce 
developed country control over financing matters (Fairman 1994).
4.3.1 Genesis of a New Multilateral Entity
The concept for a multilateral financial mechanism to address 
environmental problems which are considered to be global in scale was first 
developed by a Washington, D.C.-based think-tank, the World Resources Institute
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(World Resources Institute 1989). The French government, with support from 
Germany, was the first to express its interest in making a financial contribution to 
this type o f multilateral effort (Global Environment Facility 1992). An initially
1 7reluctant United States Government soon endorsed the idea as it did not want to 
be perceived as obstructing a northern-led global environmental initiative in the 
wake o f the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED).
Developed country governments agreed that they did not want to create a 
new organization but instead wished to rely on the expertise and experience of 
existing institutions (Dembach 1993). The World Bank offered to administer such 
a new financial mechanism and the GEF was formally established as a three-year 
pilot programme through a resolution o f the World Bank's Board o f  Executive 
Directors in 1991 (World Bank 1991b). This helped the World Bank bolster its 
credentials as an environment-friendly aid agency and establish leadership in an 
area o f increasing interest to its major donors (Fairman 1996).
Once established, the World Bank invited the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to 
join the GEF in a tri-partite structure. In the division o f labour amongst the three 
GEF Implementing Agencies, responsibility for technical assistance projects fell to 
UNDP, while UNEP was charged with providing overall scientific guidance. The 
World Bank, on the other hand, would administer the GEF trust fund, house and 
staff the GEF Secretariat and be responsible for all GEF investment projects 
(Global Environment Facility 1991). In addition, many GEF grants are not 
financing free-standing projects but represent components o f larger, regular World 
Bank loans (GEF 1991).
As in the case o f  the World Bank's IDA operations, donor country 
contributions to the GEF are based on the size o f a country's economy, a principle 
known as "burden-sharing". As a result the United States is, at least in principle, 
the largest donor followed by Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France.
17 The United States government was less than enthusiastic about the establishment o f  the GEF 
because o f  its reluctance to commit to providing new and additional financial resources for areas 
such as climate change (Fairman 1994).
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GEF resources are intended to provide grants for the "agreed incremental costs"18 
o f innovative projects in four focal areas: climate change; biodiversity loss; the 
pollution o f international waters; and the depletion o f the ozone layer19 (World 
Bank 1991b). The incremental cost criterion excludes the financing o f projects 
which have primarily local benefits. The sharp conceptual distinction between 
local and global benefits is important for finance ministries and aid agencies in 
developed countries since they have to justify budget allocations for the GEF as 
being separate from their countries' regular development assistance programmes 
(Fairman 1996).
During the GEF pilot-phase, participating governments formed the 
Participants' Assembly whose task was to approve overall GEF work programmes 
which contained only brief descriptions o f the projects to be financed by the GEF. 
Further detailed elaboration o f the projects and their final approval is in the hands 
o f the respective Implementing Agency, whose own policy guidelines apply to its 
GEF work. The latter rule is particularly important with regards to the World Bank 
which has the most detailed environmental policy guidelines o f the agencies and is 
responsible for all GEF investment projects. GEF investment projects, with costs 
o f US $ 10 million and above, follow regular World Bank approval procedures, i.e. 
they have to be approved by the World Bank's Board o f Executive Directors where 
the largest donor countries are the most influential voice.20 The World Bank's role 
in determining the GEF's investment programme was further strengthened when it 
successfully rebuffed requests by UNDP and UNEP to review and comment on 
World Bank investment project proposals (Fairman 1996). Both United Nations 
agencies were assigned the roles o f  junior partners in the tri-partite arrangement, 
largely because the main donor governments consider the W orld Bank to be more 
effective in handling large amounts o f funding (Porter & Brown 1996).
18 "Agreed incremental costs" as defined by the GEF represent the difference between the costs o f  
projects undertaken with global environmental benefits in mind and the costs o f  an alternative 
project which does not reflect such concerns (GEF 1994c).
19 The GEF does not serve as the financial mechanism for the Montreal Protocol, which has its own 
interim multilateral fund. GEF-funding for projects to reduce ozone-depleting chemicals is made 
available to those countries which have signed the Montreal Protocol but do not qualify for support 
from the interim fund because their ozone-depleting emissions are above the cut-off point o f 0.3 
kilograms per capita as specified at a June 1990 meeting in London when agreement on the interim 
fund was reached (GEF 1991).
20 GEF investment projects under US $ 10 million can be approved by senior World Bank 
management without involvement o f the Board o f Executive Directors.
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The creation o f the GEF prior to UNCED allowed developed countries to 
define global environmental problems as they perceived them and to establish the 
limits and the scope o f their responsibilities in assisting developing countries.
4.3.2 Post-Rio Compromises
Developing countries grouped together in the Group o f 77 (G 77) in the 
United Nations opposed the GEF as the sole funding entity for global 
environmental agreements because it had been set up without their consultation 
and because it is largely managed by the World Bank, which is controlled by 
wealthy donor countries (Porter & Brown 1996). In addition, the G 77 would have 
preferred for the GEF to include environmental problems that represent greater 
national priorities such as desertification, reduced agricultural productivity and the 
availability o f fresh water. At UNCED, the G 77 proposed a revised governing 
structure for the GEF based on the full equality o f all participants with decisions 
made by a simple majority (Group o f  77: 1993).
Developing countries were also ambivalent about the GEF because they felt 
that any alternative proposal to the GEF would not receive the backing o f the 
major donors and therefore would have little practical relevance (Gupta 1995). At 
the Rio Summit, developing countries were presented with an already established 
GEF capitalized with a US $1 billion core fund, which donor governments 
promised to make available in addition to their on-going development assistance 
programmes. Since many developing countries feel that their mandate is to tap 
whatever aid is available, they felt that they had no alternative but to agree to the 
GEF in some form (Gupta 1995).
As a result, the first major North-South battle over a global environmental 
institution (Porter & Brown 1996) turned into a compromise solution in which the 
GEF was designated as the "interim" financial mechanism for the two United 
Nations conventions signed at Rio, the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Convention on Biodiversity (United Nations 1992). The compromise, 
however, also stipulated that the GEF be restructured to become more democratic 
and transparent and that it follow the guidance o f the governmental parties to the 
U.N. Conventions on issues relating to climate change and biodiversity 
conservation (GEF 1994b).
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UNCED validated the GEF's status as the world's major source o f public 
funding to address global environmental issues (Fairman 1996). In comparison, the 
other major action plan adopted in Rio, known as Agenda 21, fell short. Agenda 21 
stipulated that developed countries would provide US $ 141 billion annually in 
grants and low interest loans in the 1993-2000 period to foster sustainable 
development. But it never received the financial backing from the major donor 
countries because they were unwilling to support an initiative in which their 
control over financial matters might be weakened.21
In addition to the UNCED-mandate to restructure, the GEF pilot-phase 
underwent a detailed evaluation by the World Bank's Operations Evaluation 
Department (OED) and the respective evaluation mechanisms within UNDP and 
UNEP. The final evaluation report called for major changes in GEF management, 
operating principles and the definition o f its mission (GEF 1994a).
During the eighteen months o f restructuring the GEF which led to a fresh 
infusion o f US $ 2 billion into the GEF core fund, several creative compromise 
solutions were found which pacified the developing countries without resolving 
important underlying disagreements and without undennining the ultimate power 
of the main donor countries to detennine the scale o f donations and control o f 
disbursement.
A key innovation brought about by the restructuring was the establishment 
o f the GEF Council as the GEF's main governing body, which meets every six 
months in Washington, D.C.. The GEF Council has thirty two members, sixteen 
from developing countries, fourteen from developed countries and two from 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (GEF 1994b). Mirroring 
the World Bank's Board o f Executive Directors, the main donors have their own 
representative on the Council while smaller countries and recipient countries have 
formed constituencies in which one Council member represents various states. The 
voting system in the GEF Council represents a hybrid form o f the United Nations 
(one country/one vote) and the Bretton Woods (vote proportional to financial 
contribution) systems in the form o f a double-weighted voting system. This system 
requires a majority o f both donor countries and recipient countries should an issue 
be brought to a formal vote. Since decisions by the GEF Council usually are taken
21 Interviews with Government officials in the United States and Germany in 1992-95.
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on an informal consensus basis, no formal voting had taken place as o f 1999. Even 
after the restructuring, ultimate project approval rests with the GEF Implementing 
Agencies.
The restructuring also led to a new status for the GEF Secretariat, which 
continues to be administered with support from the World Bank but which now has 
the mandate to carry out its tasks in a functionally independent manner (GEF 
1994b). The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) o f the Secretariat who also serves as 
the chairman o f  the GEF, is appointed by the GEF Council. The GEF Participants' 
Assembly, which includes representatives o f all participating governments, was 
maintained as a formal body which meets every three to four years to review and 
evaluate the GEF on the basis o f reports submitted by the GEF Council (GEF 
1994b).
The GEF's membership has grown from 24 countries in 1991 (GEF 1991) 
to 164 countries in 1998 (GEF 1998a). The GEF is the only major financial 
accomplishment o f  the Rio Earth Summit as illustrated by the growing 
contributions to its core fund (Fig. 4.3). The core fund does not include an 
estimated US $ 5 billion in co-financing, i.e. additional investments by other 
donors for the same activities (GEF 1998a).
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Fig.4.3 Contributions to the GEF 
Source: GEF 1998a
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4.3.3. In the Realm of Biodiversity
Biodiversity-related projects represent the largest share o f the GEF 
portfolio (Fig. 4.4). By order o f magnitude, the GEF's biodiversity programmes 
represent the largest amount o f funding ever made available for biodiversity 
conservation in developing countries by a single source (Wells 1994). Biodiversity 
protection is also the area where the GEF's goal o f translating international 
decisions into local actions is most in evidence (GEF 1998a). While decisions 
about funding and design o f biodiversity projects are made in a global context, 
GEF-funded projects are targeting local conditions, often in remote regions in 
developing countries which are usually inhabited by rural communities and/or 
indigenous peoples.
Distribution of GEF Projects by Focal Area
Biodiversity
46%
Fig. 4.4 Distribution o f  GEF Projects by Focal Area 
Source: GEF 1998a
Documentation on GEF biodiversity projects usually highlights the social 
dimensions o f biodiversity by emphasizing that sustaining the livelihoods o f local 
communities and maintaining their quality o f life is one o f its goals (Newcombe & 
Richardson 1993). The language in GEF project documents refers extensively to
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“sustainable development”, “involving local people in design and implementation” 
and “strengthening institutions” (GEF Work Programmes 1991-1998). However, 
the same documents usually do not specify how these goals are to be implemented 
in practice (Wells 1994).
In the biodiversity area, GEF projects follow mostly the traditional 
approach o f setting-up and supporting protected areas. While the GEF works 
through governments, large northern-based nature conservation organizations 
which have long experience in protected area management have been able to 
participate in many o f these projects, as, for example, in the case o f Cameroon 
(chapter 7).
However, not everyone in the nature conservation community was 
enthusiastic about the GEF. The chief conservation officer for the International 
Union for the Conservation o f Nature (IUCN) expressed it bluntly: "The GEF is a 
typical top-down, throwing-money-at-the-problem, dealing-with-symptoms-rather- 
than-causes solution to a very complex set o f issues" (McNeely 1993:1).
These types o f preoccupation are echoed within the GEF Secretariat and the 
Implementing Agencies themselves. Social scientists inside the institutions are 
warning that the success o f biodiversity conservation projects depends upon a 
thorough understanding and careful consideration o f social, political and cultural 
factors and that these factors are often overlooked as project preparation 
concentrates on financial, technical and administrative aspects (Cruz & Davis 
1996).
The U.N. Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), a legally binding document 
which adopted the GEF as its interim financial mechanism in 1992, has had little 
influence on the GEF. Article 21 o f  the CBD lays out that the GEF will function 
under the authority and the guidance o f the Conference o f the Parties o f the CBD 
(United Nations 1992). In addition, the CBD establishes that the Conference o f the 
Parties o f the CBD is in charge o f  determining policy, strategy, programme 
priorities and eligibility criteria for the GEF (Glowka et al. 1994). Indeed, only 
countries which are signatories to the CBD qualify for GEF funding for 
biodiversity projects. But the Conference o f the Parties o f  the CBD has not been 
able to provide effective guidance to the GEF. One o f the several reasons for this is 
that the underlying North-South questions have not been resolved and there is little
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political will on all sides to confront them head-on as this might lead to the 
disintegration o f the GEF (Fairman 1996).
Developing countries, which constitute the majority in a United Nations 
context such as the Conference of the Parties o f the CBD, emphasize the need for 
national action and priority-setting as opposed to activities which are mainly 
concerned with global priorities. The CBD calls on the GEF to provide financial 
resources for country-driven activities and programmes that are consistent with 
national objectives (GEF 1998b). Donor countries, however, are not inclined to 
give up on the GEF's incremental cost principle, according to which the GEF only 
finances the "additional" costs o f projects (or project components) which produce 
global enviromnental benefits, i.e. projects which developing countries have 
insufficient economic incentives to undertake on their own. This insistence by 
donor nations has more to do with their own domestic budgeting processes than 
with practical relevance. A coherent methodology for measuring incremental costs 
has not been developed and it continues to remain unclear how the concept is being 
used for project selection and funding decisions (GEF 1998b).
The incremental cost principle does not appear to be easily applicable since 
it will often be too contrived to draw a clear distinction between local and global 
interests. This is particularly true o f biodiversity protection, for example, in the 
area o f  funding for institutional strengthening, which is a component o f many GEF 
biodiversity projects. It is not surprising therefore that the principle has not been 
applied in a rigorous fashion (Fairman 1996).
Although most Northern and Southern countries may bargain for increasing 
their share o f  power and control, they want the GEF to go forward for their own 
reasons. Northern governments can satisfy domestic environmental constituencies 
by participating in the GEF and Southern governments hope for increased grant 
funding and technology transfer from the North.
North-South bargaining and underlying tensions help the GEF and other 
international financial institutions increase their operational autonomy from both 
donor and recipient governments (Fairman 1996). This relative autonomy is 
reflected in the GEF's institutional structure with its diffuse lines o f authority and 
informal decision-making procedures. The resulting gray areas provide 
discretionary decision-making power to the bureaucracies o f the GEF Secretariat 
and its Implementing Agencies.
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4.4 Cameroon
This section provides an overview o f the specific country context in which 
the case studies o f  the three following chapters will be examined. W hile the focus 
o f this study is on the international financial institutions and their compliance with 
their own biodiversity-related policies, it is necessary to place the case studies in 
their proper political, socio-economic and environmental context. A variety o f 
World Bank and GEF reports are quoted throughout this section, which reveal the 
institutions’ uneven knowledge and approaches to ‘7a crise” which has dominated 
Cameroonian life since the late 1980s.
4.4.1 Political Environment
"...D u peuple camerounais trop longtemps anesthesie, 
hebete de propagande et de terreur, decervele proprement, 
mais que se reveille lentement et commence a se ressaisir: 
ainsi done, chuchote-t-il, ce fut pendant presque trente ans le 
regne du meurtre et de la rapine? Comment cela a-t-il ete 
possible?" (Mongo Beti 1986).
( ’’... O f the Cameroonian people who have for too long 
been anaesthetized, numbed by propaganda and terror, 
thoroughly debrained, but who are slowly awakening and 
beginning to recover: So then, people whisper, for almost 
thirty years this was the rule o f murder and o f  pillage? How 
has this been possible?")
This is how Mongo Beti, one o f the leading literary voices in the 
Francophone world, refers to the awakening o f civil society in his native Cameroon 
after almost thirty years o f  independence.
Cameroon, which covers a territory of about 475,000 square kilometers and 
has a population o f  an estimated 14.3 million people, is often described as a 
miniature continent because its great diversity in ethnic groups and landscapes 
appears to reflect Africa itself.
According to historians, Cameroon represents a typical example o f the 
hasty African experience o f post-colonial "late development" in which a nation­
state polity and a modem economy were put in place in ways which limited 
democratic initiatives (Takougang & Krieger 1998:xx). It is in the 1990s that a
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stirring o f civil society is becoming a stronger factor in national politics although 
democracy is far from being consolidated as the decade approaches its end.
The area o f modem day Cameroon came under German colonial rule in 
1884. Germany's defeat in the First World War led Cameroon to be partitioned 
between Britain and France in 1916. The partition, which was confirmed by a 
mandate o f the League o f Nations in 1922 and subsequently by United Nations 
trusteeships, left its imprints, including the language o f the respective colonial 
ruler, in East Cameroon (French) and West Cameroon (British). French 
colonialism was more direct and centralized by comparison with the more 
decentralized and indirect approach adopted by Britain. East Cameroon received 
large numbers o f French administrators who were sent to "Overseas France" to 
assist in the building o f bureaucratic and hierarchical structures and small local 
elites were assimilated into being French (Binns 1994). On the British side, which 
represented a much smaller fraction o f the territory and the population, a stronger 
sense o f local autonomy and a structure o f power may have been preserved which 
continues to play a forceful role in Cameroon politics o f the 1990s. Anglophone 
South-West and North-West Provinces are the main regions o f opposition against 
Cameroon’s present regime.
Independence, in 1960, from Great Britain and France, was followed by the 
unification o f the two Cameroons and the Federal Republic o f Cameroon was bom  
in 1961 (Egbe 1997). Newly independent Cameroon continued to have strong ties 
to France which were reflected in a series o f bilateral political, military and 
economic agreements (Takougang & Krieger 1998). France placed Ahmadou 
Ahidjo, Cameroon's first president, in power and supported his rule in order to 
ensure continued French authority in the country after independence (Takougang 
& Krieger 1998). Ahidjo's rule (1960-1984) established the hegemonic structures 
o f an autocratic state, which was geared towards maximizing presidential powers. 
In order to tighten his control over the minority Anglophone population in the 
former British Trust Territory, Ahidjo staged a referendum in 1972 which 
reportedly was approved by 99.99% of the population. It curtailed the autonomous 
rights o f former West Cameroon and established Cameroon as a unitary state, the 
United Republic o f Cameroon (Takougang & Krieger 1998:4).
Resistance and opposition within the country and amongst Cameroonian 
exiles abroad were swiftly dealt with by security and intelligence services directly
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supported by French assistance. French military involvement helped build the 
country's national anny and one o f the most effective intelligence services in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, SEDOC, the Service des Etudes et de la Documentation, which 
later became the feared CND, the Centre National de Documentation (Takougang 
& Krieger 1998). During his twenty years in power, anti-subversion legislation and 
the terror spread by his various security forces, allowed Ahidjo to maintain an iron 
grip over Cameroonians.
It will be left to historians to discuss the role played by the extreme 
centralization o f power and oppression in promoting the political stability and the 
measure o f economic and social gains made during the Ahidjo years. Under his 
successor, President Paul Biya who took office in 1982 and remains in power as o f 
1999, the country continued to be run by a monolithic state and a party apparatus 
as its key agencies. France continues to play the key-role in Cameroonian politics 
with unconditional political and military support for the Biya regime (Agir Ici & 
Survie 1996). Whenever the state's coffers are empty, French bilateral assistance 
ensures that salaries o f the military and police are promptly paid (Verschave 1998).
In order to diffuse growing pressure for democratic reforms, a law allowing
multi-party politics was made in 1990 that led to the registration o f more than 100
• 22political parties. Since then Cameroon has found itself in a transitional period, 
where democratic reforms seem to have stalled or reached an impasse, but where, 
never-the-less, a fledgling civil society is increasingly making its voice heard. An 
independent press has developed although its journalists and editors are frequently 
subject to harassment if  not outright imprisonment, as was the case until recently 
o f Pius Niawe, director-general o f Le Messager, Cameroon's best known 
independent newspaper.23
New political parties have emerged and elections are being held but the 
regime in power closely controls the rules and procedures, thereby ensuring vastly 
favorable election outcomes for itself. In the October 1997 presidential elections, 
which independent observers describe as fraudulent, President Biya was reelected 
to another seven-year term with 92.57% of the vote.24 Cameroon's Roman Catholic
22 The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports, 3fd Quarter 1998.
23 Amnesty International has documented the arrest ofPius Niawe and numerous opposition figures 
in its 1997 Country Report for Cameroon with the title "Cameroon - Blatant Disregard for Human 
Rights".
24 The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report for Cameroon, 1st quarter 1998.
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Cardinal Christian Tumi described the elections as a complete mockery o f 
democracy.25
Cameroonian theologian and author Jean-Marc Ela, exiled in Canada, 
maintains that poverty in his country is being created by a neo-colonial state which 
marginalizes a majority o f  its people and rules with oppression and injustice 
enabling the wealthy national elite to maintain its grip on power (Ela 1993). While 
Ela's social justice thinking may be rooted in his religious beliefs, the economic 
theory o f the rentier state is helpful in explaining his observations o f the growing 
disenfranchisement o f a majority o f the population.
Yates in his study o f the rentier economy in Africa shows ".. .how and why 
neocolonialism causes underdevelopment, dictatorship and general suffering for 
the average African who lives under it" (Yates 1996:8). A rentier state is a country 
whose government receives substantial amounts o f external economic rent (Yates 
1996). This rent concentrates wealth and with it political power in the hands o f a 
few. The income from rent, which is the result o f chance, not work, frees the state 
and its rentier class from promoting economic growth domestically because they 
do not depend on a domestic tax base. Morton has pointed out that the almost total 
dissolution o f taxation as a means by which the contract between a state and its 
people is regulated may be a root cause o f the lack o f accountability in many 
African states (Morton 1994). Since there is little to tax, there appears to be no 
need for the rentier state to seek legitimation from its own people. Instead of 
seeking socio-economic transformation, the rentier classes use every means at their 
disposal to maintain the status quo (Yates 1996).
In the case o f  Cameroon these rents are mostly derived from oil and timber 
exports, both o f which are "free goods" for the government since both the mineral 
wealth and the forest belong to the state. Since multinational companies are 
managing the extractive activities, few if  any investments on the part o f the state 
are required. The rents are the country's main source o f revenue and the 
Cameroonian state has used a part o f the rent to feed a broad patronage network 
which French scholar, Bayart, has termed "the politics o f the belly" (Takougang & 
Krieger 1998, Ekoko 1995). The model implies the existence o f a highly 
centralized state with quasi total control of wealth which is used to promote
25 Quoted in the Washington Post, "Cameroon Election, President's Victory Called a 'Mockery o f  
Democracy'", 25 October 1997.
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pervasive clientelism at all levels o f society, as Takougang and Krieger put it 
.the people did eat" (Takoungang & Krieger:4).
This model worked for Cameroon's elites until the mid-1980s. With the 
onset o f a severe economic crisis, prospects o f democratization and a weakening of 
authoritarian rule, there have been fewer crumbs for the many and even larger 
shares for the few (Ekolo 1995).
4.4.2 Socio-Economic Developments as Reflected in World Bank Reports
After years o f steady growth fueled by stable prices for agricultural exports 
and increased oil production, in the mid-1980s Cameroon entered what people in 
the country simply refer to as "la crise." From 1985 to 1989 Cameroon's terms-of- 
trade fell by about 50% and oil production declined by about one third (World 
Bank 1995f). According to the World Bank, "la crise" with an estimated decline 
o f 55% o f per capita GDP between 1986-1994, represents a collapse that has been 
one o f the most painful that any country has suffered (World Bank 1995i:ii).
The World Bank tried to help Cameroon address the external imbalances 
through structural adjustment loans (SALs). A World Bank Project Completion 
Report reviewing the impacts o f its 1989 and 1994 SALs concludes that the 
government's lack o f political will and uncertain leadership were the main factors 
for the unsatisfactory results o f the programmes (World Bank 1995f). Cameroon's 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank by an estimated 30% during this period 
and salaries paid in the public sector were reduced by about 60% (World Bank 
1995i). However, in addition to blaming the government, the W orld Bank report 
admits that the design o f the SAL was flawed because it aimed at "reestablishing 
the competitiveness o f the economy through deflationary, internal policies alone," 
i.e. without devaluing the exchange rate at the same time (World Bank 1995f:vi).
As a result, the World Bank acknowledges that the implementation o f the 
SALs had a major negative impact in social terms: unemployment soared, farm 
incomes fell by 40 to 65% depending on the crop, and the reduction in public 
spending, particularly in health and education, had adverse consequences for the 
country's most vulnerable population groups (World Bank 1995f: 32).
In order to mitigate some o f these impacts, the World Bank launched a 
"Social Dimensions o f Adjustment project" in 1991, which was cancelled three 
years prior to its scheduled conclusion because o f poor project implementation.
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The World Bank states that a weak commitment to reduce poverty on part o f the 
government, including a lack o f  transparency in the management o f project 
accounts and procurement, was one o f the key-reasons for project cancellation 
(World Bank 1995b). In addition to the problems caused by the government, the 
World Bank once again acknowledges that its own project design was flawed. The 
project was too complex and the World Bank had poorly assessed the capacity o f 
government agencies to implement the programme and made too few resources 
available for adequate project appraisal and supervision (World Bank 1995b: iii).
Lack o f Government commitment and flawed project design o f World 
Bank loans have led to a severe degradation o f the nutritional status, health and 
education for a majority o f Cameroonians. The devaluation o f the Franc CFA by 
50% in January 1994 was to help jump-start economic growth but it has had little 
impact on reducing pervasive poverty (World Bank 1998b). As a result o f the 
devaluation, Cameroon's status was downgraded from a middle-income to low- 
income country and it became eligible for concessional IDA-loans. Cameroon's 
previous borrowing from the World Bank, including for the SAL referred to above, 
had been on near-market IBRD terms.
The World Bank’s 1995 Poverty report permits a glimpse o f the human face 
behind the macro-economic language o f deflationary policies and demand- 
contraction (World Bank 1995i), According to the report, roughly two thirds o f the 
urban population in Yaounde and Douala reported that the quality and quantity of 
their nutrition had markedly declined over the 1989-1994 period. Most people 
struggled to eat one meal per day, usually consisting o f banana, pepper and palm 
oil (World Bank 1995i:37). Physical measurements o f children at a primary school 
in Yaounde revealed that malnutrition had grown substantially during the same 
period. The children, who were the sons and daughters o f  high- and medium level 
civil servants, became considerably thinner. Given the social status o f these 
children, the report extrapolates that the nutritional status o f the majority o f low 
income children had even deteriorated more (World Bank 1995i:50).
Access to clean water was an acute problem for the majority o f  poor people 
in both rural and urban areas and a simple piece o f laundry soap has become a 
luxury item (World Bank 1995i;37). The urban unemployment rate was one o f the 
highest in Africa and well above the rates recorded in Asia and Latin America with 
youth unemployment particularly severe (World Bank 1995i:iii).
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A vast majority o f Cameroon's people had been pushed to the edge o f 
survival. Yet their country is richly endowed with tropical forests, coastal fisheries, 
mineral resources (oil, bauxite, natural gas), fertile agricultural land and a 
favorable climate (World Bank 1995f). W hy is food security such a problem in a 
country, which the poverty report describes as being o f "striking diversity and 
tantalizing potential" (World Bank 1995i:l)? The report itself tries to provide an 
answer by stating that the severe distortions in food supply have been caused by an 
over-emphasis on agro-industrial investments and the promotion o f export crops at 
the expense o f the small-holder agricultural sector, the main provider o f food 
(World Bank 1995i:49).
Yet, as another World Bank report points out, most World Bank loans have 
been for the development o f agricultural export crops and transport infrastructure: 
only 6% o f a total investment o f US$ 1.5 billion for 75 operations financed by the 
World Bank in Cameroon as o f 1994, had been targeted to the social sectors 
(World Bank 1995b:l).
The problems o f corruption and a severe foreign debt burden are key 
ingredients in the present situation. The annual "Corruption Perception Index" for 
1998 and for 1999, which is compiled by a Berlin-based organization, 
Transparency International, lists Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the 
world, surpassing two o f the better known cases, Nigeria and Indonesia.26 Until 
early 1998, oil was Cameroon's main export but oil revenues were never entered 
into the national budget in what the Economist Intelligence Unit has described as a 
historic lack o f transparency in public accounts.27 Oil revenues were deposited in 
foreign bank accounts where they were supposed to be safely kept as a reserve for 
bad days. When the bad days arrived in the mid-1980s, the reserves had 
disappeared (Verschave 1996). Both the IMF and the World Bank have made 
considerable efforts to have oil revenues become part o f the regular government 
budget (Verschave 1996) and corruption is increasingly a subject matter that the 
World Bank brings up in its dialogue with the government (World Bank 1998b). 
However, the World Bank seems to rely on assurances by the government itself 
that it has begun addressing corruption (World Bank 1998b:3). These assurances
26 The Economist magazine, 3 October 1998; World Wide Web Resource: www.Transparency.de, 
accessed 30 October 1999.
27 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report for Cameroon, Quarter 1996.
112
have facilitated the concession of a new structural adjustment loan in 1998 which, 
like previous ones, is largely focused on export-led growth and the simple 
assumption that economic growth will reduce poverty (World Bank 1998b).
Vigorous export promotion in order to ease the country's foreign debt 
problem also lies at the heart o f the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy for 
Cameroon (World Bank 1996h:7). Cameroon's external debt problem, which 
amounted to about $ 9.5 billion in 1996, is more severe than the debt situation 
faced by Latin American countries in the 1980s (EIU28, World Bank 1996h). As of 
m id-1997, the country's public external debt was equivalent to 80% o f GDP and 
scheduled debt service represented 50% o f export proceeds and 75% o f budgetary 
receipts (World Bank 1998b:49).
The World Bank considers that the Government o f Cameroon has been 
more serious about adequate implementation o f structural adjustment measures 
over the past two years and as a result the economy has started to grow at an 
estimated 5% per year (World Bank 1998b). According to the World Bank, this 
growth has only had limited impact on the poor but the Government is now 
developing a national poverty reduction strategy which was to be completed in 
1999 (World Bank 1998b:3).
4.4.3 Wealth in Biodiversity: Viewed From the Science and Donor
Perspective
In addition to considerable scientific uncertainties about the subject o f 
biodiversity, there are multiple levels o f meaning attached to the concept 
depending on the perspective from which it is being looked at (chapter 2).
Although much remains unknown, there is a broad consensus amongst the 
scientific community and international donors that Cameroon is a country uniquely 
endowed with biodiversity (Gartlan 1989, McNeely et al. 1990, Sayer et al, 1992, 
Alpert 1993, World Bank 1995d, Smith, T.B. et al. 1997, Sunderland 1997, Sikod 
et al. 1998).
Cameroon is thought to be one o f the most important countries in the world 
with respect to species abundance, endemism and ecosystem diversity. This wealth 
in biodiversity is attributed to large remaining tracts o f relatively undisturbed
28 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report for Cameroon, ?d Quarter 1996.
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lowland humid tropical forest, the broad range o f habitats resulting from marked 
gradients in elevation and rainfall, as well as biogeographical affinities with both 
western and central Africa (Alpert 1993). The mosaic o f habitats includes moist 
tropical forest dominating in the south and south-east, montane forest and alpine 
savanna in the highlands and sub-sahelian savanna and near desert in the north 
(Gartlan 1989). These diverse habitats are home to large numbers o f nationally 
threatened and endemic plants (World Conservation Monitoring Center 1996). 
Cameroon's wildlife is also highly diverse with an estimated 849 species o f birds in 
the areas of Mounts Cameroon, Kupe and Oku (International Council for Bird 
Preservation 1992). The sahelian savanna includes such megafauna as the 
endangered black rhinoceros and the savanna elephant (Gartlan 1989). The moist 
tropical forests in the south and south-east are home to gorillas, forest elephants, 
bongos and other forest ungulates (World Bank-Global Environment Facility 
1995d).
Inventories of large mammals, birds and trees represent easy pickings for 
biodiversity research. A recent taxonomic study o f just one forest area in south- 
central Cameroon estimates that taxonomists and ecologists worldwide do not have 
the resources to study the wide range o f taxa as they are being affected by 
deforestation in a single region (Lawton et al. 1998). The study on the effects of 
forest disturbance and clearance on biodiversity concluded that although species 
richness generally declined with increasing disturbance, no single group o f  species 
could serve as an indicator taxon for changes in the species richness o f other 
groups (Lawton et al. 1998). After collecting data on eight groups, including the 
flagship taxa o f birds and butterflies, the study concluded that the scientific effort 
required to provide inventories o f biodiversity even in this single area in 
Cameroon's Mbalmayo Forest Reserve would exceed anything attempted so far 
anywhere in the world (Lawton et al. 1998: 74).
While conservation organizations and international donors have focused 
much o f their attention on moist tropical forest, ecotones, the transition zones 
between rainforest and savanna, are emerging as key areas in the generation o f 
biodiversity (Enserink 1997). These transition areas (Fig. 4.5) provide zones o f 
contact between closely related species and the use o f DNA studies provides 
insights on the degree o f interbreeding between them. A study o f Cameroon's little 
greenbul (Andropadus virens), a small forest bird, documents that despite the
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interbreeding, species in the rainforest and in the ecotone develop differently 
because the pressures for survival in the two habitats are very different. This 
differentiation may lead to the development o f new species. These findings 
contradict the view that populations must be geographically separated for evolution 
to drive them to diverge, while confirming the theory that the transition areas are 
the birthplace o f much o f the biodiversity found in rainforests (Smith et al. 1997).
Cameroon's high level o f biodiversity has attracted considerable attention 
from the international donor community and an estimated US $ 100 million have 
been invested in biodiversity conservation in Cameroon between 1987 and 1997 
(Sunderland et al. 1997). In addition to the World Bank and the Global 
Environment Facility, other donors include the European Union and a host of 
bilateral aid agencies from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France 
and Canada (World Bank-Global Environment Facility 1995d).
The importance o f  biodiversity in Cameroon in the view o f multilateral 
institutions is demonstrated by the fact that the Global Environment Facility 
selected Cameroon as the site for one o f its earliest GEF project proposals (Horta 
1991). World Bank documents for structural adjustment loans emphasize that 
Cameroon's long-term development depends on an efficient management o f natural 
resources and the environment (World Bank 1994b:21). The World Bank's 
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Cameroon states that the country's long­
term development prospects are closely associated with the sustainable use o f 
forests, soils and biodiversity (World Bank 1996h). However, the CAS does not 
indicate how the World Bank plans to tackle the sustainable use problems in its 
own development assistance programmes for Cameroon.The World Bank's latest 
structural adjustment loan makes a single reference to the government's intention to 
adopt a national strategy for biodiversity management and conservation at some 
unspecified point in the future (World Bank 1998b:48).
Meanwhile, deforestation, the principal threat to Cameroon's biodiversity, 
is increasing at an alarming rate (FAO 1993). Already prior to the devaluation o f 
Cameroon's currency in 1994, the country had one of the highest rates o f 
deforestation in the world (World Resources Institute 1994-95).
While the underlying causes o f the loss o f forests and biodiversity are 
multiple, deforestation in Cameroon is largely driven by commercial logging and 
associated land conversion (Sunderland et al. 1997). In the year following the
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devaluation o f the Franc CFA by 50%, log exports increased by 34% (Kaimowitz 
et al. 1997). This has led to a situation where exports o f logs and wood products 
have become the fastest growing export commodity in 1994, doubling from 6 to 
12% of all exports (World Bank 1996h:7). Economic forecasts for Cameroon 
estimate that the revenues generated by timber exports will exceed oil export 
revenues for the first time in the 1997/98 period making timber the country's 
foremost export.29 Logging operations are usually carried out without forest 
management plans. They are leading, both directly and indirectly, to increasing 
deforestation in what has been described in a confidential study for DFID as a 
"poorly organised race to extract maximum profits from a rapidly disappearing 
resource" (Burnham & Sharpe 1997:4). One o f the industry's increasingly well- 
documented impacts is on wildlife since it provides the infrastructure and 
communications for the commercial bushmeat trade. This trade which includes 
large-scale hunting o f gorillas and forest elephants, would be unable to operate 
without the logging roads and often the transportation provided by logging trucks 
(World Society for the Protection o f Animals 1995, Sikod et al.1998).
While there is broad evidence o f deforestation, data collection in Cameroon 
is difficult. Deforestation can be deducted from timber export figures, it can be 
observed on countless individual logging sites or estimated on the basis o f 
anecdotal evidence such as endless convoys o f logging trucks on Cameroon's main 
roads and the large amounts o f raw logs and sawn timber waiting for shipment in 
the port o f Douala. However, precise data on logging concessions, the hunting of 
rare wildlife or the bushmeat trade involve political sensitivities and are difficult to 
obtain. Even if  these data are collected, it is almost impossible to ensure their 
reliability (Sikod et al. 1998:5).
4.5 Summary
This chapter begins to examine the interface between international financial 
institutions and the environment. The first section contrasts the role o f  the major 
donor governments in setting the agenda for the World Bank with efforts by World 
Bank senior management to obtain greater institutional autonomy. In addition, it
29 The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, lsl Quarter 1998.
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documents the emergence and history o f the environmental agenda at the World 
Bank from the late 1980s though the late 1990s.
The second section examines the reasons behind the establishment o f the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1991. It analyses its institutional 
arrangements, which have led to North-South tensions at the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and to the subsequent 
restructuring o f the GEF in the 1992/93 period. It concludes by examining the 
magnitude o f biodiversity investments in the GEF's portfolio, the policy statements 
surrounding biodiversity conservation and the approach that is being taken in this 
area.
The choice o f  a geographic space in which to examine the World Bank’s 
and GEF’s compliance with their biodiversity-related policies fell on Cameroon 
because both institutions consider the country to be home to globally important 
biodiversity and both are carrying out programmes in Cameroon which have direct 
and indirect impacts on biodiversity
The overview o f  the political, socio-economic and environmental 
geography o f Cameroon provided in the final section o f this chapter is critical to 
situating the case studies o f the following three chapters in their broader context. 
According to political ecology thinking, environmental degradation is both a 
biophysical and a political issue. Attention to the political environment and the 
socio-economic realities o f a country is indispensable to understanding its 
ecological problems. As Morton puts it, when international financial institutions 
pay insufficient attention to these dimensions, their investments may do little to 
advance their stated goals o f promoting sustainable development (or protecting 
biodiversity) but instead ease the pressure inside the domestic economy to bring 
about necessary policy changes and thereby contribute to further distorting the 
society which they are affecting (Morton 1994).
The next chapter examines the World Bank’s overall development strategy 
for Cameroon, which is laid out in the Country Assistance Strategy, and reflected 
in the policy recommendations o f Structural Adjustment Programmes. It will shed 
light on how the institution’s environmental discourse and biodiversity-related 
policies are integrated at this critical level o f planning and policy advice.
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Cameroon Ecotone and Forest Habitats
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Fig. 4.5 Cameroon Ecotone and Forest Habitats 
Source: Smith, T.B. et al. 1997
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CHAPTER 5
POLICY DIALOGUE: 
CONSTRUCTING A DEVELOPMENT GEOGRAPHY
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provides background on the international financial 
institutions and on the political, socio-economic and enviromnental realities o f 
Cameroon and thereby has set the stage for the case studies o f  this and the 
following two chapters. This chapter examines the integration o f the World Bank’s 
environmental discourse and its bio diversity-related policies at the level o f 
strategic planning and policy advice for Cameroon.
The World Bank's policy dialogue with borrowing governments provides 
the overarching framework for the formulation o f macro-economic and sector 
policies and the implementation o f individual development projects. The key 
document resulting from policy dialogue is the Country Assistance Strategy 
(CAS) which represents the principal statement o f the overall World Bank strategy 
in a given country. The CAS is also presented as the vehicle through which the 
Bank in dialogue with governments works to ensure that biodiversity concerns are 
taken into account in economy-wide government policies and development 
programmes and that sectors such as agriculture, forestry, tourism, energy and 
infrastructure are more biodiversity-friendly (World Bank 1995a:25). Figure 5.1 
illustrates the various levels o f policy dialogue examined in this chapter.
World Bank environmental and social policy staff reiterate in numerous 
official publications that the empowerment o f local peoples and communities is 
critical to sustainable development in general and to biodiversity conservation in 
particular (GEF 1993, World Bank 1996d). According to a World Bank study on 
Africa, a sound development strategy implies n. . .a highly participatory approach - 
less top down, more bottom-up than in the past - which effectively involves local 
people, especially at the village level, in the decisions that directly affect their 
lives” (World Bank 1989: 59). The question o f how 'policy dialogue' addresses 
political power relationships and access to productive resources in a country is thus 
critical to Bank efforts in assisting a country with conserving its biodiversity.
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The first section o f this chapter introduces the role o f Country Assistance 
Strategies as the World Bank's overall blueprint for development o f  a specific 
client country. It then analyses the specific Country Assistance Strategy for 
Cameroon and how forest and biodiversity conservation, which the Bank 
recognizes as critical to Cameroon's development, has been integrated into the 
proposed strategy. The World Bank’s Enviromnent Department recognizes that 
targeted lending for biodiversity conservation efforts by itself is insufficient to 
ensure that biodiversity concerns are integrated into a country's overall 
development strategy: " ... the conservation o f biodiversity depends in large 
measure on how well policies and progammes in the economic sectors manage to 
address biodiversity” (World Bank 1995a:I). The section examines to what degree 
the Bank's own environmental expertise is reflected in the Cameroon CAS.
The second section analyses Bank efforts to promote a new forestry code in 
Cameroon. Since these efforts were part o f several consecutive structural 
adjustment programmes, the section begins by examining the overall relationship 
between policies promoted through structural adjustment programmes and the 
enviromnent. While the literature documents that the general correlation between 
structural adjustment programmes and environmental effects remains ambiguous 
(Reed 1992), the question the section seeks to analyse is to what degree structural 
adjustment programmes in Cameroon may be complementing or undennining the 
Bank's efforts on reforming Cameroon's forestry code. The stated goal o f the 
Bank's work on Cameroon's Forestry Code is to establish a framework for 
biodiversity conservation and forest conservation with local participation (World 
Bank 1994b: 11). Using Blaikie's identification o f three distinct approaches to 
biodiversity conservation, i.e. the 'classic', the 'neo-populist' and the 'neo-liberal 
approach' (Blaikie 1995), the section analyses which o f these approaches are used 
in the Forestry Code's reform efforts and what are the possible obstacles to their 
implementation.
Inspired by Crush's suggestion that development discourse is not 
hermetically sealed and might be open to challenge (Crush 1995), the conclusion 
o f this chapter seeks to identify challenges within the policy dialogue which may 
provide an opening for future reformulation o f World Bank approaches to improve 
convergence o f the World Bank's enviromnental and social policy statements and 
its operational practice.
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The method o f analysis used is that o f "informal logic" which is more 
conducive to understanding wide-ranging development discourse than a formal 
logic approach, which is better suited to analysing law's (Gasper 1996b). Informal 
logic, also known as practical argument analysis, consists o f two phases: first, 
specifying the content and structure o f the discourse and only secondly, assessing 
them.
Levels of Policy Dialogue
Fig. 5.1 Levels o f  Policy Dialogue
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5.2 Country Assistance Strategies and their Role in World Bank
Programmes
The CAS is the key strategic document laying out World Bank priority 
investments for its IDA and IBRD borrowers. According to Bank Procedure (BP), 
the CAS is based on the priorities o f a particular country and is prepared with its 
government in a participatory way. It is, however, not a negotiated document and 
BP requires that any differences between the government's agenda and the Bank's 
strategy be highlighted in the CAS (World Bank 1995e). The goal o f the CAS, 
which usually covers a period o f three years, is to lend cohesion to the Bank's 
entire portfolio for a country and thereby help ensure the overall quality o f its 
operations. In addition to being written in consultation "with the country" (i.e. the 
government), Bank staff are advised to pursue consultations on the CAS with civil 
society, including NGOs, but to do it with sensitivity and with the prior consent o f 
the government (World Bank 1997b:2).
The audience for the CAS is the World Bank's Board o f Executive 
Directors, who discuss the CAS at the same time as they approve a proposed 
lending operation for the country in question. The Board does not formally approve 
the CAS and its role is limited to a discussion o f the contents o f a CAS. Board 
discussions o f the CAS had been strongly resisted by Bank Management which 
had stated that the role o f  the Board was to approve policies and projects and that it 
should not be involved in strategy discussions.1 While the large number o f CASs 
and the work overload o f the Executive Directors’ offices with their limited staff 
resources usually do not allow for a detailed discussion o f an individual CAS, the 
Board's involvement in CAS discussions has made it possible to raise ’governance' 
questions as part o f Bank strategy.
Despite the importance o f  the CAS as a blueprint o f a country's 
development strategy, the CAS is a confidential document and not available to the 
public. The public includes national parliaments in both recipient and donor 
countries, unless the government in question specifically authorizes the release o f 
the document. Depending on the recipient government's inclination, there may be a 
general discussion before the CAS is completed or a presentation o f the overall 
results o f the CAS following its adoption in order to obtain broader support for its
1 Interviews with staff o f World Bank Executive Director offices, November 1997
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execution. The document itself, however, remains confidential and not subject to 
democratic process. The Bank explains confidentiality as essential to the protection 
o f a frank discussion o f development challenges facing the country. However, the 
confidentiality o f the CAS does not guarantee overall frankness o f its contents. An 
internal World Bank document calls for candor in the CAS but warns that 
assessments o f particularly sensitive matters should be reserved for oral statements 
(World Bank 1997b:2).
5.3 Biodiversity and the Country Assistance Strategy
The 1987 reorganization o f the Bank under President Barber B.Conable 
created a new emphasis on integrating environmental considerations into its overall 
activities including traditional project lending, designing special environmental 
projects or discussing national environmental policies with borrowing 
governments. Biodiversity, especially tropical forests which the Bank describes as 
storehouses o f medicines, would be protected by Bank intervention: "The Bank's 
goal is to blur the lines between enviromnental activities and the rest o f the Bank's 
work - to make them one" (The World Bank 1989b:9).
An internal World Bank memorandum advises all Operational Managers 
that "Environmental issues are now central to our Country Assistance Strategies" 
(World Bank 1996e: 1). According to the Bank, in Cameroon these environmental 
issues are the protection and conservation o f the country's natural forests, which 
are considered to be key habitats for globally threatened biodiversity (World Bank 
1995d).
5.4 The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Cameroon
This research had access to the 1996 CAS for Cameroon which provides 
the policy framework for economic reforms which can have significant, often 
unintended, consequences both for human society and the natural environment 
(World Bank 1996g). The development discourse used in the Cameroon CAS 
needs to be examined in its different economic, political, social and environmental 
dimensions as all are to some degree connected and have a bearing on the 
conservation o f biodiversity.
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Gasper's description o f the informal logic method is expanded by a critical 
analysis which pays attention to both the text and the context o f underlying 
assumptions in the Cameroon CAS (Gasper 1996b). The audience to whom the 
CAS is addressed, as well as who is included and who is ignored in the CAS form 
part o f this context (Crush 1995:6). An additional question to be considered is 
whether and to what degree the CAS for Cameroon represents the results o f a 
"learning approach" as opposed to "blueprint development" (Roe 1991), a standard 
and normative approach that is widely applied.
5.4.1 Structure and Contents
The 1996 CAS for Cameroon is an English language document2 which 
consists of five sections and several statistical annexes. The Introduction, or first 
section, summarizes the following three sections which cover a report on the 
country’s economic performance and needs for reforms (Section 2), the 
Government's strategy (Section 3) and the World Bank Group's strategy (Section 
4) to address the economic situation. The core o f the strategies put forward in 
Sections 3 and 4 are identical, only the emphasis shifts from what the Government 
stated goals are to what the World Bank Group's instruments and means are to 
achieving these goals. The lack o f discussion or presence o f divergent opinions 
may be explained by the fact that according to the CAS, the Bank's proposed 
strategy reflects the conclusions o f a workshop held with economic ministers and 
advisers in Cameroon. The final and fifth section consists o f a half-page note from 
the World Bank's President addressed to the audience o f the CAS, the World 
Bank's Board o f Directors, listing four possible topics the Board might wish to 
discuss during its consideration o f the Cameroon CAS
5.4.2 The Core Contents
The core contents o f the Cameroon CAS consist o f a description o f 
Cameroon's economic situation and a macro-economic reform program. 
Cameroon's external debt situation, which is described as more severe than the debt
2 According to the Bank's Country Department for Cameroon an unofficial French translation o f  the 
CAS has been provided to the government with the goal o f facilitating communication.
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problem faced by Latin American countries in the 1980s, is the central 
preoccupation o f the CAS. At US $ 9.2. billion, Cameroon's external debt exceeds 
its GDP and on average 6% o f its GDP is transferred abroad each year to service 
this debt. A 1995 rescheduling o f the debt by Cameroon’s principal donors led to a 
reduction o f debt service from 90 to 77% of Government revenue. While most of 
this debt is bilateral, 10% o f the debt is to the World Bank most o f which is for 
high interest IBRD loans. Cameroon contracted these high cost loans before its 
middle-income country status was down-graded to low-income country status in 
early 1994, which made the country eligible for concessional IDA loans.
The Government's and Bank's strategy for Cameroon is centered around 
macro-economic reforms aimed at servicing Cameroon's external debt and the 
creation o f an enabling environment for the private sector as a future engine of 
economic growth. The two priorities o f this strategy are:
(1) fiscal adjustments to release sufficient resources to keep the government 
current on its interest payment obligations;
(2) comprehensive privatization and financial sector reform to improve the 
business climate (World Bank 1996g:l),
The promotion o f exports is the central element in this strategy. The Bank 
sees its role as helping Cameroon restructure its economy "to remain competitive 
in a rapidly changing world" (World Bank 1996g: 13). The Government and the 
Bank agree that the technical means to reach the goals consist o f further trade and 
price liberalisation. Export promotion ranks as the first priority. Building on the 
50% devaluation o f the F CFA in January 1994, the strategy aims at making 
Cameroon's exports, which consist principally o f primary commodities (oil, coffee, 
cocoa and timber) more attractive on the international market. Exports o f logs and 
wood products were the fastest growing export commodities following the 1994 
devaluation, doubling from 6 to 12% o f all exports.
In addition to IDA balance-of-payments support in the form o f several 
structural adjustment loans, IDA investment projects, e.g. for the transport sector 
and an oil pipeline, are also designed to help generate foreign exchange. According 
to the CAS, the pipeline is o f  special significance because o f its potential ",. .to 
produce a major stream o f foreign exchange that would help the government meet 
its heavy debt service obligations" (World Bank 1996g: 14). Chapter 6 analyses
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how both the Transport Sector and Pipeline projects address the Bank's stated 
commitment to biodiversity conservation.
Further reforms revolve around a tight fiscal policy with the objective o f 
generating surpluses as well as a restructuring and reform o f  the civil service. New 
organizational structures put in place in 1995 resulted in the departure o f 7,000 
civil servants, or about 5.7% o f the civil service, with further restructuring 
underway.
5.4.3 The Peripheral Contents
In addition to the core o f the strategy, the CAS refers to the need for 
governance refonn, poverty alleviation and environmental/biodiversity protection. 
The macro-economic refonns, however, never leave center stage, since they are 
considered a pre-condition for poverty alleviation efforts and essential to restoring 
investor confidence. Despite the World Bank’s stated commitments to integrating 
environmental considerations into all its activities, which were prominently 
emphasized during the World Bank’s 1987 reorganization, a potential linkage 
between macro-economic refonns and the environment is not established.
Amongst the peripheral issues, governance reform receives the strongest 
endorsement in the CAS, which does not shy away from the sensitive topic o f 
corruption. The CAS states that the government's long-tenn objectives are to create 
a democratic society and to double per capita income within 20 years (World Bank 
1996g:8).
In the short-term, however, the situation is more problematic. According to 
the CAS, . .the legitimacy o f  the current administration is broadly challenged 
among civil society, not just among fringe secessionist elements." The CAS 
acknowledges that the country's oil revenues have not been wisely invested (World 
Bank 1996g:3) and refers to the problem that long-entrenched corruption, political 
interference and arbitrariness injudicial decisions are seen as wide-spread and 
represent a key impediment to private investment (World Bank 1996g:l 1). 
However, the CAS reports that the President o f Cameroon recognizes the need for 
improved governance, that he has strengthened the authority o f the ministry o f 
finance and that he and his core team of advisors are committed to reform (World 
Bank 1996g:6). The CAS also refers to the need for constitutional and political 
reforms as they are essential for private sector confidence (World Bank 1996g:5)
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and it calls for greater freedom for NGOs to operate effectively (World Bank 
1996g:14). Overall, the CAS concludes that governance reforms will not be easy 
and that they imply a fundamental social transformation (World Bank 1996g:6).
With regard to social analysis, the CAS refers to a World Bank Poverty 
Assessment for Cameroon, which found that Cameroonians have suffered a 
significant increase o f poverty (World Bank 1995i). A six percent annual decline in 
GDP during the 1986-1993 period is said to have produced a 50% decline in per 
capita income. The CAS states that spending for social sectors was sharply 
curtailed and as a result Cameroon's social achievements are rapidly being eroded. 
Malnutrition is widespread and maternal mortality is high. The rural population 
suffered severely as result o f reduction in producer prices for cash crops and the 
elimination o f government subsidies before the 1994 devaluation o f the currency 
(World Bank 1995i). Urban incomes suffered when civil service salaries were 
decreased by 50% in 1993. The CAS adds that the 1994 currency devaluation has 
improved the situation, especially for those sectors of the population who can 
benefit from Cameroon's increased competitiveness on export markets.
The CAS states that the Government has a medium-tenn plan to addressing 
issues such as safety nets, land tenure reforms, food security and a bigger role for 
women and local communities. In the same breath, the CAS warns that any 
hesitation in implementing the macro-economic reforms can undermine these 
poverty alleviation efforts (World Bank 1996g: 11). The CAS does not examine if  
the implementation o f the macro-economic reforms is consistent with the stated 
social goals in the medium-term. It simply assumes this to be the case, although it 
is aware that social indicators may worsen in the short term. The CAS explicitly 
refers to the risks posed by anti-reform lobbies which know that the government's 
strategy will be detrimental to p er  capita consumption in the short term (World 
Bank 1996g).
In the area o f biodiversity and environmental reforms, the CAS refers to the 
fact that Cameroon is partly situated in the tropical forest belt o f the Congo Basin 
and that the long-term development o f the country is closely associated with the 
sustainable use o f forests, soils and biodiversity. In addition, it points to World 
Bank implementation o f a GEF biodiversity protection project and assistance in the 
preparation o f Cameroon's National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP). It also 
makes reference to World Bank efforts to reform Cameroon's forestry code, which
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are listed as a major achievement o f structural adjustment programmes and are 
examined later in this chapter.
5.4.4 Assessing the CAS’s Central Mission
The CAS is not the result o f an analytic process, if  analytic discourse is 
defined as one that contains multiple perspectives on policy issues, all o f which 
potentially could have some validity and need to be taken into account (White 
1994). Contrary to internal World Bank recommendations, the CA S’s overriding 
focus on macro-economic refonns indicates that it was not prepared in a 
participatory fashion beyond inclusion o f a small circle o f government 
representatives.
The core and essence o f the CAS represents what Gasper has described as 
"prescriptive essentialism", which holds that a policy measure is inherently 
appropriate (Gasper 1996a). It is focused on avoiding the possibility o f  a scenario 
where Cameroon would accumulate arrears on its foreign debt and enter into 
default. The macro-economic refonn programme's possible causal linkages or 
potential implications for increasing democratic governance, poverty alleviation 
and biodiversity conservation are not discussed. References to the need for 
governance reform are made in the context o f the macro-economic goal o f 
restoring investor confidence. Poverty alleviation is seen as a longer-term goal 
dependent on prompt macro-economic reforms. This approach to poverty 
alleviation is based on the assumption o f neo-liberal economic theory that export- 
led economic growth will eventually trickle down and "lift all boats". The 
underlying premise is felt to be "an empirical truth and yet is placed beyond 
empirical test" (Gasper 1996a: 155). The CAS for Cameroon represents a model o f 
development discourse which Crush has described as a discourse which is usually 
seen as self-evident and beyond question in the way it establishes its authority and 
constructs the world (Crush 1995:3).
The short-term focus o f the CAS makes it difficult to consider the long­
term consequences for Cameroon's development that its policy prescriptions may 
engender. The possible implications o f a "strong fiscal contraction" in terms o f 
human suffering from malnutrition, lack o f  hasic medical care and a youth whose 
intelligence and talents are wasted in an environment that offers neither education
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nor employment, remain unexamined. The only connection established between 
the macro-economic reforms and a reduction in per-capita consumption is made 
through the warning that a possible populist opposition (anti-reform lobby) may 
use this as an argument against the refonn package.
5.4.5 The Politics of Marginalization
The strategies o f both the Government o f Cameroon and the World Bank, 
as described in the CAS, are identical and the CAS does not note any differences 
that might exist between the two (World Bank 1996g). The strategies are based on 
discussions between World Bank officials and a narrow circle o f Cameroonian 
officials around the Presidency and representatives of the finance ministry.
Whether the consensus is based on the like-mindedness o f a small group o f 
economic experts or on the pressure felt on the Cameroonian side to agree with 
Bank proposals in order to protect access to international funding, remains open to 
speculation.
The government which the CAS describes as being committed to reforms is 
the same government which sections of the CAS acknowledge to be responsible 
for extensive economic mismanagement and wide spread corruption, and which is 
resisting democratic reforms and facing broad opposition from civil society (World 
Bank 1996g). The fundamental governance problems identified by the CAS 
appear, however, to have no consequences for the Bank's proposed strategy. This 
can in part be explained by the fact that the CAS defines Cameroon's problems as 
technical problems which can be solved by technical solutions consisting o f fiscal 
and monetary policy reforms. The depoliticization o f  the issues that follows from 
treating matters, which affect people in different ways and on which they may have 
different perspectives, as technical problems allows the CAS to avoid linking 
governance reform to economic reforms and the disbursement o f funds (Gasper 
1996b).
The technical framing o f  issues also appears to facilitate the limitation o f 
the discussion on the economic future o f the country to a narrow set o f officials, 
although the government they represent is acknowledged to have little legitimacy 
and credibility in the eyes o f broad sections o f the country's population (World 
Bank 1996g). The technical approach favored in the CAS does not raise questions
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concerning possible problems o f providing fresh loans to a government that, 
according to the Bank's own assessment, has only a weak commitment to poverty 
alleviation (World Bank 1995b).
The central question o f how the proposed macro-economic reforms will 
affect the structure o f power and wealth and the access to productive resources in 
the country has thereby been avoided. A response to this question, however, is 
pertinent, if  not decisive, for the prospect o f conserving the country's rich forests 
and biodiversity. Will the pressure to earn foreign exchange displace local people, 
including indigenous forest dwellers, whose livelihoods and culture depend on 
forest resources, when their forest lands are taken over by industrial forest 
exploitation?
The lack o f public debate on the far-reaching macro-economic reforms 
contained in the CAS is likely to lead to further political disempowerment o f the 
overall population who ultimately are the intended beneficiaries o f the reform 
programme. An open discussion might have posed a challenge to the hegemony o f 
strict neo-liberal economics by, for instance, considering the merits o f a Keynesian 
strategy o f enlarging domestic markets to generate growth. It might also have put 
forward a social justice agenda, tying economic reforms to income distribution and 
land reform.
The World Bank’s belief in the inherent suitability o f the CAS strategy 
leads to a situation where the consideration o f possible alternatives is considered as 
heretical. Gasper explains that struggles to legitimize one base case and set o f 
categories leads to a tendency to discredit possible alternatives and to the claim, 
that 'There is no Alternative' to the current policy (Gasper 1996b: 50).
In addition to the marginalization o f Cameroonians, the CAS reflects the 
marginalization o f social science and biodiversity expertise within the World Bank. 
There is a gulf between the institution's research and expertise in the environmental 
and social field and its macro-economic expert teams, which comes to the surface 
in the CAS. The latter maintain a strong upperhand relegating the 'soft sectors' o f 
environmental and social expertise to enclaves away from decisions affecting large 
financial flows.
Notwithstanding this overall situation, the CAS is porous to new ideas and 
has the potential for openings. Its strong statements on the need for political 
reforms, including a call for greater freedoms for NGOs to operate effectively and
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its references to social and environmental issues, fall outside o f  the traditional 
Bank focus on economic growth. More fundamental issues, however, such as 
whether the continued influx o f fresh loans is conducive to bring about the needed 
political reforms, are not raised.
In this context, James Morton's case study on development aid in the 
Darfur region o f Sudan raises a hypothesis which may have validity beyond his 
particular study area. He reaches the conclusion that because direct donor control is 
not feasible, donors use money as an incentive to make governments undertake 
refonns that the donors consider necessary:
"But money is precisely the wrong thing to offer as an 
inducement. It eases the only pressure inside the 
domestic economy that might bring about necessary 
policy changes. It provides foreign exchange, 
undennining the effect o f the devaluation which is 
usually a key component o f the policy reforms that 
are being proposed. Lastly, like all aid which must 
pass through government hands, it strengthens the 
government's position and so undennines the pressure 
to make government more accountable, which is the 
second key component o f refonn" (Morton 1996:30).
The CAS recognizes that a 'fundamental social transformation' may be 
required to achieve the needed governance reforms (World Bank 1996g:6). It does, 
not, however, consider the role of continued lending to the Government o f 
Cameroon in achieving, or undermining, the social transformation that will allow 
these governance reforms to take root.
5.4.6 The CAS’s Divorce from Biodiversity
Summarizing four years o f World Bank research on participatory 
development, the Bank's Environment Department concludes "Development only 
w orks... if  it can be environmentally and socially sustained. And it is only 
sustainable if  it speaks with the voices o f the people whose lives are being touched: 
participatory development, tapping into their knowledge, organization, norms and 
motivations” (World Bank 1996d:17). World Bank social scientists emphasize that 
the empowerment o f local peoples and communities is critical to biodiversity 
conservation (GEF 1993). Furthermore, the Bank's own research establishes the 
need for economic programmes to pay attention to biodiversity concerns "Hence,
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the conservation o f biodiversity depends in large measure on how well policies and 
programmes in the economic sectors manage to address biodiversity" (World Bank 
1995a:I).
Considering the impacts o f its macro-economic reform programme on 
biodiversity represents a challenge the CAS is not willing to take up. There are 
several hypotheses on the ways in which the macro-economic reforms promoted 
through the CAS may have an impact on biodiversity none o f which receive 
specific attention in the CAS:
(1) the impact of'vigorous export promotion' in which raw logs from Cameroon's 
primary moist tropical forest play a leading role.
(2) World Bank programmes inherently influence the "enabling environment" for 
biodiversity conservation by strengthening or weakening different agencies and 
actors within the state. A vastly reduced and weakened civil service, which 
includes the forestry agencies, may have impacts on long-term forest management 
and the sustainable use o f a variety o f forest products.
(3) the potential implications of increasing poverty o f both rural and urban 
populations on forests and biodiversity. If  economic and political empowerment o f 
indigenous peoples and other forest-dependent people promotes their well-being 
and the protection o f biodiversity, as World Bank social scientists state (GEF
1993), then disempowerment and growing poverty may lead to the opposite effect. 
World Bank annual reports and other publications commonly establish the 
connection between poverty and environmental degradation, but not the CAS for 
Cameroon (World Bank 1989c, 1991a, 1992a, 1994f).
Instead o f considering its possible implications for the environment and 
biodiversity, the CAS refers to other Bank-supported initiatives that address these 
issues. The World Bank implemented GEF biodiversity protection project and a 
National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) for Cameroon, which was drawn up 
with Bank support, are the other principal initiatives. In addition, the CAS refers 
to the new forestry code which is listed as a major achievement o f  structural 
adjustment programmes. The CAS describes the new forestry code for Cameroon 
as a reform effort which includes provisions aimed at increasing transparency in 
the attribution o f concession rights and setting 'the right prices' for timber. The 
final sections o f this chapter analyse the new forestry code and the structural 
adjustment programmes in which it is embedded.
Despite Bank claims that the environment and biodiversity are central to 
the CAS (World Bank 1996e), the CAS for Cameroon has divorced itself from
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these considerations and assigned them to the isolated enclave inhabited by 
environmental and social scientists.
5.4.7 The Bank's Long-Term Role and Institutional Self-Interest
The CAS states that the World Bank has been actively engaged in 
development activities in Cameroon since 1967 (World Bank 1996g: 13). In 1991, 
the Bank’s portfolio in Cameroon included 14 active IBRD projects, the majority 
of which encountered severe problems leading to their closing or restructuring. As 
o f the writing o f the 1996 CAS, three IBRD and two IDA projects remained in the 
Bank's Cameroon portfolio. The problems which were common 'to virtually all 
sectors' are described by the CAS as due to different types o f mismanagement 
problems on the part o f Cameroonian government authorities (World Bank 
1996g:16).
From this point of view, the projects were inherently good, only the 
Government was incapable o f handling them correctly. There is no mention of 
attempts to reach a more in-depth understanding o f the possibility that project 
design, perhaps the absence of equity considerations or o f clear mechanisms o f 
accountability, could bear a share o f the responsibility in the failure o f these 
projects. Questions such as whether greater public participation and transparency 
in the design and implementation o f the project, i.e. adherence to World Bank 
stated policy commitments, could have led to better results, remain unanswered.
The funds disbursed for these failed projects have further increased 
Cameroon's foreign debt and since the loans were made from the Bank's hard loan 
window (IBRD), the interest rate is close to market interest rates as opposed to 
much lower rates o f concessional development funding. Unlike a private 
commercial bank that has to take a loss if  it lends for a failed project, the World 
Bank is shielded from the rigors o f  the marketplace. Its status as a 'preferred 
creditor', usually guarantees that the World Bank gets repaid for its loans 
independent o f their performance.
The World Bank's focus on adjustment lending to help Cameroon service 
its foreign debt is illustrated in the table below which lists past, present and 
planned lending to Cameroon. The 'Fifth Dimension' category specifically
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represents IDA loans to Cameroon for the repayment o f interest on previous IBRD 
loans.
Cameroon - Bank Group Fact Sheet Fiscal Years 1993-1998 
IBRD/IDA Lending Program m m e, FY 96-FY 98
Planned
Commitments (US$ 176 86 472
millions)
Sector(%)
Education - - - 2
Health - - 50 -
Human Resources - - - 4
Non-sector(a) - 100 38 79
Public Sector 
Management
2
Transportation - - 12 13
TOTAL - 100 100 100
Lending Instrument (%)
Adjustment Loans 100 64
Fifth Dimension - - 38 15
Specific Investment 65 27 15 100
t o ™ /
100 100 100
(continued on next page)
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*Disbursements (US $
■
millions)
Adjustment Loans - 103 112 300
Fifth Dimension
;  T  v  . * ' ■' * ■ - 51 33 72
Specific Investment
' -'v "
Loans and others
65 27 15 100
Repayments (US $ 
millions)
32 105 94 268
Interest (US $ millions) 32 92 60 142
Fig. 5.2 World Bank Group Fact Sheet for Fiscal Y'ears 1993-1998
Source: Memorandum o f  the President o f  the International Development Association to the 
Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy o f  the World Bank Group for the Republic 
o f Cameroon. Annex A 2. 1996
This table provided in the 1996 CAS for Cameroon shows both 
commitments and disbursements for Cameroon during the 1993-98 period. The 
discrepancy between commitments and disbursements can be due to numerous 
reasons such as a delay in the preparation o f a specific investment project. The 
figures are not entirely clear such as the one in column five (FY 98-FY-98) on the 
previous page under ‘Specific Investments Loans and others’ which lists as being 
o f 100%. Given that the expenditures for ‘Adjustment Loans’ and ‘Fifth 
Dimension’ are 64% and 15% respectively, the percentage for ‘Specific Investment 
Loans and others’ should be the difference between 79% (64%+15%) and 100%, 
i.e. 21%. However, the overall picture drawn by this table is one where the vast 
majority o f lending is for structural adjustment and ‘Fifth Dimension’ loans, the 
latter o f which represent new IDA loans to repay old IBRD loans with only a small 
amount o f the resources dedicated to expenditures for health and education.
The table reveals a crisis situation in which financial resources are used to 
service creditors and few resources are left for investments in social sectors. Emery 
Roe found that "Crisis narratives are the primary means whereby development 
experts and the institutions for which they work claim rights to stewardship over 
land and resources they do not own" (Roe 1995:1066). The CAS's story o f 
Cameroon's crushing debt is a crisis narrative and its emphasis on extracting and
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exporting primary commodities as the main way out o f the crisis indicates that Roe 
may have made a valid point.
It is necessary to keep the broader World Bank context o f the CAS for 
Cameroon in mind. A potential default by the Cameroon government on its World 
Bank loans can potentially threaten the World Bank's top credit ratings on 
international financial markets, especially if  it encourages other governments to 
default as well. Lower credit ratings in turn would hamper its ability to borrow 
money on relatively favourable rates from these markets and reduce its lending 
abilities, thereby ultimately threaten its raison d'etre.
The CAS does not explicitly establish this context but states that a failure to 
implement the proposed macro-economic reforms will make it increasingly 
difficult for Cameroon to .service its external debt, even to preferred creditors" 
(World Bank 1996g:9). Concern about a default on Cameroon's debt is heightened 
by recent experience, because between 1989 and 1993 Cameroon accumulated 
arrears on all its commercial and bilateral debt and, according to a 1995 World 
Bank rep o rt" . . .so far only the Bretton Woods Institutions have collected debt 
service payments in full but with substantial delays" (World Bank 1995f 7).
As referred to earlier in this chapter, the audience for the CAS is the Bank's 
Board o f Executive Directors, which represents the shareholders o f the World 
Bank. The goal o f avoiding potential arrears or even defaults on World Bank loans 
is o f primordial interest to the shareholding governments since they are the 
ultimate guarantor o f loans contracted by the Bank on international capital 
markets. In case o f default, they would be called upon to satisfy the lenders. This 
may in part explain the Board’s reluctance to delve into deeper underlying issues 
which might ultimately threaten the repayment o f Bank loans. In addition, time 
constraints and the large quantity o f material that the Bank's Board has to deal 
with, make detailed Board discussions about a specific CAS or project a rare event. 
Although questions may have crept up in the minds o f Board members about the 
unquestioned validity o f the neo-liberal assumptions underlying strict macro- 
economic reforms, there is as o f now no 'alternative development narrative' that 
would help bureaucrats and policy-makers to make sense o f macro-economic 
uncertainties and that could be turned into a broadly applied approach (Roe 1991).
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5.5 Cameroon's New Forestry Code and Structural Adjustment
The World Bank has worked towards influencing the management o f 
Cameroon's primary moist tropical forests through a set o f separate provisions 
which were part o f consecutive structural adjustment operations. The overriding 
stated goal of the Bank's efforts is to put in place a framework for biodiversity 
conservation and forest management with local participation (World Bank 
1994b: 11). To achieve this goal the forestry code reform provisions aim at putting 
timber exploitation in Cameroon on a more sustainable footing by promoting the 
transparency o f business transactions in the sector and increasing government 
revenue from timber exports. As referred to in the previous section, the CAS lists 
the refonn o f Cameroon's Forestry Code amongst the achievements o f structural 
adjustment (World Bank 1996g:6).
Since the policy reforms promoted through structural adjustment 
programmes by themselves can have impacts on forest ecosystems and 
biodiversity, it is necessary to separate the analysis o f structural adjustment on its 
own terms from its more specific provisions on forestry code reforms. The two 
parts may be mutually reinforcing, they may be neutral towards each other or one 
may be subverting the goals o f the other.
Documentation on specific World Bank structural adjustment programmes 
is highly confidential and the programmes as negotiated with the governments 
rarely find their way into the public domain. There is, however, publicly available 
general information on both structural adjustment and Bank proposals for 
reforming Cameroon's forestry code. In addition, several internal World Bank 
documents were made available to the researcher.
This section begins by examining the general discussion o f the potential 
impacts o f structural adjustment operations on the environment, forest ecosystems 
and biodiversity. It then turns to documentation o f the impacts o f  structural 
adjustment on Cameroon's moist tropical forest. The third part examines the 
politics o f the reform o f Cameroon's Forestry Code, its specific provisions and 
their implementation.
5.5.1 Structural Adjustment and Environmental Impacts
The 1987 Report by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) called attention to World Bank structural adjustment
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programmes and their impacts on the environment (WCED 1987:78). Referring 
especially to resource-based sectors such as agriculture and forestry, the report 
calls on the World Bank to take sustainability considerations into account in its 
structural adjustment operations.
The economic policy reforms promoted under structural adjustment usually 
consist of a mix o f currency devaluation, reduced public spending, trade 
liberalisation, increased taxation and promotion o f foreign investment. The 
economic and social changes brought about by these policy changes m ay have 
direct and indirect influence on the natural environment. How the impacts of these 
economic policy refonns on the environment can be measured continues to be the 
subject o f considerable debate. A key reason why establishing a causal relationship 
between structural adjustment programmes and the environment is a thorny 
problem is that in methodological tenns it is difficult to define the counterfactual 
baseline o f "no structural adjustment", i.e. what would have happened in the 
absence o f structural adjustment programmes.
The World Bank's 1994 report on adjustment in Africa recognises that 
economic refonns which change relative prices, such as a devaluation o f  the 
exchange rate or the switch to market-determined prices for agricultural products 
and privatization, can change the incentives for resource use and conservation 
(World Bank 1994c: 175). The overall position o f the report is that structural 
adjustment programmes promote economic growth, which reduces poverty and, 
given the assumption that poverty causes environmental degradation, also benefits 
the environment. However, when the report specifically considers the 
environment, it concludes that there is insufficient empirical research on the 
precise interaction between economic and environmental changes. Some policy 
reforms promoted through structural adjustment, such as reductions in pesticide 
subsidies, may lead to positive environmental impacts, while others, such as the 
promotion o f timber and agricultural products exports, may damage the 
environment. Other research reaches similar conclusions, namely that the 
correlation between structural adjustment programmes and the environment 
remains ambiguous (Reed 1992).
The question o f debt and deforestation is a subset o f the more general issue 
o f how policy reforms affect the environment. It appears again that no easy 
conclusions can be drawn from the macro-economic framework for deforestation.
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A 1997 case study on Ecuador considers the opposite scenario by analysing the 
relationship between a large influx o f oil boom money and deforestation. The study 
concludes that the boom in foreign exchange receipts helped finance the 
Ecuadorian government's strategy to build infrastructure and expand the 
agricultural frontier and thereby increase deforestation (Wunder 1997). Therefore, 
if  debt and deforestation might be positively related, the opposite scenario o f a 
large financial influx leading to deforestation may also apply.
Another study based on the review o f 140 economic deforestation models 
highlights a few variables and causal relations involved in deforestation, 
concluding that deforestation tends to increase when road-building makes forests 
more accessible, when agricultural prices are higher, rural wages lower and when 
there are more opportunities for long-distance trade. The impact o f other variables, 
such as technological change in agriculture, tenure security and household income, 
is not clear (Angelsen & Kaimowitz 1997).
The complexity and geographic variability between macro-economic 
adjustment and deforestation makes generalized conclusions difficult to sustain. 
Even in a specific country context, the relationship o f a particular policy refonn to 
environmental impacts may not be traceable in an unambiguous manner.
5.5.2 Specific Impacts in Cameroon
This section analyses the hypotheses put forward in the section about the 
Cameroon CAS, namely that there are three main ways in which structural 
adjustment can potentially affect the environment in the Cameroon country 
context:
(i) the impact o f 'vigorous export promotion' in order to service debts and 
ultimately achieve balance-of-payments equilibrium;
(ii) the influence on the ‘enabling environment’ for forest and biodiversity 
conservation by strengthening or weakening different agencies and actors within 
the state;
(iii) the potential implications o f increasing poverty o f both rural and urban 
populations on forests and biodiversity.
Concerning (i), the key to export promotion in Cameroon was the 
devaluation o f the country's currency. In January 1994, the parity o f the F CFA,
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which is tied to the French Franc, was changed from CFA 50/ FF1 to CFA 100/ 
FF1. As a result, the terms-of-trade for timber improved by 50%. With an 
estimated deforestation rate o f 0.6%, Cameroon already suffered a high annual rate 
o f deforestation prior to the devaluation (World Resources Institute 1994-95). A 
comparative study on the impact o f structural adjustment on forests in Indonesia, 
Bolivia and Cameroon concluded that when timber already plays a key role in a 
country's exports, then devaluation puts additional pressure on forests (Kaimowitz 
et al. 1997). This was the case in Cameroon which produced 34% more logs in 
1994 after the devaluation than in 1993 (Kaimowitz et al. 1997).
Concerning (ii), across the board reductions in government spending cannot 
but diminish the government's ability to manage the country's forests or to establish 
the capacity for doing so in the first place. While the decline in the effectiveness o f 
Cameroon's Forest Service is not wholly attributable to structural adjustment, cuts 
in government spending have aggravated the Forest Service's operational 
problems. Cameroon's Forest Service had slightly more control over logging 
activities before the public sector entered into severe crisis and the country began 
to depend heavily on timber exports.3 The institutional weaknesses preceded 
stiuctural adjustment programmes but were further aggravated by them. The 
overall result is that, at present, logging operations are not supervised, forest rent is 
not collected and there is little incentive for logging companies to invest in limiting 
the damage to the forests from logging (Tschoungui et al. 1996).
Concerning (iii), prior to the devaluation, the World Bank concluded that 
structural adjustment programmes were having significant social impacts. A major 
negative impact was a significant increase in unemployment created through civil 
service reform, massive lay-offs and reduction in salaries. In addition, a reduction 
in producer prices led to a fall in farm income by 40-65% and reductions in health 
and education expenditure led to adverse consequences for vulnerable population 
groups (World Bank 1995f:32). Some o f these consequences were to be remedied 
through a separate "Social Dimensions o f Adjustment Program", which, according 
to the Bank's own evaluation report, ended in failure as a result o f the government's 
lack o f commitment to addressing with poverty issues (World Bank 1995b).
3 Interviews with Enviro-Protect and other NGOs in Cameroon, as well as with officials in MINEF, 
the Ministry for Environment and Forests, 1997 and 1998.
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Following the devaluation, the World Bank expects improvements for those 
sectors o f the rural population that are producing for the tradable sector. 
Furthermore, the liberalization of the economy and the increase in international 
competitiveness is expected to lead to higher income levels and new opportunities 
for all social groups over time. However, while producer prices for coffee and 
cocoa improved after the devaluation, a new export tax on coffee and cocoa, the 
collapse o f government technical, financial and marketing services for tree crops 
and the removal o f  input subsidies, have limited the potentially positive effects o f 
the devaluation. As a result o f the collapse o f government services, more intensive 
land-use was not possible and the pressure on forests further increased as 
Cameroon's farmers needed to clear more land for commercial swidden agriculture 
( Kaimowitz et al. 1997). Additional pressure on forests and wildlife resulted from 
the fact that large numbers o f village extension workers in rural areas became 
unemployed and had few options to make a living other than illegal hunting or 
cutting trees in forest reserves (Tchoungui et al. 1996).
When peasants can no longer use their traditional lands because these are 
used for export crops, they move deeper into forests to obtain land (Lensink 1996). 
A variation o f this problem holds true for Cameroon's indigenous Baka people, 
who are displaced by increasing logging activities from their ancestral forest lands 
and are moving in larger numbers into protected areas.4
Environmental experts at the World Bank were aware that the devaluation 
would lead to increased deforestation and loss o f biodiversity unless accompanied 
by special measures, but they had little influence. One official recalls: "I still 
remember calling a meeting in early 1994 to discuss the impact o f the CFA 
devaluation on Central and West African forests, and the need for mitigating 
measures: forest fiscal reform, improved concession inspection and tax recovery. 
Twenty-five Bank staff attended, including environment and natural resource 
management specialists, agricultural division chiefs, but not a single country 
economist. Apart from the obvious environmental issues, we are talking macro­
4 Interviews with Baka people as well as staff o f  the 1UCN Dia Project in south-eastern Cameroon, 
May 1997.
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economic issues here, as in hundreds o f millions o f dollars o f rent thrown to the 
dogs!"5
The empirical evidence indicates that some o f the negative impacts 
described above preceded the structural adjustment programmes. The literature and 
interviews however, indicate that since the policy refonns promoted under 
structural adjustment did not take environmental considerations into account, 
structural adjustment led to a further aggravation o f environmental deterioration.
5.5.3 The Genesis of the New Forestry Code
The Bank's support for the reform o f Cameroon's forestry code is the centre 
piece o f its environmental strategy for Cameroon. It is based on the recognition 
that Cameroon's long-term development depends on "...an  efficient management 
o f natural resources and the environment sector" (World Bank 1994b:21). As such 
it introduces a far-reaching goal: create a framework for biodiversity conservation 
and forest management with local participation (World Bank 1994b: 11).
The critical issues for the Bank are increased transparency in the sector and 
improved revenue collection for the government. These are difficult and delicate 
issues to tackle since the timber sector provides politicians with an important 
source o f patronage income and any increase in transparency is considered a threat 
to the existing power structures (Ekoko 1995).
The W orld Bank discussions with the Government o f Cameroon on the 
need for reforming the country's Forestry Code began in the early 1990s. After the 
1994 devaluation, Cameroon was no longer considered creditworthy for IBRD 
loans and became eligible for IDA funding. Subsequently, a structural adjustment 
credit on more favourable IDA terms replaced the third tranche o f a 1989 IBRD 
structural adjustment loan. The new structural adjustment credit contained 
conditions regarding the completion o f forestry policy reforms that had already 
been discussed unsuccessfully with the government in previous years. W hile the 
World Bank and the Government came to agreement on a draft o f  a new forestry 
code, a debate about the draft in Cameroon's parliament led to substantial 
revisions. The Government promulgated a new forestry code in January 1994 
which incorporated these revisions. This revised version, however, was not
5 Interview with World Bank environmental expert June 1997
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acceptable to the Bank. The Bank's objections concerned the lack o f  transparency 
o f proposed procedures for awarding logging concessions, the role o f state 
intervention which was considered to be excessive and a proposed ban on log 
exports which was considered to lead to perverse economic incentives (1995f:5).
The political maneuvering behind the scenes in Cameroon’s parliament is 
unclear even to close observers in Cameroon (Ekoko 1995). The election o f 
Cameroon's parliament in 1992 had been boycotted by major opposition groups 
and the parliament is not considered to be a broadly representative body. What is 
clear, however, is that the World Bank did not expect possible opposition from 
parliament. In order to circumvent possible parliamentary stumbling blocks in the 
future, the Bank suggests alternative ways o f promoting forestry code reforms 
"...using pre-existing legislation, regulations or administrative actions to 
accomplish the same results" (1995f:vii).
Following the Bank's rejection o f the new forestry code, the government 
added amendments to bring the forestry code back into conformity with the earlier 
draft that the World Bank had accepted. The Government also adopted an 
implementation decree for the forestry code which was a pre-condition for the 
Bank's next structural adjustment loan, the Economic Recovery Credit o f June 
1994 (World Bank 1995f).
5.5.4 The Contents of New Forestry Code
One o f the main pillars o f the new forestry framework is its insistence on 
transparency in the allocation o f logging concessions. The Bank's plan is to move 
away from arbitrary concession allocations to a system o f competitive bidding for 
concessions. In order to avoid collusion, the Bank's recommendation is that the 
bidding should be open to international as well as local firms, local communities 
andN G O s(G rut etal. 1991).
Another pillar o f  forestry code refonn is the scope and length o f 
concessions. The Bank wants concession areas to cover 500,000 hectares and have 
a duration o f twenty five years. It is believed that this would give the concession 
owners the necessary incentives to manage their concessions rationally and to 
invest locally. Smaller concession areas granted for shorter periods o f time are
143
considered to be an invitation to rapidly 'mine' the forest. For example, if  
concession periods are brief, it would not be in the concessionaire's self-interest to 
exercise care during logging operations in order to avoid damaging younger trees 
(Nguiffo-Tene 1994).
Simplification o f the existing forestry tax system is a priority for the Bank. 
It proposes replacing a host o f complicated tax measures with a simplified and 
transparent system o f utilizing fob (free-on-board) prices as the bases for tax 
calculations. Although the new system represents a reduction in tax rates, the 
application o f real fob prices is expected to lead to a significant increase in 
government tax revenues from timber exports.
At the request o f the World Bank, the new forestry code contains 
provisions for the establishment o f community forests. Article 30 o f the new 
forestry code gives local communities in Cameroon the possibility o f obtaining the 
legal right to managing their traditional community forests for the first time. 
However, the law does not foresee the granting o f property rights to the 
communities since the state remains the de jure  owner o f the forest (Egbe 1997). 
The law's provisions on community forests specify that local communities must 
present detailed management plans to the government before they can be granted 
legal title to their community forest. This requirement presents a serious obstacle 
for local communities since few communities would be able to shoulder the costs 
or mobilize the resources to draw up detailed maps, prepare complete inventories 
o f all the resources in the forest and obtain the seal o f approval o f a certified 
agency (Penelon 1997).
Using Blaikie's matrix o f three distinct approaches to biodiversity 
conservation, the 'classic', the 'neo-populist' and the 'neo-liberal economic* 
approach (Blaikie 1995), the Bank's support for forest and biodiversity 
conservation in Cameroon's new Forestry Code contains both 'neo-classical 
economic' and 'neo-populist' approaches. The former is represented in the bidding 
process for concessions, which is to lead to prices that reflect the value o f the 
forest, and a tax system which is to serve as an incentive for forest conservation. 
The ’neo-populist' approach is represented by opening the bidding process not only 
to foreign and local companies but also to communities and NGOs, as well as by 
the forestry code's provisions for community forests.
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5.5.5 Implementation of the New Forestry Code
Cameroon's system o f arbitrary allocation o f forest concessions is a source 
o f power and wealth for politicians. Given the Bank's traditional claim o f non­
interference in internal political affairs, its attempt to clean up corruption in 
Cameroon’s forest sector represents a new willingness to tackle the root causes of 
economic, social and environmental problems.
The World Bank's efforts to introduce transparency into Cameroon's 
forestry sector, to make logging companies pay taxes and move them towards 
sustained yield practices in their concession areas have the potential to improve the 
status quo in the forestry sector. The Bank's insistence on including provisions for 
the establishment o f community forests in the forestry code have created a legal 
basis which could lead to local community empowerment and stewardship over 
biodiversity.
In practice, however, the provisions in the new forestry code do not 
unambiguously advance social and environmental objectives. W hile presenting an 
improvement over the present situation, they fall short o f creating the framework 
for biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management with local 
participation, which the World Bank had intended to put in place (World Bank 
1994b).
While the World Bank believes that competitive bidding helps reflect the 
value o f the concession areas, Bank research also indicates that forestry 
concessions will not ensure the production o f  non-market, public or collective 
benefits, such as watershed protection and erosion control benefits as well as 
common property benefits o f  non-timber forest products and biological diversity 
(Grut et al. 1991: 41). Competitive bidding for concessions and increasing the 
length o f  concession periods do not ensure that concession holders will protect 
biodiversity.
Given the institutional weakness o f Cameroon Forestry Service, the large 
size o f the concession areas promoted by the World Bank will make effective 
monitoring and control o f logging practices very difficult. In the absence o f 
effective government forestry services and an empowered local population, there 
appears to be little incentive for logging companies, which have to function in a 
competitive international market place, to invest in costly forest conservation 
measures. Bank research confirms that most concessionaires operating in West
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and Central Africa are unwilling to assume forest management responsibilities 
(Grut et al. 1991).
In theory, higher forest fees and collection rates could provide funding for 
the Forestry Service to monitor and control logging operations and to work 
towards the protection and regeneration o f forests. In practice, it is unclear i f  the 
increased revenues will help cover the recurrent costs o f the Forestry Service and 
strengthen its operations.
The forestry code's provisions for the establishment o f community forests 
are too cumbersome and costly for most local communities and legal rights to their 
traditional forest lands continue to be beyond their reach. At present, it appears that 
mostly small Cameroonian logging companies which sell their timber to large 
international companies, are using the legal provisions for community forests to 
obtain additional logging areas.6 The offer o f opening-up the bidding process for 
concessions to local communities represents a misreading o f power relationships in 
Cameroon, where local communities usually do not have the resources to compete 
with transnational logging companies.
Although the environmental and social aspects o f the forestry code remain 
weak, the forestry code's push for increased transparency in the timber sector is 
politically strong and therefore opposed by powerful Cameroonian politicians who 
stand to lose a lot i f  minimal reforms are widely applied in practice. Three years 
after the adoption o f the new forestry code through Government decree, its 
application has been very limited. The collection and monitoring o f forestry taxes 
is not adequate and the Government has not been able to explain 'shortfalls' to the 
World Bank. The bidding process for concession areas still has to prove itself 
workable. There is little progress in the establishment o f genuine community
n
forests. The impact o f the new forestry code has been described as: "Decrees and 
laws that protect the interests o f some foreign companies, juicy contracts, shares in 
privatized companies, and logging concessions for allies" (Ekoko 1995:5). The 
World Bank recognizes the fundamental short-comings in the implementation o f 
the forestry code and as a result is preparing a new loan for a 'Forestry and
6 Interviews in Cameroon with representatives o f  Cameroonian and international NGOs., May
1997.
7 Interviews with World Bank officials in Washington, D.C. and with NGOs in Cameroon, 1997,
1998.
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Environment' project to assist the Government with implementation o f the forestry 
code (World Bank 1997c).
5.6 Summary
The Bank's policy dialogue with Cameroon produces a geography o f 
development that is depoliticized and compartmentalized. The confidential nature 
o f the CAS and SAP documents keeps them out o f the public domain and the lack 
o f public debate facilitates what Gasper has termed 'prescriptive essentialism,' 
which holds that a policy measure is inherently appropriate (Gasper 1996a). As a 
result there is little room in the World Bank’s policy dialogue for a plurality of 
values and ways o f  thinking about specific policy issues. The depoliticization of 
vital issues has been identified as a central feature o f development discourse 
(Ferguson 1994, Crush 1995) and it characterizes the Bank's policy dialogue with 
Cameroon. Both the CAS and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) for 
Cameroon frame the central issues as representing technical problems requiring 
technical solutions, which the World Bank can supply.
The technical framing of the issues promotes their compartmentalization. 
Despite the World Bank’s public policy statements which require that 
environmental considerations be central to the CAS, the CAS is able to relegate 
biodiversity and social concerns into separate spheres which are marginal to 
decisions on major economic issues and on financial flows. The economic crisis 
and environmental degradation are viewed as unrelated issues. The SAPs ignore 
their possible negative impacts on Cameroon's environment, in particular the 
country’s moist tropical forest, by implying that the environment is a separate 
sector, which the Bank is addressing through efforts in assisting the Government o f 
Cameroon with reforming its forestry code.
The depoliticization and compartmentalization o f the issues at the 
operational level may be part o f the explanation for the gap between public Bank 
statements and the practice that emerges from the Bank's policy dialogue with 
borrowing countries. On the one hand, the institution describes its strategy for 
Africa as one requiring ",. .a highly participatory approach - less top down, more 
bottom-up than in the past - which effectively involves local people, especially at 
the village level, in the decisions that directly affect their lives” (World Bank 1989: 
59). On the other, it limits its discussion o f fundamental questions regarding a
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country's strategy for development to only a limited set o f finance ministry 
officials representing a government, which the Bank acknowledges not to have 
legitimacy in the eyes o f the general population in Cameroon (World Bank 1996h).
Wade describes the Bank's situation as one of'm assive mission overload'. 
The Bank adopts new issues such as biodiversity protection and the promotion o f 
local participation as gestures which are made for legitimacy reasons but which are 
largely ineffective at the operational level (Wadel997a,b).
The 'mission overload' and search for legitimacy are symptoms o f internal 
challenges which indicate, as Crush suggests, that development discourse is not 
hermetically sealed (Crush 1995). There are openings which allow for 
interventions o f a political nature, e.g. the Bank's efforts in reducing corruption in 
Cameroon's timber sector as part of its support for refonn o f the country's forestry 
code. A main channel for internal challenges to surface is through the Bank's 
Board o f Executive Directors, which represents the shareholding governments. It is 
largely through actions taken by several members o f the Bank's Board that the 
Bank is taking an interest in 'governance' questions and has made biodiversity and 
other environmental and social issues central to its development discourse. These 
political channels have generated the beginnings o f a new framing for policy issues 
which still needs to be translated into operational practice.
The present organizational structure o f the World Bank allows for a 
‘decoupling’ o f development discourse and practice (Wade 1997a). The 
explanation for this 'decoupling' must contain multiple layers o f analysis and some 
o f the analytical tools which can be employed in its understanding are described in 
chapter 3. On the organizational side, the relative position o f the economic 
profession as compared to staff from other disciplines within the Bank, the role o f 
staff incentives, the institutional culture and other characteristics may all be 
relevant to the ‘decoupling’ o f stated policy from operations.
This chapter focuses on what the World Bank tenns policy dialogue, the 
development o f  a country assistance strategy and structural adjustment lending. 
The following two chapters examine World Bank and GEF activities at the project 
level, which are subject to a more specific set o f mandatory World Bank policies. 
After contrasting the results o f the three case studies with the institutions’ own 
internal evaluation reports, chapter 9 will gather the multiple strands and present
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the overall analysis o f the political and institutional mechanisms which explain the 
gaps between stated policy commitments and the institutions’ operational practice.
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CHAPTER 6
BIODIVERSITY IN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMMES
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter analyses how the World Bank’s stated policy 
commitment, to integrating biodiversity considerations into all its activities is 
reflected in the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy and structural 
adjustment lending for Cameroon. This chapter examines the preparation o f two 
large infrastructure development projects with significant potential enviromnental 
impacts on Cameroon's moist primary forests which both the World Bank and the 
GEF consider to be home to globally important biodiversity. It analyses how 
World Bank biodiversity-related policies are being taken into consideration at the 
critical stage o f project preparation and the key factors which influence the degree 
to which these policies are being adhered to.
Political ecology thinking emphasizes that environmental problems have 
important political and socio-economic dimensions in which a variety o f social 
actors with vastly different access to political power pursue different goals. In the 
two projects analysed in this chapter, the social actors include international 
financial institutions, the Cameroonian state, transnational corporations as well as 
local farmers and vulnerable ethnic minorities. The focus here is on one actor, the 
Word Bank, because o f its status as a powerful global institution and its potential 
role as arbiter between the global and local geographic scales. W hile the World 
Bank works through states or transnational corporations, its biodiversity-related 
policies include a commitment to the empowerment o f  local communities in 
biodiversity-rich areas which often live in remote areas and removed from access 
to political power.
The analytical tools being used are borrowed from political science and the 
areas o f sociology and economics concerned with theory o f organization. The 
realist approach o f political science theory, which holds that international financial 
institutions have to be understood in terms o f  the interests o f their principal 
shareholders (Ascher 1983, Vaubel & Willet 1991), will be tested in the context o f 
the two infra-structure projects being analysed in this chapter. Its explanatory
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power, though, is limited. Tools from theory o f organization provide additional 
insights on international financial institutions as self-interested political entities in 
their own right (Le Prestre 1986, Vaubel 1991, Dillon, Ilgen & W illett 1991).
In addition, the analysis o f the two specific projects in this chapter reveals a 
dynamic situation in which the relative weight o f intra-organizational relationships 
between the World Bank's Board o f Executive Directors, Senior Management, 
operational departments and technical (environmental) departments can shift. This 
indicates that there is room within the organizational structure for reforms to 
improve policy implementation.
The first project is a Transport Sector loan, which was approved by the 
World Bank's Board o f Directors in 1996. Its stated objective is to provide 
technical support and financing for various transport sector initiatives, including 
railways, port development, civil aviation and rehabilitation o f  a priority road 
network. The project anticipated no major adverse environmental impacts and 
therefore no environmental impact assessment was carried out.
The second project is a proposed oil pipeline which is to transport oil from 
production fields in southern Chad to the Atlantic coast traversing 880 kilometers 
of Cameroonian territory, including forest areas that are considered to be very rich 
in biodiversity. As o f the time of the writing o f this chapter, the World Bank's 
Board had not yet approved the loan for the project. Preparatory work, however, 
including the environmental impact assessment for the project, had largely been 
completed.
The analysis o f the existing and publicly available information provides 
insights into the degree to which World Bank policies have been adhered to during 
the preparation o f  both projects. A key difference between the two projects is that 
the Transport Sector loan received little public attention until after completion o f 
project preparation and shortly before it was submitted to the World Bank's Board 
o f Directors for approval, while public scrutiny in the preparatory stages o f the 
pipeline project is extensive in several o f the World Bank's shareholding countries. 
The analysis o f the Transport Sector loan is largely based on existing 
documentation, including a variety o f internal World Bank memoranda and 
interviews with Bank staff. The analysis o f the planned Chad/Cameroon Oil 
pipeline is based on World Bank and Oil Consortium documents, including the
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environmental impact assessment and interviews. It is complemented by field 
research on the implementation o f World Bank policies in Cameroon.
6.2 The Transport Sector Loan
In May 1996, the World Bank approved a $ 60.7 million IDA loan for 
Cameroon, which represents the Bank's share in an investment o f $ 664 million 
for a transport sector programme co-financed by other donors, mainly the 
European Union and French bi-lateral assistance programmes (World Bank 1996i). 
The Cameroon Transport Sector project involves support for state divestiture from 
transport operations, improvement in the regulatory framework as well as 
maintenance and rehabilitation o f a priority road network. The development and 
implementation o f a sector policy to protect the environment is also listed as a 
stated objective o f the project (World Bank 1996i: 11).
The key document o f the project is the Staff Appraisal Report which 
contains detailed project information and is the document presented to the Bank's 
Board o f Executive Directors as the basis for its decision on loan approval (World 
Bank 1996j). According to the World Bank's Procedures on the Disclosure of 
Operational Information (Shihata 1994: 357), the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) is 
not available to the public until after loan approval and then only after the 
borrowing government has had the opportunity to exclude infonnation it deems to 
be o f a confidential or sensitive nature. As a result, public input into the design o f a 
project is made very difficult, especially, as is the case here, when no 
environmental assessment has been carried out.
In addition to addressing questions o f the privatization o f public enterprises 
in the civil aviation, maritime and urban transport sectors, the project plans to 
contribute to the financing o f  the maintenance and rehabilitation o f 13,783 
kilometers o f  both paved and earth roads which are part o f a priority road network. 
The stated goal o f the project is to put in place a more efficient and cost-effective 
transport system to benefit the rural poor by providing them with better farm-to- 
market roads (World Bank 1996i:2). A more detailed explanation o f  the rationale 
for World Bank funding is presented later in the document listing three World 
Bank priorities, where helping the poor by providing easier access to markets is 
left unmentioned: (1) stabilization o f public finances; (2) creation o f an 
environment conducive to private sector development; and (3) alleviation o f
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poverty. The latter is to be achieved through labour-intensive methods in road 
rehabilitation works (World Bank 1996i:44).
The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) does not specify which roads out o f the 
priority network are to be rehabilitated with World Bank funding and states that 
these will be determined after consultation with the beneficiaries (World Bank 
1996i:38). Only the maps, which are attachments to the SAR, provide information 
on the location o f the priority road network. They also indicate that several road 
segments to be rehabilitated under the project are in Cameroon's south-eastern and 
coastal rainforest.
The most salient o f these road segments into biodiversity-rich areas are the 
Gari Gombo to Moloundou road, which is located near the site o f a GEF-financed 
protected area, and the Abong Mbang to Lomie road, which borders on the Dja 
Wildlife Reserve, a UNESCO World Heritage Site (fig. 6.1). The focus o f the 
present analysis is the 131 kilometer long Abong-Mbang to Lomie road, as there is 
extensive documentation on the environmental impacts that improvement of this 
road might cause. This documentation was produced in 1993 in the course o f a 
detailed environmental impact assessment commissioned by the African 
Development Bank, a regional sister bank o f the World Bank. In addition, the road 
is known to the author who first visited the area in 1990 and then again in 1997 
(fig. 6.2). The Abong Mbang - Lomie road segment which traverses an area of 
largely intact moist tropical forest is located in the traditional homeland o f Baka 
people, who are commonly referred to as Pygmies. Wildlife in the area includes 
forest elephants, chimpanzees, gorillas, mandrills and bongos, all o f  which are 
threatened by poaching by outsiders. The sale o f bushmeat is a lucrative business 
as meat from wild animals is considered a delicacy in the urban markets o f Douala 
and Yaounde (World Society for the Protection o f Animals 1995).
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A bong M bang -  L om ie Road in 1990 (K.Horta)
Fig. 6.2 Abong Mbang-Lomie Road 1990
The World B ink did not carry out an environmental impact assessment for 
this loan. As a result, no information on the project was publicly available aside 
from a brief "Project Information Document"(PID) which does not contain 
specific information on the road rehabilitation component o f the project and which 
classifies the project as a category B project, i.e. a project without major adverse 
environmental impacts.
While no environmental assessment was deemed to be necessary, the Staff 
Appraisal Report refers to a mitigation plan to address environmental issues in 
road maintenance which would be carried out under a separate Transport Sector 
Technical Assistance project. This mitigation plan would also include guidelines 
for the integration o f environmental considerations into road rehabilitation projects 
(World Bank 1996i:35).
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6.2.1 A Precedent-Setting Case
In June 1993, the African Development Bank (AfDB), a regional 
development bank with headquarters in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, considered 
financing the rehabilitation o f the Abong Mbang-Lomie road. Prior to approving 
the respective loan, the AfDB completed an enviromnental assessment (EA) for the 
project. On the basis o f the recommendations o f EA, the AfDB decided against 
financing the project.
The central findings o f the EA were that the sphere o f influence o f the 
rehabilitation o f the road would extend beyond the immediate project area. It 
concluded that rehabilitation o f the Abong Mbang-Lomie road would have an 
impact on the south o f Cameroon's eastern province as a whole, i.e. an area o f 
about 6 million hectares (60,000 km2) o f a largely intact natural and social 
environment (African Development Bank 1993:27). The EA noted that according 
to local forestry operators, rehabilitation o f the road would provide access to
200.000 hectares o f forest to the south and east o f  Lomie and would therefore 
facilitate greater timber production from another 100,000 hectares east and west o f 
the road (African Development Bank 1993:122). As a result o f road rehabilitation, 
timber companies would see significant reductions in transport costs. The EA adds 
that negative environmental and social impacts o f logging activities are already 
beginning to manifest themselves in the region, including significant negative 
impacts on the Baka people who are estimated to number between 20,000 to
35.000 in the south-eastern forests. Where logging is already a major factor, the 
Baka are losing their traditional way o f  life, which is leading to alcohol abuse, 
prostitution, lack o f  adequate protein (from declining wildlife populations) and 
other health problems (African Development Bank 1993:135). The Baka are semi- 
nomadic, during the rainy season they live dispersed in the forest and during the 
dry season they return to the small villages along the existing Abong Mbang- 
Lomie earth road. Their settlements along the road are still characterized by 
traditional Baka constructions, domed huts covered with leaves, although mud 
houses are now being constructed more frequently in imitation o f  Bantu 
construction technology (fig. 6.3).
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H ouses along the A bong M bang-L om ie Road (K.Horta)
Fig. 6.3 Houses along the Abong-Mbang-Lomie Road
According to the EA, a majority o f local people favour improvement o f the 
road, but they do not have information on the plans for the road rehabilitation 
project. Above all, they are unaware o f the expropriations in store for them. In the 
mind o f local people, an improved road will improve travel and transportation and 
improve the market conditions for agriculture and game hunting. There is little 
awareness, particularly among the young, o f  the threat o f over-exploitation o f 
game species and o f timber (African Development Bank 1993: 52). While the EA 
acknowledges that the improvement o f the road is important for the local 
population, it cautions that the project would cause irreversible environmental 
damage and negative social impacts. It emphasizes that "...development planning 
must follow a long-term schedule and above all take care o f irretrievable natural 
resources" (African Development Bank 1993:184).
The environmental assessment concludes that rehabilitation o f the road 
would vastly accelerate negative impacts from logging, and that in order to avoid 
"...irreversible and dramatic negative long-term impacts on the environment and
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man," the project must be integrated into a comprehensive regional development 
plan (African Development Bank 1993:184). The environmental assessment noted 
the need for additional environmental and social studies and recommended that 
rehabilitation o f  the road be postponed until projects to protect the Dja Forest 
Reserve1 are implemented, a regional land-use plan is established and Cameroon's 
new forestry code is implemented (African Development Bank 1993:184).
6.2.2 An Array of World Bank Policies at Stake
The AfDB's EA provides an overview o f critical environmental and social 
issues to be considered in the rehabilitation o f the Abong Mbang-Lomie road.
Since this road segment is part o f the priority network of roads and as such 
potentially funded under the World Bank's Transport Sector loan, a variety o f 
World Bank policies applies to the loan.
The World Bank's Transport Sector review paper indicates that potential 
problems in the sector are well known (World Bank 1995h). It notes that lack o f 
attention to transport can damage habitats and biodiversity and adds that
"... roads or other transport links not be built unless there is some regional 
framework to anticipate and mitigate likely adverse impacts. Current 
environmental assessments for Bank-supported projects do require the 
inclusion o f a regional plan for the area affected" (World Bank 1995h:27).
The Transport Sector Review further emphasizes this point by stating that 
the Bank should not support
"... transport developments threatening encroachment on natural 
habitat or cultural heritage unless the Bank is satisfied that the correct 
framework o f protection is in place before implementation" (World Bank 
1995h:29).
The following four mandatory World Bank policies are particularly 
relevant to the Transport Sector Loan2:
(1) Environmental Assessment Policy. The environmental assessment policy states 
that "thepurpose ofE A  is to improve decision-making and to ensure that the 
project options are environmentally sound and sustainable." Though EA is
1 The Dja Animal and Forest Reserve, an area o f  526,000 hectares, was created in 1950 by means o f  
a decree issued by the High Commissioner o f  the French Republic in Cameroon. In 1984 it became 
a biosphere reserve within UNESCO's “Man and the Biosphere Reserve" (MAB) Programme and 
was also recognized as a World Heritage Site.
" The appendix o f  this study present summaries o f  the relevant World Bank policies.
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primarily the responsibility o f the borrower, the Bank works with the borrower to 
ensure that there is capacity for environmental and social assessments. The policy 
states that "EA preparation should form  part o f  the overall preparation work fo r  
the project, so that E A ’s findings can be directly integrated into project design" 
(World Bank OD 4.01, 1991).
(2) Forest Policy. The World Bank's Forest Sector Policy notes that "Financing 
infrastructural projects (such as roads, dams and mines) that may lead to loss o f  
moist tropical forests and other prim ary forests will be subject to vigorous 
environmental assessment as mandated by the Bank's operational guidelines fo r  
projects that raise diverse and significant environmental issues. A careful 
assessment o f  the social issues involved will also be required" (World Bank 
1991a:65). The Forest Policy classifies Cameroon as one o f 20 countries with 
threatened tropical moist forests (World Bank 1992:86).
(3) Indigenous Peoples Policy. The World Bank recognizes the Pygmy peoples o f 
Cameroon as distinct tribal groups with their own culture who deserve special 
consideration under World Bank projects (World Bank 1982). The Bank's 
Indigenous Peoples Policy emphasizes that issues concerning indigenous peoples 
can arise from a variety o f sectors that concern the Bank, including road works, 
and that these sectors should be carefully screened. The policy notes that cases will 
occur, especially when dealing with the most isolated groups, where adverse 
impacts are unavoidable. "In such situations, the Bank will not appraise projects 
until suitable plans are developed by the borrower and reviewed by the Bank." It 
adds that as a prerequisite for a successful indigenous peoples development plan, 
"studies should make all efforts to anticipate adverse trends likely to be induced by 
the project and develop the means to avoid or mitigate harm" (World Bank OD 
4.20, 1991).
(4) Natural Habitats Policy. According to the World Bank's Natural Habitats Policy 
the institution does not support projects that, in its opinion, involve the significant 
conversion or degradation o f critical natural habitats (World Bank OP 4.04, 1995).
The next section examines the lack o f intra-departmental communication at 
the World Bank which helps explain why the above policy mandates were ignored 
in the preparation o f the Transport Sector loan.
6.2.3 Institutional ‘Disconnects’
The World Bank's Infrastructure Operations Division for the Africa Region, 
the operational department responsible for preparing the project, explains the 
rationale for IDA financing o f the project by citing its consistency with the 
Country Assistance Strategy (Chapter 5). It adds that the Government o f Cameroon 
and IDA had agreed th a t".. .long-term development can only be achieved by 
substantially improving fiscal performance in order to generate additional
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resources to finance priority development expenditures and to cover debt service 
obligations" (World Bank 1996i:44). The analysis o f the Country Assistance 
Strategy (Chapter 5, 5.4) reveals a central World Bank preoccupation with the 
possibility o f a Cameroonian default on its foreign debt obligations and the 
country's substantial delays in repaying even its preferred creditors, theBretton 
Woods institutions (World Bank 1995f:7).
In off-the-record interviews, World Bank officials explained that prior to 
the 50% devaluation o f the F CFA in January 1994, there had been almost no 
lending to Cameroon for several years. After the devaluation, which doubled 
Cameroon's foreign debt in local currency, there was a sudden massive search for 
lending opportunities.3
The need for fresh loans to assist in the repayment o f  old debts is therefore 
likely to have contributed to pressure on the Infrastructure Operations Division to 
prepare a new loan, despite the fact that previous audits o f World Bank 
investments in Cameroon's transport sector had revealed poor perfonnance by the 
Government and its "... lack o f commitment to genuine change" (World Bank 
1996i:43).
The preparation of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) would have 
led to considerable delays in project preparation. The initial difficulty in EIA 
preparation is locating funding since borrowing governments usually do not 
finance EIAs for their own projects.4 These difficulties combined with the lack of 
environmental knowledge on the part o f many World Bank project managers, who 
are called task managers, lead to the fact that many environmentally sensitive 
projects are assigned Category B status, i.e. not requiring a full environmental 
impact assessment.5 But although the Transport Sector loan received Category B 
status, it did require a sign-off by environmental staff working in the Africa 
Technical Department.
3 Interview with officials in the Africa Technical Department, August 1998.
4 Environmental Impact Assessments for World Bank-financed projects are usually funded by a 
variety o f  trust funds managed by the World Bank.
5 Various interviews with World Bank environmental staff in 1997/98.
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6.2.3.1 The Environmental Sign-Off
The Infrastructure Operations Division requested a rapid sign-off by 
environmental staff in the Africa Technical Department in order to present the 
project to the World Bank's Board o f Directors for approval. The Africa Technical 
Department had no knowledge about the environmental assessment previously 
carried out by the African Development Bank. After a quick review o f  the Staff 
Appraisal Report (SAR), an environmental expert gave his approval to the project. 
With hindsight, this official acknowledged that he had wrongly given the green 
light for the project to go ahead. He explained that the project was a "Russian doll 
kind o f project" and that he had been "bluffed" by the Infrastructure Operations 
Department. He had accepted on face value that the project was a category B 
project and had made no further inquiries since the document did not specify the 
actual location o f the roads to be funded under the project. He had also been 
assured by the statement in the SAR that a mitigation plan to address 
environmental issues in road maintenance was being carried out. He later found out 
that this work had not yet begun at the time that he was requested to sign-off on the 
project.6
6.2.3.2 Lack of coordination with the World Bank-GEF
Several o f the roads identified in the priority road network as candidates for 
rehabilitation are located in close proximity to areas that the World Bank has 
recognized as critical ecosystems. According to the World Bank and the GEF, 
some o f these areas are home to globally important biodiversity and the World 
Bank is using GEF handing to protect some o f these areas. But rehabilitation o f 
these road segments has implications for the World Bank implemented GEF 
Biodiversity Conservation Management project (Chapter 7) because construction 
activities and road improvement significantly increase access to several GEF 
project sites. For example, the Gari Gombo-Yokadouma-Moloundou road cuts 
between Boumba Bek and Lobeke, two GEF project sites in Cameroon, and 
increases access to the GEF-financed Nouabale-Ndoke National Park which is 
situated in the Republic o f Congo near the border with Cameroon. The Kribi- 
Campo road opens access to the GEF-funded Campo Wildlife reserve (fig 6.4).
6 Interview with the World Bank official in the Africa Technical Department responsible for 
signing-off on the Transport Sector loan, August 1998.
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GEF project managers both at World Bank headquarters and in the field in 
Cameroon were unaware o f the proposed road rehabilitation programme to be 
funded under the Transport Sector loan.7
6.2.4 Weakness of Political Oversight
The history o f how the Transport Sector loan was approved by the World 
Bank's Board o f Executive Directors on 30 May 1996 provides a rare glimpse into 
the organizational politics o f the institution. It shows how World Bank Senior 
Management is able to press for approval o f a loan even if  the institution's 
principal shareholders are either opposed or express fundamental concerns about a 
project.
While the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) is not a publicly available 
document until after approval o f a project by the Board o f Executive Directors and 
authorization from the borrowing government, individual governments may choose 
to share the document with outside organizations. In the case o f the Transport 
Sector loan, the U.S. Treasury Department, which provides instructions to the U.S. 
Executive Director on the World Bank's Board, decided to circulate the SAR for 
comments to non-govemmental-organizations in the United States, who then sent 
copies to their European and developing country partner NGOs. As a result o f 
public input, the U.S. Treasury Department was made aware o f the African 
Development Bank’s 1993 environmental assessment and requested that a Board 
decision about the project be delayed. Similarly non-govemmental-organizations in 
several West European countries called the attention o f their governments to the 
potential risks o f the project.
As soon as information about possible U.S. opposition to the project 
became known, World Bank environmental staff acknowledged the Transport 
Sector Loan’s environmental dangers and expressed their agreement with the 
external criticism o f the loan: "Some serious flak is coming up around the 
Cameroon transport sector project.. ..One o f the roads on the map is a pure and 
simple logging road that AfDB rejected on environmental grounds."8 This is 
followed by a more explicit acknowledgment of where the World Bank is at fault:
7 Interviews with World Bank officials in Washington, D.C. and GEF project managers in 
Cameroon,
May 1997.
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" .. .going ahead as things are entails the risks o f a major embarrassment because 
we are at fault on the following specific issues" which are listed as the lack o f an 
environmental mitigation plan and the inclusion o f logging roads in a road 
rehabilitation programme.9
In view o f a potential public embarrassment, the Infrastructure Operations 
Division proposed to Senior Management that the project be delayed for two 
previously unmentioned reasons: (1) repayments o f World Bank loans to 
Cameroon are overdue; (2) the Government is failing to implement its new forestry 
code by granting logging concessions in the old, non-transparent fashion.10
However, a decision at the highest level o f Bank management was made 
that face-saving reasons for a delay in the Board approval date were unnecessary.11 
The project was presented to the Bank's Board o f Executive Directors for approval 
within a few days. Several steps were taken to assure the Board o f Executive 
Directors that the project would be environmentally sound. These consisted o f a 
letter from the Prime-Minister o f Cameroon committing his government to take all 
necessary environmental precautions and the promise of accelerated preparation o f 
an environmental mitigation plan. According to a World Bank Office 
Memorandum, the letter from Cameroon's Prime Minister was actually drafted by 
World Bank staff: "M .. .with her team, has drafted a letter that we would receive 
(early next week) from the Government o f Cameroon. According to the letter, the 
Government would take the necessary enviromnental precautions for all the 
maintenance and rehabilitation work, particularly in the ecologically sensitive 
areas..."12
With the letter from the Prime Minister o f Cameroon in hand and a 
commitment to carrying out an environmental mitigation plan, the loan was 
approved by the Board o f Executive Directors on 30 May 1996. The United States 
Government, the Bank's largest shareholder, voted against the project, citing the 
lack o f an environmental analysis. Describing the project, the United States 
Government stated "There are elements here o f the 'old' World Bank, not the 'new'
8 World Bank Office Memorandum o f  16 May 1996 from Africa Technical Department.
9 World Bank Office Memorandum o f  18 May 1996 from Africa Technical Department.
10 World Bank Office Memorandum without date from Infrastructure Operations Division Africa 
Region.
11 In the absence o f  World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn, the decision was taken by acting
President Richard Frank, World Bank Office Memorandum o f  21 May 1996, Africa Technical 
Department.
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World Bank we have all worked so hard to create".13 Several other major donors 
to the World Bank, who had received campaign letters from environmental 
pressure groups in their home countries, including the United Kingdom and 
Germany, raised serious concerns about the project but were satisfied with the 
reassurances from Bank management and voted for the project. A reaction to 
Britain's approval o f the loan is reflected in an article in the Daily Telegraph o f  9 
September 1996 (fig.
6.5).
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m illion  World Bank road  
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tected rainforests.
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protected areas of Camer­
oon, in clu d in g  the fo rest  
hom e of the Baka pygm y  
tribe, will be affected by the 
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The forest is a World Heri­
ta g e  S ite  and h a s  b een  
, recommended as a national 
park.
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opposed it as environm en­
tally damaging but was out­
voted.
One leaked internal memo 
on May 16, seen  by The Daily 
Telegraph, admits that “one 
of the roads on the map is a 
p u re and s im p le  lo g g in g  
road” .
An environm ental assess­
m ent of the project in 1991 
said the logging road would 
irreversibly affect the Baka 
tribe’s way of life in the pro­
tected  Dja forest reserve. 
The area also contains low ­
land gorillas, chim panzees, 
an endangered crow species 
and a rich variety of flora.
Tony Juniper, deputy cam­
paigns director of Friends of 
the Earth, sa id :'“ This pro­
ject amounts to a m assive
subsidy from taxpayers in 
developed countries to pri­
vate sector com panies log­
g in g  in  th e  A fr ica n  
rainforest.”
Clare Short, Labour over­
sea s  develop m ent sp o k es­
man, said: “ I shall be writing 
to the World Bank and to 
Lady Chalker, the Overseas 
D evelop m en t A d m in istra ­
tion  M inister, questioning  
th e ir  su p p o r t for  th is  
project.”
The ODA said: “ We are 
satisfied that this project is a i 
good on e.”
G eoff Lam b, the World 
B a n k ’s r e p r e se n ta tiv e  in  
London, said many people 
living at the end of the roads j 
w ere poor.
U p grad in g  them  w ould  
give the inhabitants greater 
a c c e s s  to  s c h o o ls  and  
markets.
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6.2.5 A Muted Challenge to Bureaucratic Power
Several o f the road-building and rehabilitation components o f the 
Cameroon Transport Sector loan carry significant ecological risks by opening-up 
new forest areas to industrial logging. An environmental impact assessment for one 
o f the road components, which was previously carried out by the African 
Development Bank, warned that rehabilitation o f the road would lead to 
irreversible long-term negative impacts on the environment and its human 
inhabitants. It added that these impacts could only be mitigated if  road 
rehabilitation was preceded by a regional development plan which would take the 
situation o f the semi-nomadic Baka people and local farmers into account.
Preparation o f the Cameroon Transport Sector loan by one o f  the World 
Bank's operational departments, the Infrastructure Operations Division for the 
Africa Region, ignored these potential problems and did not consider any o f the 
applicable World Bank policies to avoid or mitigate potential environmental 
damage and social disruption. The World Bank's environmental experts in the 
Technical Department for the Africa Region were given insufficient information 
and time to review the project but felt compelled by pressure from the operational 
department to give the project the green light.
Once it became public knowledge that several major shareholders were 
concerned about the potential environmental impact o f the loan, the operational 
department tried to save the World Bank from public embarrassment (and to avoid 
having to admit mistakes) by suggesting arguments that Bank Senior Management 
could use to explain a delay o f the project to the World Bank's Board o f Executive 
Directors. Ironically, the arguments included the lack o f environmental 
responsibility o f  the Government o f Cameroon which was continuing to grant 
logging concessions in a fashion which was in violation o f its newly adopted 
forestry code (chapter 5).
World Bank Senior Management paid little attention to the environmental 
experts who had concluded that World Bank environmental policies had been 
violated in the preparation o f the project. It also overrode the operational 
department's suggestion to save face in a potentially embarrassing situation. The 
Transport Sector loan reveals the central preoccupation o f Senior Bank 
Management with "loan approval" (Wapenhans 1992). It presented the project for 
approval to the Board o f Executive Directors despite the violation o f World Bank
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policies and concerns expressed by some o f the Bank's main shareholders.14 In a 
gesture o f acknowledgment o f  the concerns, Senior Management produced a letter 
from the Prime-Minister o f Cameroon expressing his government's commitment to 
protecting ecologically sensitive areas. Unbeknownst to the Board o f Executive 
Directors, this letter had been drafted by World Bank staff, who were aware o f the 
Government of Cameroon's violations o f its own Forest Policy.
The Transport Sector loan is an example o f the limited explanatory power 
of the realist approach to international financial institutions in political science.
The role o f the World Bank's Board o f Executive Directors in the approval o f  the 
Transport Sector loan indicates a fundamental weakness o f the main shareholding 
governments relative to World Bank Senior Management in ensuring that World 
Bank policies are adhered to in development projects. The trajectory o f this loan 
from preparation to final approval suggests that the institution is a political entity 
in its own right and that theories o f organization can make an important 
contribution to understanding the functioning o f international financial institutions 
and to point to possible directions for change.
6.3 The Cameroon Oil Pipeline
An international oil consortium consisting o f Exxon (Esso), Shell and E lf is 
planning a $ 3.5 billion oil project, which includes the development o f three oil 
fields in southern Chad and the building o f a 1,100 km long pipeline to Cameroon's 
Atlantic coast (Fig. 6.6). The consortium estimates a production o f approximately 
924 million barrels o f  crude oil from the fields in southern Chad over a period o f 
about 30 years (Dames & Moore 1997:2-2). The Cameroonian portion o f the 
project will consist o f an 880 km long pipeline, two pumping stations, one pressure 
reducing station, an 11 km sub-sea pipeline tenninating at a floating storage and 
off-loading vessel and various other infrastructure works. The pipeline, which will 
require the clearing o f a strip o f land between 30 and 60 meters wide, as well as the 
upgrading or building o f new road segments, will pass through ecologically 
sensitive areas. In addition to the largely undisturbed wooded savanna o f the
u Although World Bank Senior Management has to pay deference to the institution's principal 
shareholders, it can always count on internal divisions within the Board.Executive Directors 
representing developing countries usually act as a bloc since they do not oppose loans for another 
developing country, and Executive Directors representing donor countries are rarely united i.e. in
167
Mbcrc Rift Valley (ca. 110km o f the pipeline route), the pipeline will traverse 
biodiversity-rich forest areas. These are the Deng Deng region (approximately 300 
kilometres o f pipeline route) and the Atlantic littoral evergreen forest in the coastal 
region o f Kribi (ca. 180 km o f pipeline route). The pipeline will also cross seven 
major rivers in Cameroon and an uncounted number o f smaller streams. The 
people in the project area are fanners, herders, fishermen and traditional hunters 
and gatherers, the Bakola, in the coastal moist tropical forest.
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A brief project report prepared by Exxon, the leader o f the Consortium, 
states that World Bank Group funding o f the project represents the foundation o f 
the financing structure o f the project.15 While the amounts o f proposed funding 
from the World Bank group are relatively small ($ 120 million from IDA/IBRD 
and $ 250 million from IFC), the Consortium considers World Bank participation 
in the project to be essential for two reasons. On the one hand, it provides political 
risk insurance since few developing country governments can afford to be on bad
the case o f a loan for a Francophone country, the Executive Director for France can be counted on 
to support the loan independent o f  its ments.
15 Exxon, Exxon's ChadDoba Project. August 15, 1996.
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terms with the World Bank as this might endanger access to other public and 
private funding (Duncan 1997). On the other, World Bank participation lends the 
project a seal o f approval which facilitates raising additional project funding from 
other sources, such as export-credit agencies and commercial banks.16
In order to obtain World Bank financing, the Consortium has to comply 
with applicable World Bank policies. For this reason, the Consortium 
commissioned a voluminous environmental impact assessment from a private U.S.- 
based consulting company. The Cameroonian portion o f the environmental 
assessment and accompanying enviromnental management plan consists o f four 
volumes. According to the EA, its preparation has been based on the 
environmental assessment requirements o f the World Bank, including its 
guidelines and operational directives (Dames & Moore 1997:1-1). In compliance 
with these guidelines, the EA emphasizes the need for consultation:
"Consultations with affected groups, including the local population, non­
governmental organizations, and relevant government ministries and 
agencies, have been undertaken and will continue throughout project 
development" (Dames & Moore 1997:1-2).
6.3.1 Inquiry on Public Consultations
Consultation with and active participation o f affected communities and 
non-govemmental-organizations is a central tenet o f World Bank environmental 
policies. For example, the Operational Directive (OD 4.01) on environmental 
assessment, which has mandatory character states:
"The Bank expects the borrower to take the views o f affected groups and 
local NGOs fully into account in project design and implementation, and in 
particular in the design o f EAs. This process is important in order to 
understand both the nature and extent o f any environmental impact and the 
acceptability o f proposed mitigatory measures, particularly to affected 
groups" (O.D. 4.01 o f October 1991).
The Environmental Assessment commissioned by the Oil Consortium 
acknowledges this requirement, stating: "A program has been established fo r  the 
proposed project to coordinate and consult with government agencies, affected
16 A major task for the IFC in this project is to help raise $ 1 billion in limited recourse debt, i.e. 
debt for which the responsibility o f  the parent company is limited (Interview with IFCstaff
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groups, and non-govemmental-organizations (NGOs). This program has been 
developed to meet the project's objectives fo r  consultation and comply with the 
requirements o f  the World Bank Environmental Assessment Source Book (World 
Bank 1991-1995 [1991a, 1193, 1994], World Bank Operational Directives 4.01 
and 14.70 (World Bank 1991b and 1989), and International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) Environmental Review and Analysis o f  Projects (IF C 1993)" (Dames & 
Moore 1997: 9-3). The EA further states that "Consultation with affected groups is 
essential to gain proper understanding o f  the nature and extent o f  social and  
environmental impacts that may result from  the development o f  the project and to 
seek inputs from  those communities in the development and implementation o f  
appropriate mitigation measures" (Dames & Moore 1997: 9-3)
These statements confirm good communication between the World Bank 
and the Consortium, and between the Consortium and the consulting company in 
charge o f the environmental assessment, on what World Bank policy requirements 
must be met. How is the global level requirement to consult locally affected 
communities in the design o f the environmental assessment and o f the project itself 
being carried out at the local level?
The goal o f the field research was to generate an assessment o f  the degree 
to which this central provision o f OD 4.01 concerning the consultation o f local 
communities and NGOs had been implemented. The research was earned out in 
two phases: (1) pre-release o f the Environmental Assessment (May 1997) in order 
to gauge public input into the design o f the EA and the project as required by OD 
4.01; and (2) post-publication o f both the EA and Environmental Management 
Plan (June 1998) in order to understand the degree to which local people had felt 
consulted and/or informed on the potential environmental hazards o f having a 
pipeline pass through their fields and forests. The research was conducted using 
informal research methods, non-random sampling and semi-structured interviews 
(chapter 3).
February 1997).
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6.3.1.1 Pre-Release of Environmental Assessment
The EA was publicly released in October 1997 after several months o f 
delay caused by its lack o f approval by the Government o f Cameroon.17 The field 
work was earned out by the author in May 1997, at a time the EA had been 
completed from the point o f view o f the Oil Consortium. Since little was known 
about the exact routing o f the pipeline at the time, field research focused on 
villages near the town o f Kribi which faces the planned off-shore oil storage and 
loading facilities, as well as locations in the Lomie region bordering on the Dja 
Wildlife Reserve (Fig. 6.4).
Based on the policy requirement that project design and implementation, in 
particular the design o f EAs, should take the views o f affected groups and local 
NGOs into account (OD 4.01), five questions were used as topics in both 
individual and group interviews. At the same time the interview situation was open 
for respondents to touch on other issues, such as sensitive political matters, if  they 
themselves choose to do so {i.e. transparent distribution o f revenues).
Check List of Questions
(1) Have you heard about a planned pipeline project?
(2) Do you know, even approximately, the routing o f the proposed pipeline?
(3) How and from whom did you receive information on project?
- Oral presentations?
- Written documentation?
(4) Have you been asked to provide input into the environmental impact assessment 
study and the environmental mitigation plans?
(5) How do you think that the pipeline will affect you and your family? 
(Alternative; How do you think it will affect your country?)
Fig. 6.7 Check List o f  Questions
17 The Government's delay in approving the EA is thought to have been a negotiating tactic to 
increase its bargaining power with the Oil Consortium and to have had little to do with the EA per 
se (Interview with World Bank officials July 1998).
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The respondents were divided into three distinct groups, consisting o f 
representatives o f NGOs, groups o f local villagers and forest dwellers (Fig.
3.1)
The methodology, i.e. preparation for and approach to interviews with 
each o f these groups, provided different set o f challenges, as described in 
chapter 3.
Interview Results
The different life experience o f each o f the three major groups is 
reflected in the way each responded to the questions. Therefore it makes sense 
to summarize their responses separately. The three sections will then lead into a 
conclusion about the degree to which the World Bank's Environmental 
Assessment guidelines concerning affected groups and NGOs have been 
adhered to.
Representatives of the NGO-Communitv
Question 1: The large NGOs, which are members o f important international 
NGO networks, were contacted by EXXON and informed that the project 
would be undertaken (e.g. INADES, SAILD, CARE, WWF). All o f them had 
been invited to meetings with Exxon. The smaller NGOs, which have few or no 
international connections, had not been contacted and did not know about the 
project (e.g. Center for Environment and Development, Defense de 
l'Environnement Camerounais).
Question 2: None o f  the NGOs knew the routing o f  the pipeline. Only the 
American director o f WWF in Yaounde had an approximate idea o f the 
routing. Representatives o f SAILD, who had attended two meetings with 
EXXON, erroneously believed that the pipeline would not pass through 
Cameroon, but through the Central African Republic.
Question 3: With two exceptions, the information on the project had been 
provided orally. One exception was a brochure and video temporarily given to 
INADES, which was asked by EXXON to review the material. INADES had 
to sign a confidentiality agreement which does not allow the organization to 
speak about the contents o f the material and to keep a copy o f the material. The 
other exception was a brochure in the hands o f the director o f WWF. The
172
brochure did not list the name of the publisher or a date. None o f the other 
organizations had written material. The IUCN representatives, who attended a 
meeting with EXXON, requested written material which was handed to them 
for the duration o f the meeting. Much to their consternation, their bags were 
searched at the end o f the meeting to ensure that no copy o f the material would 
leave the room inadvertently. All NGOs were frustrated about the lack o f 
public project documentation. SAILD, a large African organization, described 
its meetings with EXXON as serving to "remplir la fiche de presence" (fill out 
the list o f participants) and little else.
Question 4: The NGOs were not asked to provide input into the environmental 
assessment or environmental mitigation plans. A slight exception again was the 
WWF representative who said he was able to tell the Exxon representatives his 
views on problems concerning alternative routings o f the pipeline. Some o f the 
large NGOs were asked if  they would be interested in project sub-contracts. 
CARE-Canada offered its services to EXXON to work on public health-related 
issues but had not received a response from EXXON. INADES was asked by 
EXXON if  it could help in a "sensibilisation" programme o f the local 
population, who lives in the path o f the oil pipeline. INADES turned down this 
offer because the organization believes that its cooperation with the Oil 
Consortium would lead to making false promises to local people. In view o f 
current political circumstances in Cameroon, INADES believes the pipeline 
project to be destructive and harmful to the interests o f local people.
Question 5:
The local office o f IUCN in Lomie, which is dedicated to protecting the Dja 
Wildlife Reserve, expressed concern about possible impacts o f the pipeline on 
the Dja Wildlife Reserve, which became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 
1984 and the protection o f which is being funded by the European Union. Even 
if  the pipeline passes at a distance o f 50 kilometers, IUCN staff believe that it 
will increase poaching in the Reserve and possibly threaten its viability.
All NGOs shared concerns about the potential harm that the pipeline could 
cause. There was, however, a noticeable difference between the expatriate and 
the Cameroonian NGO representatives. It was surprising to find that there was
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consensus amongst the Cameroonian NGO representatives, who represent a 
broad spectrum ranging from small activist groups without proper resources to 
the well-equipped large NGOs. Despite their formidable differences, all were 
convinced that the project would cause more harm than bring benefits. There 
was also consensus that under the present government, none o f the revenue 
generated by the pipeline would be used to improve the living conditions o f 
local people and that most o f it would disappear into some deep pockets. The 
expatriate NGO representatives also expressed concern about the possible 
destruction o f coral reefs near Kribi (WWF) and loss o f one year’s agricultural 
production by local people living near the construction areas (CARE). 
However, they were more inclined to regard the project as a fa it accompli and 
did not see the project as negatively as their Cameroonian colleagues. They 
believed that there could be potential for some positive spin-offs from the 
pipeline such as schools and hospitals near the pumping stations which are to 
service the pipeline.
Groups of Local Villagers
Question 1: The group o f middle-aged and older men in the village o f 
Eboundja, as well as the young people, mostly boys, in the village ofBwambe, 
had heard about the planned pipeline by word-of-mouth.
Question 2: The villagers had no idea about the routing o f the pipeline and did 
not know exactly where in the Kribi region it would enter the ocean. Most 
thought that it would be either in Bwambe or Eboundja village. (Note: The lack 
o f information extends to local government representatives: the provincial 
delegate o f  the M inistry o f Tourism in Kribi knew about plans for the pipeline 
and that it would come to Kribi, a major provincial town, but knew o f  no 
further details).
Question 3: Information about plans for the pipeline became public in the 
region when President Biya visited the area in early 1997 to inaugurate an off­
shore oil platform in front o f Eboundja village. There was no written material.
Question 4: Local villagers were not consulted on the environmental 
assessment or the environmental mitigation plans. "Nobody has come to
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explain the benefits and the problems o f the pipeline. It is the wealth o f the 
state, we do not know about it," said one o f the villagers.
Question 5: The villagers o f all age groups had few or no expectations that the 
pipeline would be beneficial to the local economy and to them personally. 
Cameroon's deep economic crisis and worsening environmental degradation at 
the local level has hurt Bwambe and Eboundja villages. One might expect that 
the pipeline would be considered as an opportunity to escape poverty. Again, 
there was a consensus and also a remarkable depth o f analysis o f the situation. 
Why were they not expecting to get jobs through the pipeline project? 
According to the villagers in Bwambe, local people do not have the schooling 
to work for an oil company. O f about 40 children in the village, 35 were not 
going to school and will live as fishermen as their parents do. School fees are 
too high for villagers. Families who have made the sacrifice o f sending their 
children to school, see that their children cannot find work after completing 
school.
The fishermen o f Bwambe village try to make a little money by selling soft 
drinks or food to the occasional tourist. Young people know the word 
'ecotourism' and it represents to them what they believe to be a good future for 
their region: have visitors who can enjoy the beautiful surroundings (at 
Bwambe village the Lobe river cascades into the ocean as a waterfall) and buy 
some o f their fish and soft drinks. They are afraid that possible oil pollution 
could drive visitors away. This fear is echoed by the provincial delegate o f  the 
Ministry o f Tourism, who stated that she feared that tourism in the region, 
which has barely begun, would come to an end if  there were signs o f  pollution 
in the water and on the beaches. The expatriate owner o f a small hotel in 
Bwambe village, who has lived in the country for several decades and is 
married to a Cameroonian, explained that she had tried to research the pipeline 
because she considers it a danger to her business. She found that there was no 
information in Kribi but through foreign contacts in the capital she heard that 
about 30 Americans would come to work for the oil consortium in Kribi. She 
was told that except for short-term construction jobs, there would be no 
employment for local people since everything the Americans would need 
would be imported from the USA.
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The group of men in Eboundja village, which faces a newly inaugurated oil 
platform, were very pessimistic about the impact o f the pipeline on their lives. 
They said that since the oil platform began operations in October 1996, there 
was noise and pollution which had made it difficult to catch fish. The small 
pirogues have to go further into the ocean and stay for longer periods o f time, 
often under dangerous conditions, to catch the same amount o f fish. The 
villagers feel trapped. In front o f them they see the oil platform and behind 
them are forest lands that are increasingly being destroyed. Logging trucks pass 
constantly on the narrow dirt road passing through the village and are a danger 
to the children. What about the pipeline? If  it comes ".. .on est completement 
fini" ("...w e are completely finished").
The problem as identified by one o f the young men has to do with the lack of 
democracy: "People wish they could vote freely, then representatives could be 
elected to parliament who would represent their interests and let them know 
about such things as the pipeline and its local impacts."
Residents in the small town o f Lomie did not know about the pipeline.
Forest Dwellers
The Bakola camp was reached after travelling about two hours on a canoe 
upstream on the Lobe River and a short walk into the forest. There were mostly 
men and small children in the camp made up o f several small rondavel houses 
built o f twigs and leaves. The women o f the camp had departed for a gathering 
expedition earlier that morning. I f  interviewers are an intrusion into a rural 
village, the intrusion is much worse when visiting a Bakola camp. Some small 
gifts facilitated the initial contact. The language problem was considerable 
since translation had to be made from the Bagyeli language to the local Bantu 
language and from there into French.
Question 1: The Bakola apparently did not know what an oil pipeline was and 
had never heard o f the one that was likely to traverse their traditional forest 
lands. The Baka near Lomie also did not know about the pipeline.
Question 5: While not able to talk about the potential impact o f the pipeline on 
their lives, the Bakola voiced their grievances about the expanding logging
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operations in their area. The hunting grounds were getting smaller, there were 
fewer animals to hunt. Outsiders would come and hunt. The Bakola are clearly 
under severe stress and are suffering as a result o f the shrinking o f their 
traditional forest lands. They are worried about their future. Everything seems 
to be against them. The logging companies come and take the trees, with them 
come outsiders who are hunting with guns (the Bakola hunt with spears and 
they set snares). One o f the Bakola man said "The logging companies come 
and take the forest, but they don't give us jobs."
The pipeline has the potential to further increase the stress felt by the Bagyeli 
since it will bring construction crews and other people into the area driving the 
Bakola into an ever smaller area and thereby increasingly endangering their 
survival as a people.
The situation o f the Baka people is at present less severe since logging has not 
been as extensive in the south-eastern region as it is in the coastal regions.
Logging is advancing rapidly, however, and increasing numbers o f Baka are 
concentrated in smaller forest areas. Since the logging companies are especially 
interested in trees which also happen to be o f great value to the Baka, such as 
the Moabi tree (Ballionella toxisperma), the Baka say that it becomes more 
difficult for them to trade with the Bantu villagers. The Moabi, for example, is 
an integral part o f the social fabric o f the region. It provides cooking oil and 
medicines which the Baka exchange for metallic goods and starchy foods 
planted by Bantu villagers. With the disappearance o f the Moabi tree, young 
Baka say, they have to work like slaves on the fields o f the Bantu.
6.3.1.2 Post-Publication of Environmental Documentation
The Environmental Assessment became a public document in October 
1997. It was followed by the publication o f an Environmental Management Plan, 
which specifies some o f  the environmental mitigation measures, in February 1998. 
The second phase o f the field research was carried out in June 1998 and 
concentrated on the southern section o f the pipeline route on the axis Lolodorf, 
Bipindi, Kribi (fig,6.6). In addition to NGOs and local Bantu and Bakola 
communities, informal interviews were held with local government officials and 
local church representatives.
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The first phase o f field research May 1997 was characterized by an almost 
complete lack o f knowledge about the project in Cameroon and there had been no 
contact between the Oil Consortium, COTCO18, or the Government o f Cameroon 
with locally affected people. In the second phase in June 1998, English and French 
language versions o f the environmental studies were public documents and could 
be consulted in designated places. At the local level, along the route o f the 
pipeline, two main events had occurred: a team of social scientists had passed 
through to collect some basic socio-economic data and an exploratory mission had 
begun to cut a continuous alley through the entire area where the pipeline was to be 
placed.
Respondents from all sections (Church, local government, Bantu villagers, 
Bakola people, local NGOs) were unanimous in stating that they had not been 
infonned about the potential environmental impacts of the project and that nobody 
had come to seek their views on the project. The pipeline teams that had traveled 
along the pipeline route had awakened hopes for jobs. They also had taken note of 
crops and trees that were destroyed in the initial clearing o f space for the pipeline. 
Farmers were told that they would receive compensation but they were not 
infonned about the rates at which they were to be compensated. Decisions on 
compensation are made unilaterally by the Government and the Consortium. 
Compensation is only to be paid for trees and fields planted by fanners not for 
forest trees and other forest products that occur in the wild and are central to the 
livelihoods o f the Bakola.
Given the unanimous response to the question asked, what follows are 
quotes from the different groups reflecting their respective concerns:
Bakola People:
"We are afraid that things will be destroyed in the forest that are 
necessary and useful for us. There are many trees and lianas. The 
logging companies just take what they want, but we the Pygmies, 
get nothing. The loggers sleep where the Bantus are. The forest is 
very rich for us Pygmies, for us to nourish ourselves. We have not 
yet been told where the pipeline will pass" (Bandewani Village).
18 Cotco is the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company, which is owned mostly by the Oil 
Consortium, but the Governments o f  Cameroon and Chad are minority shareholders.
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"We heard that the pipeline will come, but we know nothing more. 
Here there were no meetings. The problem with compensation is 
that it may only be for the village chief. Some time ago the 
government told us to leave the forest, but we have not seen any 
benefits o f this" (Ntdoua Village).
Local Government Officials in the sub-prefectures of Lolodorf and Bipindi:
"At our level we only know what we are being told, our work is 
limited to facilitating the project, but the project is entirely being 
carried out by people from outside, i.e. Yaounde. There was a 
meeting with some o f  the local people, they were told that they 
would get some o f their fields back at the end o f the works and then 
could plant them again. They would be compensated for losses. At 
the beginning the information was not clear,the negotiations with 
local people were strong-armed (French: muscules) .. it was our role 
to help explain."
"The consequences for the Pygmies maybe especially bad, many of 
the trees they rely on will be cut here and there. But the Pygmies, 
cannot declare that things they planted are being lost and therefore 
they will get no compensation There are sacred places, but the 
pipeline will try to avoid these. How can you make an omelet 
without breaking eggs? It will be the local people who are the 
losers. When somebody sees that you are very poor then he will 
walk all over you. Even in Lolodorf, there is no clean drinking 
water."
"The Cameroonian state has committed itself and now we are 
obliged to respect the word that Cameroon has given."
"There was a meeting in Bipindi with people from the pipeline 
project. But the intellectual level o f local people is not very high 
and it is unclear what they have understood from what was said. At 
first people will look forward to the pipeline as a means o f getting 
jobs for young people and better roads, there is also hope for money 
and compensation."
"But there is reason to be unquiet, what happens if  the pipeline is 
pierced? I fear for local people what might happen to them as a 
result o f damage from oil spills. A technical failure is always 
possible, as is human error."
"When the pipeline is built, then there will be no more jobs. But the 
roads will still be a benefit, for example the Kribi-Lolodorf road. 
We are already suffering from deforestation here, the trees being cut 
are below the diameters they should have. For the Pygmies there are
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several problems. Their habitat and nature are one, in the forest 
everything belongs to them. But they have no rights, compensation 
is only to be paid to those who have planted trees. What about the 
wild trees? We have written 4 or 5 months ago to COTCO about 
this problem o f compensation for the Pygmies, we have not 
received a response. The Pygmies did not attend the Bipindi 
meeting."
Parish priests and nuns along the southern section of the pipeline route:
"The pipeline is a poisoned gift. The population has not been 
infonned ("sensibilisation") about the project. W e do not know who 
will profit from it. There is a danger that an oil spill could set the 
fields ablaze and lead to a catastrophe. The people here are hungry 
and prudence and poverty do not go well together. People will 
pierce the pipeline to get some o f the oil."
"I remember a scene elsewhere when a large quantity o f  frozen 
chicken had been spoiled and had to be thrown into a garbage depot. 
People were told they would become sick and die if  they ate the 
chicken, but they would get the chicken anyway, saying it is better 
to die with a full stomach than with an empty one. People will do 
anything to pierce that pipeline."
"The poor here are being abused. They work hard the whole day 
using up all their energies for a single bread. They are ignorant 
about many things and therefore they are being abused. The fruits o f 
growth are not well-distributed."
"A lot will be destroyed, but who will profit? The project is paying 
between 1000 and 3000 F FCA per tree being lost, but the sale o f 
the fruits from one o f  these trees in just one year brings in more 
money than that, and the tree will go on giving fruit for many 
years."
"We are very concerned that the pipeline will destroy little rivers 
and that it will create stagnant water, we are worried about malaria, 
especially children are suffering from it more and more and many 
die."
"For the Bakola life will be very difficult. The game that they need 
to feed themselves will flee. The Bakola are told that they can 
cultivate crops, but the layer o f humus is very thin. This is the 
further impoverishment o f Africa, drought will advance as the little 
rivers no longer run. These things make us afraid."
Bantu villagers in the Lolodorf and Kribi areas:
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"There are no jobs being created for villagers. COTCO had a 
meeting at the house o f the village chief and there COTCO said that 
the plantations would have to be put elsewhere and that some trees 
would have to be cut down. Unfortunately, neither schools nor 
recruitment for work has arrived. We are worried about 
deforestation, what will become o f Cameroon within the next ten 
years? It is visible and we can feel that drought is advancing, the 
diy periods are getting longer. Production o f com is at its lowest 
level and fisheries are affected too as more and more little streams 
dry up."
"Nothing is known about the pipeline. The Presidents o f Cameroon 
and Chad were to come here at the end o f M ay to lay the foundation 
stones for something, but this has not happened. Nobody knows 
exactly what is going on."
"I had hoped to be able to cook some meals for the workers. But 
they eat in their own canteen and not in the village. The food comes 
from elsewhere too. They (Satom, the contractor) have done nothing 
for the people here. Even the cook for the canteen comes from 
either Yaounde or Douala. They don't give work to the unemployed 
here, but they bring in people from other areas."
Local NGOs in Lolodorf:
"There has been no contact with the Consortium or contractors. The 
only thing there is, is a reading room. But this is not adequate since 
few Cameroonians are literate, people prefer to listen to the radio or 
go to meetings. Very few people know what the pipeline is going to 
be good for. There is a great lack of information."
"The situation o f the Pygmies is precarious, they will further suffer 
with the pipeline, some will be displaced, they will lose their 
sources o f  water and the tombs o f their ancestors, the game will 
flee."
6.3.2 Results of the Inquiry
The Consortium is aware o f  the World Bank’s operational directive on 
environmental assessment and in particular o f  its requirement that locally affected 
people and NGOs be provided with the opportunity to provide input into the design 
o f the EA (Dames & Moore 1997:9-3).The same operational directive also requires 
that affected groups have to
181
. .understand both the nature and the extent o f any social or 
environmental impact and the acceptability o f proposed mitigatory 
measures" (OD 4.01-19).
The environmental assessment acknowledges these requirements:
"Consultation and interaction with affected groups, local interested 
parties, local and international NGOs, and government agencies, is viewed 
as a critical component o f project development and EA preparation. This 
consultation assists with the identification o f possible project impacts, 
reconciliation o f opposing views about the project, promotion o f 
understanding o f the nature and extent o f any social or environmental 
impacts, and the acceptability o f proposed mitigation measures to affected 
groups" (Dames & Moore 1997:9.2).
The Consortium (or an entity acting on its behalf) established different 
types o f contact with different groups o f stakeholders in Cameroon. These can be 
summarized as follows:
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International and national NGOs
With the exception o f one major international organization (WWF), the 
Consortium did not solicit input into the design o f the EA or the project. While the 
Consortium initially did not provide detailed information on the project, including 
the routing o f the pipeline, it later conducted a public information campaign which 
was announced in Cameroon's principal daily newspaper (fig. 6.9). The
183
announcement in the newspaper o f 5 September 1997 states that the public 
information campaign on the pipeline began on 22 August 1997 and invites NGOs 
to attend public information sessions. As per the announcement, the meeting in the 
capital city o f Yaounde is to occur at 10.00 a.m. on 5 September 1997, the date o f 
the publication o f the newspaper. The short notice made it impossible for many 
NGOs to attend.19
Local villagers and opinion-leaders
On the Kribi-Lolodorf axis, the southern part o f the pipeline route, the 
pipeline crosses fields, fallow lands and cocoa plantations, as well as forests. By 
m id-1998, local villagers knew that a pipeline was going to traverse their areas. 
Some o f them had contact with the team of experts who had passed through the 
area to collect basic socio-economic data and a few had found short-term 
employment in clearing an alley for the pipeline. However, they did not receive 
information on the possible environmental impact o f the project {i.e. oil spills, 
increased deforestation and loss o f wildlife, spread o f sexually transmitted 
diseases, in particular AIDS, etc.). The environmental information provided by the 
Consortium or its agents was limited to announcing which land would be needed 
by the project and which trees had to be cut down. It was announced that there 
would be compensation but the rates of compensation were not discussed with the 
villagers.
Bakola People
While the Bakola had no information about the pipeline initially, they had 
heard about it by m id-1998. Some o f them had been visited in November 1997 by 
a team of social scientists working for the Consortium. The experts told them that 
the pipeline would try to avoid destroying their sacred sites and displacing their 
villages. The Bakola had no further information about the project and had not been 
consulted during the BA process or thereafter.
While the Consortium and/or its agents approached the three groups in 
different ways, the flow o f information was mostly uni-directional, i.e. the 
Consortium disseminated some information about the project, but did not inform
19 Interview with the Center for Environment and Development in Yaounde, June 1998.
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about its potential environmental and social implications, nor did it discuss 
environmental mitigation measures. In the urban settings o f Yaounde and Kribi, 
members o f the Cameroonian audience expressed fears about the environmental 
dangers o f the pipeline. However, the only environmental issues which the 
Consortium referred to in the villages were the loss of crops and trees.20
After finalizing the environmental assessment, the Consortium made the 
entire nine-volume study, which covers both Chad and Cameroon, publicly 
available in reading rooms in major towns. While this is a positive step, 
respondents considered this approach to be entirely insufficient in a country where 
literacy rates are low and few o f the people in remote rural areas, who will be most 
directly affected by the project, have the means to spend time in an urban setting to 
read through complicated technical documents.21
6.3.3 A Forceful Internal World Bank Critique
In the summer o f 1998, ten World Bank (including IFC) environmental 
experts prepared a joint critique o f the nine-volume environmental assessment 
presented by the Consortium.22 The document states that the EA does not provide 
an adequate basis for World Bank appraisal o f the project and cites the lack o f 
public consultations as one o f its central failures. Since the EA had not been made 
available for public review and comment before being finalized, the document 
recommends that the current EA be considered a draft which, after a public review 
period, must include comments and concerns expressed by the public.
Furthermore, the critique calls upon the Consortium to provide a full 
economic, technical, ecological and socio-economic analysis o f  possible 
alternative pipeline corridors and a detailed explanation o f why the current pipeline 
routing had been chosen. It calls attention to the ecologically sensitive nature o f 
several areas the pipeline plans to traverse and refers to the Bank's policy on 
Natural Habitats which states that the World Bank will not support projects that
20 A  recent report commissioned by Friends o f die Earth Netherlands and carried out bya Dutch 
and a Cameroonian scholar confirm the findings o f  theenquiry: Biesbrouck K. & Dkamela, G.P. 
The Oil Pipeline Project in Cameroon: With or Without Local Populations? Amsterdam, May 1998. 
38pp.
The researcher visited the reading room in Lolodorf in June 1998 and reviewed the list o f  people 
(names and professions) who had visited there. The majority were people who had come in the 
mistaken belief that they could apply for jobs with the Consortium in the reading room.
“  "Chad-Cameroon Oilfield and Pipeline Project - World Bank Group Comments on 
Environmental Reports," 12-page memorandum without date.
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involve the significant conversion or degradation o f natural habitats unless there 
are no feasible alternatives (OP 4.04, 1995).
In addition, the World Bank’s environmental experts express their concern 
about the lack o f an indigenous peoples' plan for the forest-dependent peoples (the 
Bakola people) o f the Atlantic coast, as is required under the Indigenous Peoples' 
Policy (OD 4.20, 1991).
According to several of the environmental experts who participated in 
writing the critique o f the EA, the unanimity and determination with which the
9 3group rejected the EA presented by the Consortium are unprecedented. Why did 
environmental staff feel empowered to be outspoken about a sensitive project 
involving some o f the largest oil companies in the world which have their 
headquarters in some of the Bank's most influential shareholder-countries?24 
World Bank officials explain that the high public visibility o f the project has 
encouraged their outspokenness.25 In addition to Church, human rights and 
environmental organizations in North America, Europe and Africa, questions about 
the project are increasingly being raised by members o f  parliament and the media 
in several countries.
As o f October 1999, the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors has 
not taken a final decision on approving the project. The World Bank's operational 
divisions continue to argue that the project will help alleviate poverty in both Chad 
and Cameroon, because governments are expected to use the newly generated 
income for poverty programmes. At the same time, operational staff recognize that 
both governments lack transparency in the way public finances are being handled 
but believe that these types o f problems can be fixed through separate technical 
assistance projects which would introduce the governments to transparent budget 
processes.
6.3.4 Shift in the Internal Balance-of-Power?
Unlike preparation o f the Transport Sector loan discussed in the previous 
section, the Oil Pipeline Project is being prepared in full knowledge o f the
23 Interviews with staff in the Central Environment Department as well as the Africa Technical 
Department, July 1998.
24 Exxon in the U.S., Shell in both the U.K. and the Netherlands, and E lf in France.
25 Interviews with staff in the Central Environment Department and Africa Technical Department, 
July 1998.
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applicable World Bank environmental policies. The Consortium restates the 
requirements o f World Bank environmental policies in its environmental 
assessment, including the mandatory requirement to consult with locally affected 
populations and NGOs during the enviromnental assessment process. While the 
Consortium states that it is adhering to World Bank policies, the field research on 
public consultation documented in this section shows that the interaction between 
local populations and the Consortium or its agents was late and mostly unilateral. 
Once the enviromnental assessment had been completed, the Consortium largely 
limited itself to infonning groups o f local people about the project's needs for land 
clearing. The population was not infonned about potential environmental dangers 
related to the oil pipeline and their input into the design o f the enviromnental 
assessment or mitigation plans was not requested.
While a final decision on World Bank financing o f the oil pipeline has not 
yet been taken, the institutional dynamics at play in the preparation o f this project 
show considerable differences with the preparation o f the Transport Sector loan. 
The influence o f the World Bank's environmental experts was very limited, if  not 
nil, in the Transport Sector loan, whereas their role in the Oil Pipeline Project is 
much more forceful. A key variable is that the latter project was subject to an 
environmental assessment while the former was not. In addition to the 
enviromnental assessment, which provides the World Bank's enviromnental 
experts with a basis for their evaluation o f the project, the Oil Pipeline Project is 
subject to international public scrutiny from civil society organizations, 
government departments and the media.26 According to World Bank enviromnental 
staff, the outside attention being paid to the project helped focus their attention and 
encouraged outspokenness about the potential environmental problems o f  the 
project.27
26 The record o f  environmental and human rights abuses related to Shell operations inOgoniland in 
neighboring Nigeria is one o f  the reasons for the public interest in the project. Furthermore, the 
pipeline project is adding to a broader development debate which questions the benefit o f  
subsidizing transnational corporations as a means o f  poverty alleviation in developing countries.
27 Interviews with World Bank environmental experts, August 1998. It should be noted that reports 
by World Bank environmental staff on projects are not public documents. They do, however, 
sometimes find their way into the public domain through unofficial channels.
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6.4 Summary
World Bank environmental policies are careful not to characterize 
biodiversity protection as a separate sector but emphasize the need to integrate 
biodiversity considerations into all o f the institution's development activities.
These policies also commit the World Bank to the empowerment o f local 
communities whose active participation in the design and implementation of 
projects is considered central to biodiversity conservation.
Both the Transport Sector loan and the Oil Pipeline project represent a 
considerable threat to Cameroon's moist tropical forests. The preparation o f both 
projects, despite protestations to the contrary from the Consortium in the case o f 
the latter, did not comply with mandatory World Bank biodiversity-related 
operational policies. As a result o f political pressure, the Consortium presented 
nineteen additional volumes o f enviromnental studies in the summer o f 1999.
These may lead to some technical improvements in the project, but do not change 
the lack o f consultation with locally affected people during the EA process itself 
when crucial decisions, such as the routing o f the pipeline were taken. The 
presentation o f the new studies has largely silenced the World Bank’s 
environmental experts in part because o f the technical improvements they contain 
and in part because o f pressure from the Bank’s senior management to move the 
project ahead without further obstacles.
The political ecology perspective can explain the lack o f  implementation o f 
World Bank biodiversity related policies by examining some o f the institution's 
underlying implicit assumptions. These are, for example, that the state is a neutral 
actor and that projects can be evaluated and carried out independent o f their 
specific political and socio-economic context (Blaikie 1985). Neither the Transport 
Sector loan nor preparation o f the Oil Pipeline project benefited from a political 
economic analysis o f the situation in Cameroon. Questions about who exercises 
power and how the power is used, which lie at the heart o f  political ecology, are 
not taken into consideration (Blaikie 1985, Harvey 1996). The state, as held by the 
realist approach o f political science theory, is assumed to be a neutral agent 
working for the greatest benefit for the largest number (Dillon, Ilget & Willett
1991). There is no analysis about how the ruling classes express their interests 
through the state and might be able to take advantage o f large infrastructure 
projects for their own gain. There is also no analysis o f the impact on local
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communities who might face growing inequalities and thereby become less 
empowered to protect the biodiversity on which their livelihoods may depend to a 
large degree.
Recognizing the specific political economic context o f a project and 
acknowledging that all proposals concerning the environment are necessarily also 
proposals for social change (Harvey 1996:119) might lead to problematic 
relationships between the World Bank and its client-govemments and thereby lead 
to a reduction in the number and volume of World Bank loans. This might bring 
the institution into conflict with its own organizational goals. Theory o f 
organization, such as the Public Choice Approach, explain that the fundamental 
goals o f organizations are their survival, decision-making autonomy and control 
over resources, while value allocation, the central purpose for which an 
organization was established, comes in second place (Le Prestre 1986). The 
Transport Sector loan confirms this theory. Value allocation, i.e. promoting 
environmentally sustainable development in the case o f the World Bank, is 
subordinated to the overall organizational goals. This explains why World Bank 
Senior Management decided that adherence to World Bank environmental policies 
was less important than maintaining its decision-making autonomy, even if  this 
entailed criticism from some o f its most influential shareholder governments.
The organizational structure in place is one that permits ‘decoupling’ o f 
stated institutional goals and project practice. This is a structure in which the 
World Bank adopts new issues, such as biodiversity conservation, for legitimacy 
reasons, although these gestures are largely ineffective at the operational level 
(Wade 1997a).
The discussion o f  the Cameroon Transport Sector loan indicates two 
linchpins in the structure that facilitate ‘decoupling5. On the one hand, there is the 
bureaucratic power o f World Bank Senior Management vis-a-vis the institution's 
shareholders, who, as members o f the Board o f Executive Directors, are charged 
with oversight over Senior Management. On the other, there is an institutional 
disconnection between the operational departments that are in charge o f preparing 
projects and the technical (i.e. environmental) departments which provide 
enviromnental expertise and other input into project preparations.
What causes the weakness o f those who are charged with general oversight 
over the institution and those who are charged with scrutinizing the environmental
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impacts o f World Bank-financed projects? With respect to the Board o f Executive 
Directors, an important part o f the explanation resides in the high information costs 
to the Executive Directors and their home governments in monitoring the activities 
o f the institution. Executive Directors are political appointees who occupy their 
positions for a limited number o f years as opposed to members o f the Bank's 
Senior Management who commonly spend most o f their careers at the institution. 
As a result, the latter have at their disposal a knowledge base on the institution and 
its relationships with borrowers that cannot easily be matched by their political 
overseers. Given the volume o f project documentation and the number o f annual 
loans, the Executive Directors and their small staff do no have the resources to 
analyse in detail the loans they are being requested to approve. Some o f the 
analysis is earned out by their home offices, such as the Treasury Department in 
the U.S., DFID in the United Kingdom or the Ministry for International 
Cooperation in Germany. Yet the home offices too, lack resources and staff to 
provide detailed oversight over financing decisions. The shareholders largely rely 
on Bank management and staff to carry out the institution's work. The "realist" 
approach to international institutions from political science theory thus has limited 
explanatory power concerning the allocation of funds for particular projects or the 
adherence to World Bank policies.
With respect to the Bank's environmental experts in the institution's 
technical departments, one o f the key explanations for their relative weakness is 
their lack o f budgetary autonomy. The operational departments (or Country 
departments) have their own budgets while technical departments function 
essentially as internal consulting firms, which have to "sell" their services to them. 
The incentives that are thus being put in place interfere with independent 
environmental oversight and make it difficult for environmental staff to provide 
comments which could lead to the delay o f the approval o f projects (Wade 1997a).
Why could the environmental experts inside the World Bank be largely 
ignored in the case o f the Transport Sector loan and why do they have a strong 
voice in the Oil Pipeline project? In the case o f the Transport Sector, the lack o f an 
enviromnental assessment limited the information available to the World Bank’s 
environmental experts. Perhaps more importantly, there was little attention being 
paid to the project by government shareholders and by non-go vemmental- 
organizations until shortly before the scheduled project approval date. The Oil
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Pipeline project faces a different scenario. Previous public protests about activities 
by transnational oil companies such as Shell's links to environmental disaster and 
human rights abuses in Nigeria's Ogoniland, have generated interest in the Oil 
Pipeline project by human rights and environmental organizations as well as 
decision-makers and the media. Information on the project is publicly available 
and has been widely circulated. This is a case where “the costs o f not learning” 
may be high in terms o f institution's own survival interests (Wade- 1997a:33). 
Public attention to the project, in particular, has helped create a political space 
within the institution in which environmental experts were encouraged to be 
outspoken. This political space is likely to be o f a temporary nature as long as the 
institution does not carry out fundamental changes, such as the establishment o f 
autonomous budgets for the departments charged with overseeing the World 
Bank's compliance with its own social and environmental policies.
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Fig. 6.9 Intra-Institutional Channels -  Transport Sector Loan
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The analysis o f the extent to which the two infrastructure projects comply 
with the World Bank's biodiversity-related policies shows that the institution is not 
a monolithic entity. The above diagrams show the different intra-institutional 
linkages at work in each o f the projects (Fig. 6.10 and Fig. 6.11). The principal 
differences are that the Central Environment Department was excluded from 
playing a role and the lack o f involvement o f the public and the Executive 
Directors the Transport Sector loan. In the case o f the proposed Oil Pipeline, the 
Executive Directors and the public are strongly involved and the Central 
Environment Department was allowed to play an oversight role. These differences 
indicate that there is room for maneuver in the intra-organizational structures 
which can improve the institution’s compliance with its own policy mandates. 
However, the institution will only adopt the necessary changes if  it feels that it is in 
its interest to do so in order to enhance or ensure its survival as an institution, in 
particular its access to the financial resources o f its shareholders.
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CHAPTER 7
THE INTERFACE OF GLOBAL GOALS AND LOCAL REALITIES:
THE WORLD BANK-GEF PROJECT FOR BIODIVERSITY 
PROTECTION IN CAMEROON
7.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters examined how the World Bank’s environmental 
and social policy commitments which are related to biodiversity protection, are 
translated into concrete action at the level o f policy discussions, i.e. the Country 
Assistance Strategy and Structural Adjustment loans (chapter 7) as well as in the 
context o f more traditional lending for infrastructure development (chapter 6). This 
chapter finally analyses a GEF project which was specifically designed to protect 
biodiversity. The project, which is financed through a GEF grant, is being 
implemented by the World Bank.
The global politics behind the establishment of the GEF and its institutional 
arrangements have been analysed in chapter 4. Theories o f Organization provide 
the conceptual tools to understand the World Bank's successful attempt to capture 
the leading role within the GEF as a means of adapting to external demands and 
ensuring continued, if  not growing, access to resources. Theories o f organization 
emphasize that organizational goals, such as survival o f the institution, autonomy 
in decision-making and control over resources, take precedence over the 
organization's stated objectives (value allocation).
Since World Bank policies apply to the GEF whenever the World Bank 
serves as the GEF Implementing Agency, this chapter analyses how the GEF 
Biodiversity Conservation and Management Project for Cameroon project 
complies with the relevant World Bank policies. This project serves as a mini­
laboratory which may help shed some light on the difficulties o f an existing power 
structure in bridging global concerns with local realities and thereby contribute to 
possible responses to Harvey's question about the nature o f a power structure able 
to arbitrate and translate between global and local geographic scales (Harvey 
1996:204).
Publications by the World Bank's Environment Department emphasize that 
biodiversity protection is central to the institution's mission o f promoting
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sustainable development. They refer to the role o f the World Bank's Country 
Assistance Strategies (CAS) for individual countries as the vehicle through which 
biodiversity is taken into account in macro-economic decision-making as well as in 
development programmes in sectors such as agriculture, forestry and infrastructure 
(World Bank 1995a: 25). Contrary to these statements, the CAS for Cameroon 
does not consider the environmental or biodiversity ramifications o f the macro- 
economic and sector policies or o f the individual development projects which it 
negotiated with the government (Chapter 5). The CAS for Cameroon shifts the 
entire weight o f addressing the loss o f biodiversity to the separate and relatively 
modest scale o f the GEF project for Cameroon.
The present chapter analyses the GEF Biodiversity Conservation and 
Management project for the Republic o f Cameroon. The World Bank serves as the 
Implementing Agency for this project as it does for most, if  not all, GEF 
investment projects.1
Using the theoretical framework developed by Blaikie and first applied to 
land-and-soil conservation and then to biodiversity protection (Blaikie 1985, Biot 
et al. 1995, Blaikie 1995), the chapter begins by analysing the World Bank-GEF 
general approach to biodiversity conservation as reflected in its publications. After 
listing specific World Bank policy guidelines which are relevant to biodiversity 
conservation, the chapter turns to the GEF Biodiversity Conservation and 
Management Project for Cameroon. It examines where the idea for the project 
originated, how it evolved as well as the project's objectives and contents. 
Following this overview, the chapter examines the role o f  different project actors, 
the World Bank, the Government o f Cameroon and international Non- 
Govemmental-Organizations and considers some aspects o f  project 
implementation, especially as they relate to specific World Bank policy guidelines. 
This is followed by an analysis o f the lessons emerging from the Cameroon 
Biodiversity Protection project and how they might be explained using theory o f 
organization. The conclusion then refers back to the central question seeking to 
identify the political and institutional conditions which determine the degree to 
which the World Bank-GEF complies with its own policies.
1 The GEF activities o f  UNDP and UNEP, the World Bank's partners in the GEF, focus on technical 
assistance (UNDP) and scientific studies (UNEP)
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7.2 Conservation Paradigms in the World Bank-GEF Approach
The underlying premise o f political ecology is that ecological problems can 
only be understood from a perspective in which the environment and politics are 
interrelated (Atkinson 1991, Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Geographer David Harvey 
expresses it in the following terms:
"...all ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously 
political-economic projects (and arguments) and vice-versa. Ecological 
arguments are never socially neutral any more than socio-political 
arguments are ecologically neutral" (Harvey 1996: 182).
The political nature o f enviromnental projects is reflected in the three 
distinct political approaches to land degradation identified by Blaikie, which he 
later also found applicable to the question o f biodiversity conservation (Blaikie 
1985, 1995):
The 'classic' approach. This approach tends to be associated with the colonial roots 
o f conservation. The state plays the key role in defining a conservation problem 
and state power is used to address it. Local people are mostly seen as obstacles to 
conservation and human welfare is not necessarily part o f the agenda.
The 'neo-populist1 approach. This approach has emerged in response to the wide­
spread failure o f the 'classic' approach and is characterized by the attempt to be 
more 'people-oriented' in conservation programmes. It emphasizes participatory 
modes o f designing and implementing projects.
The 'neo-liberal economic' approach. This approach is also in part a response to the 
failure o f the 'classic' approach with its overreliance on state bureaucracy and 
control. It emphasizes the role o f the market in regulating the use o f natural 
resources and limits the role o f the state to establishing a regulatory framework that 
removes perverse incentives and encourages internalization o f environmental costs. 
(Blaikie 1995: 6-7).
These approaches do not represent a straightforward historical sequence 
and they are not mutually exclusive (Biot et al. 1995: 1). Which approach or which 
combination o f approaches is reflected in the World Bank-GEF project documents 
on biodiversity?
All GEF biodiversity investment projects provide grant financing directly 
to governments but governments are expected to enter into partnerships with local 
and international non-govemmental-organizations, research institutes and the
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private sector. Nearly all projects include components for institutional 
strengthening or, in cases where the necessary institutions do not exist, assistance 
in establishing institutions capable o f  integrating biodiversity protection with 
sustainable development (Newcombe & Richardson 1993:5).
World Bank publications complement the focus on governments and the 
strengthening o f central government agencies by adding elements o f the 'neo­
populist' approach. The 1992 World Development Report on Development and the 
Environment, for example, emphasizes th a t"... enviromnental protection is one 
area where government must play a central role" (World Bank 1992: 1) but adds 
that many enviromnental problems cannot be solved without the active 
participation o f local people (World Bank 1992:93). World Bank-sponsored 
publications on integrated conservation-development projects emphasize the need 
to ensure the conservation o f biological diversity by reconciling the management 
o f protected areas with the social and economic needs o f local people (Wells et al.
1992).
Following the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, the Bank's statements increasingly include 'neo-populist' elements 
by highlighting the complementarity o f its mission o f reducing poverty and 
protecting the environment:
"Hence, it is now widely recognized that support for poverty alleviation 
and human development will depend on environmental sustainability 
and biodiversity conservation" (World Bank 1995a: 18).
World Bank publications refer specifically to the need o f  empowering 
local communities, indigenous peoples and other stakeholders as critical to project 
success (World Bank 1995g:9). In addition, biodiversity conservation is seen as 
something that is not limited to parks and protected areas, but something that is 
essential to agricultural systems and to a wide spectrum o f habitats modified by a 
diverse array o f cultures (Srivastava et al. 1996)
According to the World Bank's GEF Coordination Unit, a central goal o f 
the GEF is " ...to  sustain the livelihoods o f local communities and maintain the 
quality o f life while protecting biodiversity whenever the goals are not mutually 
exclusive" (Newcombe & Richardson, 1993:7). Should conflicts arise, alternative 
livelihoods for local people must be assured.
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The language in the publications indicates that the 'classic' approach, in 
which zones o f the non-human world considered to be pristine, intact or 
undisturbed, would be fenced off and thereby protected, has largely been 
abandoned. The 'neo-populist' approach, which according to Blaikie represents the 
new conventional wisdom in international discourse (Blaikie 1995), has become 
the salient element in World Bank language on biodiversity.
7.2.1 Operational Guidelines
The large number o f publications produced by the World Bank's 
Environment Department do not necessarily provide guidance to Bank operational 
staff. To this end, there are specific World Bank operational policies some o f 
which are relevant to GEF biodiversity protection projects. World Bank 
operational policies also apply to its GEF-financed operations because as the 
trustee o f the GEF and a GEF Implementing Agency, the World Bank has accepted 
that i t ".. .undertakes to administer GEF funds with the same care it administers its 
own funds" (Shihata 1994:40).
The operational policies can potentially carry considerable weight because 
Bank staff are expected to abide by them. An added incentive for World Bank staff 
to follow the operational guidelines was created in 1993 with the establishment o f 
the World Bank Inspection Panel. Since then, people in project countries who feel 
that they are being affected negatively as a result of a World Bank violation o f its 
own policies, can request the World Bank's Inspection Panel to undertake an 
investigation o f  the matter and thereby try to obtain redress for their grievances 
(Shihata 1994). Amongst the most relevant operational directives for GEF projects 
are:2
- Environmental Assessment (OD 4.01)
- Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20)
- Disclosure o f Operational Information. (BP 17.50)
2 The appendix provides summaries o f  the World Bank environmental and social policies, which 
can be ODs (operational directives), OPs (operational policies) and BPs (best practice guidelines).
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The next section analyses how the idea for the Biodiversity Protection 
and Management Project for Cameroon evolved and how the distinct approaches to 
biodiversity conservation and operational directives referred to in this section are 
reflected in the project's main documents.
7.3 Project Trajectory
7.3.1 Remote Origins
The origins o f the Cameroon Biodiversity Protection and Management 
project date back to the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP), an ambitious plan 
developed in the mid-1980s by the World Bank, the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World Resources Institute (WRI).3 The objective o f the TFAP 
was to curb deforestation in developing countries by mobilizing about US $ 8 
billion over a period o f five years for forestry-related projects, including the 
strengthening o f institutions, addressing fuelwood needs, conservation o f protected 
areas and supporting industrial forest uses. World Bank President Barber Conable 
promised in 1987 that the institution would become a leader in the environmental 
field (Rich 1994). In order to reach this goal, he committed the Bank to vastly 
increasing its lending for forestry and the TFAP seemed to be an appropriate 
vehicle to channel these investments.
The TFAP soon came under intense criticism both from inside and outside 
organizations. Critics claimed that country-specific TFAP plans would 
dramatically increase deforestation through their focus on the support o f logging 
activities (Colchester & Lohmann 1990). The TFAP for Cameroon, for example, 
stated that its primary goal was to turn the country into . .the most important 
African producer and exporter o f forestry-based products from the start o f the 21st 
century" (FAO 1988). The timber export strategy was to be made viable through 
the building o f a 600 km road to open access to a nearly 14 million hectare area o f 
moist tropical forest in the southern and eastern parts o f the country. The area is 
inhabited by indigenous Baka and Bakola Pygmy peoples whose existence is not 
mentioned in the three volumes o f TFAP reports for Cameroon (Horta 1990).
3 Interview with the World Bank's task manager for the GEF project ClaudeHeimo.
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The World Resources Institute, which was responsible for developing the 
original concept of the TFAP, published a critical report o f the TFAP's record in 
1990 and dissociated itself from the TFAP. The report criticized the TFAP's failure 
to address the underlying causes o f deforestation and to take the rights and needs 
o f forest-dwelling peoples into account (Winterbottom 1990). The World Bank too 
dissociated itself from the TFAP by not promoting its forestry projects under the 
TFAP label. Subsequent attempts to revitalize the TFAP failed and it has largely 
become irrelevant.
A remnant o f the TFAP was the planned $ 30 million IBRD Forestry and 
Environment Project for Cameroon.4 In order to add a biodiversity protection 
component to the forestry loan, the Bank's initial plan was to attach a $ 25 million 
GEF biodiversity protection grant to the forestry loan. The rationale was that the 
availability o f grant funds would be a major incentive to the government to 
implement conservation programmes (Global Environment Facility 1991).
A campaign by enviromnental organizations5 claimed that the Bank was 
trying to use the GEF grant as a green fig leaf for an environmentally destructive 
forestry loan. The campaign helped focus the attention o f the U.S. government, the 
principal shareholder in both the World Bank and the GEF, on this particular 
project. As a result, the U.S. Executive Director to the World Bank sent a letter to 
the Bank's Board o f Executive Directors requesting that the GEF project be 
separated from the forestry loan and that the forestry loan be subject to a full 
environmental impact assessment before being presented to the Board for 
approval.6 During the ensuing Board discussion o f the project, several European 
representatives expressed similar concerns verbally. As a result, the GEF 
Biodiversity Protection and Management project for Cameroon eventually became 
a stand-alone venture.
While the goals and broad contents o f  the project, i.e. the number o f sites to 
be protected, remained largely unchanged, the financial structure o f  the project 
underwent substantial modifications (fig. 7.1). Funding for the project changed
4 In 1990 Cameroon was still considered to be a middle-income country qualifying for IBRD 
funding only.
5 Environmental Defense Fund, Memorandum o f  February 27, 1991 "The Conservation o f  
Cameroon's Tropical Forests: A Test Case for the Global Environmental Facility and the N ew  
Forest Policy."
6Letter from Patrick E. Coady, U.S. Executive Director, o f March 13, 1991 address to the Bank's 
Executive Board.
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from the initially proposed $ 25 million in 1991 to $ 5 million in 1993 (date o f 
approval o f the project by the GEF Assembly as part o f its work programme)7 and 
to $ 6 million in 1995 when Bank management approved the project.8 The status 
o f the GEF project also changed. Initially the project was to be attached to a $ 30 
million forestry loan, i.e. become a grant component o f a regular loan. As referred 
to above, this idea was abandoned as a result o f statements made by members o f 
the World Bank's Board o f Directors. It was replaced by the idea o f attaching the 
GEF project to a $ 2 million ecological protection loan on IBRD terms. This was 
abandoned too9and in 1995 the Biodiversity Protection and Management project 
for Cameroon became a free-standing grant.
Evolution of the Biodiversity Conservation 
and Management Project for Cameroom
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Fig. 7.1 Evolution o f  GEF Project in Cameroon
The reduction in GEF funding was partially compensated for by a new co­
financing arrangement which, in addition to the GEF, included the Government of 
Cameroon and six additional donors. Total project costs were now estimated to be 
ca. $ 12 million as opposed to the initial $ 25 million in GEF grants (fig. 7.2). The 
number of co-financing arrangements is important since it can greatly increase the 
complexity o f a project and thereby generate a heavy load o f project management 
and coordination requirements.
7 UNDP, World Bank, UNEP - Global Environment Facility. April 1993. Work Program - Fiscal 
Year 1993 - Fifth Tranche, p. 5-9.
s Only GEF project exceeding $ 10 million must be presented to the World Bank's Board o f  
Executive Directors for approval.
9 The most likely reason for abandoning this idea was reluctance on part o f  the Government 
to borrow on IBRD term for ecological protection.
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GEF Project for Cameroon: Sources of Financing
Sources o f financing Am ount Percentage
(US $ ’000)
Govt, of Cameroon 1,000 8
Govt, of the Netherlands 1,880 15
Govt, of Germany 1,500 12
Govt, o f France 1,240 10
European Union 40 1
Govt, o f UK 770 6
GEF 5,960 48
Total 12,390 100
Fig.7.2 Sources o f  Financing for GEF Project
Source: World Bank- GEF Project Document biodiversity Conservation 
and Management Project for the Republic o f  Cameroon, March 1995
7.3.2 Concepts and Contents
Three project documents describe in varying detail the project, its 
objectives, benefits and risks. These are the initial GEF project brief (Global 
Environment Facility 1991), an environmental analysis (Government o f Cameroon
1993) and most importantly, the final 'green cover' project document (World Bank 
1995g). Both the initial project b rief and the environmental analysis contained too 
little specific information to provide guidance for project execution. The 'green 
cover' document, which describes the project as approved by World Bank 
management, is the most important and detailed o f the documents. It exists only in 
an English language version, a language which is not widely spoken in Cameroon 
and where French continues to be the dominant European language.
The green cover project document (World Bank 1995d) explains the 
rationale for the project, lists its objectives and project components and lays out a 
plan for project execution. The rationale for GEF funding is that "The protection o f 
natural forest and savanna ecosystems in Cameroon is o f high international 
importance" (World Bank 1995d:5). The emphasis is placed on the country's 
diversity in forest-dwelling primates (in Africa "second only to Zaire"), the fact 
that Cameroon is home to the only remaining population o f black rhinoceroses in 
west central Africa as well as the country's large numbers o f endemic bird and 
plant species.
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The main objective is to consolidate and upgrade the management o f 
protected areas by: . .a) providing support to the government in its efforts to
manage and conserve biological resources; b) promoting involvement o f rural 
populations in biodiversity conservation; and c) encouraging sustainable utilization 
o f renewable resources and promoting sustainable and environmentally compatible 
development in regions surrounding the Protected Areas" (World Bank 1995d:2).
The document states that the areas to be protected have been selected by the 
project {i.e. World Bank-GEF) because they are key habitats for globally 
threatened species. There is no mention o f consultation with government, at the 
national or local level, or rural people in the selection o f the protected areas. The 
seven areas to be protected with assistance from the GEF are the Campo reserve on 
southern coast, Mount Kilum, Mount Koupe and Mount Cameroon in the western 
Highlands and the Lobeke, Boumba Bek and Nki forests and faunal reserves in the 
lowlands o f eastern Cameroon (fig. 7.3). Assistance with the protection o f several 
savanna ecosystems would also be financed by the project (World Bank 1995d;3).
The green cover document refers to the fact that the Government of 
Cameroon is preparing a national environmental management plan (NEMP) in 
cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme. Although UNDP is 
a partner in the GEF, the World Bank-GEF project chooses not to integrate its own 
activities with this planing exercise and justifies the parallel nature o f its own 
endeavour by stating that the innovative features o f the GEF project with regard to 
community participation in protected area management should enhance the NEMP 
process by providing it with examples o f'best practice' (World Bank 1995d:2).
The Cameroonian lead agency for the project is the Ministry for 
Environment and Forestry (MINEF) which was created in 1992. According to the 
green cover document, the ministry would be responsible for establishing a 
technical steering committee for the national coordination o f the project while a 
special unit to be established in its Department for Wildlife and Protected Areas 
(DWPA) would be in charge o f day-to-day project administration and 
coordination. In addition to contributing $ 1 million in co-financing, the 
Government o f Cameroon is to finance staff salaries and contribute to the 
operating expenses o f  the project.
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Since government capacity for project implementation is considered to be 
limited, the green cover document specifies that it is a condition for grant 
effectiveness that the Department for Wildlife and Protected Areas enters into 
contracts which " ...are acceptable to the B ank..." with selected non-governmental 
organizations (World Bank 1995d; 35). These NGOs are the W orld-W ide Fund for 
Nature (WWF-US), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS-US) and Birdlife 
International (UK). In addition, contracts should be established with Kew Botanic 
Gardens, the Gennan Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the 
Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) (World Bank 1995d:31). These 
organizations are in charge o f executing site-based activities o f the project (e.g. 
management plan development, baseline studies, surveys and inventories).
While the green cover document does not specify how it is to be done nor 
allocates specific financial resources for the purpose, it emphasizes the need for 
local community involvement in programme planning and execution and promises 
to help reconcile the global benefits in maintaining biodiversity with national and 
local interests in increasing sustainable revenues from protected areas (World Bank 
1995d). Fig. 7.4 shows the funding for various project activities.
Disbursement Categories in US $ thousand
Category Total GEF Amount
1. Civil Works 550
2. Vehicles, Goods, 
Equipment
570
3. Technical Assistance, 
Studies, Consultancies
2,100
4. Training 320
5. Operating costs 1,630
6. Unallocated 830
Total 6,000
Fig. 7.4 Disbursement Categories for GEF Project 
Source: World Bank- GEF Project Document Biodiversity Conservation 
and Management Project for the Republic o f  Cameroon, March 1995.
The project document identifies the risks o f the project. It states that the 
long-term sustainability o f the project will ultimately depend on the Government's 
ability and commitment to finance the long-tenn recurrent costs. Another identified 
risk is that the Government may want to raise additional revenue by opening up 
new areas to logging which could make it difficult to maintain protection zones of
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sufficient size to maintain ecosystem processes and the usufruct rights over certain 
forest areas for local communities.
The project was subject to an Environmental Analysis (EA) which was 
carried out by a French consulting company on behalf o f the Government o f 
Cameroon. The EA emphasizes the need for on-going monitoring and evaluation 
because it recognizes that its own contribution is o f limited value as actions to be 
undertaken by the project were not yet defined.10 Based on its limited information, 
the EA concludes that the overall impacts o f the project would be environmentally 
beneficial, although it also points to potential risks. One risk is that project 
activities, especially if  they include some logging component, could attract 
poachers into new areas. Another risk is that strict protection o f  the reserves in 
south-eastern Cameroon could be harmful to the indigenous, forest-dependent, 
Baka people who, according to the EA, would have to change their way o f life or 
move out o f the area.11
The EA consists mostly o f a compilation o f maps and statistics that were 
previously produced in other types o f reports and its general analysis is too much 
on the surface to provide useful guidance for project implementation.
7.4 Plural Interests and Unequal Power
7.4.1 Underlying Causes and Risk Assessment
What are the underlying causes o f biodiversity loss in Cameroon? The 
green cover project document states that Cameroon's forest ecosystems are under 
pressure from a rapidly growing population, commercial forest exploitation and 
increasing international demand for timber (World Bank 1995g:7).
According to some estimates, Africa's population is expected to triple by 
the year 2025 (World Resources Institute 1990). World Bank publications on 
Africa refer consistently to population pressure as the main cause for 
environmental degradation and poverty across the entire continent (World Bank 
1989c, Cleaver & Schreiber 1992). The generalized analysis o f  African 
demographic tendencies ignores varied historical processes and geography
10 Evaluation d'lmpact Environnemental du Projet "Conservation de la Biodiversite au Cameroun" 
May 1993 (carried out by a French consulting company on behalf o f  the Government o f  
Cameroon).
11 Ibid., page 11.
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(Williams 1995).12 A mention o f marked differences in patterns o f fertility and 
rates o f population growth between different countries and regions would have 
been especially appropriate in the context o f Cameroon's forests. While 
demographic data may be sparse, anthropological studies find that there is no 
demographic pressure coming from indigenous forest populations in the central 
African forest (Bailey 1996). Low fertility rates o f the populations o f the Ituri 
forest in the fonner Zaire have been documented over several decades and these 
have been demonstrated to hold true for other forest people in central Africa's 
moist tropical forest region (Bailey 1996). While all the reasons for the low 
fertility may not be known, it is believed that sexually transmitted diseases play a 
considerable role in widespread sterility (Bailey, Bahuchet & Hewlett 1990).
Farmer migrants who have settled along the small dirt roads in the forest 
regions have higher fertility rates than the indigenous forest peoples. There is, 
however, a consensus amongst government officials, NGO representatives and 
academics in Cameroon, that demographic pressure is not a problem in the south­
eastern and southern forest ecosystems o f Cameroon which are to be protected 
with assistance from the GEF. Forest conversion by local people occurs in some 
areas but this is due not to population pressure per se, but to the continuing 
economic crisis in Cameroon (Sunderland et al. 1997).
The misreading o f the demographic situation in the main project areas 
indicates that neither demographic nor socio-economic surveys were carried out in 
preparation for the project before its approval. Instead, the green cover document 
relied on the World Bank's general assessment o f population pressure in Africa.
The director o f  the Environment Department in Cameroon's Ministry for 
Environment and Forests (MINEF) explains "The disruption o f  the forest is not 
created by the local people, uncontrolled logging is the problem."13 The green 
cover document agrees that increased logging is an immediate risk to the project 
(World Bank 1995g:7). It does not, however, refer to 'uncontrolled' logging by the 
private sector, but to the government’s temptation to generate additional revenue 
through logging. The discussion o f Cameroon's Forestry Code shows that powerful 
political forces in the country resist restrictions on logging activities which would
12 For a detailed analysis o f  the World Bank's use o f  the population/ environment linkage in Africa
see the study by Williams G. 1996. ModernizingMalthus, in : Crush, J. (Ed.) Power o f
Development.
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imply losing opportunities for economic rents and the ability to dispense 
patronage (chapter 5). The World Bank-GEF project seeks to address this risk by 
requiring that the government issue an implementation decree for the wildlife and 
protected area sections o f the new Forestry Code (World Bank 1995g:7).
New laws and decrees do not necessarily translate into political will and 
say little about actual capacity to enforce them, as the delays in the application of 
the new Forestry Code show (chapter 5). Also, in addition to the problems o f 
enforcing laws and rent-seeking by politicians, there are other forces driving 
deforestation (and biodiversity loss) which the Bank is in a unique position to 
influence. These are discussed in other chapters and just briefly referred to here:
(1) Structural adjustment and foreign debt related pressures to generate foreign 
exchange earnings from increasing exports o f primary commodities, timber being 
at the top o f the list. The budget cuts in government agencies, which reduce the 
government's ability to control the activities o f private logging companies (chapter 
5).
(2) The risks o f World Bank loans for large-scale infra-structure development in 
opening-up new areas to logging which were previously inaccessible (chapter 6).
The World Bank-GEF project does not refer to the implications of these 
policies and projects for biodiversity conservation. It also chooses to ignore the 
political-economic context o f the project. There is, for example, no reference to 
the lack o f the rule o f  law and basic rights for ordinary citizens and especially for 
the indigenous Baka and Bakola peoples and their farmer neighbours in the forests 
where the project plans to intervene.
7.4.2 The Role of Project Actors
As Blaikie puts it, when we imagine a piece o f land somewhere in the 
tropics, we bring in normative ideas about what should be happening there (Blaikie 
1995b). A World Bank mission in search o f  a potential GEF project would 
interpret the landscape o f Cameroon with the cultural and technical means at its 
disposal. Blaikie refers to this as the 'social construction o f the landscape or the 
environment' (Blaikie 1995b). The World Bank's interpretation o f the landscape in 
Cameroon can be deduced from its choice o f actors who are charged with
15 Fonki Tobias Mbenkum, Director o f  the Environment in MINEF. Interview with the author.
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implementing the project. These are first and foremost major northern conservation 
organizations concerned with wildlife protection. In addition to cultural affinities, 
there are other advantages inherent in this choice o f partners. The World Bank 
taskmanager o f the project explains that the project supports northern NGOs so 
that they can play a role in strengthening government institutions, considered to be 
weak and lacking in capacity.14 Also, the choice o f NGO partners signals a more 
open and participatory World Bank and GEF which pleases donor governments 
who are facing pressure for more openness and transparency in international 
financial institutions from environmental groups at home. It also made donor 
governments more receptive to calls for co-financing and several bilateral aid 
agencies have become additional project participants by providing both funding 
and technical assistance (Fig. 7.2). Last, but not least, the northern conservation 
organizations already have a long-standing presence in the country, particularly 
World Wildlife Fund and Birdlife International. They greatly facilitated the critical 
stage o f  project identification because they were already working in some o f the 
areas that became components o f the GEF project.15
The choice o f northern conservation organizations indicates a 
conceptualization o f biodiversity rooted in conservation biology with a marked 
interest in 'charismatic fauna', i.e. a focus on animal (or bird) species that their 
membership and financial contributors in developed countries cherish and wish to 
see protected. Their experts in the field are mostly biologists, although there may 
be a sprinkling o f social scientists here and there.
Returning to Blaikie's classification o f conservation approaches, the 
project's focus on protected areas and its implementation by northern conservation 
organizations indicates that the 'classical approach1 to conservation is strongly 
present, even if  in a modified fonn. The government here is, to a certain degree, 
being replaced by expatriate conservation experts. The repeated reference in the 
project document to the need for the involvement of local people also reveals the 
presence o f a neo-populist element. There is little specific guidance on how local 
people might be involved, however, nor are there separate budgetary resources for 
a broadly participatory approach, and as such it is largely left to the northern NGOs
14 Claude Heimo, taskmanager for the GEF project. Interview with the author.
15 Steve Gartlan, director o f  the WWF office in Cameroon. Interview with the author.
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to decide on how to include local people in the planning and implementation o f the 
various project components.
There are four broad groups o f project actors at the interface between 
global conceptions and local priorities concerning biodiversity in Cameroon, which 
are characterized by unequal access to power (Fig. 7.3). Each group is 
heterogeneous and competition and conflict between its constituent members is a 
frequent occurrence.
The World Bank-GEF The Government of 
(other bi-lateral donors) Cameroon
(Cellule FEM, MINEF, Caisse 
Autonome d'Armortissement)
Northern Conservation 
Organizations (WWF, WCS, 
Birdlife Intl., and others)
Cameroonian civil society
organizations
Local fanners
Baka and Bakola Indigenous 
Peoples
Fig. 7 .5  G lobal and L ocal A ctors in G EF Project
Each group o f actors has its own underlying institutional/ or community
goals:
(1) World Bank-GEF (and bi-lateral donors)
Goal: Mobilize financial resources from government sources, commit these 
resources for determined development and/or environmental purposes, then 
mobilize more financial resources to further expand programmes.
(2) Government o f Cameroon
Goal: Obtain resources from abroad, preferably in grant form, in order to be able to 
carry out specific tasks. Carrying out these tasks would otherwise not be possible
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as the financial situation is constrained as a result of budget cuts caused by a severe 
foreign debt problem and structural adjustment programmes.
(3) Northern conservation organizations
Goal: Demarcate conservation areas/ national parks, carry out biological surveys, 
botanical and zoological inventories and generate interest (and funding) from the 
public in developed countries.
(4) Civil society organizations, local and indigenous peoples in Cameroon 
Goal: Obtain the right to have voice in decisions affecting the communities' 
livelihoods, work to ensure continued access to resources in areas deemed to be o f 
global significance, to protect the survival o f  the community and the preservation 
o f spiritual values.
The next section analyses how the goals or agendas o f the different 
actors are playing themselves out in Cameroon.
7.4.3 Multi-Level Discord
The project involves nine expatriate project executing agencies, many of 
them funded by bilateral aid money in addition to GEF funds. Their activities are 
spread out over at least six project sites with weak, if  any, communication between 
them (LeBlanc 1997). The World Bank's taskmanager describes the project as 
being a conflict rather than a project.16 This is one statement on the project that all 
actors participating in the project appear to agree on.
Each group o f actors has its own set o f grievances against the project.17 In 
addition to the various levels o f conflict that is pitting the three most powerful 
actors against each other (World Bank/ Government/ northern NGOs), there is 
conflict amongst the NGOs and amongst different government agencies. In the 
process, the role o f the fourth actor, Cameroonian civil society organizations and 
local people, has largely been lost. There is little indication that local farmers and
16 Claude Heimo, Taskmanager for the World Bank-GEF project. Interview with the author.
17 Information obtained by the author from representatives o f  the ’actors' in Washington and in 
Cameroon.
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indigenous peoples who are directly affected by the establishment o f protected 
areas have had much o f a say in decision-making concerning resource use options
1 fiand protected area management.
The World Bank and the local and indigenous peoples find themselves at 
opposite ends o f the spectrum with regards to . .access to power in which to pack 
their own particular knowledge claim and enroll others into their project" (Blaikie 
1995b:207). At one end o f the spectrum is the influence o f the World Bank, which 
holds the purse strings not only o f the GEF grant but represents the key to access to 
international financial assistance in general. At the other end are the local fanning 
communities and the Baka and Bakola peoples who, under present conditions, have 
few bargaining chips on the unequal playing field. The Government o f Cameroon 
does not recognize the existence o f vulnerable ethnic minorities in the country. 
There is no recognition o f the economic and social value o f the traditional farmer- 
'Pygmy'19 relationship and o f the contribution that the 'Pygmies’ are making to the 
national economy by exploiting forest resources on a sustainable basis (Sayer et al. 
1992). The Government describes the Baka and Bakola peoples as 'marginal 
populations' which must be integrated into mainstream society (Government o f 
Cameroon 1990).
With local and indigenous peoples on the margins o f project activities and 
World Bank project activities limited to short-term missions to the country, the 
actors in the field are the international NGOs and bilateral agencies executing the 
project and the Cameroonian government agencies in charge o f coordinating their 
activities. Both these groups o f actors appear to be placed in an uncomfortable 
position since they are expected to take on tasks for which they are not equipped.
Cameroonian Government Agencies:
The mandate o f the GEF is to provide grants to governments. The World 
Bank-GEF, however, has little confidence in the capacity o f Cameroonian 
government agencies to execute the project. The World Bank-GEF tries to address 
the problem by requiring, as a condition for grant effectiveness, that MINEF enter 
separate contracts for project execution with international NGOs and institutions
18 Interviews with Cameroonian NGOs in 1997 and 1998.
19 The term 'Pygmy' is used in quotation marks because the Baka and Bakola people feel that the 
term is pejorative and prefer to be called by their proper ethnic names.
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(WWF, WCS, Birdlife International, Kew Gardens, the Dutch forestry research 
institute Tropenbos) as well as with the German, Dutch and French technical 
assistance agencies (World Bank 1995g:31).
A special project unit, 'cellule nationale de coordination', is established 
within the Department o f  Wildlife and Protected Areas in MINEF. The 'cellule' is 
charged with coordinating the project activities o f the international organizations. 
The stated goal o f the GEF project is to make use of the international organizations 
to strengthen local institutions in order to allow them, over time, to play a larger 
role in project management and execution (World Bank 1995g:4). The question o f 
how the imposition o f a large group o f expatriate institutions on MINEF may add 
to a sense of'country ownership' o f the project is not being considered.
The task o f  coordination was especially difficult because o f the lack o f a 
comprehensive strategy for biodiversity conservation, which, according to 
MINEF's Director for the Environment, led the expatriate institutions to believe 
that they could act independently.20
The GEF project document recognizes that MINEF is seriously 
underfunded, but despite the difficult situation, claims that MINEF is giving top 
priority to the GEF project (World Bank 1995:2). The coordinator and the head of 
the 'cellule' in MINEF emphasized in statements to a project evaluator that 
government salaries had been cut by 72% since the early 1990s and that there were 
few incentives for staff to take on the GEF task (LeBlanc 1997:9). Having few 
resources at his disposal and lacking the ability to hire his own staff, the 
coordinator felt overtaxed with the task o f coordinating the activities o f  a diverse 
group o f foreign actors, who had at their disposal material resources, information 
and specialized expertise, which Cameroonian government agencies could not 
match.21
The 'cellule' also faced resentment from other sections o f  MINEF because 
o f the perception that it had certain privileges, the most noted one o f which is that 
it has the use o f a vehicle paid for by the project. This illustrates the difficulties 
under which MINEF operates. The Forestry Department, which is located in 
MINEF and is charged with controlling the logging companies, has no vehicles at 
its disposal for independent inspection o f logging sites. According to the Director
20 Fonki Tobias Mbenkum. Director o f Environment, MINEF. Interview with the author.
21 Ibid.
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of MINEF's Environment Department, the World Bank had declared government 
vehicles to be a liability and requested, as part o f a structural adjustment 
programme in the late 1980s, that all vehicles be auctioned off.22
An additional handicap for the coordinator o f the 'cellule' has been his 
difficulty in obtaining timely payments from the project's state banker, the Caisse 
Autonome d'Annortissement. This has further reduced the authority o f the 'cellule' 
in coordinating the activities o f the international organizations which were able to 
tap their own independent sources o f  funding instead o f having to rely on the 
coordination unit.
International Conservation Organizations:
The experience o f some o f the international conservation organizations 
illustrates how they, each in its own way, feel hamstrung by the World Bank-GEF, 
which they feel is too rigid in its approach, and by the Cameroonian government 
agencies which are considered to be incapable and even 'pathetic'.23 Steve Gartlan, 
the Director o f WWF-Cameroon who has several decades o f experience in working 
on enviromnental protection in Cameroon, states that the project was flawed from 
the very beginning, because it represents a relatively small amount o f funding 
which is spread out far too thinly. He cites the example o f the Lobeke region, an 
area o f about 4,500 square kilometers, for which the project makes available $
200,000 per year.
Birdlife International perceives the World Bank-GEF project as obstructing 
community participation. Birdlife requested funding from the GEF project to 
finance a broad-based participation exercise with local people in the Mount Kilum- 
Ijim and the Mount Koupe project areas, where it operates. The request was turned 
down by the World Bank's taskmanager for the project.24
The Botanic Garden in Limbe, which is the project component supported 
by the Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew, is equally frustrated with the World Bank- 
GEF project. One o f  the tasks for the Botanic Garden in Limbe was to collate all 
the information coming from the different GEF project components in order to
2' Ibid'Steve Gartlan, Director WWF Cameroon, Interview with the author.
24 Robert Lake, Birdlife International. Information provided to the author.
213
create a faunal and floristic baseline. But the GEF project did not provide the 
necessary funding for the activity. 25
The political obstacles to involving local communities in the establishment 
of protected areas became especially evident in the Lobeke region. Before final 
approval o f the GEF project, US AID provided financial support for initial studies 
for the protection o f the Lobeke region. The beneficiary o f the funding was the 
New York-based Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), which had sent a team of 
biologists and anthropologists into the field. Bryan Curran, who led the 
anthropological work, felt strongly that the borders o f the reserve would have to be 
changed if  community participation were to be meaningful. He had found that local 
people were not opposed to the reserve as long as they could continue to have 
access to their dry season fishing grounds within the reserve. The government 
agencies, however, did not authorise a change in the boundaries o f  the area to 
accommodate the needs o f  local communities. Curran, whose position was based 
on his personal sense o f responsibility and not on official WCS policy, made 
further enemies when he informed local people about the possibilities o f 
establishing a community forest under the new Forestry Code and about the 
possibilities o f revenue-sharing with sport-hunting and logging companies. Finally, 
his denunciation o f the connivance o f senior government officials in poaching 
operations in the region led to the expulsion o f WCS from southeastern Cameroon 
at the end o f 1995.26 Within days the gap created by WCS's departure was filled 
by its long-standing competitor, WWF.
A project evaluation report commissioned by the GEF Council as part o f its 
overall GEF evaluation activities (LeBlanc 1997), confirms many o f  the findings 
obtained in interviews with different project actors. The report, the main goal o f 
which was to establish the lessons being learned from the GEF pilot phase, 
emphasizes that few lessons are emerging from the Cameroon project:
"Substantive issues such as participation appear in project documents, but these 
issues seem to have become stale after their necessary passage in the project 
proposals. Concepts that have come o f age over recent years such as capacity 
development for the environment, or the most central issue o f all which is
25 Terry Sunderland, Adviser to Limbe Botanical Gardens. Information provided to the author.
26 Bryan Curran, Anthropologist with WCS. Interview with author.The account provided by Curran 
was confirmed by SamuelNguiffo, Director o f  the Center for Environment and Development in 
Yaounde.
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sustainability o f  the impact, are hardly mentioned.... In project operations terms, 
there is no framework for participation, for community development, for conflict 
resolution, nor for participatory monitoring, etc. No one in the field in pushing for 
such a framework." (LeBlanc 1997:6-7).
7.4.4 Policy Aspects of Project Implementation
Integrating conservation and development activities is a complex task and 
still more difficult in a socio-economic environment o f substantial decline. Could 
adherence to the World Bank's policy guidelines have facilitated the task and led to 
perhaps a more pragmatic and modest project design, more broadly supported 
within the country than the present highly disparate efforts led by uncoordinated 
international organizations?
This section refers briefly to the policy guidelines on environmental 
assessment (OD 4.01) and on the disclosure o f operational information (BP 17.50) 
followed by a more detailed analysis o f the guidelines on Indigenous Peoples (OD 
4.20).
Environmental Assessment (OD 4.011
World Bank staff detennined that the GEF project for Cameroon did not 
require a full environmental assessment because o f the perceived environmentally 
beneficial nature o f the project. However, since the project would involve work in 
remote biodiversity-rich areas, the project was classified as a 'Category B' project, 
i.e. a project which requires a less stringent environmental analysis than the full 
environmental impact assessment required for 'Category A projects'. A central 
feature o f the operational policy is that:
"The Bank expects the borrower27 to take the views o f affected groups 
and local NGOs fully into account in project design and 
implementation, and in particular in the design o f the EAs. This process 
is important to understand the nature and extent o f any social or 
environmental impact and the acceptability o f proposed mitigatory 
measures, particularly to affected groups." (Shihata 1994:157).
The Operational Directive continues by spelling out that meaningful 
consultations require the disclosure o f information on the project before the
27 In the case o f  GEF projects, this should read grantee and not borrower.
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consultations take place. Once the EA report has been completed, it is to be made 
available at a public place where it is accessible to affected groups and local NGOs 
for their review and comment.
The EA for the World Bank-GEF project in Cameroon did not follow these 
guidelines. The EA does not refer to consultations and the continuous monitoring 
and evaluation process, which it recommends and which might have provided 
room for a consultations with affected groups, was not put in place.
Disclosure o f Information (BP 17.50)
The Bank Procedures on Disclosure o f Operational Information and its 
Annex A, which refers specifically to GEF projects, commit the Bank to make full 
information promptly available. It lists the different types o f project documents and 
where and when they are made publicly available. Many project documents are at 
some point in the project cycle made publicly available at the PIC (Project 
Information Center) located at World Bank headquarters in Washington,D.C..
There is no explicit requirement to ensure that the project documents are made 
available, let alone actively disseminated, in languages that are locally understood 
in the project countries.
The green-cover World Bank-GEF document was not translated into 
French. The more limited environmental analysis is a French language document. 
Were these documents available to affected people and local NGOs in Cameroon? 
Technically, the answer may be yes, because the Government agencies and some 
o f the international organizations must have had access to copies. The problem is 
that local NGOs and much less affected people would not have known about the 
existence o f these documents.28
Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20)
The principal goal o f OD 4.20 is to ensure that indigenous peoples do not 
suffer adverse effects during the development process (in this case biodiversity 
protection process) and that they receive culturally compatible social and economic 
benefits. The goal is to be achieved by developing an indigenous peoples plan
28 Information provided to the author by numerous local NGOsand academic sources in 
Cameroon.
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which is based on the informed participation o f the indigenous peoples themselves 
(Shihata 1993:237).
Harvey emphasizes the need to put the relation o f man to nature in history 
and quoting the work o f Cronon cites the example o f how the New England 
environment ".. .was the product o f more than 10,000 years o f  Indian occupation 
and forest use (promoting, through burning the forest edge, conditions which tend 
to be so species diverse) and was misread by the settlers as pristine, virginal, rich 
and underutilized by indigenous peoples" (Harvey 1996:184, Cronon 1993). 
Implementation o f the OD on Indigenous Peoples could prevent a 17th century 
misreading o f a geographic place being repeated in the late 20th century on another 
continent. The OD gives the indigenous peoples themselves a voice in decisions 
affecting them.
At present, changes in the forest over which indigenous peoples have no 
control make it increasingly difficult for them to sustain a semi-nomadic and 
flexible indigenous mode o f production. The argument being made here is not that 
indigenous peoples have an innate conservation ethic but that ecological 
transfonnation imposed from outside has the potential to destroy indigenous ways 
of production without replacing them with viable alternatives.
What impact does OD 4.20 have on the Biodiversity Conservation and 
Management project for Cameroon? The EA states that strict protection o f the 
reserves in south-eastern Cameroon could be harmful to an estimated 15,000 Baka 
who depend on access to the forest for their survival and that in such a case "Ils 
devront changer leur mode de vie ou s'exiler" (Government o f Cameroon 1993:11). 
The idea that biodiversity conservation may require an ecological transformation 
o f such magnitude that indigenous peoples are deprived o f the ecological basis for 
their particular way o f  life, does not have a scientific basis. There is growing 
recognition that biodiversity and cultural diversity are linked in a two-way fashion 
and that both people and their habitats are part o f a reciprocal system (Vansina 
1990). Bailey states that biodiversity exists in central Africa today, not despite 
human habitation, but because o f it (Bailey 1996:325).
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While the EA shows no awareness o f the requirements o f OD 4.20, the 
green cover project document does not even refer to Cameroon's indigenous 
peoples although their presence in several o f  the areas to be protected under the 
GEF project is well documented, including by Bank staff.
World Bank sociologist Mary Dyson warned that several o f the proposed 
national parks to be funded with the GEF grant were known to be the home o f 
'Pygmy' populations who are socially and politically disadvantaged vis-a-vis the 
Bantu population. She states that "The Project will be an important test for the 
Operational Directive, which in such cases requires an indigenous peoples' plan 
that should take into account both pygmies and traditional forest farmers" (Dyson 
1992: 214).
The operational directive on indigenous peoples (OD 4.20) defines 
'indigenous peoples' as social groups "...w ith  a social and cultural identity distinct 
from the dominant society that makes them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in 
the development process."(Shihata 1993:234). This definition applies to the Baka 
and Bakola peoples as do a list o f specific characteristics o f indigenous peoples 
which OD 4.20 spells out. These include indigenous peoples' close attachment to 
ancestral homelands and to the natural resources in these areas, their self- 
identification as a distinct group, their indigenous language, etc.
As Dyson puts it, an indigenous peoples’ plan must also take into account 
the traditional forest fanners, with whom the Baka and Bakola have developed 
exchange relations over long periods o f time. Anthropological studies describe the 
'Pygmy'-farmer relationship as vital to both groups' economic, social and 
psychological well-being and that programmes exclusively aimed at 'Pygmies' 
might disrupt social and economic networks that reduce risk and uncertainty 
(Bailey, Bahuchet, Hewlett 1990). According to local accounts, the 
interdependency is increasingly being eroded as logging companies and poachers 
advance into 'Pygmy' forests and deprive them o f the essential goods that make 
them a valued trading partner for the farmers, such as cooking oil and medicines 
made from various components o f the Moabi tree (Ballionella toxisperma) and
29bushmeat. As a result the 'Pygmies' are increasingly ill-treated by the Bantu
29 Information gathered by the author in Baka areas in May 1997.
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farmers, a situation which gives added urgency to integrate both groups in an 
indigenous peoples plan that OD 4.20 calls for.
A 1997 report to the then ODA found that stakeholders in remote parts of 
south and east Cameroon have no influence on decisions regarding forest resources 
and that small Bantu communities and Baka and Bakola ’Pygmies' are completely 
excluded (Burnham & Sharpe 1997).
Baka W om en and C hildren  in south-eastern  Forest (K . Ilorta )
Fig. 7.6 Baka Women and Children in south-eastern forest
7.5 O rganization Theory Meets Praxis
The GEF has the mandate and the funding from its shareholders to protect 
biodiversity. Since the World Bank is the GEF Implementing Agency for the 
Cameroon biodiversity protection project, World Bank policies apply to the 
project. Over the years the World Bank has adopted a series o f policies such as the 
ones referred to above, which provide specific and, at least in theory, mandatory 
guidance to its staff to carry out this mandate. How can theories o f organization 
help explain the problems encountered in the mini-laboratory o f  the Biodiversity 
Protection and Management project for Cameroon? Analysing an individual 
project does not yield results that are automatically applicable to other similar
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projects but it can provide insights on why institutions are failing to live up to their 
publicly stated commitments and thereby perhaps throw some light on Harvey's 
question about the kind o f power structure which is able to arbitrate between global 
and local geographic scales.
The political science perspective can provide an important contribution to 
the understanding o f international organizations. The 'realist' approach in political 
science holds that international organizations are effective only to the extent that 
they serve the interests o f the most powerful states (Dillon et al. 1991). Clearly, the 
environment and biodiversity were put on the agenda o f the W orld Bank and the 
GEF was created as the result o f  the concerns expressed by the institutions largest 
donor member states (chapter 4). While a more detailed analysis o f the 
complicated nature o f the institution's relationship with its heterogeneous state 
membership follows in a later chapter (chapter 9), the underlying power 
relationships are clearly important in determining the overall direction o f the policy 
debate and the availability o f  and access to financial resources. But the political 
science perspective, including its realist theory, has limited explanatory power in 
the analysis o f the organizations' behaviour and performance within the framework 
of its basic commitments.
Organizations, in this case the World Bank and the GEF, are political 
entities in their own right and not simply an instrument in the hands o f its 
shareholders (Ascher 1983, Williams 1997). The conceptual framework provided 
by the open system perspective o f organization theory, which examines how 
organizations interact with their environment, has much to offer in explaining why 
institutions behave in a certain way (LePestre 1986). International institutions 
cannot simply be assumed to be acting on behalf o f the 'public interest'. The public 
choice approach, which raises the possibility that international organizations 
operate in their own interests, seeks to explain the politics and internal dynamics 
within international organizations (Dillon et al. 1991).
According to these theories, international organizations have two broad 
categories o f goals. The first category consists o f organizational goals related to the 
organizations' own survival and expansion, which includes the need to have control 
over resources and autonomy in decision-making. The second category o f goals 
relates to the purpose and policy objectives o f the organization and is referred to as 
value allocation (Le Pestre 1986). Theory o f  organization, especially the public
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choice approach, holds that organizational goals take precedence over value 
allocation (Dillon et. al 1991, LePestre 1986).
When applied to the World Bank and the GEF, this broad conceptual 
framework has global reach and its impact is felt at the local geographic scale as in 
the case o f the Biodiversity Protection and Management Project for Cameroon.
The following section analyses the relevance o f the theory for this project.
7.5.1 Control over Resources
Organizations interact with their environment. When politically active 
constituencies in major donor countries began expressing concern about 
environmental degradation in developing countries, particularly in tropical 
rainforest areas, the World Bank developed a pro-active strategy by adopting the 
environmental agenda as its own and positioning itself as a possible manager for 
financial resources intended for global environmental projects (Chapter 4). World 
Bank expansion into new areas became imperative because it was linked to access 
to resources. Northern governments were increasingly under pressure to be 
perceived as doing something about global environmental problems. They could 
have decided to address the problem by focusing on bilateral cooperation with 
developing countries, by working with United Nations agencies or by creating a 
new institution. Any o f these solutions would have had the potential to divert 
financial resources away from the World Bank and to diminish its relevance in the 
international development/environment debate which was growing in importance 
just prior to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro.
At the initiative o f developed country governments, the GEF was 
successful in positioning itself prior to the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development as the most effective channel for new funding 
dedicated to global environmental issues (Chapter 4). Once additional financial 
resources are secured, the problem becomes to find 'bankable' projects in which to 
invest them.
The microcosm o f the Biodiversity and Management Project for Cameroon 
is an example o f how organizational goals supersede value allocation. It confirms 
the well-documented pressure on the GEF and on the World Bank, its parent
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organization, the World Bank, to 'move money’ (Wapenhans 1992, Global 
Environment Facility 1994a, Lancaster 1997). A central force behind this 'lending 
imperative' is that failure to obligate available funds is likely to reduce the amount 
of government contributions to the institutions in the next replenishment period. 
The following indications show that this pressure was indeed at work in the 
preparation and implementation o f the World Bank/GEF project for Cameroon:
* Lack o f socio-political considerations
No analysis of the socio-political constraints on the feasibility o f the 
Biodiversity Conservation and Management project was carried o u t.30 Such an 
analysis would have shown that the question o f land tenure, which a 1997 report to 
ODA describes as the 'real powder keg' (Burnham & Sharpe 1997), bears a strong 
influence on prospects for biodiversity conservation. Under existing Cameroonian 
law, drawn from French colonial law, customary rights in forest resources are not 
recognized. This leaves the Baka and Bakola peoples without the right to their 
traditional forest lands since all forests belong exclusively to the state and 
facilitates the granting o f logging concessions by the higher echelons o f 
government, often without even the knowledge of the Forestry Department in 
MINEF (Burnham & Sharpe 1997). This type o f analysis would not have been 
welcome by the government as the project could have been blocked from going 
forward.
* Arbitrary amount o f financing
The project started off as a $ 25 million grant attached to a $ 30 million 
loan. There was little concept o f how either the grant or the loan were going to be 
used or what the absorptive capacity o f  the Cameroonian government agencies 
was. As a result o f political pressure,31 the GEF-funding was later reduced to $ 6 
million with no noticeable change in stated project goals.
30 The World Bank's Articles o f  Agreement preclude the Bank from interfering in the political 
affairs o f any member. But the interpretation by the Bank's legal counsel allows for political factors 
to influence Bank decisions when they are deemed to have direct and obvious effects on the work 
o f the Bank (Lancaster 1997).
31 It is relatively rare that political pressure can be brought to bear on individual projects, because 
the Executive Directors to the World Bank do not have the staff or resources for detailed 
supervision o f projects (Chapter 4).
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* Fragmentation o f Responsibility
There was little consultation with biodiversity experts and sociologists both 
inside and outside o f the World Bank, who would have argued that biodiversity 
conservation problems require less capital-intensive investments but long-term 
solutions built on a reflection o f local needs and perceptions and human 
relationships among the interested parties (McNeely 1993, Davis (Ed) 1993). The 
Bank environmental and social experts were on the sidelines, involved in 
numerous other tasks such as preparing conferences on environmental topics such 
as the value o f indigenous knowledge. The disconnection between the different 
sections in the bureaucracy is documented in the previous chapters on World Bank 
policy recommendations and investments in infrastructure as well. The causes o f 
the lack o f connection will be further analysed in the final chapter (chapter 9).
* Lack o f Institutional Assistance for Staff
Although it is the largest GEF Implementing Agency, the World Bank has 
neither hired staff nor provided specific training to existing staff in this new area o f 
work. The operational staff responsible for the Biodiversity Conservation and 
Management project had little institutional assistance in taking up the new issues, 
which lay outside their area o f expertise.
* Strategic Alliances
Organizational theory hypothesizes that entering coalitions helps control 
competitors and expand resources. The establishment o f  the GEF itself is a good 
example o f this organizational strategy in which the World Bank officially entered 
as an equal member o f a tri-partite coalition, but in which it ultimately is the 
dominating actor (Chapter 4). In the context o f the Biodiversity Protection and 
Conservation project for Cameroon, the World Bank-GEF project establishes 
partnerships with some o f  the leading conservation organizations in the world, 
which helps to increase its legitimacy in the field of biodiversity and its 
management and control o f the largest single source o f funding for this purpose.
7.5,2 Value Allocation
The previous section shows how organizational goals are the driving force 
behind the Biodiversity Protection and Management project for Cameroon. The
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purpose o f the project, i.e. the protection o f biodiversity, including the 
empowerment o f local communities and o f indigenous peoples, as enshrined in 
World Bank operational directives, appears to be more o f a secondary 
consideration. In view o f the political sensitivity of'local empowerment', the GEF 
project might have focused on less controversial aspects, which the institutions 
themselves perceive to be essential to project success such as institution building 
and ensuring the long-term financial viability o f the project once GEF resources 
are no longer available. Long-term financial viability is listed as a potential project 
risk, but is not addressed by the project. An important question to ask is how the 
project approaches institution building since this is a topic World Bank research 
emphasizes as being critical to the long-term viability o f its projects (Gray et al. 
1990).
The GEF project addresses institution-building by setting up 
a semi-autonomous unit within MINEF and relying for project execution almost 
entirely on international conservation organizations, whose presence and expertise 
is expected to promote an institution-building process in Cameroon. International 
conservation organizations are usually staffed by conservation biologists and 
occasionally by social scientists. Their expertise and mandate do not necessarily 
include institution-building. The extensive use o f expatriate experts by itself does 
not appear to be conducive to strengthening local capacity.
On the other hand, the establishment o f semi-autonomous units, such as the 
'cellule de coordination' in MINEF, which often exist in an uncomfortable parallel 
with other technical branches o f government, does not reflect a strategic approach 
to institution-building and institutional development may actually be weakened as 
a result (Duncan 1997).
The project's approach to institution-building as well as its lack o f 
adherence to World Bank operational directives discussed in previous sections are 
examples o f weak value allocation. W hile there is conflict amongst the different 
project actors, most, if  not all o f them, including the World Bank task-manager, 
agree that the project is accomplishing little. Although the role o f individuals can 
be very important, the problems at hand have less to do with the work of 
individuals than with the overall institutional forces at work. These include the lack 
o f supervision and incentives for staff to adhere to the organizations' operational 
directives. One internal World Bank survey found:
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"Unfortunately, we were told that no incentives exist in the Bank for 
good supervision— that the incentives stopped once a project was taken 
to the Board. Responsibility for project outcomes seems to be very 
weak" (Gray et al. 1990:26).
Returning to the question about the characteristics o f political power 
structure capable o f arbitrating between global and local geographic scales (Harvey 
1996), the preceding analysis indicates that organizational structures are needed 
which put value allocation first and whose control over resources depends on the 
degree to which they meet the purpose for which they were established. Such 
organizational structures would be more likely to create the space for negotiation, 
which Blaikie calls for (Blaikie 1995), in which the interests o f the various actors, 
including those o f the most powerless groups, such as Cameroon's Baka and 
Bakola peoples, are taken into account.
7.6 Sum m ary
The goals o f the Biodiversity Conservation and Management project are 
to consolidate and upgrade the management o f protected areas in Cameroon. The 
World Bank, which serves as the Implementing Agency for this GEF project, 
emphasizes a 'neo-populist' approach, i.e. the inclusion o f rural populations in 
biodiversity conservation in its project documents. In practice, the nine different 
project components are being executed by a diverse group o f international 
conservation organizations and by bi-lateral aid agencies, which are bringing their 
own co-financing to the project. A special unit in Cameroon's M inistry for the 
Environment and Forests (MINEF) was established to coordinate GEF project 
activities in the country but in the absence o f a comprehensive biodiversity 
conservation strategy, the project's many components and foreign experts have 
rendered this task too complex. As a result, the project is perceived to consist o f 
disconnected activities in which each actor acts independently.
Although the World Bank's Operational Directives (OD) apply to GEF 
projects when the World Bank is the Implementing Agency, the project pays little 
attention to them. An example is OD 4.20, which obliges the World Bank to 
consult with indigenous peoples and ensure that they do not suffer adverse effects 
as a result o f World Bank/GEF activities. There is no systematic involvement o f
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local communities affected by the project and Cameroon's indigenous forest 
dwellers, the Baka and Bakola peoples, are not mentioned in the W orld Bank/GEF 
project document. The socio-political conditions in the country which are driving 
deforestation and the loss o f biodiversity are not analysed.
The Biodiversity Conservation and Management project for Cameroon is 
an example o f an activity driven by the organizational goals o f  an institution. 
Having expanded into the area o f the 'global environment', both the GEF and the 
World Bank are under pressure to show 'results' by making funding commitments 
for projects. In response to the question on the characteristics o f political power 
structures which can mediate between global and local levels, the analysis 
presented in this chapter suggests that organizational structures which put value 
allocation first and whose control o f resources depends on the degree to which they 
meet the goals for which they were established, can provide part o f  the answer. 
Such organizational structures would also be more likely to create the space for 
negotiation (Blaikie 1995) in which plural views, including the ones o f the 
politically weakest groups, contribute to the social construction o f landscape.
The next chapter contrasts the findings o f the Cameroon case example o f 
this and the two previous chapters with the World Bank’s and GEF’s own 
evaluation reports. This helps mitigate the methodological risk o f having focused 
on a single country and may help indicate whether the place-specific findings in 
Cameroon form part o f more systemic patterns o f institutional behaviour.
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CHAPTER 8
THE INSTITUTIONS' OWN EVALUATION EFFORTS: 
PROVIDING CONTEXT FOR PLACE-SPECIFIC FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters have examined the degree to which the World 
Bank and the GEF adhere to their own biodiversity-related policy statements and 
mandatory operational guidelines in three distinct types o f programmes which they 
finance in Cameroon. This chapter briefly reviews the central findings from the 
case study material concerning the three programme areas (1) economic policy­
making (2) infrastructure development and (3) the GEF-financed biodiversity 
project. The World Bank is in charge o f preparing and implementing all three 
projects, although the latter is a GEF project, i.e. it is funded by a GEF grant and 
not by a World Bank loan.
Limiting the case study material to one single country carries methodological 
risks. While these risks cannot be completely eliminated, the World Bank's and the 
GEF's own evaluation and quality perfonnance reports provide a broader context 
for the Cameroon case examples and indicate whether or not the findings form part 
o f larger institutional trends. The context o f the institutions’ own evaluation reports 
helps to relate the place-specific results to a more systemic pattern o f internal 
institutional dynamics. This chapter provides an overview o f several public and 
internal World Bank evaluation reports as well as an overview o f  two GEF- 
commissioned evaluations, which are relevant to how the institutions comply with 
their own policy mandates. It then relates the case material findings to the broader 
institutional patterns revealed in the institutions' own assessments.
8.2 Overview of Case Study Material
There are few systematic and independent assessments o f  the environmental 
consequences o f World Bank/ GEF financed programmes or o f the institutions' 
compliance with their own environmental policy mandates. The lack o f case 
studies representing all regions and sectors makes it difficult to analyse to what 
degree the institutional changes at the policy level (e.g. commitments to protecting 
biodiversity and the participation o f  local people) have had concrete impacts in the
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investments made by the institutions. So far the evidence points to very partial 
institutional change which is inherently uneven and often contradictory (Fox & 
Brown 1998). The case material examined in detail in the previous three chapters, 
which is summarized below, bears this out.
8.2.1 Policy-Based Operations
The World Bank's 'policy dialogue' with its client governments takes two main 
shapes (chapter 5). The broad World Bank blueprint for a country's development is 
the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), a document which, according to World 
Bank procedures, is to be prepared in a participatory manner with the government. 
The other part o f the dialogue is reflected in structural or sectoral adjustment loans, 
which, as a matter o f principle, require a borrowing government to adopt a set o f 
macro-economic policy reforms aimed at opening up a country's economy to 
international trade and investment. In the case o f Cameroon, the structural 
adjustment loans included conditionalities to promote reforms in the country's 
forestry policy. This policy and its implementation are perhaps the most critical 
factor in biodiversity conservation in Cameroon.
World Bank publications emphasize that the CAS, the first element o f 
policy dialogue, is the vehicle through which the Bank, in dialogue with the 
governments, works to ensure that biodiversity concerns are taken into account in 
economy-wide policies and development programmes. The expected outcome is to 
make sectors such as agriculture, forestry, tourism, energy and infrastructure more 
biodiversity-friendly (World Bank 1995a:25). The World Bank's primary 
environmental concern in Cameroon is the protection o f the country's natural 
forests, which are considered to be key habitats for globally threatened biodiversity 
(World Bank 1995d). The biodiversity o f Cameroon's forests is at the centre o f 
both the World Bank's and the GEF's environmental considerations in the country.
How did the CAS for Cameroon reflect these concerns and how are they 
integrated in the development strategy that it proposes?
The CAS is mostly a crisis narrative about Cameroon's serious debt 
problem. It emphasizes activities related to extracting and exporting primary 
commodities as the main way out o f the crisis. It is focused on macro-economic 
policy reforms to help Cameroon restructure its economy "...to  remain competitive 
in a rapidly changing world" (World Bank 1996h:13). The CAS does not mention
228
that Cameroon's main export commodity, aside from oil, is tropical timber from 
uncontrolled exploitation of the country's tropical rain forest, a sector which is 
riddled with corruption.
The CAS does make reference to biodiversity and the need for sustainable 
management o f the country's forests but these areas are relegated to other Bank 
programmes such as a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) and the GEF- 
financed biodiversity project. This 'ghetto isation' o f the environment/ biodiversity 
away from the powerful macro-economic terrain (i.e. benefiting from large-scale 
financial backing) to the relatively weak areas o f the Bank's environmental and 
social expertise areas, which have no autonomous budgets, is a tell-tale sign o f the 
distance between the domain o f real financial decision-making and the institution's 
environmental policy commitments. World Bank research emphasizes t h a t . t h e  
conservation o f biodiversity depends in large measure on how well policies and 
programmes in the economic sectors manage to address biodiversity" (World Bank 
1995a:I). There appears, however, to be no mechanism which translates the 
findings o f the institution's research into practical considerations at the operational 
level.
An additional element to be considered is the secrecy surrounding the CAS. 
Despite its key importance as a multi-year development plan, the CAS is a 
confidential document until after it has been adopted by the Bank, i.e. until when 
public debate can no longer influence the outcome. This is not easily reconcilable 
with the Bank's policy statements on the need for broad-based public participation 
as the underpinning for sustainable development processes, including 
environmental and biodiversity protection. A further indication o f  the restrictive 
nature o f the CAS for Cameroon is that it has not been officially translated into 
French, the country's main European language. Only an unofficial translation was 
done in order to facilitate the dialogue with the government.
The second element o f policy dialogue concerns the forest policy 
conditionalities that have been part o f successive World Bank structural adjustment 
loans beginning in the late 1980s. Given the fact that the forest sector in Cameroon 
is riddled with corruption, Bank efforts have focused on increasing transparency in 
the sector with the goal o f increasing government revenue from industrial logging 
operations which are expanding across most o f the country's forest areas.
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A more transparent allocation o f forest concessions through 
competitive bidding, lengthening o f the concession periods and a simplified 
forestry tax system are the comer stones o f the reform efforts. In addition, the 
World Bank promoted a provision in Cameroon's 1994 Forestry Code which 
allows for the establishment o f community forests. This provision created a legal 
basis for granting communities stewardship over their traditional lands and 
empowering them to confront loggers and poachers in their forests.
The ideas contained in the new Forestry Code represent a substantial 
improvement over the status quo o f forestry practices in Cameroon but they do not 
go as far as unambiguously advancing social and environmental objectives. They 
fall short o f the World Bank’s goal o f creating a framework for biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable forest management with local participation (World 
Bank 1994b). Competitive bidding is believed to help reflect the value o f timber in 
concession areas but it cannot ensure the production o f non-market, public or 
collective benefits, such as biodiversity and watershed protection and erosion 
control benefits. The Forestry Code’s provision for community forests on the other 
hand, requires detailed inventories and officially certified management plans which 
in most cases make it too cumbersome and costly for local communities to apply 
for community forests on their traditional lands. The World Bank's offer o f 
opening up the bidding process for concession areas to local communities 
represents a misreading o f power relationships in Cameroon, where local 
communities usually do not have the resources to compete with transnational 
logging companies.
In practice, Cameroon's new forestry code is not being implemented since 
the corruption in the forest sector is an important source o f  income for politicians 
and members o f the elite. This has not kept the World Bank from making new 
loans to the government and reiterating its requests for reforms in the forestry 
sector (World Bank 1998b).
Notwithstanding the lack o f consistency between the Bank's environmental 
policy statements and its development planning and lending for policy reforms in a 
client country, the CAS and the Bank's efforts to reform Cameroon's Forest Policy 
reveal a measure o f porosity to new ideas and the potential for more far-reaching 
change. They make reference to the need for governance reforms to address 
pervasive corruption. They refer to the importance o f social and environmental
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issues. The next step would be to relate these types o f issues to their own macro- 
economic and sectoral reform proposals. This might reveal several inherent 
contradictions, such as an intent to fight corruption while providing rapidly 
disbursing structural adjustment loans with few possibilities o f checking where the 
money goes, or demanding that borrower governments protect their country's 
forests at the same time as calling for an increase o f exports which leads to the 
conversion of forest lands through agricultural expansion or logging. 
Acknowledgement o f the underlying contradictions may open the way to more 
open strategies which are not singularly focused on macro-economic equilibria,
8.2.2 Infrastructure Development
The infrastructure development area considers two distinct projects: a 
Transport Sector loan, which was approved in 1996; and a planned oil pipeline 
traversing Cameroon from north to south, which as o f this writing (May 1999), is 
in the advanced stages o f preparation (chapter 6).
The Transport Sector loan included plans for the rehabilitation and up­
grading o f several road segments in ecologically sensitive rain forest areas 
inhabited by semi-nomadic Baka people. According to Bank operational policies, 
especially OD 4.01 and OD 4.20, both a full environmental impact assessment and 
an indigenous peoples’ plan are required for this type of investment. One o f  the 
World Bank's regional sister banks, the African Development Bank, had refused 
financing for one o f these road segments in 1993. It based its decision on the 
findings o f an environmental assessment which had concluded that rehabilitating 
this particular road in Cameroon's south-eastern forests would cause irreversible 
environmental and social impacts as a result o f vastly increased logging.
World Bank staff in the Infrastructure Operations Division prepared the 
Cameroon Transport Sector loan without taking the Bank's applicable and 
mandatory policy guidelines into account. An environmental assessment was not 
carried out and the existence o f Baka people, a vulnerable minority in one o f  the 
project areas, was not acknowledged. Despite these serious shortcomings, Bank 
environmental experts from the Africa Technical Department signed-off on the 
project. These experts, however, were given too little time and too little 
information to assess the possible enviromnental implications o f  the project by the 
operational department, the Infrastructure Operations Division. Once made aware
231
of the situation by outside groups, Bank environmental staff acknowledged that 
their sign-off on the project had occurred under time pressure and lack of specific 
project information. They agreed that World Bank mandatory policy guidelines 
had been violated, especially the ones on Enviromnental Assessment and 
Indigenous Peoples.
The planned Chad-Cameroon oil & pipeline project is one o f the largest 
infrastructure projects to be built in Africa. Starting at the oil fields in southern 
Chad, the 1,100 kilometer-long oil pipeline will traverse Cameroon from the north 
to the Atlantic coast. Three o f the world's largest oil companies, Exxon, Shell and 
ELF, are promoting this project and have repeatedly stated that the project will not 
go ahead without World Bank co-financing. World Bank participation serves as 
risk insurance for the oil companies. Any government in power in this politically 
volatile region will have to be on good terms with the World Bank if  it wishes 
access to both public and private international financing.
The project is billed as a model for cooperation between the private sector 
and the world's leading development agency. World Bank participation in the 
project means that application o f its enviromnental policies is mandatory.
Unlike the Transport Sector loan which was very much out o f the public 
eye until it reached the project approval stage, the Chad-Cameroon project has 
received early attention from human rights, development and environmental 
organisations in Northern as well as Southern countries. The reason for this can in 
part be traced to the media attention on the Ogoniland situation in neighboring 
Nigeria, where oil exploitation has severely impoverished local people by 
destroying their water sources and fields. Ogoniland galvanised international 
public opinion when the most prominent Ogoni leader, Ken Saro Wiwa, and 
several o f his colleagues were publicly hanged.
In order to obtain World Bank co-financing, the Oil Consortium 
commissioned an extensive environmental assessment which includes symbolic 
gestures towards complying with World Bank environmental guidelines. There 
were pro-forma meetings with non-govemmental-organisations and groups o f local 
people, including the Bakola people. The Bakola inhabit Cameroon's southern rain 
forest which the pipeline will traverse. However, as field research shows, local 
people and non-governmental organisations received little or no information on the 
possible environmental impacts o f the project, which include possible oil spills,
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deforestation and the spread o f diseases, including higher rates o f malaria and 
substantial increases in AIDS infections. The oil companies largely limited 
themselves to trying to recruit non-governmental organisations as sub-contractors 
and to inform local people that they would lose some fields and trees. The oil 
companies announced that there would be compensation for the assets being lost. 
However, the rates o f compensation were not discussed with the villagers.
Given the controversial nature o f the project, non-govemmental 
organisations in Germany and the Netherlands requested that their governments 
carry out an independent evaluation o f the quality o f the multi-volume 
environmental assessment. The conclusion o f both studies was that the 
environmental assessment presented by the oil consortium was o f poor quality and 
inadequate given the magnitude o f the multi-billion dollar project. Public attention 
emboldened the Bank's enviromnental staff to produce their own very critical 
analysis o f the environmental assessment. According to numerous interviews with 
World Bank staff, the high public visibility o f the project had, at least temporarily, 
increased the standing o f the enviromnental experts within the organisation.
As a result o f the criticism, the oil companies are currently preparing 
additional environmental studies, including an indigenous peoples plan, in order to 
comply with, or at least to be perceived as complying with, World Bank policy 
directives.
The Chad/ Cameroon oil and pipeline project is a clear indication that 
public scrutiny is a critical variable which tends to promote greater attention to 
World Bank policy mandates. As long as there is public attention, World Bank 
management is concerned about critical media reports, inquiries by members o f 
parliaments or the U.S. Congress, etc.. Public attention also helps create the 
political space within the bureaucracy for environmental and social science experts 
whose existence within the institution is often tenuous. Since they do not have 
autonomous budgets and must "sell" their expertise to the operational departments, 
they are often severely constrained in raising questions which might lead to the 
delay o f projects.
8.2.3 GEF Biodiversity Investment
The GEF has three Implementing Agencies, the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Environment
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Programme, Since the GEF has not established a uniform set o f guidelines for the 
projects it funds, it is left to the Implementing Agencies to apply their own policies 
(chapter 7). Amongst the World Bank policies which are applicable to GEF 
biodiversity protection projects implemented by the World Bank are the 
operational directives on information disclosure, enviromnental assessment and 
indigenous peoples. Unlike World Bank loans which, even at low interest rates and 
long maturity rates, add to a country's debt burden, GEF funding comes mostly in 
the fonn o f grants in amounts o f several million U.S. dollars.
The GEF project for biodiversity protection in Cameroon was subject to an 
environmental analysis which, by definition, is shorter and less in-depth than a 
fully-fledged enviromnental assessment. An enviromnental analysis is usually 
considered to be adequate for projects intended to have positive enviromnental 
impacts. The environmental analysis, which at the request o f the World Bank was 
carried out by a French consulting company for the Government o f Cameroon, 
consists mostly o f a compilation o f maps and statistics that were previously 
produced in other types o f reports. In addition, its analysis is too general to provide 
useful guidance for project implementation. The enviromnental analysis itself 
points out that its usefulness is limited because it was written before the specific 
actions to be undertaken by the project were defined (Republic o f Cameroon 
1993). Based on its limited information, the environmental analysis concludes that 
the overall impacts o f the project would be environmentally beneficial, although it 
also points to potential risks. One risk is that project activities, especially if  they 
include some logging component, could attract poachers into new areas because o f 
improved transportation, especially the building o f  logging roads, into remote 
areas. Another risk is that strict preservation o f the reserves in south-eastern 
Cameroon could restrict the use o f the forests and thereby be harmful to the ca. 
15,000 indigenous Baka people whose livelihoods depend on continued access to 
their traditional forest lands. According to the environmental analysis, the Baka 
would have to change their way o f  life or move out o f the area (Republic o f 
Cameroon 1993:11).
The stark choice put before indigenous peoples to either change or leave 
their traditional homelands reveals that the consulting company and the 
Government o f Cameroon did not know about World Bank’s policy requirements 
concerning the participation o f  indigenous peoples in programmes that directly
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affect their lives. The World Bank's policy on indigenous peoples (OD 4.20) 
requires the Bank not to fund projects which bring harm to vulnerable populations.
On the other hand, the GEF biodiversity project for Cameroon does 
envision ample participation by Northern conservation organisations. The World 
Bank, as Implementing Agency for this project, knew that government capacity for 
project execution was very limited. Although the GEF grant had to be channeled to 
the government, a condition for grant effectiveness was the requirement that the 
government sub-contract the work to well-known international organisations such 
as World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF-US) and Birdlife International (UK).
The choice o f Northern conservation organisations indicates a 
conceptualization o f biodiversity rooted in conservation biology with a marked 
interest in 'charismatic fauna', i.e. a focus on animal (or bird) species that the 
membership and financial contributors o f the organisations cherish and wish to see 
protected. Their experts in the field are mostly biologists, although there may be a 
sprinkling o f social scientists here and there.1
A political advantage o f choosing Northern NGO partners is that it signals 
a more open and participatory World Bank and GEF in the donor countries. This 
pleases donor governments who wish to see these reforms and who face pressure 
for more openness and transparency in international financial institutions from 
enviromnental pressure groups at home.
The World Bank-GEF project document promises to reconcile the global 
benefits o f maintaining biodiversity with national and local interests in increasing 
sustainable revenues from protected areas. It also emphasizes the need for local 
community involvement in programme planning and execution, but does not 
specify how this is to be done and does not allocate specific financial resources for 
the purpose (World Bank-GEF 1995d).
The same project document makes no reference to indigenous peoples 
although their presence in several o f the areas to be protected under the GEF 
project is well documented, including in the environmental analysis carried out for 
the project. The key project document has mostly been available to Northern 
conservation organisations. It was not translated into French, which is more 
commonly understood in Cameroon.
1 Interviews with representatives ofWorld-Wide Fund for Nature, Wildlife Conservation 
International and Birdlife International.
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The GEF project in Cameroon has run into serious problems and is strongly 
criticized by all parties involved, including the participating Northern conservation 
organisations. Integrating conservation and development activities is a complex 
task and still more difficult in a socio-economic environment o f substantial 
decline. Adherence to the World Bank's policy guidelines might have facilitated 
the task and perhaps led to a more pragmatic and modest project design but one 
more broadly supported within the country than the present highly disparate efforts 
led by uncoordinated international organisations.
8.3 World Bank Evaluation Reports
The World Bank's stated mission is to promote poverty alleviation and 
sustainable development. Its policy statements and mandatory operational policies 
are meant to help the institution accomplish these overall goals. Given the lack o f 
independent studies on how the World Bank adheres to its own policies in the 
context o f concrete programmes, it is necessary to turn to the institution itself for 
further insights.
The World Bank, however, does not routinely monitor and evaluate the 
projects it finances. Although the World Bank has specific guidelines on project 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E), these are not followed in a systematic fashion. 
While it noted a trend towards improvement, the World Bank's own Operations 
Evaluation Department (OED) concluded that the Bank's record on M&E is very 
poor especially with regards to project implementation (World Bank 1995j). In 
addition, whatever project monitoring reports or mid-term evaluations there may 
be, these documents remain solely in the hands o f Bank management. They are not 
distributed to the institution's board o f Executive Directors and they do not enter 
the public domain.
The poor monitoring and supervision o f projects by Bank staff increases the 
weight o f the reports carried out by the World Bank's Operations Evaluation 
Department (OED), a semi-independent unit within the World Bank. OED reviews 
project completion reports prepared by World Bank staff on a selective basis and 
provides authoritative assessments o f the effectiveness o f Bank policies in 
accomplishing the Bank's development goals. Occasionally, senior World Bank 
management requests additional evaluation reports which are often based on the 
data and findings by OED.
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Some o f the evaluation reports referred to below, especially the OED 
studies on environmental assessment and on poverty assessment, as well as the 
Quality Assurance Group (QAG) studies, cannot be found on the institution's web 
page nor in the World Bank's information shop. These studies are internal 
documents, but since the institution is not monolithic, there are sections within it 
which believe that transparency and public scrutiny can only benefit attempts to 
reform the institution from within. As a result, important internal documents, 
especially those which are circulated widely within the institution, find their way 
into the public realm.
8.3.1 OED Reports
OED's independence from World Bank management is important as a 
means to ensure that evaluation is impartial and free from bias in its findings, 
analyses and conclusions (World Bank 1994g). The independent character o f OED 
is due to the establishment in 1975 o f the post o f director-general. The director- 
general reports directly to the World Bank's Board o f Executive Directors and 
represents a fundamental link in the accountability o f the institution to its 
shareholding governments (fig. 8.1).
Fig. 8.1 Institutional C on text o f  O perations E valuation  D epartm ent
OED reviews project completion reports prepared by operational staff and 
carries out independent reviews o f the development impact o f selected Bank
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operations, policies and business processes. Some of its reports are confidential 
internal documents which are provided to the institution's Board o f Executive 
Directors and circulate within the institution, others such as the, Annual Review o f  
Evaluation Results are available to the public.
Amongst the OED reports which have great relevance for the study o f the 
degree to which the institution adheres to its own policies as they relate to 
biodiversity conservation, are the reviews on the effectiveness o f enviromnental 
assessments (World Bank 1996a) and on the progress regarding its poverty 
assessments (World Bank 1996h). The central findings o f these reports are 
summarized below:
(a) Environmental Assessment (World Bank 1996a)
The OED report emphasizes that its focus is not on assessing compliance 
with the operational directives related to enviromnental assessments per se but on 
the impact o f the Bank's procedures. It states that:
- the environmental assessments are carried out in isolation from project 
preparation efforts;
- when the environmental assessment is finally completed, the project design is 
often already finalized, thus there is no meaningful consideration o f alternatives 
(which is a specific requirement o f OD 4.02);
- there is often no follow-up on the environmental assessment once a project has 
been approved;
- environmental assessments are often not understood by project implementation 
staff and copies are in many instances not available in project offices.
In summary, OED concludes that environmental assessments are 
often a mere pro- forma exercise with little influence on project design, which 
".. .generated massive documents that are o f little use in project design and during 
implementation" (World Bank 1996a:6). According to OED, the recommendations 
and mitigation plans o f environmental assessments are not adequately integrated 
into project implementation and related World Bank supervision is weak (World 
Bank 1996a:6).
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Thus, while there is formal policy compliance, i.e. an environmental 
assessment is being carried out, specific provisions o f the Operational Directive are 
ignored, such as the requirement to consider project alternatives. Given the lack o f 
integration o f environmental assessment and actual project design and 
implementation, the intent o f the policy, which is to avoid and mitigate 
environmental impacts, is being lost.
The same OED report analyses the effectiveness o f National Environmental 
Action Plans (NEAPs) which the World Bank requires all its IDA borrowers to 
undertake. As with enviromnental assessments, the NEAP represents, in most 
cases, a mere fonnality with little practical relevance. "In most countries few 
environmental professionals and staff working in Bank-financed projects had ever 
heard o f the NEAP" (World Bank 1996a:8).
(b) Poverty Assessment (World Bank 1996j)
The reduction o f poverty is the very raison d'etre o f the World Bank. The 
Bank's major donor governments made the preparation o f poverty assessments a 
condition o f the US $ 18 billion replenishment for IDA, the World Bank's soft loan 
lending window, for the period 1994-96. The goal o f poverty assessment is to 
improve the incorporation o f poverty reduction elements in the institution's main 
lending operations.
OED's review o f the World Bank's compliance with its operational 
directive on poverty assessment (OD 4.15) is relevant because World Bank 
publications frequently establish a link between poverty, environmental 
degradation, deforestation and biodiversity loss. In addition, the operational 
directive itself emphasizes the link between poverty and the environment and 
includes related issues such as questions o f ownership and access to assets.
Not unlike OED's findings with regard to environmental assessments, the 
OED study on World Bank poverty assessments concludes that these assessments 
only have very limited practical relevance. Poverty assessments, which are to be 
completed for all o f the Bank's borrowing countries, are meant to assist the Bank 
and the borrower to identify poverty targeted project opportunities. However, the 
OED report found that there was a very weak correlation between poverty 
assessments and poverty related lending. The poverty assessments also had little 
influence on the design o f Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) and overall, a large
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percentage o f them lacked operationally useful recommendations. A key 
requirement o f poverty assessments is the establishment o f targets for the 
improvement o f social indicators (World Bank 1996h:7). However, OED could not 
find a single case in its sample where this requirement had been fulfilled.
In conclusion, the OED report states "Bluntly put, a significant mismatch 
appears to exist between the ambition and the specificity o f OD 4.15, on the one 
hand, and the performance o f the Bank and its borrowing members countries in 
delivering on its provisions, on the other" (World Bank 1996h:l 1).
8.3.2 The Wapenhans Report
In 1992 then-World Bank President Lewis T. Preston established the 
Portfolio Management Task Force to examine the reasons for a marked decrease in 
the quality o f World Bank loans. The findings from this task force are known as 
the Wapenhans Report, named after World Bank Vice-President Willi Wapenhans 
who headed the task force.
OED data, based on a review o f completed projects, had revealed an 
accelerated and pervasive deterioration o f the Bank's project performance in an 
increasing number o f sectors. In the period between the World Bank’s fiscal years 
1989-1991 only 65.7% o f World Bank-financed operations were rated as being 
successful, i.e. likely to reach their economic goals. Projects with severe problems 
were especially numerous in the water and sanitation area (43%) and in agriculture 
(42%). The region worst hit by problem projects was Africa (Wapenhans 1992;ii). 
As o f 1992, the World Bank had US $ 138 billion in lending commitments under 
implementation which, together with borrower country contributions and co­
financing from other donors, represented US $ 360 billion in programmes and 
projects (Wapenhans 1992: Annex E). With over a third o f these programmes and 
projects unlikely to reach their economic goals, the cost for the Bank's borrowers 
were indeed very high (Wapenhans 1992:5).
The OED uses economic criteria as its main project rating tool. These 
criteria are mainly focused on the difference between the expected economic rate 
o f return o f a given project at project appraisal and the real rate at project 
completion. Since economics is the World Bank's chief area o f expertise and 
economists and financial experts form the core o f its staff, the finding that over one
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third o f all Bank operations are rated as unsatisfactory on economic grounds may 
be unexpected.
While the Wapenhans Report acknowledged that deficiencies in national 
policies, global economic downturns and other external factors play a role in poor 
project performance, its main finding is that the underlying problem o f Bank 
practice is its ", ..pervasive preoccupation with new lending" (Wapenhans 
1992:iii). Wapenhans refers to this constant pressure to lend as the Bank's 
"approval culture". Project appraisal, which in theory should be a disinterested 
assessment o f a proposed project's development impact, is perceived by many 
Bank staff as a marketing tool to obtain loan approval and to achieve personal 
recognition (Wapenhans 1992:12).
According to the report, the "pervasive emphasis" on loan approval is not 
matched by adequate attention to implementation planning or to assessments o f 
possible risks to the project. These findings reveal an institutional culture which is 
also relevant to understanding the degree o f policy compliance in the social and 
enviromnental areas. In view of the subordinated role o f the World Bank's social 
science and environmental expertise, it is fair to assume that the implementation of 
policies relating to these areas does not fare better than the institution’s overall 
project implementation record. Indeed, World Bank staff interviewed by Vice- 
President Wapenhans and his staff in preparation for the Wapenhans Report stated 
that the main goal o f novel features (the environment, women in development and 
poverty) is to secure a positive reaction by the World Bank's Board o f Executive 
Directors. They added, however, that having to integrate environmental, gender 
and poverty issues into projects has rendered them too complex and prevented 
borrowers from effective implementation (Wapenhans 1992:5).
Based on its findings, the Wapenhans Report recommends far reaching 
changes in the Bank's internal values and incentives. The primary recommendation 
is that Bank management and staff must focus attention more fully o f the Bank's 
central objective o f achieving sustainable development impacts on the ground. 
According to the report, the World Bank should foster adequate participation both 
by Borrowers (government agencies) and intended beneficiaries throughout the 
identification, preparation and implementation stages o f a project. Without 
adequate participation, successful project implementation is unlikely (Wapenhans 
1992: Annex A). Participation, as previous chapters have pointed out, is an
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essential component o f many o f the World Bank's biodiversity-related policies, 
including its policy on environmental assessment.
The essential conclusion o f the Wapenhans report is that the World Bank 
must rebalance its priorities and turn away from determining its success by 
measuring loan approval, good reports or disbursements and instead concentrate on 
the on-the-ground net benefits o f its loans.
In response to the Wapenhans Report, the World Bank developed an Action 
Plan and instituted a "country portfolio management" approach to change the 
culture o f the Bank from the "approval culture" to the "implementation culture". 
However, Mr. Wapenhans him self was not convinced by the proposed measures: "It 
is perhaps noteworthy that the Bank's management response to the Wapenhans 
report does not yet address the recommendations concerning accountability. The 
‘cultural change’ required is, however, unlikely to occur unless the recognized 
performance criteria change" (Wapenhans 1994: C 304).
The World Bank-commissioned official history o f its first fifty years 
concludes that the World Bank's response to the Wapenhans report was in the 
classic manner o f  a bureaucracy under siege: it became ever more meticulous and 
elaborate in the design of its projects whose long-term sustainability was 
improbable. Instead o f adjusting its overall lending volumes to some agreed-upon 
government effort, the institution placed its efforts in ever more meticulous 
engineering o f its lending (Kapur, Lewis & Webb 1997:397). Another chapter in 
the official history summarizes the underlying problem: "The force behind this 
'lending imperative1 (which is often present in aid agencies) is that failure to 
obligate available funds within an anticipated period suggests to governments 
contributing funds to the Bank that they are providing more than is really needed. 
Should there be a shortfall in lending, contributing governments would be likely to 
reduce the amount o f their contributions to the Bank in successive replenishment 
periods." (Lancaster 1997:172).
8.3.3 The Quality Assurance Group (QAG)
When Mr. James Wolfensohn took over as president o f the World Bank in 
June 1995, he promised to revolutionize the Bank, to turn around that "huge
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tanker" and move the institution to a culture o f "development effectiveness" where 
economic, social and environmental results in the field would be the priorities.2
Within a short time o f taking office, he launched a Portfolio Improvement 
Programme and established the Quality Assurance Group (QAG). The QAG, 
which consists o f a group o f senior managers, is charged with leading the efforts of 
improving the performance o f World Bank projects. In order to meet its 
obligations, the QAG commissioned fourteen in-house sectoral reviews, covering 
areas such as lending for energy, forestry, and natural resource management as 
well as a detailed analysis o f 150 projects in 25 countries. The combined effort 
amounted to the most extensive assessment ever o f the Bank's ability to fulfill its 
mission. The reports consist o f about 1,000 pages and were meant to be strictly 
internal. However, copies o f some o f the reports, including its synthesis report, 
were leaked to the press and became public.
Five years after the Wapenhans report, the QAG synthesis report provides a 
disturbing picture o f an institution unwilling to learn from past experience: "The 
lessons from past experience are well-known, yet they are generally ignored in the 
design o f new operations. This synthesis concludes that institutional amnesia is the 
corollary o f institutional optimism" (World Bank 1997e:15). The synthesis report 
identifies the Bank's culture as the root cause o f poor project performance, 
including the constant pressure to lend, fear o f offending a client government and 
fear that a more realistic, and thus more modest, project would be dismissed as too 
small and inadequate in its impact. In the same vein as the Wapenhans report, the 
synthesis report emphasizes that active beneficiary participation in the design o f a 
project is critical to its success. Summarizing its findings, the Synthesis report 
notes: " ... few o f the findings o f  these reviews are surprising or new, which raises 
the question o f why improvements were not made earlier" (World Bank 1997e:25).
The Synthesis report lacks specific recommendations and instead implies 
that the problems identified are already being addressed by several initiatives such 
as the establishment o f networks, matrices and improved portfolio management 
tools. These measures, however, appear to be rather formalistic in nature and not 
directed at influencing the underlying institutional culture.
2Notes taken by the author during a meetingwith Mr. Wolfensohn and non-govemmental- 
organisations in Washington, D.C. on 3 April 1995 prior to his taking office as president o f  the 
World Bank.
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8.4 GEF Evaluation Reports
Although the GEF is a relatively young institution, it has undergone two 
extensive independent evaluations since its establishment in 1991. These 
evaluations were requested by the major shareholding governments in the GEF as 
part o f their deliberations on replenishing the GEF's financial resources in 1994 
and in 1998. In addition, several specific projects have been subject to evaluation. 
Amongst these is the GEF project to protect biodiversity in Cameroon.
The first evaluation report on the GEF's initial three-year pilot phase was 
earned out by professional evaluators in the World Bank's OED and the 
corresponding entities at the United Nations Development Programme and the 
United Nations Enviromnent Programme (Global Environment Facility 1994a).
The report is candid in the way it shows that the GEF's institutional structure and 
operational procedures represent serious stumbling blocks which prevent the 
institution from meeting most o f its stated goals. In particular, it points to political 
and bureaucratic conflict amongst the three GEF Implementing Agencies.
According to the evaluation report, the GEF designers did not establish a 
clear rationale for the institution's choice o f its four focal areas. It adds that the 
GEF had failed to establish operationally useful objectives, strategies or criteria for 
project selection. Although GEF projects are supposed to be innovative and 
ground-breaking, the evaluation finds that the GEF has not put in place a 
systematic mechanism for monitoring, evaluation and learning from experience o f 
the GEF (Global Environment Facility 1994).
The evaluation identifies "the lack o f agreement among industrial and 
developing countries on the raison d'etre, objectives and strategies o f the GEF" as 
the underlying cause o f  its operational shortcomings (Global Environment Facility 
1994:5). An additional problem is the fact that the Implementing Agencies prepare 
the project concepts without involving the host countries early on in the process. 
With regards to public participation, the evaluation report states that the lack of 
adequate involvement o f affected communities in designing and implementing the 
projects is a frequent and justified criticism o f most projects in the portfolio 
(Global Environment Facility 1994:68).
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At the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), both the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the U.N. 
Biodiversity Convention adopted the GEF as their interim financial mechanism to 
assist developing countries with meeting the Conventions' goals. Both U.N. 
Conventions, however, insisted on a restructuring o f the GEF to make it more 
transparent and democratic (United Nations 1992). Following UNCED, the GEF 
went through a restructuring process which was concluded in 1994.
The evaluation report could have been a valuable tool for the restructuring 
of the GEF. It did, however, have little impact on the agreement emerging out of 
the restructuring negotiations (Fairman 1994). One significant example is the 
evaluation report's call for the establishment o f an independent GEF Secretariat to 
replace the largely World Bank-managed Secretariat. The restructuring limited 
itself to the establishment o f a "functionally independent Secretariat" housed and 
administratively supported by the World Bank and fails to establish the power of 
the Secretariat over the policies and projects o f the GEF Implementing Agencies.
Four years after the first evaluation report, the newly restructured GEF 
underwent a second evaluation. This time a group o f outside consultants were 
contracted to review the performance of the GEF in terms o f internal organisation 
and project development procedures (Porter et al. 1998). This evaluation is less in- 
depth and rigorous than the 1994 evaluation report, possibly because the outside 
consultants have less knowledge and experience with the institutions than the 
professional evaluators who work within the institutions themselves. The 1998 
evaluation study is, to a large degree, based on GEF Implementing Agencies' 
documentation. It praises the GEF for detailed and comprehensive plans for public 
participation and consultation with multiple stakeholder groups in the biodiversity 
area (Porter et al 1998:xiii). Yet it acknowledges that there is insufficient 
experience with the implementation o f GEF programmes and that particularly in 
the biodiversity area, there is a dearth o f information on successful projects (Porter 
et al. 1998). Furthermore, the evaluation points out that the recommendation made 
in the 1994 evaluation report to establish a GEF-wide monitoring and evaluation 
mechanism had not yet been implemented but that a process to launch such a 
mechanism had now (four years later) begun.
The 1998 evaluation report includes an analysis o f the GEF Implementing 
Agencies' efforts at integration of the GEF goals to protect the global environment
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into their regular activities and project portfolios. It is in this area that the study 
comes to its most significant finding: " . ..it has found that the Bank has not done 
as much in its regular (i.e. non-GEF) portfolio o f projects in the biodiversity and 
climate focal areas as it might have; that it has not taken steps to create staff 
incentives necessary to put global environmental concerns on a par with regular 
Bank business; that it has not systematically integrated global environmental 
objectives into economic and sector work or into the Country Assistance 
Strategies” (Porter et al.1998: xiv).
This lack of'mainstreaming' raises questions about the institutional set-up 
o f the GEF. Rather than create a new institution, the rationale behind creating a tri­
partite mechanism co-managed by the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP was that the 
GEF would serve as a catalyst to 'mainstream' global environmental concerns into 
the much larger regular development operations o f the World Bank and UNDP and 
thereby exponentially increase the effectiveness o f limited GEF funding.
However, to the contrary, the evaluation report finds that the existence o f 
the GEF appears to lead to a decline o f World Bank funding for biodiversity 
projects, since more borrowing countries now have less incentive to engage 
themselves in this area unless they can obtain from the GEF a "global premium" 
associated with the protection o f biodiversity o f "global importance" (Porter et al. 
1998:40).
8.5 Establishing a Pattern of Institutional Disconnections
The OED, QAG and GEF evaluation reports provide rigorous general 
analyses which might help reorient the institutions' operations. The central finding 
o f the evaluation reports can be summarized as an internal conflict within the 
institutions “ ...w here prudence and accountability considerations interfere with 
money flow, the lifeblood o f the international financial institutions (Westberry 
1998:515).
The next chapter (chapter 9) will make use o f political science and theory 
o f organisation conceptual frameworks to explain why the critical findings o f the 
internal evaluation reports are not readily translated into practical reforms.
This section examines how the case material on Cameroon presented in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 fits into the overall results obtained by the institutions' own 
efforts at evaluating their overall operations.
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8.5.1 Simplified Roadmap
Integrating qualitative information into a straightforward data base is not 
feasible without oversimplification. An attempt to do so can only produce a general 
roadmap to facilitate a broad overview. Although it does not capture the nuanced 
findings presented in previous chapters. Fig. 8.2 provides such an overv iew:
O verview  o f  Policy C om pliance F indings o f C ase S tudies
P o licy  D ia lo g u e
Country Assistance 
Strategy No N/A No No
Structural Adustment 
Lending No N/A No No
In fra s tru c tu re  Dev.
Transport Sector No No No No
Oil & Pipeline Yes Yes No Yes/WB Envtl. Staff
GEF
GEF Biodiversity Yes Yes No Yes/GEF-Commissi<
Fig. 8 .2  O v erv iew  o f  P o licy  C om p liance F in d ings in C ase Studies
Relating the findings in these categories to the institutions' own evaluation reports 
shows that they fit into rather consistent institutional patterns:
Inclusion o f Biodiversity Considerations
World Bank research emphasizes that "...the conservation o f biodiversity 
depends in large measure on how well policies and programmes in the economic 
sectors manage to address biodiversity" (World Bank 1995a:I). Yet, biodiversity 
considerations are not present in the development planning and structural 
adjustment-type operations in Cameroon, although forestry is a major component 
o f the latter. This confirms the findings o f the evaluation reports that research and 
established environmental and social policies do not easily carry over to the 
operational level (pis. see Fig. 8.3 for an overview o f the evaluation reports). The 
lack o f attention to environmental concerns in these types o f programmes also 
reflects the limited influence o f environmental expertise: "The Bank's environment 
staff emphasizes that the CAS must reflect environmental and resource 
management concerns as part o f the overall analysis, not merely as a separate 
sectoral concern" (World Bank 1996d:21). This, however, is what happens in the
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Cameroon CAS, which relegates biodiversity to a National Environmental Action 
Plan (NEAP) (World Bank 1996h).
The distance between operational and environmental staff is very much in 
evidence in the Transport Sector loan, which indeed should have been subject to 
mandatory environmental policies such as OD 4.02 on environmental assessment 
and OD 4.20 on indigenous peoples. The infrastructure development division 
which prepared the loan did not feel obliged to consult with environmental staff in 
a way which would have provided the latter with all the necessary loan information 
to provide an infonned opinion on the project.
Only preparation for the oil pipeline project includes biodiversity 
considerations, which, at least in part, may be due to the high public profile o f the 
project. In the case o f the GEF project, the question does not pose itself, since the 
project is explicitly meant to protect biodiversity.
Environmental Assessment
According to World Bank policy, development planning and adjustment 
operations do not require environmental assessments. Therefore the Country 
Assistance Strategy and the Structural Adjustment loans did not violate an 
operational policy although they failed to apply the Bank’s stated commitments to 
biodiversity protection. The only project in the sample which violates the 
operational policy on environmental assessment is the Transport Sector loan. The 
other two cases, the oil & pipeline project and the GEF project, are in compliance 
with the formal environmental assessment requirements.
The type o f compliance is, however, rather perfunctory. OED found that while 
enviromnental assessments (EAs) were routinely carried out, the EAs ignored the 
specific provisions o f the operational directive such as the need to consider project 
alternatives and to actively involve local groups in the EA process (World Bank 
1996a). Even in the Cameroon projects which underwent environmental 
assessment (oil pipeline and GEF project), there was a lack o f active participation 
o f locally affected people. This represents a lack o f compliance with mandatory 
policy because it is an explicit requirement o f the operational directive that the 
views o f affected groups and non-governmental organisations be fully taken into 
account as a valuable way to improve decision-making.
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Participation o f Local People in Decision-Making
The most common critique presented in the institutions’ internal evaluation 
reports is about the lack o f participation o f local people in a way which would 
include their views in the decision-making (Wapenhans 1992, GEF 1994, World 
Bank 1996a, World Bank 1997e). This therefore appears to be a consistent 
problem across all types o f  programmes financed by the institutions.
In addition to the major internal evaluation reports referred to above, 
the findings o f two project specific internal documents are also consistent with the 
research presented on the Oil Pipeline project (chapter 6) and the GEF project 
(chapter 7). In the case o f  the Oil Pipeline project, World Bank group 
environmental staff reviewed the enviromnental assessment presented by the Oil 
Consortium. The review states that the enviromnental assessment for the oil & 
pipeline project had not been submitted for public review and that therefore the 
concerns o f  the public were not taken into account.3 In the case o f the GEF project 
for Cameroon, an external consultant was contracted to evaluate the project in the 
field. His report states: "Substantive issues such as participation appear in project 
documents, but these issues seem to have become stale after their necessary 
passage in the project proposals. ... In project operations terms, there is no 
framework for participation, for community development, for conflict resolution, 
nor for participatory monitoring, etc. No one in the field is pushing for such a 
framework." (LeBlanc 1997:6-7).
8.5.2 'Approval Culture'
The above findings can at least in part be explained by the 'approval 
culture' (Wapenhans 1992). W hile other subtle factors are at work as well, such as 
professional affinities between World Bank operational staff and finance ministry 
officials in the client countries, the 'approval culture' is much in evidence 
throughout the case study material presented in previous chapters. The exception is 
the Oil Pipeline project where an unprecedented degree o f public scrutiny, 
including Parliamentary inquiries and media reports, have led to a slow-down o f 
the approval process.
3 "Chad-Cameroon Oilfield and Pipeline Project - World Bank Group Comments on Environmental 
Reports," 12-page memorandum without date.
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The 'approval culture' with its pressure on World Bank staff and 
management to hasten the presentation o f large progammes to be submitted for 
approval by the World Bank's Board o f Executive Directors, is in part responsible 
for the divorce between World Bank analytical work and environmental and social 
policies on the one hand, and the operational level on the other. Under the existing 
imperative o f making large loans, operational management has little time and 
incentive to worry about research findings and environmental and social policy 
requirements. Paying attention to the enviromnental and social policies is time- 
consuming (e.g. involving local people in decision-making) and presents an 
unwelcome barrier on the fast track to obtaining approval o f a loan from the World 
Bank's Board and moving on to the next task.
The same 'approval culture' is present within the GEF. Concerning the GEF 
Implementing Agencies, Wells found that "Their major objective seems to be to 
secure funding approval for a project at the expense o f virtually any other 
consideration, even if  this means inflating claims for the likely effectiveness o f 
project-financed activities, ignoring risks, and grossly oversimplifying 
complexities" (Wells 1994:78). Tire result consists o f entire generations o f hastily 
developed projects with uncertain outcomes (Global Environment Facility 1994a, 
Wells 1994, Fairman 1996).
All evaluation reports emphasize that the participation o f  affected local 
people and non-govemmental-organisations, which is a requirement under OD
4.02 on environmental assessment, is critical to ensuring long-term project success. 
Such participation would necessarily contribute local knowledge to a given 
programme and lead to the recognition that each programme is embedded in a 
specific political, economic and social context. Such recognition would be likely to 
steer the institution away from simplification and quantification and possibly move 
it to "a learning approach" as opposed to "blueprint development" (Roe 1991), the 
standard and normative approach currently being used.
Participation, however, may challenge the existing constellation o f power 
relationships and has the potential to threaten the political status quo. It would be 
difficult to reconcile with the institutions' apolitical approach to problems which is 
meant to appeal to both donor and client governments.
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The World Bank's and GEF's drive for continual increases in their 
lending or grant-making volume is due to the imperative to demonstrate to member 
countries that the institutions are able to use all the capital at their disposal and are 
able to make productive use of more. Without this demonstration, governments 
would be reluctant to grant the institutions' periodic capital increases, which enable 
the institutions to expand (Miller 1996).
Many o f these new issues, such as biodiversity, and even the older issues o f 
'helping the poor', may be difficult to fit into a mode o f operation predicated on 
moving large amounts o f money within short periods o f time. As a result, the 
environment, biodiversity and poverty are incorporated into the institution's policy 
frameworks without changing the institutions' fundamental approaches. Wade has 
described the situation as one o f "mission overload", where new issues are adopted 
to maintain the legitimacy o f the institution (Wade 1997), Similarly, the official 
World Bank history states that the institution accommodates new demands by 
rhetoric and administrative labeling (Kapur et al. 1997).
8.6 Summary
In view o f the methodological risk o f examining diverse programmes in 
only one country, the findings o f  the Cameroon case studies must be confirmed by 
similar analyses in geographically and socio-politically different settings.
However, the three place-specific World Bank and GEF programmes and the 
analyses o f their compliance with the institutions' own policy commitments related 
to biodiversity can be woven into the broader institutional picture outlined by the 
institutions' own evaluation reports. The findings presented in chapters five, six 
and seven reveal a lack o f relevance o f the institution's research and analytical 
efforts for its operational work and a perfunctory approach to the implementation 
o f its environmental and social policies as they relate to biodiversity conservation. 
The place-specific research results appear to form part o f a broad institutional 
pattern, namely the "approval culture", which successive reports by the World 
Bank's own Operations Evaluation Department as well as GEF-commissioned 
evaluation reports have uncovered. These patterns are not easily discernible to the 
public in both donor and borrower countries since most o f the more relevant World 
Bank evaluation reports are not in the public domain.
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A critical observation in the institutions' own evaluation reports is 
the prevalent lack o f local people's participation in the preparation o f 
environmental assessments as well as in the design and implementation o f 
programmes o f which they are the intended beneficiaries. The case material on 
Cameroon confirms that the institutions' policy requirement to take local views 
fully into account is ignored in each o f the types o f programmes being examined. 
As a result, the programmes lack contextuality and reflect standard blueprint 
approaches which tend towards simplification and quantification.
In addition to being time consuming and thereby difficult to operationalize 
in an institutional culture driven by the imperative to make large loans,4 the 
participation o f local communities may raise thorny questions concerning the 
distribution o f political power. Thereby raising the spectre o f challenging the statas 
quo. While the institutions are increasingly open to questions o f transparency and 
civil society, their apolitical and technical stance tends to obscure the constellation 
o f power relationships in a given context.
The next chapter examines in more detail the role o f shareholding 
governments and o f internal institutional dynamics creating the gap between the 
institutions’ environmental discourse and its biodiversity-related policies and their 
operational practice. It concludes with listing institutional characteristics and 
oversight mechanisms which are required o f global power structures if  they are to 
mediate and create spaces o f negotiation between global and local geographic 
scales.
4 Grants in the case o f the GEF
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Overview of the Institutions’ Evaluation Reports
Year Name o f  Report Key Findings Key Recommendations
1992 Wapenhans Report: A Report 
o f  the Portfolio Management 
Taskforce
Pervasive emphasis on loan approval; 
Lack o f  attention to implementation 
planning and assessment o f  risks to 
projects;
Lack o f participation by borrowing 
governments and intended beneficiairies
Focus attention on achieving 
sustainable development 
impacts on the ground; 
Promote participation o f  
borrowers and intended 
beneficiaries;
Stop measuring success by 
measuring loan approval
1996 OED: Effectiveness o f  
Environmental Assessments 
(EAs) and National 
Environmental Action Plans
EAs are carried out in isolation from 
project preparation and have little 
influene on project design;
Project Alternatives are not being 
considered;
Provisions o f  EAs are not integrated into 
project implementation.
EA guidelines should be 
followed more closely than in 
the past to provide more focus 
and better analysis o f  project 
designs;
EA process must be better 
integrated into project design 
upstream to influence project 
design;
Supervision plans and 
moniroting and 
evaluationsystems for 
environmental components 
should be required.
1996 OED: Poverty Assessments - 
A Progress Review
Weak Correlation between Poverty 
Assessments and poverty-related 
lending;
Fail to establish targets for the 
improvement o f  social indicators.
The content o f  Poverty 
Assessments should be 
systematically raised 
consistent with the guidance 
provided in the Operational 
Directive (OD 4.15);
The social and environmental 
dimensions o f  poverty should 
be strengthened in the Poverty 
Assessments.
1997 Quality Assurance Group: 
Portfolio Improvement 
Program- Draft Reviews o f  
Sector Portfolio and Lending 
Instruments- A Synthesis
Lessons o f  the past are ignored in the 
design o f new operations;
Pressure to lend is a root problem;
Fear o f  offending a client government is 
a problem;
Active beneficiary participation 
is critical to project success; 
Establish networks, matrixes 
and improve management 
tools.
1994 GEF-Independent Evaluation 
Report
GEF lacks clear rationale for its choice 
o f  focal areas and on how to address 
them;
No systematic monitoring and 
evaluation is in place to facilitate 
learning;
Lack o f  adequate involvement o f  
affected communities.
Establish an independent GEF- 
Secretariat;
Establish a mechanism for 
identifying lessons and for 
promoting their application; 
Establish mutually beneficial 
collaboration with non- 
govemmental-organisations.
1998 Porter et al.: Study o f  the 
GEF's Overall Performance
GEF has developed comprehensive 
plans for consultations with multiple 
stakeholders;
Systematic monitoring and evaluation 
system is still in the process o f  being set 
up;
World Bank has not done much to 
integrate biodiversity concerns into its 
overall lending portfolio.
The GEF should develop 
quantitative and qualitative 
indicators o f  successful 
stakeholder involvement;
The World Bank should adopt 
public, measurable goals for 
the integration o f  global 
environmental objectives into 
its overall operations.
Fig. 8.3 Overview o f  the Institutions’ Evaluation Reports
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CHAPTER 9
BIODIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: 
A PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLE OF UNFINISHED REFORM
9.1 Introduction
This chapter synthesizes the material from previous chapters and develops a more 
in-depth explanation o f the behaviour o f international financial institutions. In view o f the 
wide range o f possible multidisciplinary research efforts in the area o f financial flows and 
biodiversity, the chapter begins by providing an overview o f the small, yet influential area 
o f research presented here: the compliance o f the World Bank and the GEF with their own 
enviromnental and social policies as they relate to biodiversity.1 These policies create 
frames o f reference and accountability mechanisms for those inside and outside the 
institutions concerned with compliance.
The following sections examine the roles being played by the governments 
responsible for overseeing the institutions and by the institutional bureaucracies 
themselves in the uneven, and often contradictory, implementation o f the institutions’ 
policies. There is evidence for including both the political science and theory o f 
organization perspectives which, instead o f competing, are complementing each other and 
together allow for a more comprehensive picture to emerge. While the institutions adopted 
biodiversity as a priority because o f external demands from important shareholding 
governments, the manner in which the issue is being incorporated into the daily business 
o f the institutions remains very much a matter determined by internal institutional 
dynamics.
After examining the contribution o f the realist perspective o f political science to 
explaining the functioning o f the institutions, the chapter briefly reviews the findings o f 
the case studies in the areas o f policy advice, infrastructure development and the GEF 
biodiversity protection project. The case studies results indicate the usefulness o f theories 
o f organization to explain the discrepancies between stated policies and the design o f 
programmes.
254
Finally the chapter develops a simplified construct in which to examine key 
institutional characteristics such as institutional pressures to move funding and staff 
incentives, which generate their own ideas for possible solutions. In conclusion, the 
chapter combines the multiple strands o f arguments o f the previous sections to help define 
conditions which are indispensable if  the institutions’ policies and practice are to coincide. 
This in turn contributes to defining the characteristics o f global power structures which are 
capable o f mediating between global and local geographic scales (Harvey 1996:204).
9.2. Overview of the Research Area
In an increasingly globalized world, the power structures represented by 
international financial institutions play an important role in linking globally established 
agendas with local realities. This study focuses on the World Bank and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) because o f the unparalleled power they wield in their 
respective areas o f activity. As the world’s leading development agency, the World Bank 
is the single largest source o f  financing for development purposes. Similarly, the GEF is 
the world’s most important fund for financing projects intended to protect the global 
environment. Both institutions are global actors endowed with large-scale public financial 
resources, which share the view that the world is fast approaching the point where the 
Earth’s physical and biological systems will not be able to meet the demand for 
environmental goods and services on which human societies depend (World Bank 1997a).
In the area o f biodiversity in particular, the World Bank states that it has gone 
from “doing no harm” to strategically mainstreaming biodiversity conservation into all 
aspects o f its lending and non-lending work (World Bank 1997a: 54). On the other hand, 
biodiversity protection projects represent most o f  the GEF’s project portfolio and the GEF 
serves as the financial mechanism o f the 1992 United Nations Convention on 
Biodiversity. While considered a global problem, which is often linked to global food 
security and medical research, biodiversity loss is an intensely local issue as the 
livelihoods o f  rural and forest communities, especially in tropical countries, are directly 
linked to biodiversity.
1 The Appendix presents a summary o f  the World Bank’s social and environmental policies which are 
relevant to GEF investment projects.
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Although the institutions are pursuing a global agenda, their discourse and 
environmental and social policies commit them to building bridges to local priorities and 
perspectives. The discourse o f the institutions endorses the strategy that giving priority to 
sustainable livelihoods in biodiversity-rich regions appears to be the most promising way 
to serve the needs o f both local and international communities (chapter 2). According to 
the World Bank’s policy on environmental assessment, for example, local people must 
have a voice in the design and implementation o f projects that affect them.
Yet, as previous chapters have demonstrated, the institutions’ discourse and policy 
commitments cannot be assumed to match their operational practice. The Cameroon case 
studies show an uneven and, overall, poor implementation o f the institutions’ policies. 
These findings are congruent with the conclusions of the World B ank’s and GEF’s own 
evaluation reports (chapter 8). The World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department 
(OED) states "Bluntly put, a significant mismatch appears to exist between the ambition 
and the specificity o f OD 4.15 [poverty-related operational directive] on the one hand, and 
the performance o f the Bank and its borrowing members countries in delivering on its 
provisions, on the other" (World Bank 1996h: 11). In the environmental and biodiversity 
areas, the OED reaches similar conclusions (World Bank 1996a).
While the institutions are not monolithic blocs and their impact is not uniform, 
their own internal evaluation reports call for changes in institutional culture as a 
prerequisite to improved policy compliance. Unless their present institutional 
characteristics change, the international financial institutions are unlikely to become 
credible mediators between a diversity o f interests at global and local geographic scales.
In addition, there is the risk that the institutions’ lack o f  compliance with their own policy 
mandates may discredit and crowd out unambiguously desirable and necessary forms o f 
international cooperation (Vaubel 1991). This risk lends further urgency to defining the 
characteristics o f political power structures which can open up political spaces for 
negotiation between global and local aspirations and interests.
The external relationships and internal dynamics o f  international financial 
institutions are multidimensional and complex. The next sections use political science and 
theory o f organization perspectives to shed light on the external and internal factors whose 
interplay helps explain the institutions’ behaviour.
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9.3 Realist Perspective of Political Science
The realist perspective o f political science states that international organizations 
are only effective if  nation-states view them as advancing their own interests. A 
competing political science view holds that international organizations are instrumental in 
reducing the role o f the nation-state and in fostering interdependence and exchange 
(Ascher 1983, Vaubel 1991).
The realist perspective holds more explanatory power for international financial 
institutions since their organizational structures reflect the distribution o f  power o f its 
shareholding countries. Unlike the United Nations organizations, which are based on a 
one country/one vote system, the international financial institutions distribute voting 
shares proportional to the financial contribution o f the member countries. The GEF’s 
initial governance structure was built on the same principle but modified after developing 
countries demanded changes before endorsing the GEF as the financial mechanism for 
both the U.N. Convention on Biodiversity and the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. As a result, the GEF’s voting system now represents a hybrid form 
which requires double voting majorities reflecting financial contributions as well as 
numbers of members.2
The GEF’s slight variation is more symbolic than significant since GEF decision­
making is based on consensus procedures. In addition, the major donor countries to both 
the World Bank and the GEF can exercise informal influence over the senior management 
o f both institutions. The influence o f the United States is particularly pronounced because 
o f the physical location o f World Bank headquarters and the GEF Secretariat in 
Washington, D.C.. In addition, the U.S. administration has the right to appoint the 
president o f  the World Bank and has decisive influence in choosing the chairman o f  the 
GEF.
The composition o f the governing bodies o f both institutions, the World Bank’s 
Board o f  Executive Directors and the GEF’s Council, reflects the relative power o f the 
member countries. Demands from the most powerful member governments have placed 
the environment and biodiversity on the agenda o f the World Bank and have led to the 
establishment o f the GEF (chapter 4).
2 The GEF voting system is mostly a formality which has not yet been tested in practice.
257
The World Bank’s Board which represents the institution’s 182 member countries 
consists o f 24 Executive Directors. The five most powerful members (U.S., Japan, 
Germany, U.K. and France) appoint their own Executive Directors and have between 
them over 40% o f the voting shares. All other Executive Directors are elected by multi­
country constituencies and represent more than one country.
Similarly, the GEF Council, which represents 165 member countries, consists o f 
32 Council members: 16 from developing countries, 34 from developed countries and 2 
from countries with so-called transitional economies. The net effect is that major donors 
have their own Council member representing their interests while most o f  the developing 
countries are bundled together in a complex constituency system in which one Council 
member represents numerous countries.
The establishment o f the GEF in 1991 and the World Bank’s important role in its 
management is the result o f unilateral action on the part o f the richest donor countries and 
is largely regarded as a preemptive strike against the possible dilution o f their influence 
(Fairman 1996). According to Fairman, these donor governments established the GEF 
with at least three goals in mind: to address threats to the global environment; to 
demonstrate environmental leadership to their domestic political constituencies; and to 
prevent developing countries from seizing control o f the global environmental agenda in 
the context o f the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(Fairman 1996).
Despite the multilateral character o f the international financial institutions, the 
determining influence o f the large donor nations is unmistakable when it comes to major 
geopolitically important questions. An example is the World Bank’s role in managing the 
international debt crisis o f the early 1980s. According to the World Bank’s official 
history, the institution acted in the interests o f its most powerful shareholders by 
strengthening the creditors’ cartel and banning the question o f  debt relief from 
international negotiations (Kapur et al.1997). Similarly, the World Bank’s activities in 
relation to countries which are important to the United States, for example, China, India, 
Mexico and Brazil, are constrained by the policies o f the United States vis-a-vis these 
countries (Wade 1997a).
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The realist perspective o f  viewing international institutions as instruments of 
influence and control by its most powerful members holds significant explanatory power 
for both the World Bank and the GEF. It explains how the environment and biodiversity 
became priorities on the agenda o f the institutions. Responding to environmental 
constituencies in their home countries, donor governments saw it in their self-interest to 
establish environment-friendly policies to guide their development aid and to establish 
environmental aid budgets (Connolly 1996). According to Wade, the World Bank’s 
adoption o f the environmental agenda represented a tactical move in response to the threat 
o f a cut in its financial resources (Wade 1997b).
While the influence o f the institutions’ most powerful shareholders explains why 
biodiversity became central to the policies o f  the institutions, the explanatory power o f 
the realist perspective o f political science does not reach into the internal dynamics o f the 
institutions. The institutions have been able to carve out a space o f  autonomy for 
themselves in which internal structures and processes come fully into play. It is in this 
space where much o f the explanation for the divergences between institutional policies 
and practice can be found.
9.3.1 The Quest for Institutional Autonomy
Historically, World Bank management viewed the institution’s direct relationship 
with financial markets from which to borrow for its own lending activities as the 
cornerstone o f managerial autonomy and freedom from political influence (Kapur 1999). 
Although this borrowing is backed by collateral from the donor countries, it does not limit 
autonomy the way direct contributions from donor governments do. Over several years, 
World Bank management did not want to accept IDA funds directly from donors because 
o f fear o f more direct donor government interference and loss o f  autonomy. The resistance 
against IDA only faded when it became clear that the international community was ready 
to place IDA with the United Nations instead (Kapur 1999).
With access to world-wide capital markets, substantial financial reserves, an 
annual turnover o f approaching US $ 30 billion, a net income o f about US$ 1 billion per 
year and about 7,000 full-time staff, the World Bank is considered to be one o f the most 
autonomous international institutions in existence (Miller-Adams 1996).
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Wade describes the World Bank’s autonomy as having three principal sources: (1) 
its ability to influence the terms on which low-income developing countries obtain access 
to international capital; (2) a research and policy-design budget far larger than that o f 
other institutions; and (3) its ability to attract global media coverage for its major reports 
(Wade 1996:5).
In addition, the practical autonomy and wide discretion o f  the World Bank owes 
considerable debt to the lack o f supervision by its governing body, the Board o f Executive 
Directors (Ascher 1983). The same lack o f supervision applies to the GEF, whose 
governing Council meets only twice a year and whose permanent Secretariat has little 
influence over the G EF’s Implementing Agencies, principally the W orld Bank.
9.3.2 The Role of the Institutions’ Governing Bodies
The autonomy o f the institutions vis-a-vis their overseers, the World Bank’s Board 
o f Executive Directors and the GEF’s Council, is central to understanding the 
discrepancies between the institutions’ policies and practice (Ascher 1983).
There are a variety o f explanations for the institutions’ autonomy from their 
governing bodies (Ascher 1983, Wade 1997a, Kapur et al. 1997). Three reasons in 
particular are relevant: (1) the sheer volume o f work placed before the governing bodies 
exceeds the capacities of the small staff in the Executive Directors’offices and o f the 
support offices in the home country ministries; (2) the high cost o f information for the 
governing bodies and the governments they represent; (3) The fact that the political 
enviromnent in which the institutions operate is not homogeneous provides the 
bureaucracies with additional autonomous space. Each o f these reasons require some 
further discussion:
(1) The World Bank’s Board o f  Executive Directors is a permanent supervisory 
body located at World Bank headquarters, representing the institution’s 181 member 
countries.3 The 24 Executive Directors are most often political appointees with
3 All members o f  IBRD are eligible to be join the International Development Association (IDA), the World 
Bank’s arm which provides credits to the poorest countries. 160 countries have joined IDA. Although IDA 
is legally and financially distinct, IDA and IBRD share the same staff and the same policies.
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professional backgrounds in economics and international cooperation. Their role is to 
consider and decide on IBRD/IDA loan proposals and policy issues that guide the overall 
operations o f the institution. They also are responsible for overseeing its budget process. 
Neither the offices o f the Executive Directors in Washington, D.C., nor the offices in their 
home governments which support them, have the staff and the resources to cope with the 
amount o f work in a detailed fashion. The tasks involve examining a loan portfolio o f 
approximately US $ 30 billion a year, the review o f numerous policy documents and 
country studies, as well as budget and administrative matters. The result is that the Board 
o f Executive Directors rarely reviews specific project proposals in detail, except in cases 
where a project has gained public visibility through the media or campaigns by non­
governmental organizations.
The GEF-Council faces a similar situation. It meets only twice a year and its 32 
members representing 164 governments spend most o f their professional activities on 
other tasks. Some governments are represented by officials with background knowledge in 
enviromnent and development. Other governments are represented by finance and 
planning ministry officials who already happen to be located at World Bank headquarters 
in Washington, D.C. where all GEF Council meetings take place. GEF Council members 
are charged with approving GEF work programmes and are provided with only minimal 
information on individual project proposals. In addition, much o f their time during the 
Council meetings is spent discussing policy directions and administrative matters, 
including budgets and the replenishment o f funds.
(2) Governments face substantial information costs if  they are to keep abreast o f 
the activities o f the institutions they are sponsoring. These costs are particularly high for 
members o f  the Executive Board and the GEF Council, who have to represent whole 
groups o f countries. In addition, there may often be language barriers. Vast amounts o f 
English-language only documents have to be analysed within short time periods, which 
often is not feasible.4
The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s branch which provides direct support to the 
private sector, has 174 members. The IFC has its own staff and its policies may or may not be identical with 
the IBRD/IDA policies.
4 The author has attended GEF Council meetings, which are open to NGOs, for severalyears.Council 
members regularly complained that they did not have the necessary time to read the documents which were 
only provided shortly before the Council meetings.
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The overall result is that the governing bodies surrender responsibility for the 
design and implementation o f projects to the experts in the institutions. There is great 
confidence in the work carried out by World Bank management for both the World 
Bank’s own and the GEF project portfolios. Therefore the lack o f attention to detail by the 
overseers does not seem to be important.5 Government representatives on the governing 
bodies justify this confidence by pointing to the World Bank’s pioneering role amongst 
development agencies in developing environmental policies and having accorded 
prominence to issues concerning involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples.6 
Furthermore, shareholder governments view the fact that the World Bank (the IBRD 
lending window) has earned a net income every year since 1948 as evidence o f good 
management (World Bank 1998). The latter argument ignores the World Bank’s position 
as ‘preferred creditor’ whose loans get repaid independent of the success or failure o f the 
financed operation.
An additional and important element to understanding the institutions’ autonomy 
is that they operate in a non-homogeneous environment o f underlying North-South 
tensions. Developing countries, often, are not in favour o f environmental policies of 
international financial institutions because they perceive them as green conditionalities 
infringing their sovereignty (Wade 1997). However, they accept the institutions’ 
enviromnental policy mandates as a necessity to ensure continued funding flows. The 
present Government o f Cameroon provides an example o f this when it signs agreements 
with the World Bank or the GEF to reform forestry practices or protect biodiversity, 
although there is little political will to follow-up on these commitments (chapter 5 and 
chapter 7).
The institutions are involved in a balancing act in which they have to please both 
the donor country governments and the borrowing governments. Their ability to raise 
funds depends on the good will o f the donor governments, while their ability to fully 
obligate their resources means cultivating harmonious relationships with developing 
country borrower governments (Lancaster 1997: 174). The quote “the Bank needs Egypt 
more than Egypt needs the Bank”7 captures one aspect o f the underlying diversity in
5 Interview with Staff o f  Executive Director, 9 January 1998.
6 Ibid.
7 A World Bank official quoted by Prof. Tony Allan in a communication with the author, November 1999.
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which some o f the large developing countries, such as China, India, Brazil and Egypt, are 
as central to the World Bank’s viability as the large donor nations. The divergence o f 
interests between borrowers and recipients creates a space for the institutions, a no-man’s- 
land, which further increases their freedom o f  discretion.
9.4 The Case Studies: The Decoupling of Discourse from Operations
The limits o f the realist perspective o f the political science approach is reached 
where the space o f autonomy in which the institutions operate begins, i.e. where internal 
institutional dynamics carry more weight than the influence o f the institutions’ 
shareholders. It is in this space, which is represented by a black box in section 9.7 o f this 
chapter, that the institutions are able to decouple institutional discourse and policies from 
their operations. The contents o f this black box will be analysed further below.
Although to differing degrees, the absence o f symmetry between the World Bank 
and GEF stated commitments and policy mandates and the operational practice, represents 
a common thread through the Cameroon case studies examined in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The 
relevance o f theories o f organisation in helping to account for the discrepancies is briefly 
revisited in the case study results which follow.
9.4.1 Policy-Based Operations
Country Assistance Strategy (CASh
World Bank statements have assured the donors, since the early 1990s, that the 
environment is treated as a cross-cutting discipline which is being integrated into all 
sectors and reflected in overall development planning, such as the Country Assistance 
Strategies (Wade 1996). Although the World Bank and the GEF consider Cameroon to be 
a country o f globally important biodiversity, the CAS for Cameroon excludes biodiversity 
considerations. Its goal o f vastly increasing export revenues to assist Cameroon in the 
repayment o f its foreign debt to the World Bank and other donors ignores the linkages 
between increased exports o f natural resources, mostly tropical timber in this case, and 
forest degradation and biodiversity loss.
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Forest Policy Reform.
Since the late 1980s, successive structural adjustment programmes for Cameroon 
have included provisions for more transparent mechanisms to allocate timber concessions 
and for a simplified forestry tax system. The implementation o f these proposals, which 
calls for competitive bidding for concession areas and improved tax collection, represents 
an improvement over the status quo o f forestry management in Cameroon (chapter 5). 
However, while these measures promise to increase government revenues, they do not 
inherently lead to increased forest and biodiversity protection. In contrast, World Bank 
environmental statements commit the institution to creating frameworks for biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable forest management to be achieved with the participation o f 
local communities (World Bank 1994f, World Bank 1995a).
9.4.2 Infrastructure Development
Transport Sector Loan.
Although the 1992 transport sector loan included road building and road 
rehabilitation activities in ecologically fragile rainforest areas inhabited by indigenous 
forest people, the loan was presented to the World Bank’s Board o f Executive Directors 
for approval without having undertaken environmental studies. Both a full environmental 
impact assessment and an indigenous peoples’ plan would have been required under 
mandatory World Bank policies. World Bank environmental staff state that they provided 
the environmental sign-off on the project because they were given insufficient information 
and time for an in-depth review o f  the project by the operational side o f  the Bank, 
represented by the infrastructure department in this case. Once the controversial nature o f 
this loan was publicized, they acknowledged that important World Bank policies had been 
violated (chapter 6).
Proposed Oil Pipeline
The proposed 1,100 kilometer long pipeline will traverse Cameroon from the north 
o f the country to the Atlantic coast. The World Bank plans to co-finance the project with 
three o f the world’s largest oil companies, Exxon, Shell and ELF. As a result o f World 
Bank pressure, the oil companies are seeking to comply with World Bank environmental
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and social policies. They prepared voluminous environmental studies which were rejected 
by World Bank environmental experts because o f poor quality. According to interviews 
with several World Bank staff, international media attention and campaigns by non­
governmental organizations have increased the role o f the institution’s environmental staff 
in this project by raising the costs for the World Bank if  its environmental policies are not 
being adhered to (chapter 6).
9.4.3 GEF Biodiversity Conservation Project
The World Bank is the Implementing Agency for the GEF biodiversity project in 
Cameroon. As a result, World Bank policies apply to this project. Northern conservation 
organizations have largely been put in charge of the project’s field work. The choice o f 
these organizations signals a more open and participatory GEF in donor countries. This 
pleases donor governments, which face demands for more openness and transparency o f 
international financial institutions from pressure groups at home. It also leads Northern 
conservation organizations to lobby actively for funding for the GEF, which has been 
especially important in the United States where the U.S. Congress has been reluctant to 
approve the U.S. financial contribution to the GEF.
According to the G EF’s own evaluation, local communities and indigenous 
peoples in Cameroon, whose traditional forest lands are to be protected under the project, 
have had minimal involvement in its design and implementation. W hile World Bank 
environmental statements consistently emphasize the need for local community 
involvement in project planning and execution as indispensable to ensuring project 
sustainability over the long-term, the GEF project document does not specify how this is 
to be done, nor does it allocate financial resources for this purpose (chapter 7). Further, 
the main project document only exists in an English language version, although French is 
the European language more readily understood in Cameroon (World Bank-GEF 1995d).
9.4.4 Common Patterns
The World Bank’s and GEF’s analytical work on the environment, their numerous 
environmental publications and conferences, as well as the World Bank’s pioneering role
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in establishing a comprehensive set o f mandatory environmental and social guidelines, 
stand in contrast to the findings o f the Cameroon case studies. Limiting the case studies to 
a single country involves considerable methodological risks. In order to ensure that the 
Cameroon examples were not isolated cases, they were placed in the context o f the World 
Bank’s and G EF’s own evaluation reports o f their overall activities. The results show a 
remarkable consistency o f inadequate attention to policy implementation across the board 
(World Bank 1996a, World Bank 1997e, Global Environment Facility 1994a).
Wade suggests that the dimension o f organizational integration o f environmental 
considerations has been neglected in the study o f environmental regimes (Wade 1996). 
Theories o f organization can contribute to our understanding o f how this integration takes 
place. Theories o f organization are useful in explaining the decoupling o f official 
discourse and policies from operational praxis. Applying these theories to the World Bank 
and the GEF does not mean casting them as monolithic blocs the activities o f which are 
uniform everywhere. Yet a broad, general picture emerges from the institutions’ own 
evaluation efforts and the case studies presented here, portraying an internal culture which 
lacks incentives for compliance with public policy commitments.
9.5 Theories of Organization
According to theories o f organization, obtaining and increasing their autonomy is 
a central goal o f institutions (Vaubel 1991). Other organizational goals o f institutions 
include increasing the size o f their budget and o f their staff. Theories o f  organization 
emphasize that institutions have to be understood as full actors in their own right. New 
Institutional Economics and the Public Choice Approach add that public institutions are 
self-interested entities which cannot simply be assumed to be neutral mechanisms always 
acting in the public interest (Ascher 1983, Le Pestre 1986, Vaubel 1991, Toye 1995).
An added element is that international institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
GEF, may find it easier to pursue their organizational goals than national institutions 
because they may be farther removed from political control than national bureaucracies in
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the donor nations (Vaubel 1991). An example o f this would be the limited access of 
members o f Parliament o f shareholding countries to the institutions’ documentation, such 
as internal evaluation reports. Similarly, in the United States, the Freedom o f Information 
Act which applies to all U.S. government agencies, cannot be invoked to obtain 
information from the international financial institutions.
According to Richard Webb, one o f the main authors o f the World Bank’s official 
history o f its first fifty years, the World Bank’s foremost goal is to ensure the survival o f 
the institution by ensuring continued access to donor resources (Kapur et al.1997). In his 
view, issues such as the environment and biodiversity, women in development and other 
new subject matters, are only skin-deep in order to respond to donor demands and keep 
resources coming to the institution.8 The obligation to respond to donor demands has led 
to “mission overload” (Wade 1997b) and a “cluttered agenda” (Ascher 1983) as the 
institutions take on new issues without carrying out internal adjustments. Expansion into 
new areas becomes imperative because it is linked to access to resources (Wade 1997b). 
An example o f this is the World Bank’s strategic decision to play a leading role in the 
GEF, which bolstered its credentials as an environment-friendly aid agency and 
established its leadership in an area o f increasing interest to its major donors (Fairman 
1996).
Two additional parameters can be useful in the analysis o f international 
institutions. One consists o f analysing to what degree the institutions tend to promote their 
own organizational goals over the values for which they were established. The second 
seeks to understand an institution’s position on a spectrum which leads from institutional 
learning to institutional adaptation.
9.5.1 Institutional Objectives vs. Value Allocation
Overarching institutional goals, such as expanding budgetary resources and 
institutional autonomy, may be distinct from the objectives (value allocation) for which 
the institutions were established (Le Pestre 1986). The World Bank’s objectives are 
poverty alleviation and sustainable development. The GEF’s objectives are primarily to 
address the loss o f biodiversity and climate change.
8 Discussion with Richard Webb on 5 May 1998 in Washington, D.C.
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These objectives (value allocation) may enhance the more self-interested 
institutional goals or they may only partially coincide with them (LePestre 1986).
Crane and Finkel suggest that the World Bank’s interest in maintaining control over its 
domain may be completely divorced from its stated objectives (value allocation). They 
cite the fact that large scale loans continue to be made to client governments which have a 
poor record o f redistributing income and meeting basic needs (Crane & Finkel 1981).
The examination of the World Bank’s policy dialogue with Cameroon (chapter 5) 
indicates a similar disconnection between stated objectives and underlying institutional 
interests. Financing continued over the past decade despite the fact that the government 
showed little inclination to implement reforms in the forestry sector, which were a 
requirement o f structural adjustment loans, or to increase its efforts in the poverty 
reduction area. The World Bank’s institutional interests are explicitly reflected in the 
Country Assistance Strategy with respect to Cameroon’s difficulties to “ ...service its 
external debts, even to preferred creditors” (World Bank 1996h:9). The reference to 
preferred creditors is a self-reference since the World Bank is the preferred creditor for 
Cameroon.
According to the GEF evaluation study, the GEF Biodiversity protection project 
for Cameroon pays little attention to local institutions and long-term sustainability 
(LeBlanc 1997). This again seems to be an indication o f the weight o f institutional goals 
(demonstrating biodiversity friendliness in order to please the donor community) relative 
to the intrinsic value o f protecting biodiversity.
9.5.2 Institutional Learning vs. Institutional Adaptation
Organizations both learn and adapt because this enhances their ability to survive 
(Fiol & Lyles 1985). Organizational learning includes changes brought about by the 
adoption o f qualitatively new objectives and priorities, while organizational adaptation is 
a reaction to new pressures or incentives but without adjustments in the organization’s 
underlying goals and priorities.
Following public criticism o f the World Bank’s role in aggravating environmental 
degradation in developing countries, some o f the most influential shareholding countries 
demanded environmental reforms, especially the establishment o f far-reaching
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environmental policies to guide operations (chapter 4), The dependence on the financial 
backing o f these member countries increased the institution’s awareness that its survival 
depended to some degree on sensing the mood in the main donor countries and to adapt to 
it (Hancock 1989). Taking new issues on board helped provide for greater certainty for the 
institution when major donors were moving in this direction (Ascher 1983). As Wade 
points out, the World Bank adopts new issues (e.g. biodiversity) in a ritual way since there 
is no adjustment in the institution’s underlying goals. Rather, the response within the 
institution is to decouple gestures being made for external legitimacy reasons from the 
operational level (Wade 1997b).
The evidence o f the lack o f incentives for learning is highlighted by the failure to 
translate the results o f the World Bank’s and GEF’s own evaluation reports into concrete 
changes (chapter 8). As the synthesis report for the World Bank’s Quality Assurance 
Group states: “The lessons o f past experience are well known, yet they are generally 
ignored in the design o f new operations” (World Bank 1997e:15).
According to Tumham, international financial institutions’ preoccupation with the 
environment is reminiscent o f their preoccupation with ‘basic needs’ projects in the 1970s. 
While the debate about why these projects failed still continues, Tumham emphasizes that 
there is no debate about one critical weakness, which is that many projects were quickly 
multiplied before much experience was accumulated and before design modifications 
could be made (Tumham 1991).
This experience appears to repeat itself with the GEF and its biodiversity portfolio. 
There has been no chance to learn from and reflect on the early experience in the 
biodiversity area because o f the pressure to allocate funding for an increasing number o f 
projects (Wells 1994). In spite o f the size and influence o f their portfolios, both the World 
Bank and the GEF appear to have little information about the environmental and 
biodiversity impacts o f their funding flows (Fox & Brown 1998).
9.6 A Political Ecology Framework
This and the following sections return to the question about the characteristics o f 
political power structures which can arbitrate and translate between geographic scales
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ranging from the global to the local (Harvey 1996: 204). The W orld Bank and the GEF are 
global institutions which pursue goals established at the global level, such as the 
protection of biodiversity. At the same time, their policies commit them to pursue these 
global goals in consultation with local people who are to be given a voice in decision­
making concerning projects which directly affect them. These policies, such as the 
operational directive on environmental assessment, are potential bridges between the 
global and local levels. Importantly, these policies create frames o f reference and 
accountability mechanisms for those inside and outside o f the institutions who want these 
potential bridges to become channels o f communication and negotiation with the goal o f 
finding viable ways o f protecting biodiversity based on the aspirations and interests o f 
diverse parties. An analysis o f international financial institutions, which examines the 
interface o f the institutions’ environmental commitments with the external as well as 
internal political factors driving the institutions’ behaviour, can contribute to answering 
Harveys’s question about the nature o f political power structures able to build such 
bridges. Political ecology thinking applied to international financial institutions can 
provide insights into the external and internal conditions which are critical to ensuring 
congruence between stated policy commitments and operational practice.
While the World Bank and the GEF are not monolithic entities, their range o f 
activities is complex and their staff is diverse. The research presented in previous chapters 
validates W ade’s general observations about the World Bank’s ability to decouple 
institutional discourse and policies from operational practice (Wade 1997b). Yet this 
decoupling may ultimately lead to a loss o f credibility for the institutions. The danger is, 
as Vaubel points out, that the loss o f  credibility o f international institutions carries the risk 
o f discrediting and crowding out unambiguously desirable and necessary forms o f 
international cooperation (Vaubel 1991). In Cameroon, for example, the area o f 
biodiversity conservation is largely dominated by an ineffective and conflictual GEF 
project (chapter 7), which may be crowding out less well funded programmes which are 
more attuned to local realities, such as bilateral efforts to assist with the establishment o f 
community forests.
The case studies and the institutions’ own evaluation reports show that their public 
commitments often do not match their concrete actions. Despite these problems,
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the World Bank and the GEF are unlikely to be replaced by new institutions in the 
foreseeable future and will continue to play critical roles both globally and locally. 
However, fundamental reforms are required to improve their compliance with their stated 
social and enviromnental policies. Such reforms warrant academic research and public 
attention. A political ecology focused on international financial institutions, which makes 
use o f political science, theory o f organization and perhaps additional perspectives, can 
provide helpful sign posts on the road to reforms.
A political ecology directed at the institutions has to include an analysis o f what 
Toye refers to as ‘opportunism’ o f institutions, i.e. viewing them as self-interested entities 
(Toye 1995). In addition, it has to analyse the role o f the overseers o f the institutions, their 
governing bodies, the home governments which they represent and last, but not least, the 
role o f the public in both recipient and donor nations, which the institutions are meant to 
serve.
Beetham suggests that simplified constructs help explain this underlying 
complexity (Beetham 1996). One such construct consists o f the black box, the 
autonomous space in which internal institutional structures and processes take place. 
Following this analysis, the next section returns to the political science perspective and 
recommends a framework for improved external oversight o f  the institutions.
9.7 The Black Box: A Simplified Construct
In addition to the broad parameters o f analysis o f institutions presented in previous 
sections, more detail is needed to understand how the organizational structure facilitates 
the decoupling o f discourse and policies from operations (Wade 1997b). This 
organizational structure can be pictured as residing in a “black box” which exists in the 
autonomous space in which the institutions operate.
/ /
Policy Statements Black Box World Bank Loans<=>
/
EZZ> GEF Grants
Fig.9.1 The Black Box: A Simplified Construct
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At least a part o f  the contents o f the black box can be gleaned from World Bank 
and GEF evaluation reports (Gray 1990, Wapenhans 1992, Global Environment Facility 
1994a, World Bank 1996a, Porter et al.1998). The contents not only reveal some o f the 
explanatory variables for the gap between policies and operational practice, they also 
generate proposals for possible solutions. Since the institutions are complex entities, it is 
unlikely that any one single variable carries sufficient explanatory power by itself, 
although the “approval culture,” i.e. the pressure to approve projects, is often listed as the 
major underlying factor (Wapenhans 1992). Depending on specific situations, a 
combination of several causes is likely to come into play. The following list (fig, 9.2) is 
not exhaustive and does not reflect a ranking o f  importance:
Imperative to Move Projects
Staff Incentives
Intra-Organizational Structures
Professionalisation
Apolitical Mandate
Fig. 9.2. Partial Contents o f  Black Box
In addition to these elements, other factors, such as informal political interests and 
specific sub-cultures, are likely to be influential. The following sections examine each o f  
the elements listed in Fig. 9.2 and conclude with a table which juxtaposes these elements 
with possible proposals for solutions which they themselves generate. Implementation o f 
these proposed solutions would provide the political space in the institutions to implement 
their policy mandate o f effective local participation in global level decision-making and 
thereby create the space for mediation between global and local levels.
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9.7.1 Imperative to Move Projects
According to the World Bank’s official history, fulfilling lending quotas has been 
an imperative for World Bank staff since the McNamara Presidency in the late 1960s 
(Kapur et al 1997).9 At the root o f this pressure to lend is that failure to obligate available 
funds within a given time period would convince donor governments that they were 
providing more money than needed, which in turn could lead them to reduce their 
contribution in future replenishment periods (Lancaster 1997).
The pressure to lend was also identified by the World Bank’s own evaluation 
reports as a principal cause o f lack o f project quality (Wapenhans 1992, World Bank 
1997e). The GEF suffers from similar pressure to move projects, albeit with grant funding 
and not loans, which is leading to hastily prepared projects with uncertain outcome 
(Global Environment Facility 1994a, Wells 1994, Fairman 1996),
An example o f the “approval culture” is the Cameroon Transport Sector loan. 
According to World Bank staff, this loan was very much driven by the pressure to lend. 
“After the devaluation o f the Franc CFA in January 1994, there was a massive search for 
lending opportunities and to get money to West Africa. The Transport Sector loan offered 
such an opportunity to lend money quickly.”10 For this reason no time-consuming 
environmental impact assessment was carried out (chapter 6).
Another indication o f the pressure to move projects is the continuation of lending 
in the face o f  non-compliance with the institutions’ goals or conditions. Adjustment 
lending to Cameroon continued despite the Government’s lack o f compliance with forest 
policy-related conditionalities and lack o f commitment to poverty alleviation (chapter 5). 
Lancaster writes in the official World Bank history, “The real reason for continuing to 
lend for adjustment despite non-compliance by recipients appears to come from within the 
Bank itse lf’ (Lancaster 1997:173). One senior World Bank consultant summarizes the 
present situation:
“The pressure to move money quickly persists. Careers continue to 
be made on the basis o f  moving large amounts o f money fast. The 
environmental people and those working on resettlement feel
9 Robert McNamara’s years as President o f  the World Bank lasted from 1968 through 1981, a period during 
which World Bank lending increased sixfold in real terms (Rich 1994).
!0 Interview with World Bank environmental staff, 11 August 1998, Washington, D.C.
273
marginalized. Their work is considered as putting obstacles in the 
way of an efficient loan approval system. The World Bank is 
backsliding on its commitment to the environment. Wolfensohn has 
accelerated project approval and there are fewer quality control 
mechanisms.” 11
9.7.2 Staff Incentives
The role o f incentives appears to be critical both for compliance with policies as 
well as to enable institutions to learn and thereby improve project quality (Miller-Adams 
1996, Fox & Brown 1998). According to Wilson, the role o f  rewards and penalties 
associated with alternative courses o f action is more important than a change in attitude of 
an institution and its officials (Wilson 1989). The primary incentives for staff in the 
institutions remain those o f a lending institution (Wade 1997b). This means that career 
advancement is usually based on a staff member’s contribution to moving projects rapidly 
to the approval stage. At the same time, there are no internal incentives to reward 
compliance with policy guidelines or to sanction failure when they are being sidestepped.
The establishment o f incentives to promote compliance with social and 
environmental guidelines requires a commitment to supervising the implementation o f 
projects. But supervision is an area that receives little attention (World Bank 1995j). A 
World Bank report on institutional development puts it bluntly: “Unfortunately, we were 
told [by World Bank staff] that no incentives exist in the Bank for good supervision. .. .all 
incentives stop once a project is taken to the Board. Responsibility for project outcomes is 
very weak” (Gray et al. 1990:26).
In addition to an incentive structure which favours rapid loan approval, staff are 
discouraged from calling attention to possible problems since this might lead to project 
delays. “I f  you are concerned about development and give your honest judgement, you 
w on’t get ahead. Being honest is perceived as rocking the boat. There is no debate, you 
are just being shut off.”12 This assessment is echoed by many World Bank staff members. 
A poverty specialist adds: “We take considerable risk when we provide comments about
11 Interview with a senior, long-term World Bank consultant, 15 November 1996.
12 Interview with senior World Bank staff member, 21 May 1999, Washington, D.C.
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the lack of poverty impact of a given project. Most of us are acquiescent.”13 Blaikie 
reaches a similar conclusion in the broader context o f development aid : “The individual is 
not paid to raise unnecessary dust in the formulation o f a project” (Blaikie 1985:63).
The expression used by World Bank staff to describe this disincentive is the 
“Shoot the messenger syndrome.” This situation is aggravated for foreign staff because o f 
the “G4 Syndrome” named for the visa requirement granting World Bank/ GEF foreign 
staff residency permits in the United States, which depend on their continued 
employment at the World Bank or the GEF. Once the visa is taken away, the staff have to 
leave the United States within three months. According to a senior World Bank staff 
member “Officials have to ensure that not even a minimum of responsibility falls on them 
and no one is willing to take much initiative.” 14
Wade summarizes the situation succinctly when he refers to “the slipping clutch o f 
the incentive system” to explain the gap between World Bank policies and operational 
practice (Wade 1997:614).
9.7.3 Intra-Organizational Structures
Internal organizational characteristics, especially the control o f internal resources 
and budgets, may deny the institutions the flexibility required to implement policy 
provisions with regards to the environment/biodiversity.
The recent re-organization at the World Bank under President Wolfensohn has 
farther reduced the budgetary autonomy o f the regional technical departments, now 
renamed “technical networks.” Their responsibility it is to carry out environmental 
reviews and provide the environmental “sign-off’ on projects. At the same time, 
however, budgetary resources have been reallocated to the country departments, which are 
subject to the most pressure to bring loans to the approval stage. This shift discourages 
independent input from environmental and social science expertise by putting staff in the 
technical networks into the “market place,” where they must compete with one another to 
sell their services to the country departments.15 In practical terms, as Wade points out, 
this means that a staff member who becomes known for being “tough” (e.g. on
13 Telephone interview with World Bank staff member, 21 May 1999, Washington, D.C.
14 Interview with Senior World Bank official, 25 May 1999, Washington, D.C.
15 Interviews with several World Bank staff during 1997-1999 in Washington, D.C.
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environmental standards, consultation o f local populations, e tc )  endangers his or her 
marketability and may eventually be asked to look for employment elsewhere (Wade 
1997:717).
The persistent marginality o f social science and environmental expertise at the 
World Bank came to the fore in the 1996 Cameroon Transport Sector loan. World Bank 
environmental staff provided the “sign-off’ for the project working under great time 
constraints and on the basis of insufficient information on the loan components. Only 
when details about the loan became public did World Bank environmental experts learn 
about its potential environmental impacts and admit that the loan was violating important 
World Bank environmental policies (chapter 6). However, at this point they were 
overruled and the project went forward.
9.7.4 Professionalization
Because the institutions are dominated by economists, many professional staff are 
reluctant to incorporate new considerations into their work if  this requires modes o f 
analysis that are perceived as being less rigorous than the traditional economic framework 
(Ascher 1983). Thus, integrating social or biodiversity concerns into programmes and 
projects represents a difficult challenge to standard methodologies and can be seen as a 
threat to professional norms. The absence o f environmental and biodiversity concerns 
from the Country Assistance Strategy for Cameroon is an indication o f  how public 
commitments to integrating the environment in overall planning have not yet translated 
into concrete development strategies (chapter 5).
According to Ascher, the rejection or minimizing o f  environmental goals occurs 
because the professional establishment in the institutions believes it ought to be kept 
secondary to the main work o f promoting economic growth (Ascher 1983). Prescriptive 
essentialism, which holds that a policy measure is inherently appropriate, is widespread in 
the institutions and does not allow serious consideration o f new variables. According to 
Gasper, prescriptive essentialism is very common because o f institutions’ and professions’ 
need for self-belief (Gasper 1996a).
Miller-Adams emphasizes how recruitment contributes to the endurance o f the 
institutional culture, or prescriptive essentialism, by mostly choosing candidates from
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United States and United Kingdom universities who are steeped in the neo-liberal 
economic development model with its reliance on technocratic approaches (Miller-Adams 
1996).
An additional aspect o f professionalization resides in the fact that the counterparts 
o f World Bank and GEF officials in developing countries are usually staff in the finance 
or planning ministries, which leads to a likely convergence o f organizational and 
professional interests (Crane & Finkel 1981). Mostly interested in additional transfers o f 
resources, these ministries are physically and administratively remote from local 
communities living in biodiversity-rich areas. An additional disincentive to addressing 
biodiversity concerns is that there is no assurance that doing so will lead to financial or 
political returns.
The World Bank’s professionals are also faced with what Wade describes as 
“mission overload” (Wade 1997a). However, these multiple tasks obscure institutional 
priorities and leave staff more exposed to making their own value judgements. According 
to Ascher, senior management at the World Bank never makes clear in a general way how 
much weight should be given to a particular aspect, for example the environment, relative 
to all the others (Ascher 1983).
9.7.5 Apolitical Mandate
According to its charter (Articles o f Agreement), the World Bank must not 
interfere in the political affairs o f any member and must not be influenced in its decisions 
by political considerations (World Bank 1989a). The projection o f a neutral civil service 
discourages Bank officials from overt political analysis. As the Implementing Agency for 
all GEF investment projects, the World Bank’s apolitical stance applies to its GEF 
portfolio as well.
Certainly, decisions to lend large amounts o f money to governments do require 
political judgements, even if  not in an explicit fashion. At the programme level, the 
depoliticization o f situations leads to presenting matters “ .. .which affect different groups 
o f people differently and on which they have different perspectives, as simply technical 
issues amenable to technical solutions, which the purveyor o f the discourse is able to 
provide” (Gasper 1996a: 151). The proposed technical solutions, however, ignore the
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political and social context which create the problems to begin with (Blaikie 1985). 
Furthermore, as in Blaikie’s classical model o f soil conservation, environmental and 
biodiversity issues represent complex socio-environmental problems which are not 
amenable to quick technical fixes.
The GEF Biodiversity Conservation for Cameroon, which excludes an analysis of 
the forces driving biodiversity loss in the country, is an example o f the technical approach 
to biodiversity conservation (chapter 7). Instead, it focuses on the establishment of 
protected areas and ignores the underlying causes, which are sensitive political questions 
such as the absence o f  land rights for local people living in the forest areas.
However, the World Bank’s charter may not be as restrictive as is often claimed by 
World Bank staff. It is sparse and flexible and has allowed the institution great leeway to 
pursue new goals (Miller-Adams 1996). The Bank’s own legal counsel left some 
ambiguity in the interpretation o f  the relevant article (Art. IV: 10), stating that Bank staff 
may not advocate openly a particular kind o f government, but if  a borrowing government 
behaves in a fashion that undermines the Bank’s economic objectives, then staff may be 
justified to call for political changes or terminate lending (Lancaster 1997).
9.7.6 The Black Box’s Roadmap to Possible Solutions
While not exhaustive and lacking in detail, the elements contained in the black box 
examined in the previous sections generates their own logical roadmap o f possible 
solutions (fig. 9.3). The following table, while oversimplifying a complex situation, 
provides a sense o f overall direction similar to a roadmap.
Imperative to Move Projects Change methodologies of internal decision-making 
away from quantitative targets
Staff Incentives Revise incentive structure and ensure 
enforceability of new structure
Intra-Organizational
Structures
Create autonomous budgets for departments 
charged with overseeing compliance with 
environmental and social policies
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Professionalism Create political space for non-economist 
professionals and broaden outreach within client 
countries beyond ministries of finance and 
planning
Apolitical Mandate Acknowledge that participation of local people is 
embedded in local political realities and that 
political-economic analysis is indispensable to 
project design and implementation
Fig. 9.3 The Back B ox’s Roadmap to Possible Solutions
The identified possible solutions contribute to defining the characteristics o f a 
political power structure that can create spaces o f mediation between a diversity o f views 
at different geographic scales. According to the suggested solutions, some o f these 
characteristics would be: (1) qualitative considerations over quantitative targets; (2) 
incentive structure which reinforces stated policies and goals; (3) independent oversight 
within the institutions; (4) expanding the breadth o f knowledge within the institution and 
in its networks; (5) recognize political nature o f development and environment 
programmes and include political-economic analysis in decision-making.
Implementation o f these possible solutions, especially the shift from a focus on the 
quantity o f money to the quality o f projects, requires the transformation o f institutional 
culture that Wapenhans has called for (Wapenhans 1992). While advocating such a 
transformation as necessary (World Bank 1995c), senior leadership at the World Bank and 
the GEF has been reluctant to carry out reforms, such as changes in staff incentives, which 
are conducive to changing the institutional culture. The reasons for this reluctance may 
have to do with the short and medium term risks o f slowing down the project pipeline 
which might reduce the institutions’ ability to raise funds from the main donor 
governments. With less resources available to them, the institutions may be concerned 
about a loss o f influence. However, the lack o f in-depth reforms may carry long-term risks 
such as the loss o f credibility and political support in both donor and recipient countries.
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The focus o f this study has been on the World Bank and the GEF because o f their 
global leadership role in the areas o f development and protection o f the global 
environment and the emphasis o f both institutions on the need to protect biodiversity. 
However, the institutional problems encountered by the World Bank and the GEF are not 
unique to these institutions. On a smaller scale and to varying degrees these problems are 
present in other governmental and non-governmental organisations. The following section 
sets the World Bank’s and G EF’s institutional problems in the broader context o f other 
development aid agencies.
9.7.7 Perspectives on Other Donor Agencies
The World Bank and GEF are pioneers in establishing specific environmental and 
social policies to guide their programme managers and obtain consistency throughout their 
project portfolios. These policies provide a framework for accountability. The case studies 
presented in this thesis focused on the compliance o f the institutions with their mandatory 
policy guidelines and have found an uneven and often contradictory record of 
implementation o f operational policies. The regional development banks have adopted 
similar policies, often with a time lag o f  a few years, but little is known about the 
relevance o f these policies for their lending operations. According to a recent study on the 
effectiveness o f poverty reduction strategies o f the European development agencies, these 
agencies generally lack clear policy guidelines for their programme managers (Cox & 
Healy 2000:143). The study contrasts this state o f affairs with the World Bank, which 
does provide operational directives and best practice guidelines to its staff, and implies 
that the European agencies should consider adopting a similar system for themselves (Cox 
& Healy 2000: 224). However, the study finds that where specific guidelines on poverty 
reduction do exist in European agencies (for example in Sida, Danida, KfW and DG VIII), 
these are rarely implemented in practice (Cox & Healy 2000:146).
These findings show that European development agencies face similar sets o f 
institutional problems as the World Bank and GEF. The organisational structure and 
working culture o f the agencies, despite the differences among them, are considered to be 
major stumbling blocks to translating the agencies’ stated goals into practice (Cox & 
Healy 2000). Since the problems are similar, the possible solutions for the World Bank
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and GEF presented in figure 9.3 are also likely to be applicable to other international and 
national agencies. This point is made by Berg in his analysis o f obstacles to institutional 
learning, which uses the World Bank as the main source o f organizational insights. Berg 
identifies the pressure to spend, the primary importance o f the volume o f lending, internal 
incentive structures and a lack o f project supervision as key factors in an institution’s 
inadequate response to failure (Berg 2000: 36-37). The author concludes that the 
institutional difficulties and the prescriptions which readily flow from them probably hold 
true for the broader community o f development aid agencies (Berg 2000:24). The 
prescriptions derived from B erg’s diagnosis overlap with some o f the possible solutions 
presented in Fig. 9.3, such as the need to turn away from quantitative targets and to 
change staff incentives accordingly. However, to date there appears to be no record o f the 
implementation o f these prescriptions or o f the possible solutions by development aid 
agencies.
One o f the reasons for the lack o f implementation o f these possible solutions may 
reside in the fact that the debate about the effectiveness o f international aid is o f recent 
date. In addition, there is limited knowledge about the impact o f aid. The World Bank’s 
and GEF's evaluation reports (chapter 8) show that the institutions often know little about 
the actual impact o f their projects. Similarly, according to a recent volume on learning in 
development cooperation, there appears to be little solid knowledge about the impact o f 
development aid provided by other agencies (Carlsson & Wohlgemut 2000:7).
While the list o f  possible solutions (Fig. 9.3) was derived from the case studies as 
well as the World Bank’s and GEF’s own evaluation reports, recent research on 
development cooperation in a broader context provides similar recommendations 
concerning the problems internal to the institutions.
The “approval culture” identified by Wapenhans (Wapenhans 1992) is 
present in other agencies as well. Cox and Healy identify the need to disburse aid within 
allotted timeframes and career advancement linked to disbursement rates as central 
problems (Cox & Healy 2000:150). As possible solutions, they advocate personal 
incentive systems to encourage long-tenn and participatory approaches for poverty 
reduction. Similarly, the editors o f a recent volume on learning in development 
cooperation consider disbursement targets, i.e. money has to be spent regardless o f
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whether there are useful purposes for it, to be an underlying institutional problem of 
development aid agencies (Carlsson & Wohlgemut 2000: 11). The authors also advocate 
an incentive structure in the agencies which should reflect the objectives o f the 
programmes the agencies are promoting (Carlsson & W ohlgemut 2000:18). A study on 
the obstacles to institutional learning concerning the Swedish development agency Sida 
found that the paradox between quantity o f disbursements and quality o f projects seemed 
to be the cause o f a schizophrenic state o f affairs within Sida (Edgren 2000:54). However, 
the study also makes clear that the problem was not peculiar to Sida and describes it as 
being ingrained in the whole culture o f the aid industry, including the World Bank and 
UNDP (Edgren 2000:54).
In addition to the ‘Imperative to Move Projects’ and ‘Staff Incentives’ (Fig. 9.3.), 
other areas o f institutional problems and possible solutions listed in figure 9.3. also 
overlap with recommendations o f the most recent literature. Concerning the area o f 
‘Professionalism’ (Fig. 9.3), the study on European aid for poverty reduction encounters 
an over-emphasis on economics and engineering skills in the agencies and calls for more 
“soft area” expertise in areas such as social development and participatory approaches 
(Cox & Healy 2000:151). Carlsson and Wohlgemut consider a too narrow definition o f 
professional expertise for staff o f the development agencies as an obstacle to institutional 
learning (Carlsson & Wohlgemut 2000:13). Concerning the area o f Tntra-Organizational 
Structures’ (Fig. 9.3), the editors identify the quality o f contacts between the operational 
and policy-making levels o f institutions as a major hurdle in improving development 
effectiveness through institutional learning (Carlsson & W ohlgemut 2000:13). With 
regard to the problem area o f  ‘Apolitical M andate’ (Fig, 9.3.), Carlsson and Wolhgemut 
reach a conclusion which is analogous to the possible solution presented in figure 9.3. by 
stating that political consideration should be brought into the analysis (Carlsson & 
Wohlgemut 2000:9).
The focus o f  this thesis is the World Bank and the GEF because o f their 
umnatched institutional resources and pioneering role in establishing policy frameworks 
which commit the World Bank to both poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation 
and confirm the GEF as the world’s premier entity in charge o f financing biodiversity 
protection on a global scale. The implementation o f the possible solutions suggested by
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this thesis (Fig. 9.3) and similarly by recent studies which analyse a broader set o f 
institutions, is likely to require strengthened external oversight and public scrutiny of 
international public financial flows.
9.8 A Framework for Strengthened External Oversight
In addition to the internal dynamics o f the institutions analysed in the previous 
sections, the case studies indicate that external oversight plays a critical role in helping the 
institutions focus on compliance with their own policies. Consequently, a framework for 
strengthened oversight o f the institutions including both governments and the non­
governmental sector is necessary.
Previous sections in this chapter show that while the most influential 
shareholder governments establish the institutions’ strategic priorities, the institutions act 
in an autonomous space in which internal dynamics detennine the implementation o f 
policies to a large degree. The increasing volume and complexity o f projects and 
programmes has reduced the capacity o f the governing bodies, the World Bank’s Board o f 
Executive Directors and the GEF Council, to oversee the institutions’ activities. As a 
result, the institutions’staff has considerable discretion to accept or resist new approaches, 
even if  these, as in the case o f the biodiversity-related policies, are mandated by the 
Executive Board (Ascher 1983).
The World Bank states that the Executive Directors have responsibility over 
virtually all Bank policy, so their role cannot be clearly separated from most o f  the Bank’s 
initiatives and activities (World Bank 1998a: 10). From the institution’s point o f view, the 
apparent merging between it and its governing body may be desirable. However, from the 
perspective o f  oversight and accountability, this situation is problematic.
In addition, the perceived need for confidentiality o f many types o f information is 
not conducive to facilitating oversight. Task managers, who are responsible for preparing 
individual projects, thrive through lack o f transparency (Ascher 1993). Existing 
institutional structures impede information flow not only to the public, but also to the
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governing bodies.16 In addition, according to a senior World Bank consultant, staff often 
manipulate data to promote their projects with the governing bodies.17
However, increased transparency and infonnation flow alone are insufficient if  not 
accompanied by greater capacity o f the governing bodies to absorb and evaluate the 
information. The governing bodies both in Washington, D.C. and in the home offices in 
their capitals need the staff and the resources to allow them to fulfill their oversight 
function. In addition, government representatives will have more incentives to monitor 
and improve the compliance o f  international financial institutions with environmental and 
other policies if  there is greater scrutiny o f the institutions’ activities by the public in both 
donor and recipient countries.
Public scrutiny appears to be a critical factor in overcoming institutional inertia 
and sustained external pressure turns out to be necessary in encouraging compliance with 
World Bank policies (Fox & Brown 1998). The different treatment o f indigenous peoples 
in the case o f the GEF project and the Oil Pipeline project are cases in point. Assuming 
that the GEF Biodiversity project, as an environmental project, was benign by definition, 
it received no public attention. As a result, the GEF was not criticized for failing to make 
reference to the indigenous peoples living in some o f the areas to be protected. The 
Exxon, Shell and ELF oil pipeline, on the other hand, was subject to intense public 
scrutiny from the beginning and the oil companies are making efforts to be perceived as 
complying with World Bank policies, including the policy on indigenous peoples.
To date, public attention to the institutions’ activities is limited to a few high 
profile projects. In order to achieve greater adherence to environmental policies across the 
board, building the capacity o f the still incipient non-governmental efforts in independent 
monitoring and evaluation o f policy and programmes is indispensable (Fox & Brown 
1998).
16 Interview with Ernst Broder, former head o f  the World Bank’s Independent Inspection Panel, May 1999.
17 From minutes taken by Katherine Marshall, World Bank, at the Conference on “Reinventing the World 
Bank” at Northwestern University (with SOAS), 14-16May, 1999.
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9.9 Conclusion
The international financial institutions have made great strides over the past 
decade in adopting environmental and biodiversity-friendly policies. The GEF owes its 
establishment to the growing concern, particularly in Northern donor nations, about the 
loss o f biodiversity in tropical countries. A growing body o f research documents the 
implications o f biodiversity loss for growing inequality and impoverishment o f rural 
communities and indigenous peoples (Bell 1987, Barraclough & Ghimire 1995). As a 
result, biodiversity conservation is moving beyond the biological sciences and is 
increasingly recognized as a political issue. According to Harvey, despite the bourgeois 
aesthetic and politics o f much o f the Northern environmental movement, its success in 
raising the profile o f enviromnental issues on the global political agenda has now led to a 
situation where environmental issues are not easily controlled by powerful interests as a 
mere adjunct o f bourgeois fashion (Harvey 1998).
Both the World Bank and the GEF have become more open to consulting with 
non-governmental organizations in recent years. This openness represents a conceptual 
breakthrough from previous decades, when consultations were between the institutions 
and governments only. Yet, as the research presented in this thesis and the institutions’ 
own evaluation reports show, the institutions’ mandatory policy provisions on the 
participation o f affected people in their projects are routinely sidestepped. There is still 
some way to go in moving from the policy stage to one o f implementation.
One way o f  looking at political ecology is to understand it as an important field in 
which the regulation o f  societal relationships with nature takes place (Keil et al. 1998:12). 
A critical area o f this regulation is reflected in the enviromnental and social policies 
adopted by the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility, because they intend to 
regulate how activities backed by large-scale international funding insert themselves into 
the natural environment. Compliance with existing policies would move the international 
financial institutions from being global actors, pursuing their own institutional agendas, to 
a role in which they could create spaces o f negotiation for the multiple interests that they, 
as institutions with a global membership, were created to represent.
On the one hand, the institutions’ internal structures and processes must be 
transformed to provide the conditions and incentives for compliance with stated policies.
285
On the other, strengthened oversight from governments represented in the governing 
bodies of the institutions as well as from the public in both donor and recipient nations is 
critical to ensure that reforms will take hold and to monitor the need for future 
adjustments.
The proposals presented in the previous sections are not far-fetched and they are 
increasingly being adopted by mainstream decision-makers. For example, the U.S. 
Executive Director to the Asian Development Bank, Linda Yang, emphasizes the need for 
pragmatic and down-to-earth refonns focused on incentives and compensation for staff of 
international financial institutions. In addition, she recommends opening the institution’s 
Board meetings to the public.18 This would represent an important break from the status 
quo o f secret proceedings and confidentiality o f documentation.
While there was a b rief reference to the apolitical mandate o f the institutions in the 
analysis o f the black box, this point requires further emphasis. According to Crush, the 
technocratic depoliticized language o f international development does not fit the political 
conditionalities espoused by the institutions today, such as the emphasis on the 
participation o f local people and on governance reforms (Crush 1995).
Political ecology thinking requires that the political and economic root causes o f  
problems be taken into account and the underlying assumptions be made explicit. Who 
has the power and how is it exercised? When international financial institutions pay 
insufficient attention to the political environment and its socio-economic dimensions, their 
investments may do little to advance their stated goals o f promoting sustainable 
development and even, instead, ease the pressure inside the domestic economy to bring 
about necessary policy changes. This then may ultimately contribute to further distorting 
the society which they are affecting (Morton 1994).
A question that must be asked is whether the institutions’ alliance with the central 
government apparatus consolidates central power while diminishing autonomy at the local 
community level vis-a-vis central institutions, and whether this may work against the 
institutions’ objectives o f protecting biodiversity and reducing poverty. These thorny 
questions o f the distribution o f power cannot be avoided if  the institutions are to comply
18 From minutes taken by Katherine Marshall, World Bank, at the Conference on “Reinventing the World 
Bank” at Northwestern University (with SOAS), 14-16May, 1999.
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with their own policies on local participation as a central condition for successful 
biodiversity protection and overall development effectiveness. Transparent socio-political 
analysis o f the potential winners and losers o f activities proposed for international 
financing should be an indispensable tool in decision-making concerning the allocation o f 
funds intended to promote poverty alleviation and environmental protection. The 
institutions may not shy away from critical political-economic analyses even if  this may 
lead to uncomfortable recommendations for some donor and recipient governments.
International financial institutions have to recognize that their activities are 
inherently political, as channeling large amounts o f money into a country inevitably 
affects different groups o f people in different ways. International financial institutions 
which have a more politically aware understanding o f a plurality o f interests and views 
regarding the enviromnent and biodiversity can, as Blaikie suggests, open up spaces o f 
negotiation between different parties (Blaikie 1995). The political ability and will to open 
up such spaces for negotiation will have to exist at the very heart o f  political power 
structures able to arbitrate and translate between different geographic scales (Harvey 
1996).
287
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abramowitz, J.N., 1991. Investing in Biodiversity. U.S. Research and  
Consei'vation Efforts in Developing Countries. World Resources Institute, 
Washington, D.C. 94pp.
Adams, W.M. 1995. Green Development Theory? In: Crush, J. (Ed). Power o f  
Development. Routledge, London & New York. 87-99.
African Development Bank, 1993. Environmental Impact Assessment Study o f 
the Abong Mbang-Lomie Road (Cameroon). Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. 184pp.
Agir Ici & Survie. 1996. Dossiers Noirs de la Politique Africaine de la France 
No. 7 - France Cameroun Croisement Dangereux. Editions Harmattan, Paris. 
94pp.
Alpert, P. 1993. Conserving Biodiversity in Cameroon. Ambio, Volume XXII, 
No. 1,44-49.
Anderson, D. & Grove, R. (Ed). 1987. Conservation in Africa. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge, U.K. 355pp.
Angelsen, A. & Kaimowitz, D. 1997. What can we leam from economic models 
of tropical deforestation? Paper written for the Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR), Jakarta, 28pp.
Ascher, W. 1983. New Development Approaches and theAdaptability o f 
International Agencies:The Case o f the World Bank. International Organization, 
37 (3) 1983,415-439.
Atkinson, A. 1991a. Principles o f  Political Ecology>. Bellhaven Press, London, 
251pp.
Atkinson, A. 1991b. Environment and Development: concepts and practices in 
transition. Public Administration and Development. Vol. II, 401-413.
Bailey, R.C., Bahuchet, S. & Hewlett, B.1990. Development in Central African 
Rainforest:
Concern for Forest Peoples. Paper presented at the World Bank, IUCN and AfDB 
Conference on West and Central African Forests, Abidjan. 33pp.
Bailey, R.C. 1996. Promoting Biodiversity and Empowering Local People in 
Central African Forests. In: Sponsel, L.E., Headland, T.N. and Bailey, R.C. (Ed) 
Tropical Deforestation. Columbia University Press, New York. 316-341.
Balick, M.J., Elisabetsky, E., Laird, S. A. (Ed). \996.Medicinal Resow ces o f  the 
Tropical Forest. Columbia University Press. New York. 440pp.
288
Bailie, J. & Groombridge, B.(Ed). 1996.19961UCN Red List o f  Threatened 
Animals. The World Conservation Uniion (IUCN). IUCN Publications, Gland, 
Switzerland. 368pp.
Barraclough, S.L. & Ghimire, K.B. 1995. Forests and Livelihoods. The Social 
Dynamics o f  Deforestation in Developing Countries. MacMillan Press, U.K. 
259pp.
Beetham, D. 1996. Bureaucracy. Open University Press, Buckingham. 120pp.
Bell, R. 1987. Conservation with a Human Face: Conflict and Reconciliation in 
African Land-Use Planning. In: Anderson, D. & Grove, R. (Ed). Consei'vation in 
Africa. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, U.K. 79-102.
Berg, E. 2000. W hy aren’t Aid Organizations Better Learners. In: Carlsson J. & 
Wohlgemuth, L. (Eds). Learning in Development Cooperation. Published by 
EGDI (Expert Group on Development Issues o f the Swedish Department for 
International Development Cooperation). Stockholm. 24-40.
Biesbrouck, K. & Dkamela, G.P. 1998. The Oil Pipeline Project in Cameroon: 
With or Without Local Populations?. Report commissioned by Friends o f the 
Earth Netherlands. Amsterdam. 38pp.
Binns, T. 1994. Tropical Africa. Routledge, London and New York. 190pp.
Biot, Y., Blaikie, P.M., Jackson, C. & Palmer-Jones, R. 1995. Rethinking 
Research on Land Degradation in Developing Countries. World Bank Discussion 
Papers, 289. Washington, D.C. 139pp.
Blaikie, P. 1985. The Political Economy o f  Soil Erosion in Developing Countries. 
Longman, London and New York. 188pp.
Blaikie, P. & Brookfield, H. (Ed). 1987. Land Degradation and Society. 
Routledge, London and New York. 296pp.
Blaikie, P. 1995a. Biodiversity and the Politics o f the Local Control o f  Resources 
with a Case Study o f  Cameroon. Paper presented at the annual meeting o f 
American Geographers, Chicago. 35pp.
Blaikie, P. 1995b. Changing Environments or Changing Views? Geography, 
Volume 80(3), 203-214.
Blaikie, P. & Jeanreneaud, S. 1997. Biodiversity and Human Welfare. In: 
Ghimire, K.B. & Pimbert, M.P. Social Change & Consei'vation. Earthscan 
Publications. 46-70.
Botkin, D.B. & Talbot L.M. 1990. Biological Diversity and Forests. A 
Background Paper for the World Bank. Washington, D.C. 33pp.
289
Bourque. J.D. & Wilson, R. 1990. Rapport de l'Etude d'Impact Ecologique d'Un 
Projet d'Amenagement Forestier Concemant les Forets Classes de Ziama et de 
Diecke en Republique de Guinee. IUCN, Gland. 128pp.
Bowles, I.A. & Kormos, C.F. 1995. Environmental Reform at the World Bank: 
The Role o f the U.S. Congress. Virginia Journal o f  International Law. Volume 
35, Number 4, Summer 1995. 777-839.
Brookfield, H. 1989. 'Sustainable Development' and the Environment. Journal o f  
Development Studies. April 1989. 127-135.
Brown, K., Pearce, D., Perrings, C. & Swanson, T. 1993. Economics and the 
Consei'vation o f  Global Biological Diversity. Global Environment Facility, 
Working Paper Number 2, Washington, D.C. 75pp.
Bryant, R.L. 1997a. Beyond the Impasse: The Power o f Political Ecology in Third 
World Environmental Research.. Area (1997) 29.1., 5-19.
Bryant, R.L. & Bailey, S. 1997b. Third World Political Ecology>. Routledge, 
London. 237pp.
Bulmer, M. & Warwick, D.P. 1993. Research Strategy. In: Buhner, M. & 
Warwick, D.P. Social Research in Developing Countries. University College 
London Press. 27-40.
Buhner, M. 1993. Interviewing and Field Organization. In: Bulmer, M. & 
Warwick, D.P. Social Research in Developing Countries. University College 
London Press.205-217.
Burnham, P. & Sharpe, B. 1997. Political, Institutional, Social and Economic 
Dimensions o f Cameroon's Forestry and Conservation Sectors. Confidential Paper 
to ODA. London. 25pp.
Cahn, J. 1993. Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the 
Democratization o f Development. In: Harvard Human Rights Journal, Volume 
Six, Spring 1993, 159-194.
Carlsson J. & Wohlgemuth, L. 2000. Learning in Development Cooperation -  An 
Introduction. In: Carlsson J. & Wohlgemuth, L. (Eds). Learning in Development 
Cooperation. Published by EGDI (Expert Group on Development Issues o f the 
Swedish Department for International Development Cooperation). Stockholm.6- 
22 .
Carney, D. (Ed). 1998.Sustainable Rural Livelihoods. W hat contribution can we 
make? Papers from the Department for International D evelopm ent‘s Natural 
Resources Advisers’ Conference, DFID, London, 1998.
Caufield, C. 1996. Masters o f  Illusion.The World Bank and the Poverty o f  
Nations. Henry Holt and Company, New York. 432pp.
290
Chambers, R. 1983. Rural Development. Patting the Last First. Longman, U.K. 
246pp.
Chambers, R. 1986. Sustainable Livelihoods. Institute o f Development Studies, 
University o f Sussex, Mimeo.
Chambers, R. 1993. Challenging the Professions. Frontiers fo r  Rural 
Development. Intermediate Technology Publications. London. 143pp
Chandler, P. 1991. The Indigenous Knowledge o f Ecological ProcessesAmong 
Peasants in the People's Republic o f China. Agriculture and Human Values. 
Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society,Vol. VIII., Numbers 1 and 2. 
Florida, USA. 59-66.
Cleaver, K. & Schreiber G. 1992. The Population, Agriculture and Environment 
Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank, Washington, 206pp.
Colchester, M. & Lohmann, L. 1990. The Tropical Forest Action Plan. What 
Progress? World Rainforest Movement, Penang, Malaysia and London, UK.
Colchester, M. & Lohmann, L. (Ed). 1991. The Struggle fo r  Land and the Fate o f  
the Forests. The Case fo r  Agrarian Reform. World Rainforest Movement &The 
Ecologist, Malaysia and U.K.
Colchester, M. 1993. Slave and Enclave. Towards a Political Ecology o f 
Equatorial Africa. In: CDR/IWGIA Document No.74 "... Never D rink Form The 
Same Cup" Copenhagen, 179-231.
Colchester, M. 1994. Salvaging Nature. Indigenous Peoples, Protected Areas and 
Biodiversity> Conservation. United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNSRID), World Rainforest Movement and W orld Wide Fund for 
Nature, Geneva. 76pp.
Connolly, B. 1996. Increments for the Earth: The Politics o f Environmental Aid. 
In: Keohane, R.O. & Levy M.A. Institutions fo r  Enviromental Aid. The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London. 327-365.
Cox, A. & Healey, J. (with Hoebink,P. & Voipio,T.).2000. European 
Development Cooperation and the Poor. MacMillan Press Ltd. U.K. 236pp.
Crane, B.B. & Finkle, J.L. 1981. Organizational Impediments to Development 
Assistance: The World Bank's Population Program. World Politics. 0043- 
8871/81. Trustees o f Princeton University. New Jersey. 516-551.
Cronon, W. 1993. Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists and the Ecology o f  
New England. Hill and Wang, New York. 241pp.
Crush, J. (Ed.). 1995. Power o f  Development. Routledge, London & New York. 
324pp.
291
Cruz, M.C.J. & Davis, S.H. 1996. Social Assessment in World Bank and GEF- 
Funded Biodiversity Conservation Projects. Case Studies from India, Ecuador and 
Ghana. World Bank Paper, Washington, D.C., April 1996. 33pp.
Daly, H.E. & Townsend, K.N. (Ed). 1993. Valuing the Earth. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 387pp.
Daly, H.E. & Cobb, J.B. 1994. For the Common Good. Beacon Press, Boston. 
534pp.
Dames & Moore Company. 1997. Environmental Assessment Chad Export 
Project/ Cameroon Portion. Houston, Texas, October 1997.
Davis, S.H. (Ed). 1993. The Social Challenge o f  Biodiversity Conservation.
Global Environment Facility, Working Paper No. 1. Washington, D.C. 43pp.
Dembach, J.C. 1993. The Global Environment Facility: Financing the Treaty 
Obligations of Developing Countries. Environmental Law Reporter, Vol. XXIII, 
No. 3, 10124-10132
Dillon, P., Ilgen T. & Willett, T.D. 1991. Approaches to the Study o f International 
Organizations: Major Paradigms in Economics and Political Science. In: Vaubel 
R. & Willett, T.D. (Ed) The Political Economy o f  International Organizations - A 
Public Choice Approach. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado and Oxford. 79-99.
Duncan, A. 1997. The World Bank as a Project Lender: Experience from Eastern 
Africa. In: Kapur, D., Lewis, J.P. & Webb, R. (Ed). The World Bank  - Its First 
H a lf Century. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., Vol. 2, 385-425.
Dyson, M. 1992. Concern for Africa's Forest Peoples: A Touchstone o f a 
Sustainable Development Policy. In: The World Bank, Conservation o f  West and 
Central African Rainforests, Washington, D.C., 210-219.
Economist Intelligence Unit. 1996. Cameroon Country Report 2nd Quarter 1996. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit.London. 21pp.
Egbe, S. 1997. Forest Tenure and Access to Forest Resources in Cameroon. 
International Institute for Environment and Development, London, Paper No. 6, 
25pp.
Ehrlich, P.R.& Wilson, E.O. 1991. Biodiversity Studies: Science and Policy. 
Science, Vol. 253, 16.August 1991,758-762.
Ekoko, F. 1995. The Political Economy o f the 1994 Cameroon Forestry Law. 
Unpublished manuscript, 7 pp.
Ela, J.M. 1993. Le Cri de THomme Africain. Editions l'Harmattan, Paris. 173pp.
Edgren. G. 2000. Fashions, Myths and Delusions: Obstacles to Organisational 
Learning in Aid Agencies. In: Carlsson J. & Wohlgemuth, L. (Eds). Learning in
292
Development Cooperation. Published by EGDI (Expert Group on Development 
Issues o f the Swedish Department for International Development Cooperation). 
Stockholm.41-68.
Eserink, M. 1997. Evolutionary Biology: Life on the Edge: Rainforest Margins 
May Spawn Species. Science, Vol. 276, 20 June 1997. 1791-2.
Fairhead, J. & Leach M. 1993. Contested Forests: Modem Conservation and 
Historical Land-Use o f Guinea's Ziama Reserve. Connaissance et Organisation 
Locales Agro-Ecologiques, Working Paper 7, Guinea. 29pp.
Fairhead, J. & Leach, M. 1998. Reframing Deforestation: Global Analysis and 
Local Realities: Studies in West Africa. Routledge, London. 238pp.
Fairman, D. 1994. Review o f the Report o f the Independent Evaluation o f the 
Global Environment Facility Pilot Phase, Environment, Vol. 36, Number 6, 25-30.
Fainnan, D. 1996. The Global Environment Facility: Haunted By the Shadow of 
the Future. In: Keohane, R.O. & Levy M. A. Institutions fo r  Environmental Aid.
The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 55-88.
Ferguson, J. 1994. The Anti-Politics Machine, "Development,” Depoliticization 
and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. University o f Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
320pp.
Fiol, C.M. & Lyles, M.A. 1985. Organizational Learning. Academy o f  
Management Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, 803-813.
Flitner, M. 1998. Biodiversity: O f Local Commons and Global Commodities. In: 
Goldman, M (Ed). Privatizing Nature - Political Struggles fo r  the Global 
Commons. Pluto Press, London. 144-166.
Fox, J.A. & Brown, L.D. (Ed). 1998. The Stm ggle fo r  Accountability - The World 
Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 570pp.
Furze, B., De Lacy, T, &Brickhead, J. 1996. Culture, Conseiwation and 
Biodiversity. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto, 
Singapore. 269pp.
Gandhi, V.P. (Ed). 1996. Macroeconomics and the Environment. International 
Monetary Fund, Washington. D.C. 275pp.
Gartlan, S. 1989. La Conservation des Ecosystemes Forestiers du Cameroun. 
International Union for the Conservation o f Nature, Gland, Switzerland & 
Cambridge, U.K. 186pp.
Gasper, D. 1996a. Essentialism In and About Discourse. European Journal o f  
Development Research, 1996, 8(1), 149-176.
293
Gasper, D. 1996b. Analysing Policy Arguments. European Journal o f  
Development Research, 1996, 8 (I), 36-62.
Gasper D. & Apthorpe R. 1996. Introduction: Discourse Analysis and Policy 
Discourse. In: European Journal o f  Development Research, 1996 8(1), 1-15.
Ghimire, K.P. & Pimbert, M.P. (Ed). 1997. Social Change and Conseiwation. 
Earthscan Publications, London. 334pp.
Global Environment Facility. 1991. What is the GEF? GEF, Washington, D.C.
10pp.
Global Environment Facility. 1992. The Pilot Phase and Beyond. GEF, 
Washington, D.C.52pp.
Global Environment Facility, 1993. The Social Challenge o f  Biodivei'sity 
Conservation. Working Paper No. 1, Washington, D.C. 43pp.
Global Environment Facility. 1994a. Independent Evaluation o f the Pilot Phase. 
Washington, D.C. 192pp.
Global Environment Facility. 1994b. Instrument fo r  the Establishment o f  the 
Restructured GEF. GEF, Washington, D.C. 39pp.
Global Enviromnent Facility. 1994c. Rules o f  Procedure fo r  the GEF Council. 
GEF, Washington, D.C. 14pp.
Global Environment Facility, 1994d. The Resti'uctured GEF- Questions and  
Answers. GEF, Washington, D.C. 5pp.
Global Environment Facility. 1996a. The GEF Project Cycle. GEF, Washington, 
D.C. 15pp.
Global Environment Facility. 1996b. Public Involvement in GEF-Financed 
Projects. GEF, Washington, D.C. 9pp.
Global Environment Facility. 1998a. Annual Report. Washington, D.C. 62pp.
Global Environment Facility. 1998b. Relations with the Conventions. GEF 
Council Document, GEF/C.12/12. October 1998. 18pp.
Glowka,L., Burhenne-Guilmin, F. & Synge, H. 1994. A Guide to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity. Environmental Law and Policy Paper No. 30, IUCN-The 
World Conservation Union, Gland Switzerland and Cambridge, U.K. 161pp.
Goodland, R. 1982. Tribal Peoples and Economic Development. Human Ecologic 
Considerations. The World Bank. Washington, D.C. 111pp.
294
Graham, R.L., Perlack R.D., Prasad, A.M.G., Ranney, J.W., Waddle, D.B. 1990. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Oakridge National 
Laboratory, Tennessee. 135pp.
Graham, R.W. 1992. Late Pleistocene Faunal Changes as a Guide to 
Understanding Effects o f Greenhouse Warming on the Mammalian Fauna o f 
North America. In: Peters, R.L. & Loveljoy, T.E. (Ed). Global Warming and 
Biological Diversity. Yale University Press, New Haven and London. 76-90.
Gray, A. 1991. Between the Spice o f  Life and the Melting Pot: Biodivei'sity 
Conservation and its Impact on Indigenous Peoples. IW GIA Document 70. 
Copenhagen. 74pp.
Gray, C.W., Khadiagala, L.S. & Moore, R.M. 1990. Institutional Development 
Work in the Bank - A Review o f 84 Projects. Policy, Research and External 
Affairs, the World Bank, Washington, D.C. 27pp.
Groombridge, B. (Ed). 1994. Biodiversity Data Sourcebook. World Conservation 
Monitoring Center. World Conservation Press, Cambridge. 155pp.
Group o f 77. 1993. Draft o f the Agreement to Establish the Restructured Global 
Environment Facility. Paper from the Office o f  the Chairman. New York. lOpp
Grove, T.A. 1989. The Changing Geography o f  Africa. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 241pp.
Grut, M. Gray, J.A. & Egli, N. 1991. Forest Pricing and Concession Policies. 
Managing the High Forests o f West and Central Africa. World Bank Technical 
Paper Number 143, Washington, D.C. 77pp.
Gupta, J. 1995. The Global Environment Facility in its North-South Context. 
Environmental Politics. Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1995. 19-43.
Haas, P.M. & Haas, E.B. 1995. Learning to Learn: Improving International 
Governance. Global Governance, 1 (1995), 255-285.
Hancock, G. 1989. Lords o f  Poverty. The Atlantic Monthly Press, New York. 
234pp.
Harte, J., Tom, M. & Jensen D. 1992. Consequences o f Indirect Linkages 
Between Climate Change and Biological Diversity. In: Peters, R.L. & Loveljoy, 
T.E. (Ed), Global Warming and Biological Diversity. Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London. 325-342.
Hartshorn, G.S. 1992. Possible Effects o f  Global W anning on the Biological 
Diversity in Tropical Forests. In: Peters, R.L. &Lovejoy, T.E. (Ed). Global 
Warming and Biological Diversity. Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London. 137-146.
295
Harvey, D. 1996. Justice, Nature & the Geography o f  Difference. Blackwell 
Publishers, Malden, Massachusetts and Oxford, U.K. 468pp.
Harvey, D. 1998. W hat’s Green and Makes the Environment go Round? In: 
Jameson, F. & Miyoshi, M. (Ed). The Cultures o f  Globalization. Duke University 
Press, Durham and London. 327-355.
Helleiner, G.K., Blyth, C. Demas, W., Jayawardena, L., Osha, H.M., Dadzie, 
K.K.S., H am s, S. Morse, J., Patel, I.G. 1983. Towards a New Bretton Woods. 
Report by the Commonwealth Study Group. Commonwealth Secretariat, London. 
148pp.
Hershfield, A.F., Rohling, N.G., Kerr, G.B. & Hursh-Cesar, G. 1993. Fieldwork 
in Rural Areas. In: Bulmer, M. & Warwick, D.P. Social Research in Developing 
Countries. University College London Press. 241-252.
Hirschman, A.O. 1995. Development Projects Observed. Brookings Institution 
Press (originally published in 1967), Washington, D.C.. 197pp.
Hook, W. 1995. Downward Mobility? Towards a Sustainable Global Transport 
System and the Role o f the Multilateral Development Banks. Paper presented at 
New York University, March 1995.
Horta, K. 1990. Environmental Defense Fund Memorandum: The Tropical 
Forestry Action Plan for Cameroon. Manuscript. 12pp.
Horta, K. 1991. The Plundering o f Cameroon's Rainforests. The Ecologist, Vol. 
21, No. 3, U.K. 142-147.
Horta, K. 1994. Troubled Waters- World Bank Disasters Along Kenya’s Tana 
River. M ultinational Monitor. July/August 1994, U.S. 12-16.
International Alliance o f the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples o f the Tropical Forests. 
1992. Charter o f the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples o f the Tropical Forests. Penang, 
Malaysia. 16pp.
International Alliance o f Indigenous-Tribal Peoples o f the Tropical Forest & 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. No date. Indigenous Peoples, 
Forest, and Biodiversity. Published by the International Alliance o f  Indigenous- 
Tribal Peoples o f the Tropical Forest International Secretariat, London. 197pp.
International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and 
Development Process in Africa. 1990. African Charter fo r  Popular Participation 
in Development and Transformation. E/EC A/CM.6/11 printed in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. 73pp.
International Council for Bird Preservation (ICBP). 1992. Putting Biodiversity on 
the Map. ICBP Publications. Cambridge, U.K. 90pp.
International Development Research Center. 1994. People, Plants and Patents. 
IDRC. Ottawa, Canada. 317pp.
296
Jeanrenaud, S. 1997, Perspectives in People-Oriented Conservation. Ai'borvitae, 
Supplement,WWF, IUCN. Gland, Switzerland, (no page numbers)
Joint Ministerial Committee o f the Boards o f Governors o f the World Bank and 
the Intemaional Monetary Fund. 1987. Environment, Growth and Development. 
Washington, D.C. 33pp.
Joint Ministerial Committee o f the Boards o f Governors o f the World Bank and 
the Intemaional Monetary Fund, 1989. World Bank Support for the Environment: 
A Progress Report. Washington, D.C. 41pp.
Juma, C., Mugabe J. & Kameri-Mbote, P. (Ed). 1995. Coming to Life . 
Biotechnology> in African Economic Recoveiy. African Center for Technology 
Studies, Nairobi & Zed Books, London. 192pp.
Kaimowitz, D., Erwidodo, Noye, O., Pacheco, P. & Sunderlin, W. 1997. Forests 
under Structural Adjustment in Bolivia, Cameroon and Indonesia. Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Indonesia. 23pp.
Kapur, D., Lewis, J.P. & Webb, R. (Ed). 1997. The World Bank- Its First H alf 
Century. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. Vol. I (History) 1275pp, 
Vol. II (Perspectives) 766pp.
Kapur, D. 1999. The Changing Anatomy o f Governance o f the World Bank.
Paper Prepared for Conference at Northwestern University, May 1999. 14pp.
Keil, R., Bell, D.V.J., Penz, P. & Fawcett, L. (Ed). 1998. Political E cology-  
Global and Local. Routledge, London and New York. 387pp.
Keohane, R.O. 1996. Analyzing the Effectiveness o f International Environmental 
Institutions. In: Keohane, R.O. & Levy, M.A.(Ed). Institutions fo r  Environmental 
Aid. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 3-28.
Kramer, F.A. 1981. Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy. Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston and Toronto. 240pp.
Kuhn, T.S., (Second Edition, Enlarged). 1970. The Structure o f  Scientific 
Revolutions. University o f Chicago Press, Chicago. 210pp.
Kuwick, B. 1994. Cameroonian Participation in the Global Environment Facility's 
Biodiversity Conservation and Management Project. Fulbright Scholar 
unpublished paper. 8pp.
Lancaster, C. 1997. The World Bank in Africa since 1980: The Politics o f 
Structural Adjustment Lending. In: Kapur, D., Lewsi, J.P. & Webb, R. (Ed). The 
World Bank - Its First H a lf Century. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 
D.C., Vol. II, 161-194.
297
Lawton, J.H., Bignell, D.E., Bonlton, B. et al. 1998. Biodiversity Inventories, 
indicator taxa and effects o f  habitat modification in tropical forest. Nature, Vol. 
391, 1 January 1998, 72-76.
Leach, M. & Meams, R. (Ed.) 1996. The Lie o f  the Land. Challenging Received 
Wisdom on the African Environment. The International African Institute, London. 
240pp.
LeBlanc, H. 1997. Consultant’s Report on Lessons Learned in the Pilot-Phase - 
Cameroon Biodiversity Conservation and Management Project. Toronto. 12pp.
Lensink, R. 1996. Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa, Longman, 
London & New York. 145pp.
Le Prestre, P.G. 1986. A Problematique for International Organizations. 
International Social Science Journal, No. 107, 127-138.
Le Prestre, P.G. 1989. The World Bank and the Environmental Challenge. 
Associated University Presses, Cranbury, New Jersey, and London. 263pp.
Little, P.D. & Brokensha, D.W. 1987. Local Institutions, Tenure and Resource 
Management. In: Anderson D. & Grove, R. Conservation in Africa, people 
policies and practice. Camrbidge University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 193-209.
Lonsdale, J. 1987. Consequences for Conservation and Development. 
Introduction. In: Anderson, D. & Grove, R. (Ed). 1987. Consei'vation in Africa. 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, U.K. 271-276.
Lugo, A.E. 1988, Estimating the Reductions in Tropical Forest Species. In: 
Wilson, E.O. (Ed). National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 58-
70.
Lutzenberger, J. 1985. The World Bank's Polonoroeste Project: A Social and 
Environmental Catastrophe. In: The Ecologist, No. 15, 69-72.
Lynch, O.J. & Talbott, K. 1995. Balancing Acts: Community-Based Forest 
Management and National Law in Asia and the Pacific. World Resources 
Institute. Washington, D.C. 188pp.
MacArthur, R.H. & Wilson, E.O. 1967. The Theoiy o f  Island Biogeography. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 203pp.
Machlis, G.E. 1992. The Contribution o f Sociology to Biodiversity Research and 
Management. Biological Consei'vation, 62,161-170.
Mann, C.C. 1991. Extinction: Are Ecologists Crying Wolf? Science, Vol. 253,
16. August 1991.736-738.
McNeely, J.A., Miller, K.R., Reid, W.V., Mittermeier, R.A. & Werner, T.B. 
(1990). Conserving the World's Biological Diversity. International Union for the
298
Conservation o f Nature and Natural Resources, World Resources Institute, 
Conservation International, World Wildlife Fund-US and the World Bank. Gland, 
Switzerland. 193pp.
McNeely, J.A. 1993.Global Environment Facility: Cornucopia or Kiss o f Death 
for Biodiversity? IUCN, Gland, Switzerland.Manuscript.4pp.
McNeely, J.A. 1996. Who Cares about Forest Biodiversity. Global Biodiversity. 
Special IUCN Issue, Vol. 6, No.2, Gland, Switzerland, 14-24.
Miller-Adams, M.1996. The World Bank in the 1990s: Understanding 
Institutional Change. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting o f the American 
Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 29 September 1, 1996. 22p.
Mitchell, J. & Slim H. 1990. Hearing Aids for Interviewing. IIED RRA Notes 
No. 9, London. 27-30.
Morton, J. 1996. The Poverty o f  Nations. The A id  Dilemma at the Heart o f  Africa. 
I.B. Tauris Publishers, London, New York, 265pp.
Mongo Beti. 1986. Lettre Ouverte aux Camerounais - On la Deuxieme Mort de 
Ruben UmNoybe. Editions des Peuples Noirs, Diffusion l'Harmattan., Paris. 
131pp.
Moore, P.D., Chaloner, B. & Stott, P. 1996. Global Environmental Change. 
Blackwell Science Ltd. U.K. 235pp.
Munasinghe, M. & McNeely, J. (Ed). 1994. Protected Area Economics and 
Policy. World Bank and World Conservation Union. Washington, D.C. 361pp.
Munasinghe, M. & Cruz, W. 1995. Economywide Policies and the Environment. 
World Bank Environment Paper Number 10. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
86pp.
Myers, N., 1979. The Sinking Ark. Pergamon Press, Oxford. 307pp.
Myers, N., 1984. The Primary Source. Tropical forests and Our Future. W.W. 
Norton & Company, New York & London. 399pp.
Myers, N. 1988. Tropical Forests and their Species. In: Wilson, E.O. (Ed). 
Biodiversity, National Academy Press, Washington, 28-35.
Myers, N. & Simon, J.L. 1994. Scarcity or Abundance. A Debate on the 
Environment. W.W. Norton & Company, New York & London. 254pp.
National Research Council. 1996. Lost Crops o f  Africa. Volume I. Grains. 
National Academy Press. Washington, D.C. 383pp.
Nelson, G.J. & Serafm, R. 1992. Assessing Biodiversity: A Human Ecological 
Approach. Ambio, Vol. 21, No.3, May 1992, 212-218.
299
Neme, L.A. 1995. The Political Dynamics o f Environmental Decision-Making: A 
Case Study o f Botswana's Bureaucracy. PhD Thesis, Princeton University, New 
Jersey.
Newcombe, K. & Richardson, K. 1993. A Profile o f the Pilot Phase Biodiversity 
Portfolio.
Global Environment Coordination Division o f the World Bank, Washington, D.C.
11pp.
Nguiffo-Tene, S.A., 1994. La Nouvelle Legislation Forestiere au Cameroun.
Paper published by the Fondation Friedrich Ebert, Yaounde, Cameroon, 57pp.
Nichols, P. 1991. Social Survey Methods. A Fieldguide for Development 
Workers. Oxfam Publication, Oxford. 13 lpp
Norgaard, R.B., 1987. The Economics o f Biological Diversity: Apologetics or 
Theory? in: Southgate D.D. & Disinger, J.F. (Ed). Sustainable Resource 
Development in the Third World. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 95-109.
Norgaard, R.B. 1994. Development Betrayed. Routledge, London & New York.
280pp.
Norse, E.A. (Ed). 1993. Global Marine Biological Diversity. Island Press. 
Washington, D.C. 383pp.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1994. 
Economic Incentive Measures fo r  the Consei'vation and Sustainable Use o f  
Biological Diversity: Conceptual Framework and Guidelines fo r  Case Studies. 
Paris. 29pp.
Pearce, F. 1997. Lost Forests Leave West Africa Dry.TVew Scientist, 15 January 
1997,218.
Penelon, A. 1997. Community Forestry - It may be indeed a New Management 
Tool, but is it Accessible? International Institute for Environment and 
Development, London, Paper No. 8, 16pp.
Picciotto, R. 1995. Putting Institutional Economics to Work. W orld Bank 
Discussion Paper No. 304, Washington, D.C. 22pp.
Pimbert, M.P. & Pretty, J.N. 1997. Parks, People and Professionals: Putting 
'Participation' into Protected Area Management. In: Ghimire K.B. & Pimbert, 
M.P. (Ed). Social Change and Consei’vation. Earthscan Publications,
London, 297-329.
Pincus, J.R. & Winters, J.A. 1999. Development Rhetoric and Operational 
Realities: The Case o f Indonesia's Integrated Pest Management (IPM) Training 
Programme. Paper presented at the Conference 'Reinventing the World Bank: 
Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century,' Northwestern University, May 
14-16, 1999.
300
Poore, D.(Ed). 1989. No Timber Without Trees. Earthscan Publications, London. 
252pp.
Porter, D.J. 1995. Scenes From Childhood. In: Crush, J. (Ed). Power o f  
Development. Routledge, London & New York. 63-86.
Porter G. & Brown J.W. 1996. Global Environmental Politics. Westview Press, 
Colorado. 238pp.
Porter, G., Clemencon, R., Ofusu-Amaah, W. & Philips, M. 1998. Study o f the 
GEF's Overall Performance. Global Environment Facility, Washington, D.C.
111pp.
Posey, D.A. 1996. Traditional Resource Rights. IUCN - The World Conservation 
Union, Gland, Switzerland & Cambridge, U.K. 221pp.
Pratt, B. & Loizos, P. 1992. Choosing Research Methods. Data Collection fo r  
Development Workers. Oxfam Publications, Oxford. 66-77.
Raven, P.H. 1988. Our Diminishing Tropical Forests. In: Wilson, E.O. (Ed). 
Biodiversity. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 119-123.
Redclift, M. 1987. Sustainable Development. Exploring the Contradictions. 
Routledge, London & New York. 221pp.
Reed, D. 1991. The Global Environment Facility. Sharing Responsibility fo r  the 
Biosphere. WWF-Intemational, Gland, Switzerland. 18pp.
Reed, D. 1992. (Ed). Stnictural Adjustment and the Environment. Westview 
Press, Boulder, San Franciso, Oxford. 209pp.
Reed, D. (Ed). 1996. Stnictural Adjustment, the Environment, and Sustainable 
Development. Earthscan Publications Ltd., London. 386pp.
Republic o f  Cameroon. 1990. Fiche Synoptique du Document de Projet. Etude et 
Realisations en vue de l'integration socio-economique des populations 
Baka/Bakola au Cameroun. 5pp.
Republic o f Cameroon. 1993. Conservation de la Biodiversite au Cameroun. 
Consultants' Report. Paris and Yaounde. 63pp.
Republic o f Cameroon, Le Ministere de l'Environnement et des Forets. 1996. Plan 
de Gestion de l'Environnement au Cameroun. Document de Synthese pour la 
Table Ronde des Bailleurs de Fonds. Yaounde. 34pp.
Republic o f Cameroon, 1996. Law No, 96/12 o f 5. August 1996 Relating to 
Environmental Management. Yaounde. 39pp.
301
Republic o f Cameroon, Ministere des Travaux Publics, 1997. Etude de Plan de 
Limitation des Impacts Environnementaux de l'Entretien Routier. Rapport de 
Tecsult International Limitee. Yaounde, July 1997.
Rich, B. 1994. Mortaging the Earth. Beacon Press, Boston. 376pp.
Richards, P. 1985. Indigenous Agricultural Revolution. Unwin Hyman Ltd., 
London. 192pp.
Richards, P. 1996. Fighting fo r  the Rainforest. War, Youth & Resources in Sierra 
Leone. The International African Institute, London. 182pp.
Roe, E.M. 1991. Development Narratives, Or Making the Best o f Blueprit 
Development. In: World Development, Vol. 19, No.4, pp. 287-300.
Roe, E.M. 1995. Except Africa: Postscript to a Special Section on Development 
Narratives. In: World Development, Vol. 23., No. 6, pp. 1065-1069.
Sachs, W. (Ed). 1992. The Development Dictionary, A Gidde to Knowledge as 
Power. Zed Books, London & New Jersey. 306pp.
Sayer, J.A., Harcourt, C.S. & Collins, N.M. 1992. The Conservation Atlas o f  
Tropical Forests Africa. Simon& Schuster, New York, 288pp.
Schneider, S.H., Meams, L. & Gleick, P.H. 1992. Climate-Change Scenarios for 
Impact Assessment. In: Peters, R.L. & Lovejoy, T.E. Global Warming and 
Biodiversity. Yale University Press, New Haven and London. 38-55.
Schreckenberg, K. 1996. Forests, Fields and Markets: A Study o f  Indigenous Tree 
Products in The Woody Savannahs o f the Bassila Region, Benin. PhD thesis, 
SOAS, University o f London.
Scott, J.C, 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press, New Haven. 445pp.
Secrett, C. 1986. The Environmental Impact o f Transmigration. The Ecologist,
No. 16, 77-88.
Shihata, I.F.I. 1994. The World Bank Inspection Panel. Published for the World 
Bank by Oxford University Press. New York. 408pp.
Shiva, V. 1992. Resources. In: Sachs, W. (Ed). The Development Dictionary. A 
Guide to Knowledge as Power. Zed Books, London & New Jersey. 206-218.
Sikod, F. Lisinge, E. Mope-Simo, J. & Gartlan, S. 1998. Socio-Economic Root 
Causes o f Biodiversity Loss. Case Study Summary. The Case o f  Wildlife and 
Bushmeat Trades in Cameroon.
Unpublished manuscript. 33pp.
302
Simon J.L. & Wildavsky, A. 1993. Facts, not Species, Are Periled. New York 
Times, 13 May 1993.
Sklair, L. 1991. Sociology o f  the Global System. The Johns-Hopkins University 
Press. Baltimore. 269pp.
Skole, D. &. Tucker, C. 1993. Tropical Deforestation and Habitat Fragmentation 
in the Amazon: Satellite Data from 1978 to 1988. Science, Vol.260, 25 June 1993, 
1905-1910.
Smith, F.D.M., May R.M., Pellew, R. Johnson, T.H. & Walter, K.S.1993. 
Estimating Extinction Rates. Nature. Vol 364. 5 August 1993. 494-496.
Smith, T.B., Wayne, R.K., Griman D.J. & Bruford, M.W. 1997. A Role for 
Ecotones in Generating Rainforest Biodiversity. Science. Vol. 276. 20 June 1997. 
1855-1857.
Soule, M.E. 1991. Conservation Tactics for a Constant Crisis. Science, Vol. 253, 
16. August 1991,744-750.
Soule, M.E. 1992. Foreword: The W rong Time for Climate Change. In: Peters 
R.L. & Lovejoy, T.E. (Ed). Global Warming and Biological Diversity. Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, xiii-xix.
South Centre. 1991. Environment and Development - Towards a Common 
Strategy fo r  the South in the UNCED Negotiations and Beyond. South Centre, 
Geneva. 23pp.
Sponsel, L.E., Headland, T.N. & Bailey, R.C.(Ed). 1996. Tropical Deforestation. 
The Human Dimension. Columbia University Press, New York. 365pp,
Srivastava, J.P., Smith N.J.H., Fomo, D.A. (Ed). 1996. Biodiversity and  
Agricultural Intensification. The World Bank. Environmentally Sustainable 
Development Studies and Monographs Series No. 11, Washington, D.C. 128pp.
Stone, C.D.1993. The Gnat is Older Than Men. Princeton University Press. 
Princeton. 341pp.
Stott, P. 1991. Recent Trends in the Ecology and Management o f the World's 
Savanna Formations. Progress in Physical Gegraphy, 15,1, 18-28pp.
Sunderland, T.C.H., Jaff, B. Ndam, N. & Jato, J. 1997. Conservation Through 
Utilization - A Case Study: Capacity Building and the Institutional Context for 
Biodiversity Conservation in Cameroon. Paper presented to the U.K. Tropical 
Forest Forum Workshop, Limbe Botanic Garden, Cameroon, January 1997.
25pp.
Takougang, J. & Krieger, M. 1998. African State and Society in the 1990s. 
Cameroon's Political Crossroads. Westview Press, Colorado. 283pp.
303
Tchoungui, R., Gartlan, S., Mope Simo, J.A., Sikod, F., Youmbi, A. & Ndjatsana, 
M. 1996. Case Study for Cameroon. In: Reed, D. (Ed). Structural Adjustment, the 
Environment, and Sustainable Development. Earthscan Publications Ltd., London, 
53-81.
Toye, J. 1995. The New Institutional Economics and the Implications for 
Development Theory. In: Harris, J., Hunter, J. & Lewis, C.M. (Ed). The New  
Institutional Economics and Third World Development. Routledge, London & 
New York, 49-68.
Tumham, D. 1991. Multilateral Development Banks and Environmental 
Management. In '. Public Administration and Development, Vol. 11, 363-379.
United Nations. 1992. Convention on Biological Diversity. United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development. 25pp.
United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment 
Programme, World Band. 1994. Global Environment Facility. Independent 
Evaluation o f  the Pilot Phase. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.. 192pp.
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).1993. Forest 
Resources Assessment 1990. Tropical Countries. FAO Forestry Paper 112, Rome. 
59pp.
Vansina, J. 1990. Paths in the Rainforests. Towards a H istoiy o f  Political 
Tradition in Equatorial Africa. The University o f Wisconsin Press. Wisconsin. 
428pp.
Vaubel R. 1991. A Public Choice View o f International Organization. In: Vaubel 
R. & Willett, T.D. (Ed) The Political Economy o f  International Organizations - A 
Public Choice Approach. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado and Oxford. 27-45.
Verschave, F.X. 1998. La Fransafrique - Le Plus Long Scandale de la 
Republique. Editions Stock, Paris. 379pp.
Wade, R. 1996. Japan, the World Bank and the Art o f Paradigm Maintenance:
The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective. In: New Left Review, 217, 
May/June 1996, 3-36.
Wade, R. 1997a. Development and Environment: Marital Difficulties at the 
World Bank. In: Working Paper Series o f  the Economic and Social Research 
Council, No. 29.
Wade, R. 1997b. Greening the Bank: The Struggle over the Enviromnent, 1970-
1995. In: Kapur, D., Lewis, J. & Webb, R. (Ed). The World Bank: Its First H a lf 
C entwy . The Brookings Institution, Vol. 2, Washington, D.C., 611-734.
Wapenhans, W.A. 1992. A Report o f the Portfolio Management Taskforce. The 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 29pp.
304
Wapenhans, W.A. 1994. Effectiveness and Efficiency: Is the World Bank Group 
Well Prepared for the Task Ahead? In : Bretton Woods Commission. Bretton 
Woods Looking to the Future. Background Papers published by the Bretton 
Woods Commission, Washington, D.C..C-287-304.
Ward. M. 1993. Missing the Point: Sampling Methods and Types o f  Error in 
Third World Surveys in Identifying Poverty Issues. In:Bulmer, M. & Warwick, 
D.P. Social Research in Developing Countries. University College London 
Press. 125-142.
Watson, R.T. & Heywood,V.H. (Ed). 1995 Global Biodiversity Assessment. 
Summaty fo r  Policy-Makers. United Nations Environment Programme. 
Cambridge University Press. 47pp.
Watts, M. 1995. 'A New Deal in Emotions'. In: Crush, J. (Ed). Power o f  
D evelopment Routledge, London & New York. 44-62.
Wells, M. & Brandon, K. 1992. People and Parks - Linking Protected Area 
Management with Local Communities. The World Bank, World Wildlife Fund, 
USAID. Washington, D.C.
Wells, M.P. 1994. Global Environment Facility and Prospects for Biodiversity 
Conservation. International Environmental Affairs, Vol. 6, Number 1, 69-97.
Westberry,Jr. J.P.. 1998. International Financial Institutions Face the Corruption 
Eruption: If the IFIs Put Their Muscle Where Their Mouth Is, the Corruption 
Eruption May Be Capped. Northwesterns Journal o f  International Law & 
Business, W inter 1998, Vol. 18, Number 2,
498-523,
Westoby, J.C. 1987. The Puipose o f  Forests - Follies o f  Development Basil 
Backwell Ltd., Oxford. 343pp.
White, L.G. 1994. Policy Analysis as Discourse. Journal o f  Policy Analysis and 
M anagement Vol. 13, Nr. 3, 506-525.
Wildavsky, A. 1972. The Self-Evaluating Organization. Public Administration 
Review  32, no.5. October 1972.
Williams, D.G. 1997. The Emergence an Implementation o f the World Bank' 
Good Governance Agenda. PhD Thesis, SOAS, University o f  London.
Williams, F. 1990. Forests. In: Turner II, B.I. (Ed). The Earth as Transformed by 
Human Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 179-201.
Williams, G. 1995. Modernizing Malthus - The World Bank, population control 
and the African environment. In: Crush, J, (Ed). Power o f  Development. 
Routledge, London. 158-175.
305
Wilson, E.O. (Ed). 1988. Biodiversity. National Academy Press, Washington, 
D.C.. 283pp.
Wilson, E.O. 1992. The Diversity o f  Life. The Belknap Press o f Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 424pp.
Wilson, J.Q. 1989. Beliefs. In: Wilson, J.Q. Bureaucracy: What Government 
Agencies do and why they do it. Basic Books, Inc., New York. 50-71.
Winterbottom, R. 1990. Taking Stock: The Tropical Forestiy Action Plan After 
Five Years. World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C. 59pp.
Wold, C. 1995. The Biodiversity Convention and Existing International 
Agreements: Opportunities fo r  Synergy. Humane Society o f the United States, 
Washington, D.C. 19pp.
World Bank. 1982. Tribal Peoples and Economic Development. Washington,
D .C.111pp.
World Bank. 1987. Annual Report. Washington, D.C. 216pp.
World Bank, 1988. Annual Report. Washington, D.C. 207pp.
World Bank. 1989a. International Bank fo r  Reconstruction and Development. 
Articles o f  Agreement. As amended effective February 16, 1989. Washington,
D.C. 31pp.
World Bank. 1989b. Striking a Balance. The Environmental Challenge o f  
Development. Washington, D.C. 52pp.
World Bank. 1989c. Sustainable Growth with Equity - A Long-Term Perspective 
for Sub-Saharan Africa. Document o f the World Bank, Washington, D.C, 189pp.
World Bank. 1990a.. Annual Environmental Report. Washington, D.C. 102pp.
World Bank. 1990b. Credit to Guinea for Forestry and Fisheries. Official 
Memorandum to Vice President. Washington, D.C. 23pp.
World Bank. 1991a. The Forest Sector. A World Bank Policy Paper, Washington, 
D.C. 98pp.
World Bank. 1991b. Establishment o f  the Global Environment Facility. The 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 13pp.
World Bank. 1992a. World Development Report. Development and the 
Environment. The World Bank. Washington, D.C. 308pp.
World Bank. 1994a. Learning from  the Past, Embracing the Future. The World 
Bank Group, Washington, D.C.32pp.
306
World Bank. 1994b. Memorandum and Recommendation o f the President o f  the 
International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed 
Credit in an Amount Equivalent to SDR 53.1. Million to the Republic o f 
Cameroon For an Economic Recovery Credit. Washington, D.C. May 25, 1994. 
33pp.
World Bank. 1994c. Adjustment in Africa. A World Bank Policy Research 
Report. Ocford University Press, New York. 284pp.
World Bank. 1994d, Questions about the World Bank. 50th Anniversary 
publication. Washington, D.C. 7pp.
World Bank. 1994e. Governance - The World Bank's Experience. Washington, 
D.C.65pp.
World Bank. 1994f. The World Bank Group and the Environment: Making 
Development Sustainable. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 157pp.
World Bank. 1994g. Assessing Development Effectiveness - Evaluation in the 
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 37pp.
World Bank. 1995a. Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Development.Environment 
Department Paper No. 029. The World Bank. Washington, D.C. 45pp.
World Bank. 1995b. Implementation Completion Report. Republic o f  Cameroon. 
Social Dimensions o f  Adjustment (SDA) Project. The World Bank, Report No. 
14686. Washington, D.C.64pp.
World Bank. 1995c. Annual Report. The World Bank. Washington, D.C. 224pp.
World Bank. Global Environment Facility. 1995d. Republic o f  Cameroon- 
Biodiversity Conseivation and M anagement Washington, D.C. 103pp.
World Bank. 1995e. Country Assistance Strategies. Bank Procedures, B.P. 2.11. 
Washington, D.C. 3pp.
World Bank. 1995f. Project Completion Report Republic o f  Cameroon - 
Structural Adjustment Loan/ Structural Adjustment Credit. Washington, D.C. 
December 6, 1995. 42pp.
World Bank. 1995g. Implementing the Convention on Biodiversity: Toward a 
Strategy for World Bank Assistance. Environment Department Papers, No. 014, 
Washington, D.C. 29pp.
World Bank. 1995h, Sustainable Transport: A Sector Policy Review (draft). 
Washington, D.C. June 1995. 82pp.
World Bank. 1995i. Cameroon - Diversity, Growth and Poverty Reduction. 
Report No. 13167-CM. Washington, D.C. 178pp.
307
World Bank. 1995j. OED Precis- Monitoring and Evaluation: Making Headway. 
Operations Evaluations Department, Number 83. Washington, D.C. 4pp.
World Bank. Operations Evaluation Department. 1996a. Effectiveness o f  
Environmental Assessments and National Environmental Action Plans: A Process 
Study. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 158pp.
World Bank. 1996b.(Draft). Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Agricultural 
Development. Environment Department Paper. The World Bank. Washington, 
D .C.44pp.
World Bank. 1996c. Environment Matters. Annual Review. The World Bank, 
Washington, D.C. 52pp.
World Bank. 1996d. Enviromnent Matters Magazine. The World Bank.Summer
1996. 32pp.
World Bank. 1996e. Annual Report 1996. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
263pp.
World Bank. 1996f. Social Developments and Results on the Ground. Internal 
Memorandum o f 1 March 1996.
World Bank. 1996g. Memorandum o f the President o f the International 
Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance 
Strategy o f  the World Bank Group for the Republic o f Cameroon. Washington, 
D.C. 19pp.
World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department. 1996h. Poverty Assessments: A 
Progress Review. Washington, D .C..81pp.
World Bank. 1996i. Staff Appraisal Report, Republic o f Cameroon, Transport 
Sector Project. Washington, D.C. 99pp.
World Bank. 1997a. Environment Matters Report. Winter/Srping 1997. The 
World Bank. Washington, D.C. 32pp.
World Bank, 1997b. Enhancing the Board's Discussion o f Country Assistance 
Strategies. Internal Memorandum o f 18 April 1997.
World Bank, 1997c. Internal Memorandum - Cameroon - Forestry Policy and 
Taxation, Back-To-Office Report. Washington, D.C. 15pp.
World Bank, 1997d. Our Global Environment. Draft Report dated 28 May 1997. 
Washington, D.C. 46pp.
World Bank, 1997e. Office Memorandum - Portfolio Improvement Program: 
Draft Reviews o f  Sector Portfolio and Lending Instruments: A Synthesis. 
Washington, D.C. 23 April 1997. 27pp.
308
World Bank. 1998a. The World Bank Annual Report 1998. Washington, D.C. 
298pp.
World Bank. 1998b. Report and Recommendation o f the President o f the 
International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed 
Credit o f SDR 135 million to the Republic o f  Cameroon for a Third Structural 
Adjustment Credit. Washington D.C. 3 June 1998. 95pp.
World Commission on Enviromnent and Development. 1987. Our Common 
Future. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 383pp.
World Conservation Monitoring Center. 1996. Cameroon: Nationally Threatened 
and Endemic Taxa. Report compiled from the WCMC Plants Database. 
Cambridge, U.K. 31pp.
World Resources Institute. 1989. Natural Endowments: Financing Resource 
Consei'vation fo r  Development. World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C. 
33pp.
World Resources Institute, United Nations Environment Programme, United 
Nations Development Programme and the United Nations (1990). World 
Resources 1990-91. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1990.
World Resources Institute. 1992. Global Biodiversity Strategy>- A Policy-M akers’ 
Guide. World Resources Institute, The World Conservation Union & the United 
Nations Environment Programme. Washington, D.C. 35pp
World Resources Institute. 1994. World Resources 1994-95. A Guide to the 
Global Enviromnent. Oxford University Press, New York. 400pp.
World Resources Institute, United Nations Environment Programme, United 
Nations Development Programme, World Bank. 1996. World Resources- A Guide 
to the Global Environment 1996-97. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York. 
365pp.
World Society for the Protection o f Animals. 1995. Slaughter o f  the Apes. 
London. 15pp.
World-Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). 1993. The Southern Green Fund: Views 
from  the South on the Global Environment Facility. Gland, Switzerland. 68pp.
Wunder S. 1997. From Dutch Disease to Deforestation - A Macro-Economic 
Link? A Case Study from Ecuador. Center for Development Research W orking 
Paper 97.6, Copenhagen, 39pp.
Yates, D.A. 1996. The Rentier State in Africa. Africa World Press, Inc. Trenton, 
New Jersey and Asmara, Eritreia. 249pp.
309
Zemer, C. 1996. Telling Stories about Biodiversity. In: Brush, S.& Stabinsky, D. 
(Ed). Valuing Local Knowledge: Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property 
Rights. Island Press, Washington, D.C., 68-101.
310
Appendix
Summaries of World Bank Environment and Social Policies
This Appendix contains summaries o f the content o f the World Bank's 
environmental and social policies, weaknesses in their implementation and specific 
threats. The policies discussed are: environmental impact assessment (EIA); 
information disclosure; involuntary resettlement; forests; indigenous peoples; 
natural habitats; economic evaluation o f  investment operations.
1. Environmental Assessment (EA) Policy
The World Bank’s policy on environmental assessment (OD 4.01, October 
1991) lays out the requirements for conducting environmental assessments (EAs) 
o f proposed projects. It identifies what types of projects require various levels o f 
environmental analysis and assessment. For instance, category A projects -- 
defined as projects "likely to have significant adverse impacts that may be 
sensitive, irreversible and diverse" — require a full EA. Examples o f category A 
projects include: forestry production projects; dams; land clearance and leveling; 
mineral development (including oil development and mining); and projects with 
resettlement. Category B projects, which have impacts that "are not as sensitive, 
numerous, major or diverse as category A impacts" and where remedial measure 
can be more easily designed, do not require a full EA but do require preparation of 
a mitigation plan. Category C projects, or those unlikely to have adverse impacts 
(e.g. education, family planning), do not require an EA. It notes that regional or 
sectoral EAs may be used "where a number o f similar but significant development 
activities with potentially cumulative impacts are planned for a reasonably 
localized area." It states such EAs may identify issues that project-specific EAs 
might overlook, including interactions among effluents or competition for natural 
resources. Further, it mandates that induced development (such as secondary 
growth o f  settlements and infrastructure) be addressed and encourages global 
environmental issues (e.g. global warming) to be considered where relevant and 
feasible.
The policy contains requirements for the content and process o f the EA. It 
establishes that EAs must be completed and publicly released prior to appraisal o f 
the project. It also requires that the views o f affected groups and local NGOs be 
taken into account in the preparation o f the EA and lays out the stages during the 
EA process (after EA category assigned and after draft EA has been prepared) 
during which consultations must occur. In addition, the EA must include: baseline 
data (which may require a full year or multiyear data to capture seasonal or other 
effects); identification and assessment o f impacts; an analysis o f  alternatives; an 
institutional assessment (of the existence, role and capability o f  environmental 
units, along with recommendations regarding establishment or expansion o f units 
and training requirements); a mitigation plan (including details on work 
programme, schedule and budget in order to ensure proposed actions are in phase 
with engineering and other project activities throughout implementation); and a 
monitoring plan.
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Weaknesses in the policy's implementation include: inappropriate 
categorization; lack o f timely and informed participation o f  affected groups; lack o f 
adequate baseline data; lack o f full analysis o f alternatives; lack o f  assessment o f 
institutional capacity; and inadequate schedule or budget for mitigation measures.
It is also important to note that, in general, structural adjustment programmes have 
not undertaken environmental analysis.
At present, this policy is being revised into its corresponding OP, BP and 
GP. There has been an attempt by some sectors within the Bank to weaken various 
components o f the policy and to separate the requirements for IDA and IBRD 
projects.
2. Information Disclosure Policy
The World Bank's policy on the Disclosure o f Operational Information (BP 
17.50, September 1993, update memo December 2, 1993) provides requirements 
for the public release o f project documentation. In particular, environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs) or analyses, resettlement plans and indigenous peoples 
development plans must be made publicly available prior to the project's appraisal 
(which is typically more than 120 days before it is submitted to the Board for 
approval). It must be made available in the borrowing country at some public place 
accessible to affected groups and local NGOs and must be submitted to the Bank, 
which also makes it available. In addition, this policy requires that information on 
proposed projects be released publicly during their development (at a particular 
point in project processing). It also mandates that final project documents 
(previously called staff appraisal reports (SARs), now termed project appraisal 
documents (PADs)) be released after the project is approved by the Board.
The IFC and MIGA are currently establishing their own infonnation 
disclosure policies. These proposed policies shorten the time frame for release o f 
EIAs, resettlement plans and indigenous peoples development plans (to 60 days for 
IFC, 30 days for MIGA). It also reduces requirements for public release o f 
information on proposed projects as they are being developed and on project 
information after approval. These provisions are similar to requirements o f Ex-Im 
Bank and OPIC.
Weaknesses in the World Bank's implementation o f the policy have 
included: failure to release resettlement plans or indigenous peoples development 
plans in a timely manner (and with the EA); and failure to publicly release 
environmental analyses or EIAs for category B projects.
3, Involuntary Resettlement
The World Bank's policy on Involuntary Resettlement (OD 4.30, June 
1990) seeks to ensure that populations displaced by a project receive benefits from 
it. In particular, it stipulates that the living standards, income earning capacity and 
production levels o f displaced persons should improve or at least be restored to 
their pre-project levels. The policy requires that involuntary resettlement be 
avoided or minimized where feasible and that all viable alternative project designs
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be explored. For instance, siting o f projects, realignment o f  roads or reductions in 
dam height may significantly reduce resettlement needs.
Where displacement is unavoidable, the policy requires a detailed 
resettlement plan, timetable and budget. These plans must include provisions for: 
compensation for losses at full replacement cost prior to the actual move; 
assistance with the move and transition period; and assistance with efforts to 
improve or restore their former living standards, income earning capacity and 
production levels. The policy indicates a preference o f land for land compensation 
and states that cash compensation alone is inadequate. It also requires participation 
o f affected people in the preparation o f the plan and attention to resettlement's 
impact on host populations.
In practice, this policy has suffered from several weaknesses. First, the 
alternatives analysis is often incomplete. Second, participation o f displaced groups 
may be inadequate. These groups often feel there are no other options and may be 
pressed or subvertly threatened into accepting the situation "for the good of the 
nation." This can also affect the adequacy o f compensation. Third, the timing, 
financing and institutional capacity to implement resettlement measures is critical. 
Compensation must be provided prior to the main investment. However, often the 
income restoration components (which are more difficult) lag behind 
implementation o f the main investment. In addition, the financing for the 
resettlement and income restoration measures, as well as the capacity to implement 
them, needs to be assured.
4. Forest Policy
The World Bank's Policy Paper on the Forest Sector and its Forestry Policy 
(OP 4.36, September 1993) forbids direct World Bank Group (including IFC) 
financial support o f commercial logging operations or the purchase o f logging 
equipment for use in primary tropical moist forest. Where logging is already being 
done in such forests, Bank lending in the forest sector are conditioned on 
commitments from the borrowing government to undertake sustainable 
management o f conservation-oriented forestry. This includes a commitment to: 
adopt policies and a legal and institutional framework that ensures conservation 
and sustainable management and promotes active participation o f local people and 
the private sector; and to undertake social, economic and environmental assessment 
o f forests being considered for commercial use. In addition, this policy covers all 
Bank-supported activities (e.g., mining, dams) with an impact on forests, not just 
those in the forest sector.
In general, this policy tends to be applied more to those projects directly 
related to forestry. In other sectors, such as transport, the policy is less consistently 
applied. Currently, this policy is being revised. Certain sectors within the World 
Bank Group are working to allow financing o f logging operations. However, 
environmentalists are concerned because there is no scientific evidence that 
large-scale industrial logging can be done in an environmentally and socially 
sustainable manner.
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5. Indigenous Peoples Policy
The World Bank's Indigenous Peoples Policy (OD 4.20, September 1991) 
aims to ensure indigenous people benefit from development projects and to avoid 
or mitigate potentially adverse impacts cased by Bank-financed activities on these 
groups. The policy defines indigenous peoples as social groups with a social and 
cultural identity distinct from the dominant society that makes them vulnerable to 
disadvantages in the development process.
The policy requires informed participation o f the indigenous peoples 
themselves. This includes identifying local preferences through direct 
consultation, incorporation o f indigenous knowledge into project approaches and 
early use o f experienced specialists. It also requires an indigenous peoples’ 
development plan. This plan, which includes specific components outlined in the 
policy, must be prepared in conjunction with the main project investment. This 
must be done prior to project appraisal and may be done in conjunction with the 
Environmental Impact Assessment. The plan also has to include an 
implementation schedule and financing plan.
In general, there are three main weaknesses related to this policy. First, the 
definition of indigenous people is particularly difficult in Africa. Project managers 
use their own judgment in determining the populations to which this policy applies. 
As a result o f this, projects which should be sensitive to the needs o f forest 
dwellers and other groups and have indigenous peoples development plans, may 
not be adequate. Second, participation o f indigenous peoples is often not truly 
"informed." Third, the timing and financing o f mitigatory measures may be 
problematic. Often, the main investment is implemented first, with mitigatory 
measures scheduled to be put in place later. In addition, unlike the budget for the 
main investment, financing for the mitigatory measures is often less secure.
6. Natural Habitats Policy
The World Bank's policy on Natural Habitats (OP 4.04, September 1995) 
supports the protection, maintenance and rehabilitation o f natural habitats and their 
functions across its work, including project financing and policy dialogue. The 
policy states that, wherever feasible, Bank-financed projects should be sited on 
already-converted lands (excluding land converted in anticipation o f  a project). It 
forbids the Bank from supporting projects that, in the Bank's opinion, involve the 
significant conversion o f degradation o f critical natural habitats unless no other 
alternatives are available. In this case, mitigation measures, specifically those 
minimizing habitat loss and establishing and maintaining an ecologically similar 
protected area, must accompany the project. In addition, the Bank must take into 
account the borrower's ability (including institutional capacity) to implement the 
appropriate conservation and mitigation measures. The policy applies to 
subprojects under sectoral loans or loans to financial intermediaries. It also 
encourages the incorporation o f natural habitat issues in the Bank's policy dialogue.
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Depending on the project, the implementation o f this policy faces serious 
challenges. Two aspects o f it, the flexibility for staff to decide what constitutes 
significant conversion or degradation and the consideration o f alternatives, leave 
open the possibility for violation o f the spirit o f the policy, if  not the letter of it. 
(The proposed Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline is a case in point.) In addition, the 
implementation during policy dialogue tends to be weaker. If, despite the Bank's 
efforts, the borrowing government does not wish to incorporate natural habitats 
issues in its affairs, there is no sanction (e.g. refusal to provide a structural 
adjustment loan) to prevent it.
7. Economic Evaluation of Investment Operations Policy
The World Bank's policy on the economic evaluation o f investment 
operations (OP 10.04, September 1994) establishes criteria for a project's economic 
acceptability. In particular, it states that for all projects, the expected present value 
o f the project's net benefits must: (a) not be negative; and (b) be higher than or 
equal to the expected net present value of mutually exclusive project alternatives. 
This consideration o f alternatives is a critical component o f this policy. This policy 
also states that non-monetary benefits and externalities (domestic, cross-border and 
global) be considered and that the economic analysis should examine the project's 
consistency with the Bank's poverty reduction strategy.
The implementation o f the straight economic aspects o f this policy tends to 
be excellent. However, the implementation o f less straightforward aspects tends to 
be weaker. For instance, the consideration o f externalities varies. Similarly, there 
is much room for interpretation when analyzing a project's consistency with 
poverty reduction strategies. In addition, there are several weaknesses which stem 
from the policy itself. Most notably is the consideration o f alternatives. The policy 
requires only the consideration o f mutually exclusive designs, not variations (such 
as starting date or inclusion o f different components) o f the same project. Further, 
assessment o f a project's sustainability focuses on financial impacts. While the 
policy does require the Bank to ensure the appropriate legal and institutional 
framework is in place or will be developed, it tends to neglect sustainability (and 
capacity) issues related to the institutions themselves. In addition, social 
sustainability is often neglected, although the policy does state that the Bank must 
check whether critical private and institutional stakeholders have or will have the 
incentives to implement the project successfully. In essence, the main weakness o f 
this policy is that it does not require clear delineation or assessment o f  who 
benefits and loses and by how much.
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